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SUMMARY 
The dissertation evaluates the compensatory relief South African law currently 
provides to victims of crime. To obtain compensation for the harm arising from crime, 
a victim may institute a common-law delictual claim against the perpetrator of the 
crime. Because the perpetrator is unlikely to be in a financial position to compensate 
the victim’s harm, crime victims frequently frame actions against the state, not only on 
the basis of vicarious liability for positive wrongdoing by state employees, but 
increasingly on the basis of failure by the state or its employees to prevent crime. This 
dissertation describes the expanding delictual liability of the state for harm caused by 
crime and concludes that this development of the law of delict is both theoretically and 
practically undesirable. The dissertation further argues that the existing statutory 
mechanisms to claim compensation for harm arising from crime is unsatisfactory and 
provides little assistance to crime victims.  
Within this framework the dissertation considers whether there is an alternative 
method to secure compensation for the hundreds of thousands of South Africans who 
fall victim to crime each year. The most common solution adopted in foreign 
jurisdictions is the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims. 
The dissertation seeks to establish whether the legislative reform of the South African 
law of delict through the creation of such a fund is justified and appropriate.  
To do so, the dissertation analyses the historical background and policy bases of other 
significant instances of legislative reform of the South African law of delict. In the 
process, a general theoretical framework is developed that may provide an outline for 
statutory reform of the law of delict to provide compensation for specific categories of 
victims.  
The dissertation thereafter examines whether the establishment of a statutory crime 
victim compensation fund could fit within this proposed theoretical framework. It is 
concluded that the proposed fund is justifiable and, when compared to the solutions 
offered by the current developments within the common-law of delict and existing 
legislation, it seems, in principle, to be a more desirable solution to improve the legal 
position regarding compensation of crime victims. 
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To be successful, the proposed statutory compensation scheme must be theoretically 
sound and practically workable. The dissertation therefore concludes by focusing on 
several practical questions and considerations which the South African legislature 
should take into account, if it were to enact such a scheme.  
 
OPSOMMING 
Die verhandeling evalueer die wyse waarop die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel tans 
vergoeding bied aan die slagoffers van misdaad. Om die skade voortspruitend uit 
misdaad te vergoed, kan ŉ slagoffer ŉ gemeenregtelike deliktuele eis teen die 
oortreder instel. Aangesien dit onwaarskynlik is dat die oortreder in 'n finansiële posisie 
sal wees om die slagoffer se skade te vergoed, stel misdaadslagoffers gereeld eise in 
teen die staat, nie bloot op die basis van middellike aanspreeklikheid vir positiewe 
delikte van staatswerknemers nie, maar toenemend op grond van die versuim van die 
staat of sy werknemers om misdaad te voorkom. Die proefskrif beskryf die uitbreiding 
van die deliktuele aanspreeklikheid van die staat vir skade veroorsaak deur misdaad 
en kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat hierdie ontwikkeling van die deliktereg sowel 
teoreties as prakties onwenslik is. Die verhandeling argumenteer verder dat die 
bestaande statutêre meganismes om vergoeding te eis vir skade wat uit misdaad 
ontstaan onbevredigend is en min bystand verleen aan misdaadslagoffers. 
Binne hierdie raamwerk word dit oorweeg of daar ŉ alternatiewe metode is om 
vergoeding te verseker vir die honderde duisende Suid-Afrikaners wat elke jaar 
slagoffers van misdaad is. Die mees algemene oplossing wat in buitelandse 
jurisdiksies toegepas word, is die vestiging van ŉ statutêre vergoedingsfonds vir 
misdaadslagoffers. Die verhandeling beoog om vas te stel of die wetgewende 
ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg deur die skepping van ŉ 
vergoedingsfonds vir misdaadslagoffers geregverdig en gepas is. 
Om dit te doen, ontleed die proefskrif die historiese agtergrond en beleidsbasis van 
ander belangrike voorbeelde van wetgewende hervorming van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
deliktereg. In die proses word ŉ algemene teoretiese raamwerk ontwikkel wat ŉ basis 
kan bied vir statutêre hervorming van die deliktereg om voorsiening te maak vir die 
vergoeding van spesifieke kategorieë slagoffers. 
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Die verhandeling ondersoek dan of die vestiging van ŉ statutêre 
misdaadslagoffervergoedingsfonds binne hierdie voorgestelde teoretiese raamwerk 
kan pas. Daar word tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die voorgestelde fonds 
geregverdig kan word en dit wil voorkom asof die vestiging van sodanige fonds, in 
vergelyking met die oplossings wat gebied word deur die huidige ontwikkeling in die 
deliktereg en bestaande wetgewing, in beginsel, ŉ meer wenslike oplossing is om die 
regsposisie met betrekking tot skadevergoeding van misdaadslagoffers te verbeter. 
Ten einde suksesvol te wees, moet die voorgestelde statutêre vergoedingskema 
teoreties gegrond en prakties werkbaar wees. Die proefskrif sluit dus af deur te fokus 
op verskeie praktiese vrae en oorwegings wat die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewer in ag 
behoort te neem as die voorgestelde vergoedingskema vir misdaadslagoffers 
inderdaad geskep sou word. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
 
I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to my supervisors, 
Professor Max Loubser and Professor Jacques du Plessis, for their valuable guidance 
and scholarly inputs. Without their direction and feedback, this dissertation would not 
have been achievable. 
I am also grateful to my parents, Francois and Adré Wessels. They have supported 
and encouraged me in all my pursuits and motivated me in the writing of this 
dissertation. Thank you also to the rest of my family and all my friends, for your love 
and friendship.  
Finally, thank you to my wife, Catrina, who has endured the presence of this 
dissertation in our life, and who has been a source of inspiration and motivation in this 
journey. She has been very supportive and patient and her contribution to the 
successful completion of this dissertation is fondly acknowledged. 
 
 
  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 
 
INDEX 
 
1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….8 
 
2. A DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT  
 
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL POSITION REGARDING THE  
 
COMPENSATION OF HARM SUFFERED BY CRIME VICTIMS …………..31 
 
 
3. LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
THAT JUSTIFY LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW  
OF DELICT………………………………………………………………………..127 
 
4. JUSTIFYING THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE LAW OF DELICT BY ESTABLISHING  
A STATUTORY COMPENSATION FUND FOR CRIME VICTIMS………...189  
 
5. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE RELEVANT 
WHEN DEVELOPING A STATUTORY COMPENSATION FUND  
FOR CRIME VICTIMS…………………………………………………………...239 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS……………………………………………………………….....326 
 
 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………....339 
 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Setting the scene: a crime epidemic and the need for an appropriate  
legal response……………………………………………………………….……….10  
 
1.2 The need for crime victim compensation…………………………………………..13 
 
1.3 The compensation of crime victims in the South African legal system:  
a brief overview………………………………………………………………………14 
 
1.4 The expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising from crime……………15 
 
1.5 Investigating alternative methods to secure crime victim compensation……….19 
 
1.6 Research questions………………………………………………………………….21 
 
1.7 Relevance of the research questions………………………………………………22 
 
1.8 Differences between this dissertation and earlier research on the  
establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime  
victims in South Africa……………………………………………………………….24 
 
1.9 Structure of this dissertation 
 
1.9.1 Chapter 2: A description and evaluation of the current South  
African legal position regarding the compensation of harm  
suffered by crime victims…………………………………………………….26 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
1.9.2 Chapter 3: Legal and public policy considerations that justify  
legislative development of the law of delict ……………………………….27 
 
1.9.3 Chapter 4: Justifying the legislative development of the law of delict  
by establishing a statutory compensation fund for crime victims ………..28 
 
1.9.4 Chapter 5: Practical considerations that are relevant when developing  
a statutory compensation fund for crime victims…………………………..29  
 
1.9.5 Chapter 6: Conclusions……………………………………………………...29 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Setting the scene: a crime epidemic and the need for an appropriate legal 
response  
South Africa is plagued by crime.1 Violent crime, in particular, has reached epidemic 
proportions. The most striking crime statistics are unequivocal. South Africa has one 
of the highest murder rates in the world: 34 per 100 000 members of the population 
were murdered in 2015/2016,2 with approximately 51 murders being recorded on 
average per day in this period.3 And with around 1 188 assaults committed for every 
100 000 members of the population, South Africa is also considered as having one of 
the highest assault rates worldwide.4 Contrary to official statistics provided by the 
South African Police Services (“SAPS”), independent research indicates that the 
number of rapes that occur during the course of one year may be in the order of a half 
million.5 
Some perspective on the exceedingly high levels of crime in South Africa can be 
obtained by comparing crime statistics and motor vehicle accident data: the 18 673 
murders that occurred in 2015-20166 is much higher than the 13 591 people who died 
as a result of motor vehicle accidents that took place in 2015,7 while the 182 933 
assaults with the intent to do grievous bodily harm recorded in 2015-20168 is almost 
three times more than the number of people who were seriously injured in motor 
vehicle accidents in 2015 (62 520).9  
                                                          
1 See paragraph 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4. 
2 Africa Check “Factsheet: South Africa’s 2015/2016 crime statistics” available at <https://africa 
check.org/factsheets/factsheet- south-africas-201516-crime-statistics/> (accessed on 2 June 2017). 
3 See paragraph 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4. 
4 See paragraph 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4. 
5 Although the official SAPS crime statistics for 2015-2016 indicates that 42 596 rapes were reported to 
the police, this statistic has been criticised as ignoring the considerable impact of under-reporting. See 
Rape Crisis Cape Town Trust “Prevalence” available at <http://rapecrisis.org.za/rape-in-south-
africa/#prevalence> (accessed on 28 June 2017); Africa Check “Rape Statistics in South Africa: A 
Guide” available at <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/guide-rape-statistics-in-south-africa/> 
(accessed on 28 June 2017); the Independent Police Investigative Directorate Annual Report 
2012/2013 (2013) 15-16; News24 “Rape in South Africa” available at <http://www.news24.com/ 
MyNews24/rape-in-south-africa-20160810> (accessed on 17 July 2017). 
6 SAPS Annual Crime Report 2015/2016: Addendum to the SAPS Annual Report 2015/2016 (2016) 
108. 
7 Road Traffic Management Corporation (“RTMC”) The Costs of Crashes in South Africa (2016) ii.  
8 SAPS Annual Crime Report 2015/2016 108. 
9 RTMC The Costs of Crashes in South Africa ii.  
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It is therefore obvious that the risk of harm arising from violent crime is considerably 
significant and apparently more real than the risk of harm arising from motor vehicle 
accidents. For this reason it is unsurprising that a 2015 study found that, along with 
unemployment, crime ranks as the top concern for South Africans, edging out 
anxieties about government corruption, health care, infrastructure, quality of schools 
and education, energy shortages, lack of clean drinking water and pollution.10 The 
results of that study is confirmed by a national opinion survey conducted by the 
Institute for Race Relations, which requested South Africans to identify what they saw 
as “the two most serious problems not yet resolved since 1994.”11 The top two issues 
identified were crime and unemployment.12  
Arguably, there are two general ways in which the law may react to the high levels of 
crime in South Africa. First, the problem may be approached prospectively by asking: 
what could be done to prevent crime in future? To answer this question, an analysis 
of the various reasons for the escalating rate of especially violent crime may be 
conducted on the basis of which practical, workable solutions could be devised to 
combat crime and promote safety and security.  
For example, to further crime prevention efforts, the National Cabinet adopted the 
National Development Plan in 2012. It “proposes an integrated approach to resolving 
the root causes of crime that involves an active citizenry and inter-related 
responsibilities and co-ordinated service delivery from state and non-state actors.”13 
To give effect to this vision, the Civilian Secretariat for Police developed a White Paper 
on Safety and Security in 2016. It provides, inter alia, an overarching plan for crime 
prevention as well as the legislative and administrative framework required to do so.14 
Secondly, the law may respond to the crime pandemic by adopting a retrospective 
approach and enquiring: if crime occurs, what should be done? Within this context, 
there are broadly speaking two potential reactions to any specific crime.  
                                                          
10 Pew Research Center Health Care, Education Are Top Priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa (2015) 15, 
28-30. 
11 South African Institute for Race Relations Race Relations in South Africa: Reasons for Hope (2016) 
2.  
12 2.  
13 Civilian Secretariat for Police (“CSP”) White Paper on Safety and Security (2016) 30-31. See also 
National Planning Commission National Development Plan (2011). 
14 CSP White Paper on Safety and Security 7. 
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On the one hand, criminal law may respond, which would mean that the state, on 
behalf of the members of the community, would pursue the perpetrator in an attempt 
to impose criminal liability:15 the police would have to apprehend the alleged criminal, 
investigate the crime and provide the public prosecutor with sufficient evidence so that 
the matter may be tried.16 If the prosecution is successful in proving the elements of 
criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt, the court will sentence the criminal.17 In the 
execution of these functions, the criminal justice system strives to fulfil what is arguably 
its primary function: punishment.18 In doing so, this branch of the law aims to protect 
the broader public interest. In S v Dlamini,19 the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) 
summarised this response as follows: “The main purpose and social function 
of criminal proceedings are to establish the guilt of an accused person in respect 
of criminal conduct so that he may be punished according to law for that conduct.”20  
On the other hand, the crime victim may seek compensation for the harm he21 suffered 
as a result of the crime. This he could do by taking matters into his own hands and 
instituting a common-law claim against the alleged wrongdoer. Of course, as will be 
discussed in more detail in paragraphs 1.4 and 1.9.1 below, as well as paragraph 2.3 
in chapter 2, the crime victim may also rely on certain existing statutory provisions to 
seek compensation. However, as will be indicated in chapter 2, these provisions offer 
limited assistance to crime victims.  
It is trite that, to be successful with the common-law claim, the victim would have to 
prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the harm he suffered was wrongfully and 
culpably caused by the criminal’s conduct. In other words, a second retrospective 
response to the crime epidemic may be found within the law of delict, i.e. the area of 
the law that focuses its attention primarily on the compensation of harm.22  
                                                          
15 See JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 1-136. 
16 See JJ Joubert, M Basdeo, T Geldenhuys, MG Karels, GP Kemp, JP Swanepoel, SS Terblanche & 
SE van der Merwe The Criminal Procedure Handbook 12 ed (2017). 
17 See Joubert et al Criminal Procedure.  
18 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 68-94. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) 
SA 786 (CC). 
19 2012 (2) SACR 1 (SCA). See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
20 Para 55.  
21 References in this dissertation to the male gender applies also the female gender and vice versa, 
where applicable. 
22 For overviews of the function of the law of delict, see JC Macintosh Negligence in Delict 1 ed (1926) 
1; FP van den Heever Aquilian Damages in South African Law (1944) 3; RG McKerron The Law of 
Delict: a Treatise on the Principles of Liability for Civil Wrongs in the Law of South Africa 7 ed (1971); 
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This dissertation does not focus on crime prevention. Rather, it adopts a retrospective 
approach and focuses on questions concerning compensation for the crime victim’s 
harm.  
 
1.2 The need for crime victim compensation 
It is obvious that a victim of crime may suffer extensive patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
harm. For instance, it is conceivable that someone who has been raped and assaulted 
may incur extensive medical costs to repair bodily injuries and continue to incur related 
financial costs as medical treatment is likely to continue well after the date of injury.23 
Furthermore, the victim may suffer a loss of past income as well as a significant loss 
of earning capacity.24 The non-patrimonial harm which may be suffered could include 
an infringement of physical-mental integrity (i.e. pain and suffering, loss in the 
amenities of life, disfigurement, emotional shock and a shortened life-expectancy)25 
as well as an infringement of dignity26 and bodily integrity.27  
If the victim fails to obtain compensation from the criminal or another source, he will 
bear the burden of the harm by himself, thereby adding further misery to the already 
regrettable state of affairs brought about by the crime. This will be especially unfair 
where a victim is able to prove that his harm was wrongfully and culpably caused by 
the perpetrator of a heinous crime.  
However, if the victim is compensated, it does not only alleviate the financial 
consequences brought about by crime and provide satisfaction in respect of the non-
patrimonial harm, but also provides other benefits. For example, crime victim 
compensation may be used to reduce “repeat victimization as many sexual violence 
                                                          
NJ van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 ed (1976) 1-3; J 
Neethling & JM Potgieter Neethling-Visser-Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 3-17; JC van der Walt & 
JR Midgley Principles of Delict 4 ed (2016); MM Loubser & JR Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South 
Africa 2 ed (2012) 8-11. These authors are in agreement insofar as compensation is regarded as being 
the primary function of this branch of the law. 
23 JM Potgieter, L Steynberg & TB Floyd The Law of Damages 3 ed (2012) 453-462. 
24 462-477. 
25 497-512. 
26 535-536. 
27 551-552. 
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complainants can remove themselves from abusive environments, or increase their 
security”.28 
In S v Seedat,29 the appellant was convicted of raping the 58-year-old complainant, to 
whom he had delivered a bedside lamp and groceries. The reasoning of the SCA in 
this case will be discussed elsewhere,30 and for present purposes it is sufficient merely 
to take note of the victim’s testimony as it provides a practical illustration of the need 
for crime victim compensation:31 
“Prosecutor: What sentence should be imposed on the accused? 
Complainant: Other than the death penalty, I don’t think there is a fair form of punishment. 
Because what he did to me, is really terrible. And that is why I have decided to take away some 
of his money […] 
Prosecutor: Tell me, the idea of monetary compensation, since when have you had this idea with 
regard to this matter? […] 
Complainant: I don’t really know when it occurred to me, [but] why should I suffer? He is going to 
jail tomorrow and the day thereafter he will be released and he will walk away laughing and I will 
continue to suffer […] I am getting older. My transport is pathetic. Why must I continue to struggle 
if [I] could benefit from the harm which I have suffered[?]” 
Against this background, and with the purpose of introducing the research questions 
on which this dissertation will focus, a brief overview will now be provided of the South 
African legal system’s current compensatory response to harm arising from crime.   
 
1.3 The compensation of crime victims in the South African legal system: a 
brief overview 
Broadly speaking, crime victims may institute either a common-law delictual claim in 
pursuit of compensation or turn towards applicable legislation in an attempt to obtain 
compensation for the harm they suffered. From a delictual point of view, crime victims 
may institute common-law claims against the perpetrator of a crime if they can prove 
                                                          
28 B Greenbaum Compensation for Victims of Sexual Violence in South Africa: A Human Rights 
Approach to Remedial Criminal Compensation Provisions Unpublished Doctorate in Criminal Justice 
University of Cape Town (2013) 20. 
29 2017 (1) SACR 141 (SCA). 
30 See paragraph 2.3.1 in chapter 2.  
31 2017 (1) SACR 141 (SCA) para 25 (own translation). 
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the necessary elements of delictual liability, i.e. harm, conduct, causation, 
wrongfulness and fault.32   
For obvious reasons, the successful outcome of a common-law delictual claim against 
the perpetrator depends on his financial position. If he is unable to compensate the 
victim, it is not worthwhile to follow this route. In this regard, research indicates that 
victims generally do not institute their common-law claims because the majority of 
South African perpetrators are likely to be impecunious.33 This is also the position in 
various other jurisdictions. Writing about crime victim compensation with a 
comparative perspective, Miers points out that “[u]ndoubtedly the greatest obstacle to 
routine compensation is the commonplace fact of the offender’s limited means.”34 
The likely indigence of South African criminals presents a significant stumbling block 
to securing compensation through the institution of common-law delictual remedies 
against the perpetrator.35 As a result, those who seek compensation along the 
delictual path, would have to adopt a different strategy.36   
 
1.4 The expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising from crime 
The recent past has seen crime victims develop an alternative strategy to secure 
compensation. In essence, they argue that it is the state, rather than the perpetrator 
of the crime, that should be held delictually liable for harm arising from crime.37 More 
specifically, crime victims have argued that the state (typically the Minister of Safety 
and Security) should be held vicariously liable in delict on the basis that its employees 
(normally police officers) culpably and wrongfully caused the victim’s harm, either by 
action or inaction. This strategy is in all likelihood driven by the state’s deeper pockets, 
                                                          
32 For a summary of the available common-law delictual remedies see Loubser & Midgley (eds) The 
Law of Delict 3-34 and for a discussion of the elements of delictual liability see Loubser & Midgley (eds) 
The Law of Delict 45-160. 
33 South African Law Reform Commission (“SALRC”) Project 82: Sentencing (A Compensation Fund 
for Victims of Crime) (2004) 74. 
34 D Miers “Offender and state compensation for victims of crime: Two decades of development and 
change” (2014) 20(1) International Review of Victimology 145 150. 
35 See paragraph 3.3.1 in chapter 3 and paragraph 4.2.3.5 in chapter 4. 
36 See paragraph 2.2.1 in chapter 2. 
37 See paragraph 2.2.1 in chapter 2. 
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which, compared to the probable impecuniosity of the perpetrator, provide the real 
opportunity of receiving compensation.38  
As will be discussed later, this strategy has proven to be remarkably successful.39 The 
judicial development relating to the state’s delictual liability for harm arising from crime 
will be evaluated later,40 but for introductory purposes it may be noted that the 
expansion of the state’s liability has occurred along two discernible paths.  
In the first type of case, the crime victim has argued that the state should be held 
vicariously liable because one or more of its employees was negligent in preventing 
the crime victim’s harm, and that this failure wrongfully caused the victim’s harm for 
the purposes of delictual liability.41 Because the failure to prevent crime occurred while 
the employee was acting within the course and scope of his duty, the state, as 
employer, was held vicariously liable.  
The second series of cases deal with plaintiffs who were the victims of crimes 
committed by police officers (the leading cases deal with the crime of rape), and who 
argued that the state, as employer, should be held vicariously liable for the harm that 
was intentionally and wrongfully caused by its employees.42 In the pioneering decision 
in this context,43 the three police-officers who gang-raped the victim were on duty, 
driving a marked police vehicle and in official uniforms at the time that the rapes were 
committed. Despite the fact that committing serious crimes like rape is arguably the 
very antithesis of a police-officer’s employment duty, the Constitutional Court (“CC”) 
nevertheless held that they were acting within the course and scope of their duty and 
that their employer could be held vicariously liable.44 In a subsequent case,45 the 
                                                          
38 See paragraph 2.2.1 in chapter 2. See also A Price The Influence of Human Rights on State 
Negligence Liability In England and South Africa Unpublished PhD thesis University of Cambridge 
(2012) 137. 
39 See paragraph 2.2.1 in chapter 2. 
40 See paragraphs 2.2.1.1.3 and 2.2.1.2.4 in chapter 2. 
41 See paragraph 2.2.1.1 in chapter 2. See also Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre 
for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v 
Carmichele 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 
431 (SCA); Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA); Minister of Safety and 
Security v Hamilton 2004 (2) SA 216 (SCA). 
42 See paragraph 2.2.1.2.3 in chapter 2. See also K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (3) SA 179 
(SCA); K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v F 
2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA); F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37. 
43 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
44 The reasoning in this case will be evaluated in paragraph 2.2.1.2.4 in chapter 2.  
45 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37. 
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police officer who raped the victim was in plainclothes, driving an unmarked vehicle 
and on standby-duty at the time, but these factual dissimilarities with the earlier 
decision turned out to make no practical difference and the CC again held the state 
vicariously liable.46  
This judicial development of the common law of delict has led to the considerable 
expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising from crime.47 The extension of 
liability of the Minister of Police (formerly known as the Minister of Safety and Security) 
is reflected in a report which sets out the scope and impact of civil claims against the 
SAPS. The report states that, in recent years, the SAPS have “reported a substantial 
annual increase in civil claims filed for damages as a result of actions or omissions by 
its officials, and an even larger increase in claims that are pending. The 2014/2015 
SAPS annual report showed that pending claims stood at over R26 billion, which is 
equivalent to over a third of the SAPS budget.”48 It also asserts that between 2007/08 
and 2014/15, “claims made annually against the SAPS increased by 533% if 
considering the original rand value, or 313% if adjusted to the same rand value”.49 
Lastly, the report records that, in a parliamentary reply, the Minister of Police indicated 
that “just under R570 million had been spent by the SAPS on legal costs relating to 
civil claims between 2011/12 and 2013/14.”50  
Although much may be said about the theoretical implications of the judicial expansion 
of state delictual liability,51 it also presents a practical and financial dilemma which 
presently requires emphasis: when the state employer is held vicariously liable for the 
culpable wrongdoing of an employee and is ordered to pay the crime victim’s 
damages, it is the taxpayer who ultimately has to bear the cost. However, if taxpayer 
                                                          
46 The reasoning in this case will be evaluated in paragraph 2.2.1.2.4 in chapter 2.  
47 J Neethling “Die Hoogste Hof van Appèl Bevestig die Uitdyende Verantwoordelikheid van die Staat 
om die Reg op die Fisies-Psigiese Integriteit in die Lig van die Grondwet te Beskerm” (2003) 4 TSAR 
783 788-790; C Okpaluba & P Osode Government Liability: South Africa and the Commonwealth (2012) 
16-18, 124-127; J Neethling “State (public authority) liability ex delicto (1)” (2012) 75 THRHR 622 622-
624; Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 264-269; Price The Influence of Human Rights 111-
139; J Neethling “South Africa” in K Oliphant (ed) The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative 
Perspective (2016) 421-463. 
48 G Dereymaeker “Making sense of the numbers: civil claims against the SAPS” (2015) SA Crime 
Quarterly (54) 29 29. See also L Prince “R14,6 mjd. se siviele eise teen polisie in boekjaar” (20 April 
2017) available at <http://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Politiek/r146-mjd-se-siviele-eise-teen-polisie-in-
boekjaar-20170420> (accessed on 20 April 2017). 
49 Dereymaeker (2015) SA Crime Quarterly 31.  
50 34. 
51 See paragraphs 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2.3 in chapter 2 for a critical evaluation of the theoretical 
implications of this development.  
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money is used to pay compensation, then less money is available for performing the 
state’s ordinary tasks, i.e. in the case of the police, preventing crime and promoting 
safety and security.52 Of course, this decreased ability to prevent crime only serves 
further to increase the likelihood of a higher crime rate and the accompanying litigation 
that may be instituted against the state on the basis that they failed to prevent crime. 
This means that the South African law of delict appears to be caught in a vicious cycle 
of ever-expanding state delictual liability for harm arising from crime. 
The common-law delictual claim is not the crime victim’s only option for compensation. 
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides crime victims with a degree of 
procedural assistance in claiming compensation from the actual perpetrator. Section 
297(1)(a)(i) of the Act allows a court to postpone the sentencing of a convicted person 
for up to five years on certain conditions, including making payment of 
compensation.53 In turn, section 300 of the Act allows a court, when convicting a 
person of an offence which has caused damage to, or loss of, property (including 
money) belonging to another, to award the victim of the crime compensation for the 
damage or loss of his property. 
However, as discussed later, the potential application of the Act appears to be severely 
limited in practice.54 In addition, research has indicated that sentences of this kind is 
very scarce “and the main reason for this is the lack of means of offenders.”55  
Furthermore, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”) seeks to 
introduce measures to combat organised crime activities and provides for the recovery 
of the proceeds of unlawful activities (through confiscation orders) and the civil 
forfeiture of criminal assets that have been used to commit an offence (through 
forfeiture orders).56 Chapter 7 of the POCA establishes the Criminal Assets Recovery 
Account (“CARA”) as a separate account in the National Revenue Fund.57 The CARA 
                                                          
52 See also P Atiyah The Damages Lottery (1996) 80-81. 
53 See paragraph 2.3.1 in chapter 2.  
54 See paragraph 2.3.2 in chapter 2. 
55 JC von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa: A comparison with Selected 
Commonwealth Jurisdictions Unpublished LLD thesis Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (2007) 
88. See also RE Scott “Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes: An Analysis” (1967) 8(2) William 
& Mary Law Review 277 278; B Cameron “Compensation for Victims of Crime, The New Zealand 
Experiment” (1963) 12 Journal of Public Law 368; M Fry “Justice for Victims” (1959) 8 Journal of Public 
Law 191 192; J Goodey Compensating Victims of Violent Crime in the European Union (2003) 11.  
56 A Kruger Organised Crime and Proceeds of Crime Law in South Africa 2 ed (2013) 75-151. 
57 Section 63 of the POCA.  
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is funded by money derived from the fulfilment of confiscation and forfeiture orders as 
well as other sources.58  
Although crime victims have received payments made possible as an indirect result of 
especially forfeiture orders that have been issued under the POCA, the Act does not 
provide an adequate solution to the broad issue of crime victim compensation. This 
may be seen as a consequence of the fact that the Act is primarily concerned with 
combating and deterring organised crime as opposed to offering a legislative solution 
to the general problem of victim compensation. Also, payments made from proceeds 
of unlawful activities are limited to those who suffer harm from the criminal activities 
which form the focus of the POCA. This ultimately means that payments are made to 
relatively few victims of organised crimes while the significant number of violent crime 
victims remain without compensatory relief.  
 
1.5 Investigating alternative methods to secure crime victim compensation 
If it is assumed, for the moment, that the current legal position relating to crime victim 
compensation is indeed unsatisfactory, the fundamental question arises whether an 
alternative method exists to ensure the compensation of crime victims.  
From a comparative legal perspective, the most popular alternative solution which has 
been adopted by a wide range of jurisdictions is the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims.59 This solution amounts to the legislative 
development of the law of delict/tort law in terms of which the compensation scheme, 
                                                          
58 See section 64 of the POCA: the CARA may also be funded by the balance of all moneys derived 
from the execution of foreign confiscation orders as defined in the International Co-Operation in Criminal 
Matters Act 75 of 1996; any property or moneys appropriated by Parliament, or paid into, or allocated 
to, the account in terms of any other Act; domestic and foreign grants; any property or amount of money 
received or acquired from any source; and all property or moneys transferred to the Account in terms 
of this Act. 
59 The European jurisdictions that have created a crime victim compensation fund include Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom and Sweden. See D Greer (ed) Compensating Crime 
Victims: a European Survey (1996). Several Australian, American and Canadian territories have also 
adopted similar funds: see D McGillis & P Smith Compensating Victims of Crime: An Analysis of 
American Programs (1983); National Center for Victims of Crime Repairing the Harm (2004); Canadian 
Resource Center for Victims of Crime “Financial Assistance” available at <https://crcvc.ca/for-
victims/financial-assistance/> (accessed on 28 June 2017). 
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generally funded through tax-payer money, takes over the primary responsibility of 
compensating crime victims.  
South Africa has not enacted a crime victim compensation scheme. Arguably, this is 
not because the legislature is, in principle, opposed to intervening in the law of delict 
by establishing a compensatory regime for a special purpose. On the contrary, this 
was done for the compensation of victims of motor vehicle accidents, occupational 
injuries and diseases and defective consumer products and resulted in the enactment 
of the following statutes: the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act 130 of 1993 (“COIDA”), the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (“RAF Act”), as 
amended by the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 15 of 2005 (“RAFA Act”), and 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (“CPA”).   
Clearly, the existence of several foreign crime victim compensation schemes and the 
fact that the South African legislature has illustrated its willingness to develop the law 
relating to the compensation of other categories of victims in the past does not by itself 
provide convincing evidence to suggest that a crime victim compensation fund would 
also be a workable and desirable solution in the South African context.  
Indeed, intervention of this kind could amount to a profound legislative reform of the 
law of delict and it would therefore require justification. Unsurprisingly, scholars have 
therefore raised their concern regarding the lack of a justifiable basis for this kind of 
statutory development: “the idea of selecting this group of injured and disabled people 
for special treatment is not easily defensible”.60 Academics have consequently 
emphasised a “fundamental problem”61 that confronts reformers of the law of delict/tort 
law in this context, which is that “it is difficult to find a satisfactory rationale for singling 
out violent-crime victims from other groups of unfortunates for special treatment by the 
state.”62 
Therefore, assuming that the current South African legal position relating to crime 
victim compensation is indeed unsatisfactory, it would require further consideration as 
                                                          
60 P Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law 8 ed (2013) 303-308.  
61 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 182-183. See also Scott (1967) William & Mary 
Law Review 281; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 303-308. 
62 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 182. See also Scott (1967) William & Mary Law 
Review 281; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents (2013) 303-308. 
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to whether it could be justifiable to develop the South African law of delict through 
statutory intervention by enacting a scheme that is aimed at providing compensation 
to a specific category of victims, i.e. those who suffer harm as a result of crime.  
 
1.6 Research questions 
Three central research questions have been identified for further investigation.  
1. What is the nature of the current statutory and common-law compensatory 
regimes and does the South African law provide a satisfactory solution to the 
issue of crime victim compensation? 
 
2. Assuming that crime victim compensation under South African law is 
unsatisfactory, could the statutory development of the law of delict through the 
enactment of a crime victim compensation scheme for a specific category of 
victims (i.e. those who suffer harm as a result of crime) be justified? 
 
3. If the statutory development of the law of delict through the enactment of a 
crime victim compensation fund is justifiable, and the legislature elects to enact 
such a scheme, how would such a fund work in practice and what 
considerations would the legislature have to take into account in this context? 
It may be noted that the title of this dissertation – “Developing the South African law of 
delict: the creation of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims” – is based on 
the research questions identified for investigation. It may be said that the creation of a 
statutory compensation scheme is not about developing the law of delict, but rather 
supplementing the law of delict. However, the approach adopted in this dissertation is 
that the law of delict includes both the common law as well as certain statutes that 
impact on delictual principles and are aimed at compensating harm. From this 
perspective, the creation of a new statute would therefore amount to the development 
of the South African law of delict. 
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1.7 Relevance of the research questions 
The relevance of the first research question probably speaks for itself. Considering the 
high levels of violent crime and the substantial number of crime victims who clearly 
would require compensation for the harm that they have suffered, it is obviously 
important to evaluate the available remedies currently available in the South African 
legal system. For as long as South Africa continues to struggle with a high crime rate, 
crime victim compensation will remain an important issue that demands attention.  
It is argued that the second research question is both practically and theoretically 
important. To comprehend its relevance, regard may be had to the fact that this is not 
the first research project to emphasise the need to provide adequate crime victim 
compensation in a swift and cost-effective manner. It was the subject of an extensive 
2004 SALRC report which noted that, within the field of safety and security, the victim-
centred approach to dealing with the impact of crime required emphasis being placed 
on “the need to restore victims to a position comparable to that which they occupied 
prior to their victimisation”63 (“SALRC Report”).64 Ultimately, this involved considering 
the possibility of compensating crime victims which, in turn, involved an examination 
of the proposal “to establish a Victim Compensation Scheme in SA, through which the 
state would offer financial compensation to victims or their dependants for the harm 
done by offenders.”65 
Taking into account some of the arguments that may be raised for and against the 
establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims, the SALRC 
ultimately concluded that, although “there seemed to be substantial support for the 
creation of a compensation fund”66 the establishment of the fund was not a viable 
option.67 This conclusion was reached primarily on the basis that a fund could not be 
afforded in the financial climate of the time and because certain prerequisites required 
for the effective and efficient administration of a crime victim compensation fund were 
absent at the time.68  
                                                          
63 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 10. 
64 This dissertation is distinguished from the SALRC Report in paragraph 1.8 below.  
65 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 10. 
66 321. 
67 111-118, 321-326. See also paragraph 4.3 in chapter 4. 
68 111-118. See also paragraph 4.3 in chapter 4 
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Despite the SALRC’s financially-motivated opposition to the creation of a fund, it 
nevertheless noted that “the establishment of a compensation fund should not be 
abandoned but developed over time as a long term project within the broader objective 
of improved services for victims of crime”69 and that “developing a motivation for the 
establishment of a [statutory compensation fund] in SA remains incomplete, and must 
be completed if legislation is to be drafted, since no law should be passed without its 
objectives being clearly defined and costed.”70 
The SALRC’s rejection of the proposal to establish a statutory crime victim 
compensation scheme leaves scope for a further detailed study concerning the topic. 
In fact, as the commission itself indicated, what seems to be absent is a proper 
motivation – or justification – for the potential statutory reform of the law relating to 
crime victim compensation.  
Hence, it is argued that the research question concerning the justification of a crime 
victim compensation fund assumes significant theoretical and practical relevance. It is 
important because it attempts to fill the gap in the SALRC Report insofar as a 
justification for a potential fund is concerned. In the process several other relevant 
issues that have theoretical and practical importance will be canvassed, including the 
following: the role and function of the South African law of delict in general; the 
relationship between the common law of delict and a statutory compensation scheme 
that could potentially be enacted; the current judicial development of state delictual 
liability (the nature of the state’s liability as well as the judicial development of 
established common-law delictual principles); and providing a general theoretical 
framework which may be used for the purpose of future statutory reform of the South 
African law of delict. 
The third research question involves matters that are of obvious practical importance. 
As indicated above, the dissertation will consider how the proposed fund would 
actually work as well as various related practical considerations which the legislature 
should consider if it were to enact a statutory compensation fund for crime victims. It 
is suggested that an examination of these issues may have considerable practical 
value as a point of departure for any legislative committee tasked with the 
                                                          
69 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 322. See also paragraph 4.3 in chapter 4. 
70 318-319. 
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responsibility of proposing a crime victim compensation scheme. The further 
investigation of such a scheme may also benefit from the evaluation of existing foreign 
compensation schemes undertaken in this dissertation.  
 
1.8 Differences between this dissertation and earlier research on the 
establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims in South 
Africa 
The questions above have to some extent been considered in earlier studies. The 
SALRC examined the feasibility of a crime victim compensation fund and published 
the SALRC Report in 2004. Subsequently, JC von Bonde investigated the matter in a 
doctoral dissertation.71 However, these studies left a number of important issues open 
for further analysis.  
First, in its report, the SALRC provided a synopsis of the crime victim compensation 
regime under South African law as well as a comparative overview of the legal position 
of crime victims in the United States of America and the United Kingdom (“UK”). 
Similarly, Von Bonde’s dissertation also describes the legal position of the crime victim 
in South Africa, the UK, India and New Zealand. Although this dissertation will also 
investigate the position of crime victims within the South African compensatory 
framework, it will cover a variety of issues which the SALRC Report and Von Bonde’s 
dissertation left untouched.  
Most importantly, this dissertation sets out a critical evaluation of recent judicial 
developments within the common law of delict which have taken place since those two 
studies have been finalised. This includes a description and critical evaluation of the 
recent judicial expansion of the state’s delictual liability for harm arising from crime. 
This development arguably became much more significant when the CC handed down 
its decision in K v Minister of Safety and Security72 in 2005, one year after the SALRC 
Report was completed. The dissertation will also critically evaluate the development 
of the common-law doctrine of vicarious liability by the CC in F v Minister of Safety 
                                                          
71 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 148. 
72 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
 
and Security,73 which was handed down in 2012, five years after the completion of 
Von Bonde’s work.74 In addition, this research project will also examine the evidentiary 
obstacles related to proving fault (especially negligence), which confronts those crime 
victims who elect to institute a delictual claim – another issue left unexamined by 
earlier research.   
The SARLC Report provided a summary of the merits of a statutory compensation 
scheme for crime victims in South Africa wherein it briefly considers potential 
arguments for and against the establishment of a scheme. However, as the quoted 
extract above indicates, the commission does not attempt to provide a justification for 
this potential statutory development. Von Bonde’s dissertation does not consider the 
merits of a statutory compensation scheme in any detail and also does not provide a 
justification for legislative development in this context. This dissertation will attempt to 
fill this gap by proposing a theoretical framework for statutory reform of the law relating 
to crime victim compensation.  
Although the SALRC Report includes a draft bill that could provide the legislature with 
practical assistance if it were to enact a crime victim compensation scheme, the report 
does not pay regard to specific practical questions and considerations which will 
require the legislature’s attention, if it were indeed to enact the proposed fund. Von 
Bonde’s work also did not examine any potential practical questions which may be of 
relevance to a legislature. This dissertation will consider several considerations and 
do so after having evaluated the approaches adopted by foreign legislatures so as to 
ensure the most workable solution within the South African context.    
The approach in this dissertation is also different from that of the SALRC Report and 
Von Bonde’s research in the following respects. As part of the SALRC Report, the 
commission pays much attention to the question of developing a restorative justice 
approach in the South African criminal justice system as well as other issues related 
to victim-empowerment. This is also true of the dissertation written by Von Bonde, 
although to a lesser extent. Von Bonde’s research considers the legal position of crime 
                                                          
73 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). 
74 See further paragraph 2.2.1.2.4 in chapter 2. 
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victims in India and New Zealand in detail. None of these matters will be considered 
in this dissertation.  
Von Bonde ultimately makes the following recommendation:75  
“[T]he consolidation of the Road Accident Fund and the Compensation Fund operating in terms 
of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act. These two bodies should be 
amalgamated to create a unified Compensation Scheme to compensate victims of crime, as well 
as victims of traffic and industrial injuries. General qualifying criteria for claimants would be 
drafted, with specific criteria applying in cases of traffic, industrial and crime related injuries, 
respectively.”  
Referring to Canada and Australia as providing an example of the way forward for the 
South African legislature in relation to crime victim compensation,76 the SALRC 
formulated its ultimate proposal as follows:77  
 
“[T]he Commission was of the view that […] legislation should, as a minimum, provide for: (a) the 
creation of a permanent structure, like an office for Victims of Crime within government structures, 
to take care of the needs of victims on a permanent basis; (b) the creation of a permanent body 
or institution (like an Advisory Council) to advise government on policy issues and legislative 
amendments to meet the needs of victims of crime; (c) the introduction of legislative […] principles 
to guide the treatment of victims of crime; and (d) the creation of a dedicated fund to facilitate 
and develop the establishment of victim services. The above principles are supported by all 
commentators to the Commission’s discussion documents.”  
 
As will become clearer through the course of the dissertation, this dissertation will 
consider issues and material not investigated in the earlier research referred to and 
will propose a different system for the compensation of crime victims.  
 
1.9 Structure of this dissertation 
1.9.1 Chapter 2: A description and evaluation of the current South African legal 
position regarding the compensation of harm suffered by crime victims 
This chapter will focus on the first research question, examining and evaluating the 
ways in which the South African legal system currently provides compensation for 
crime victims.  
                                                          
75 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa iv. 
76 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 334-335. 
77 334. The commission pointed out that the Probation Services Act 11 of 1986 provided a legislative 
basis for establishing victim-centred programmes aimed at the compensation of crime victims. 
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First, crime victims may seek compensation by means of a common-law claim in delict. 
The theoretical and practical problems arising from the judicial expansion of the 
delictual liability of the state are examined. The evidentiary burdens facing crime 
victims who institute common-law delictual claims are highlighted. Then follows an 
analysis of the existing statutory provisions allowing crime victims to claim 
compensation for harm caused by crime, in particular the provisions contained in the 
Criminal Procedure Act. 
The chapter concludes that an alternative form of crime victim compensation should 
be considered. The most common solution adopted in foreign jurisdictions is the 
enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation scheme. In South Africa this would 
entail a large-scale legislative reform of the law of delict and funding from tax revenue. 
The crucial question is whether this statutory development is justifiable. 
 
1.9.2 Chapter 3: Legal and public policy considerations that justify legislative 
development of the law of delict 
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the second research question: is it justifiable to establish 
a statutory crime victim compensation scheme?  
Chapter 3 will propose a general theoretical framework that provides an outline for 
future statutory reform of the law of delict insofar as victim compensation is concerned. 
This chapter examines legal and public policy considerations which in the past have 
formed the basis for statutory reform of specific areas of the law of delict. To do so, 
the focus will shift to analysing the background to, and policy bases of, the three major 
statutes that have developed the law relating to the compensation of specific 
categories of victims in the past: the RAF Act, the COIDA and the CPA.  
As will be illustrated in chapter 3, these statutes share common policy considerations 
that have been used to justify earlier legislative reform of the law of delict. They were 
enacted to alleviate the victims’ exposure to the substantial risk of harm arising from 
motor vehicle accidents, occupational injuries and diseases and defective 
manufactured products as well as the accompanying risk of receiving no 
compensation if the relevant risk of harm materialises. They also aim to promote the 
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constitutional right to social security. A further common aim is to ease the significant 
evidentiary burden that relates to proving the common-law delictual requirement of 
fault (specifically negligence).  
Further general considerations underlying the enactment of these statutes include the 
high costs involved when instituting a common-law delictual claim as well as the likely 
under-compensation which may occur when doing so, the advantages of statutory as 
opposed to judicial reform, and the need to avoid arbitrary outcomes that may be the 
product of claiming compensation by delictual action.  
 
1.9.3 Chapter 4: Justifying the legislative development of the law of delict by 
establishing a statutory compensation fund for crime victims 
This chapter examines whether the establishment of a statutory crime victim 
compensation fund could fit within the proposed theoretical framework outlined in 
chapter 3.  
Therefore, chapter 4 will establish the extent of the risk of falling victim to crime (as 
well as the accompanying risk of receiving no compensation where risk materialises). 
Also, it will examine whether the enactment of the proposed scheme could further the 
constitutional right to social security. Furthermore, it will be considered whether crime 
victims, like victims of motor vehicle accidents, occupational injuries and diseases and 
defective manufactured products are confronted with an evidentiary obstacle in 
claiming compensation if they institute common-law delictual claims.  
The chapter will also examine whether the general dissatisfaction with the high 
transaction costs and levels of under-compensation attributed to the civil procedural 
system, the advantages of statutory as opposed to judicial reform and the need to 
avoid arbitrary outcomes can justify the proposed scheme.  
Lastly, it will be enquired whether considerations that thus far have counted against 
the introduction of the fund, namely problems with affordability and administration, as 
well as the potential erosion of the deterrence function of the law of delict, present 
conclusive arguments against its implementation. 
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Chapter 4 concludes that, when compared to the solutions offered by the current 
developments within the common-law of delict and existing legislation, a statutory 
compensation fund seems, in principle, to be a more desirable solution to improve the 
legal position of crime victims insofar as their compensation is concerned. 
 
1.9.4 Chapter 5: Practical considerations that are relevant when developing a 
statutory compensation fund for crime victims  
The success of any proposal to enact a statutory compensation scheme would depend 
on how well it would work in practice. Chapter 5 will focus on several practical 
considerations which the South African legislature should take into account if it were 
indeed to enact such a scheme.  
Some of these practical questions include the following. Who should be eligible to 
claim compensation from the proposed fund? If a person satisfies the eligibility criteria, 
what type of harm should be compensated? Should the potential availability of a claim 
against a statutory compensation fund involve the abolition of the crime victim’s 
common-law claim against the actual perpetrator of the crime? Should the victim’s 
claim against the compensation fund be limited? Should the compensation fund be 
no-fault based? Should benefits received under a statutory compensation fund be 
deducted from compensation received under a residual common-law claim of delict (if 
it were to remain)?  
  
1.9.5 Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The final chapter of this dissertation will provide a summary of the main arguments set 
out in the dissertation. It will also include comments relating to the relationship 
between the common law of delict and statute as well as the function of the South 
African law of delict, which are themes that will be referred to during the course of the 
dissertation. This is done with the view of making a meaningful contribution towards 
the development of the South African law of delict in general and, specifically, in 
furtherance of future research projects that focus on the potential statutory 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
 
development of the law of delict, a hitherto relatively under-researched area within the 
South African legal landscape. These comments pertain to the issues considered, and 
proposals presented, throughout the dissertation. 
In conclusion, as the structure of the dissertation indicates, the current compensatory 
regime relating to crime victims will first be investigated. After concluding that it is 
undesirable from a theoretical and practical perspective, it will be suggested that it 
may be worthwhile to consider alternative methods to compensate crime victims. In 
this context, the strategy adopted in most other jurisdictions is the establishment of a 
statutory compensation scheme for crime victims. This would potentially amount to the 
statutory development of the law of delict, which requires an investigation into the 
justifiability of such a development. Only once it has been concluded that such a 
development may, in principle, be justifiable, will attention be given to more practical 
and specific questions, e.g. who may be eligible for compensation. Therefore, up to 
the point at which it is specifically considered, the term “victim of crime” or “crime 
victim” will bear its ordinary, general meaning.
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CHAPTER 2: A DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT SOUTH 
AFRICAN LEGAL POSITION REGARDING THE COMPENSATION OF HARM 
SUFFERED BY CRIME VICTIMS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter, specifically, focuses on the following question: is the current South 
African legal position regarding the compensation of crime victims satisfactory? If it is, 
then it is the end of the matter. If not, a further investigation into alternative solutions 
for satisfactory crime victim compensation may be warranted.    
This chapter will commence by examining the way in which the South African legal 
system currently compensates crime victims. To do so, attention will first be paid to 
the common law of delict as the branch of the law that takes on the compensation of 
harm as its primary function.1 Thereafter, the focus will turn towards an analysis of the 
existing statutory mechanisms that may provide the crime victim with a remedy in 
respect of his harm. In particular, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 will be examined. Attention will also be given to the impact that the Prevention 
of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”) may have in the context of crime victim 
compensation.  
Regarding the structure of this chapter, it may be considered whether it would be more 
appropriate to start with an analysis of the existing statutory provisions that has a 
limited impact on crime victim compensation and then examine the way in which the 
common law of delict provides crime victims with relief. However, this chapter deals 
with the current compensatory regime for crime victims in South Africa and, as will 
become clear throughout the course of this chapter, the most notable and important 
development in this context has been the recent expansion of the state’s delictual 
liability for harm arising from crime. Indeed, the practical and theoretical concerns 
                                                          
1 For overviews of the function of the law of delict, see JC Macintosh Negligence in Delict 1 ed (1926) 
1; FP van den Heever Aquilian Damages in South African Law (1944) 3; RG McKerron The Law of 
Delict: a Treatise on the Principles of Liability for Civil Wrongs in the Law of South Africa 7 ed (1971); 
NJ van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg 3 ed (1976) 1-3; J 
Neethling & JM Potgieter Neethling-Visser-Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 3-17; JC van der Walt & 
JR Midgley Principles of Delict 4 ed (2016); MM Loubser & JR Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South 
Africa 2 ed (2012) 8-11. These authors are in agreement insofar as compensation is regarded as being 
the primary function of this branch of the law. 
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related to this development of the common law of delict partly prompted this research 
project. The chapter therefore investigates this development first and only focuses on 
existing statutory provisions, which plays a much less significant role in the context of 
crime victim compensation, thereafter.  
For the sake of clarity, it is further emphasised that the aim of this chapter is not to 
determine whether a specific type of crime is adequately compensated under the law 
of delict. Rather, the focus is on describing and evaluating the compensatory regime 
in South Africa as it relates to crime victims. To do so, the position under the common 
law is first described. In this context, the chapter focuses on cases which, arguably, 
have contributed most to the expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising from 
crime. Those cases involved the crimes of rape and assault. Therefore, the focus on 
those crimes are incidental to the main aim of the chapter. The dissertation is 
structured in a way that brings the specific question of eligibility (the meaning of the 
term “victim of crime”) into play in chapter 5 (see paragraph 5.2), only after it has been 
determined that, in principle, the establishment of a statutory compensation scheme 
may be justifiable. 
 
2.2 Seeking compensation for harm arising from crime through the common 
law of delict 
The common law of delict may be described as being “primarily concerned with the 
circumstances in which a person can claim compensation for harm that has been 
suffered.”2 It is trite that, in order to be successful with a delictual claim, a plaintiff must 
prove on a balance of probabilities that his harm was culpably and wrongfully caused 
by another person’s conduct. Someone who has fallen victim to crime and who is 
interested in obtaining damages in respect of the harm suffered, will thus be required 
to prove those elements of liability in a civil court. 
It might be thought that, considering the high frequency of crime and the 
accompanying high risk of falling victim to harm arising from crime,3 victims will 
regularly turn towards the common law of delict to compensate their harm. However, 
                                                          
2 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 4.  
3 See paragraph 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4. 
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an overview of the South African law reports provide remarkably few examples of 
instances where a crime victim instituted a delictual claim against the purported 
criminal to repair the harm he suffered.4 
Of course, this does not mean that there are no cases in which crime victims elect to 
institute a common-law delictual claim to compensate their harm. Indeed, there are 
several cases where victims of crime have elected to do so, all of which appear to 
share a single feature: in almost all of the cases that deal with crime victim 
compensation, the victim institutes his claim not against the criminal, but rather against 
the state (typically the Minister of Safety and Security). This choice ultimately appears 
to be based on the probable financial impecuniosity of the criminal in comparison with 
the substantially deeper pockets of the state.5  
In this chapter the arguments made by the victim to hold the state delictually liable, the 
court’s reasoning in those cases and the nature of the state’s delictual liability will be 
discussed in further detail. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that, where 
crime victims elect to institute delictual proceedings to obtain compensation, they 
mostly seek to hold the state vicariously liable. This has led to the expansion of state 
delictual liability for harm arising from crime,6 which will be described and evaluated 
in the following section.  
 
2.2.1 The expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising from crime 
This part of the chapter concerns the recent expansion of the state’s delictual liability 
for harm arising from crime. Essentially, this development has occurred in two ways, 
which will also provide the broad outline for the discussion that follows in this section. 
On the one hand, crime victims have successfully argued that the state may be held 
vicariously liable where its employees have negligently and wrongfully failed to prevent 
                                                          
4 For example, in the following cases the victim instituted the condictio furtiva for theft of his property: 
Chetty v Italtile Ceramics Ltd 2013 (3) SA 374 (SCA); Crots v Pretorius 2010 (6) SA 512 (SCA); First 
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC 2000 (4) SA 137 (D); Clifford v Farinha 
1988 (4) SA 315 (W). In the following cases the victim instituted a claim arising from violent crime: N v 
T 1994 (1) SA 862 (C); Mabaso v Felix 1981 (3) SA 865 (A); Schoultz v Potgieter 1972 (3) SA 371 (E); 
Manuel v Holland 1972 (4) SA 454 (R); Wessels v Pretorius, NO 1974 (3) SA 299 (NC); Mbatha v Van 
Staden 1982 (2) SA 260 (N); Groenewald v Groenewald 1998 (2) SA 1106 (SCA). 
5 South African Law Reform Commission (“SALRC”) Project 82: Sentencing (A Compensation Fund for 
Victims of Crime) (2004) 191, 315. See further paragraphs 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.5 in chapter 4.  
6 See Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 264-269. 
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the crime that has caused the victim’s harm.7 On the other hand, and arguably more 
significantly, courts have also held the state vicariously liable where the harm caused 
to crime victims occurred as a result of intentionally-committed crimes occasioned by 
its employees.8   
Attention will first be given to the expansion of the state’s delictual liability for the 
wrongful and negligent failure of its employees to prevent crime, which will be 
described and evaluated in the next section.  
 
2.2.1.1 Expansion of the state’s delictual liability for the wrongful and negligent 
failure of state employees to prevent crime 
 
2.2.1.1.1 The background to, and the role of the Constitution in, the state’s 
expanded delictual liability for the wrongful and negligent failure of 
state employees to prevent crime 
The expansion of the state’s delictual liability in cases where their employees 
negligently and wrongfully failed to prevent crime may be regarded as the result of the 
considerable influence which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 
(the “Constitution”) has had when assessing the wrongfulness of a state employee’s9 
negligent failure to prevent crime. In particular, it may be said that the constitutional 
rights to safety and security of the person,10 life11 and human dignity12 as well as the 
constitutional norm relating to government accountability13 have opened the pathway 
to greater state liability.  
                                                          
7 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 
(4) SA 938 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA); Minister of 
Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA); Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton 2004 (2) SA 216 (SCA); 
paragraph 2.2.1.1 below. 
8 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA); K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 
(6) SA 419 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA); F v Minister of Safety and 
Security [2011] ZACC 37; paragraph 2.2.1.2 below. 
9 In most cases which courts have dealt with, the employees were police officers, but it may also include 
a reference to other employees, such as public prosecutors.  
10 Section 12 of the Constitution.  
11 Section 11 of the Constitution.  
12 Section 10 of the Constitution.  
13 Section 41(1) of the Constitution.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
Properly depicting the influence of the Constitution in this context requires a brief 
description of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security14 (“Carmichele CC”), 
which provided the impetus for the constitutional development of the law of delict.  
In this case, the applicant was assaulted by one Coetzee. Prior to the assault, Coetzee 
had been convicted on charges of housebreaking and indecent assault. In addition to 
having been found guilty of these crimes, he was accused of rape and had appeared 
earlier before the magistrate’s court on this charge. Even though members of the 
public provided the investigative police officer with information that Coetzee posed a 
significant threat to their safety and security, he advised the public prosecutor that 
there was no reason to deny Coetzee bail and recommended that he be released on 
warning. When Coetzee subsequently appeared before a magistrate on the rape 
charge, the prosecutor therefore did not place before the magistrate any information 
concerning Coetzee’s previous conviction, nor did he oppose Coetzee’s release on 
his own recognisance.  
Following his release, a concerned member of the community approached the police 
and requested Coetzee’s detention pending his trial. The police officer in question 
referred that person to the public prosecutor who, in turn, advised that nothing could 
be done unless Coetzee committed another offence.  
Shortly thereafter, Coetzee was re-arrested, but after pleading not guilty on the charge 
of rape, he was re-released by the magistrate, pending a decision by the Attorney-
General on whether the case should be tried in the High Court or the Regional Court. 
The Attorney-General, who had been in possession of documents which reflected the 
seriousness of the rape and the extent of Coetzee’s sexual deviation, had not 
instructed the public prosecutor to oppose bail, with the result that this re-release was 
therefore unopposed.  
The applicant was assaulted following Coetzee’s unopposed re-release whereafter 
she instituted a delictual claim against the Ministers of Safety and Security and of 
Justice, arguing that the members of the police and the public prosecutors had owed 
her a legal duty to prevent Coetzee from being released on bail, and that their negligent 
failure to comply with this duty allowed him to cause her harm. The High Court rejected 
                                                          
14 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
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the argument and ordered absolution from the instance on the ground that the failure 
did not amount to wrongfulness.15 The appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) 
was dismissed, and the applicant subsequently appealed to the Constitutional Court 
(“CC”).  
The CC opined that the High Court and the SCA had overlooked the demands of the 
Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, and that the law of delict had to be developed 
beyond existing precedent. At the time, wrongfulness and the concomitant enquiry into 
the existence of a legal duty, fell to be determined with reference to the criterion as 
developed in the pioneering decision Minister van Polisie v Ewels16 (“Ewels”), i.e. the 
boni mores or legal convictions of the community. Applying this common-law criterion 
and following established precedent, the SCA had denied the existence of a legal duty 
on the part of the police and the state prosecutors:17  
“[I]t cannot be said […] that it was unreasonable for the prosecutor not to have opposed the 
release of Coetzee on his own recognisance. For this reason the prosecutor did not owe the 
appellant a legal duty either to oppose bail or to ensure his subsequent rearrest. […] There is 
another reason why the circumstances of the present case are not capable of establishing the 
legal duty contended for. This is that there was no special relationship shown to exist between 
the prosecutors at Knysna and the appellant. That there must be some relationship between the 
person who owes the legal duty and the person to whom the duty is owed, the breach of which 
would expose the latter to a particular risk of harm in consequence of an omission, which risk is 
different in its incidence from the general risk of harm to all members of the public, is well 
established in English law and is also in accordance with our law.” 
In response, the CC remarked that “the obligation of Courts to develop the common 
law, in the context of the s 39(2) objectives, is not purely discretionary”, [and that] the 
Courts are under a general obligation to develop”18 the common law so that it gave 
effect to the section 39(2) objectives.19 The CC therefore referred the case back to the 
High Court which, in its second judgment in the matter, allowed the plaintiff’s claim. 
On appeal to the SCA, the matter finally came to conclusion when the Ministers’ appeal 
was dismissed (this judgment is discussed in detail below).20 
                                                          
15 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) paras 27-32. 
16 1975 (3) SA 590 (A).  
17 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (1) SA 489 (SCA) paras 19-20. 
18 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 39. 
19 Section 39(2) of the Constitution states: “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.” 
20 Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA). 
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Although criticised by some,21 the judgment in Carmichele CC was described as 
“seminal”22 for the purposes of the law of delict and hailed as constituting a positive 
development of the common law, especially insofar as it ensured fuller protection of 
the right to bodily integrity and security of the person,23 and because it provided “much-
needed guidance and direction on the interplay between the Constitution and the 
common law.”24 Another reason for its positive reception may be the cautionary 
approach taken in respect of the Constitution’s future role in relation to private law, 
one that is mindful of the fact that the major engine for law reform should be the 
legislature and not the judiciary25 and which “could reform the law of delict without 
having to deform it.”26  
In summary, Carmichele CC “gave the green light to the courts”27 to revisit the basis 
upon which state liability cases should be determined. As will be indicated in the next 
section, it allowed courts to take into account several constitutional rights when 
considering whether a state employee’s negligent failure to prevent crime should be 
regarded as wrongful and in the process paved the way for a widened state delictual 
liability.28  
 
                                                          
21 See A Fagan “Reconsidering Carmichele” (2008) 124 SALJ 659 659-666. 
22 Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand and Others 2005 (5) SA 357 (W). See also J Neethling “Die 
Carmichele-sage kom tot ‘n gelukkige einde” (2005) 2 TSAR 402 402. 
23 J Neethling “Die Hoogste Hof van Appèl Bevestig die Uitdyende Verantwoordelikheid van die Staat 
om die Reg op die Fisies-Psigiese Integriteit in die Lig van die Grondwet te Beskerm” (2003) 4 TSAR 
783 788-790; J Neethling “Delictual Protection of the Right to Bodily Integrity and Security of the Person 
Against Omissions by the State” (2005) 122 SALJ 572 572-574; JR Midgley & B Leinius “The impact of 
the constitution on the law of delict: Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security” (2002) 119 SALJ 17 
27. 
24 Midgley & Leinius (2002) SALJ 27. 
25 H MacQueen “Delict, contract and the Bill of Rights: a perspective from the United Kingdom” (2004) 
121 SALJ 359 359-370.   
26 F du Bois “State Liability in South Africa: A Constitutional Remix” (2010) 25 Tulane European and 
Civil Law Forum 139. 
27 C Okpaluba & P Osode Government Liability: South Africa and the Commonwealth (2012) 124. 
28 Okpaluba and Osode Government Liability 16-18; 124-127; Neethling (2005) SALJ 572-574; 
Neethling “State (public authority) liability ex delicto (1)” (2012) 75 THRHR 622 622-624. 
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2.2.1.1.2 A description of the expansion of the state’s delictual liability for the 
wrongful and negligent failure of state employees to prevent crime  
Following the judgment in Carmichele CC, but prior to handing down the final judgment 
in the matter, the SCA was presented with an opportunity to illustrate the impact of the 
Constitution on the law of delict according to the recommendation in Carmichele CC.  
In Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden29 (“Van Duivenboden”), the 
plaintiff brought a claim in delict against the Minister of Safety and Security after he 
had been shot by his neighbour. It was common cause that, prior to the incident, police 
officers had information that the perpetrator, when drunk, habitually threatened to use 
his firearms against himself and others.30 Nonetheless, they had failed to take any 
steps to initiate an enquiry in terms of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 (which 
empowered the Commissioner of Police to declare someone unfit to possess a firearm 
and to seize it). The pertinent question for the SCA’s consideration was whether the 
negligent failure of the police officers to disarm the perpetrator of the crime was 
wrongful. 
In his determination of the wrongfulness of the police officers’ omission, Nugent JA  
reiterated the common-law rule that the negligent failure to act positively in preventing 
harm was not prima facie wrongful.31 He stated that it therefore had to be determined 
whether the police officers owed the plaintiff a legal duty to prevent his harm.32 To 
answer that question, Nugent JA restated the common-law criterion as developed in 
Ewels.33 The court held that, in the context of wrongfulness for an omission, “the 
question to be determined is one of legal policy”34 and that, in “applying the test that 
was formulated in [Ewels] the ‘convictions of the community’ must necessarily now be 
informed by the norms and values of our society as they have been embodied in the 
1996 Constitution.”35 In this way, public and legal policy became the gateway for the 
                                                          
29 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA). 
30 Paras 4-11. 
31 Paras 12-13. 
32 Para 12. 
33 Paras 12-13. 
34 Para 16. 
35 Para 17.  
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introduction of constitutional rights in the application of the common-law rules of the 
law of delict.36  
Nugent JA noted several policy considerations that might weigh against the imposition 
of delictual liability where police officers negligently fail to prevent crime. These 
arguments included the public policy consideration, rooted in a laissez faire concept 
of liberty, which suggested that it might be an unreasonable infringement upon 
someone’s personal autonomy to expect him to take positive steps in order to avert 
harm to others.37 Similarly, the principle of equality might be infringed upon by 
imposing liability on one person where others might equally be faulted for their failure 
in preventing the relevant harm.38 On a broader level, a public policy consideration 
that might inhibit the imposition of liability on the state and its functionaries is the 
apparent utility of allowing them the freedom to provide public services without the 
chilling effect of the threat of litigation if they negligently failed to prevent harm.39  
However, these concerns were outweighed by the following considerations. First, the 
court emphasised the obligation imposed on the state in terms of section 7 of the 
Constitution not only to respect but also to “protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights”.40 Secondly, section 2 of the Constitution demanded that these duties 
imposed by the Constitution on the state must be fulfilled.41 The relevant constitutional 
rights which the majority had in mind included the respective rights to safety and 
security of the person, life and human dignity.42 Thirdly, Nugent JA emphasised that 
section 41(1) of the Constitution expressly required government that is not only 
effective, transparent and coherent, but also accountable.43 Ultimately, considerable 
weight was attached to the constitutional norm of accountability. In fact, its application 
convinced the majority of the court to impose delictual liability on the police officers 
and to hold their employer, the state, vicariously liable:44  
“Where the conduct of the State, as represented by the persons who perform functions on its 
behalf, is in conflict with its constitutional duty to protect rights in the Bill of Rights, in my view, 
                                                          
36 FDJ Brand “Influence of the Constitution on the Law of Delict” (2014) Advocate 42 43.  
37 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) paras 16-18. 
38 Para 19. 
39 Paras 19-20. 
40 Para 20. 
41 Para 20. 
42 Para 20.  
43 Para 21. 
44 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (2) SA 431 (SCA) paras 21-22. 
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the norm of accountability must necessarily assume an important role in determining whether 
a legal duty ought to be recognised in any particular case […] Where there is a potential threat 
of the kind that is now in issue the constitutionally protected rights to human dignity, to life and 
to security of the person are all placed in peril and the State, represented by its officials, has a 
constitutional duty to protect them. It might be that in some cases the need for effective 
government, or some other constitutional norm or consideration of public policy, will outweigh 
accountability in the process of balancing the various interests that are to be taken into account 
in determining whether an action should be allowed […] but I can see none that do so in the 
present circumstances.” 
The judgment in Van Duivenboden indicates that the norm of accountability could have 
a significant impact on a court’s reasoning where there appears to be no way of holding 
the state accountable, other than for a delictual claim for damages.45  
The SCA ultimately found that the relevant police officers’ failure to act was indeed 
wrongful.46 Having also determined that their wrongful failure was negligent47 and 
caused the victim’s harm,48 the court held that “the negligent conduct of police officers 
in [the] circumstances [of the case] is thus actionable and [that] the State [should be 
held] vicariously liable for the consequences of any such negligence.”49  
Shortly after the SCA handed down its judgment in Van Duivenboden, its reasoning 
was confirmed and applied in Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security50 (“Van 
Eeden”), Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton51 (“Hamilton”) and Minister of 
Safety and Security v Carmichele52 (“Carmichele SCA”).  
In Van Eeden the appellant had been assaulted, raped and robbed by a dangerous 
criminal and serial rapist who had escaped from police custody after the failure on the 
part of the police to ensure that the criminal’s cell door was properly locked. The 
respondent had conceded vicarious liability, negligence and causation and the only 
issue remaining for decision was whether the police officers’ failure was also wrongful 
for the purposes of delictual liability.53  
In establishing wrongfulness, Vivier ADP applied the approach adopted in Van 
Duivenboden, referring expressly to the state’s constitutional duties identified in that 
                                                          
45 See A Price “State Liability and Accountability” (2015) Acta Juridica 313-335.  
46 Para 22. 
47 Para 23. 
48 Paras 24-30. 
49 Para 22. 
50 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA). 
51 2004 (2) SA 216 (SCA). 
52 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA). 
53 Para 4. 
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judgment.54 He added that the state is obliged under international law to “protect 
women against violent crime and against the gender discrimination inherent in 
violence against women”.55 This obligation was imposed on the state by virtue of 
section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, read with the preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, article 4(d) of the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women and article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women.56 Furthermore, the court emphasised section 
205(3) of the Constitution, which states that the “objects of the police service are to 
prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure 
the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law” 
as well as the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, in which the police’s 
functions to maintain law and order and prevent crime is set out.57  
The court further emphasised the need to hold the state accountable and was of the 
view that a finding of wrongfulness would not “disrupt the efficient functioning of the 
police”58 or “require additional resources.”59 Apart from the state’s constitutional 
imperatives Vivier ADP also pointed out the fact that the police had control over 
someone “who was known to be a dangerous criminal and who was likely to commit 
further sexual offences against women should he escape; and the fact that measures 
to prevent his escape could reasonably and practically have been taken by the 
police.”60  
Therefore, taking into account that the “police accordingly acted wrongfully and in view 
of the admission of negligence, vicarious liability and causation”,61 the court held the 
state vicariously liable for the plaintiff’s harm which arose from a crime committed by 
a third party, but which was caused, in law, by the negligent, wrongful failure of police 
officers to comply with their legal duties. 
                                                          
54 Paras 12-22. 
55 Para 15. 
56 Para 15. 
57 Para 16. 
58 Para 21. 
59 Para 21. 
60 Para 24. 
61 Para 24. 
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In Hamilton the respondent had suffered serious bodily injuries after being shot by one 
McArdell, who was issued a license to possess a revolver after a successful 
application lodged with the Stellenbosch Police Station in terms of section 3(1) of the 
Arms and Ammunition Act. From the facts it appeared that McArdell had a history of 
psychological and emotional disturbance and was receiving counselling from several 
mental health professionals. She had also abused alcohol and certain psychiatric 
medications were prescribed for her by various psychiatrists. The respondent 
instituted a delictual claim against the Minister of Safety and Security, arguing that the 
relevant police officers62 working in the Stellenbosch Police Station owed him a legal 
duty to take proper measures to screen an application for a firearm licence by making 
such enquiries as were reasonable in the circumstances and to corroborate 
the accuracy of the information furnished to them by the applicant in relation to her 
physical, temperamental and psychological fitness to possess a firearm.  
Van Heerden AJA held that there was indeed a legal duty on the police officers, 
emphasising that the “sources of this legal duty […] are both the common law and the 
statutory provisions”.63 Although the court chose not to rely directly on constitutional 
rights in identifying the source of the state employee’s legal duties, it did follow the 
reasoning in Van Duivenboden insofar as it considered legal and public policy 
considerations relevant to the determination of wrongfulness.  
The court stated that the public interest would be best served by allowing a delictual 
claim against the state.64 It also noted “the undoubted public importance of the 
effective control of firearms.”65 In addition, the court was convinced that there was no 
possibility that imposing delictual liability upon the state would open the floodgates of 
litigation or that it would result in the “chilling effect of potential limitless liability on the 
efficient and proper performance by the police of their primary functions”.66 Because 
there appeared to be no effective way to hold the state accountable other than by 
allowing an action for delictual damages, the court held the Minister of Safety and 
Security vicariously liable for the plaintiff’s harm, which arose from a crime, but was 
                                                          
62 2004 (2) SA 216 (SCA) paras 27-29: reference is pertinently made to two police officers (Warrant 
Officer Loubser and Lieutenant Groenewald) who were required to comment and make a 
recommendation in respect of the application. 
63 Para 36.  
64 Paras 35-36. 
65 Para 36. 
66 Para 35. 
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found to be caused in law by the negligent, wrongful failure of police officers to comply 
with their legal duties. 
Lastly, in Carmichele SCA, Harms JA, in respect of the element of wrongfulness, held 
that although it was trite that the police officers and public prosecutors owed the victim 
a legal duty under public law to oppose bail,67 the court had to establish whether the 
breach of such a public legal duty by the respective state employees could be 
transposed to a private legal duty.68 To answer this question, the court relied heavily 
on the reasoning in Van Duivenboden and, again, emphasised the need to hold the 
state accountable: “Did the State owe a duty to the plaintiff? The answer lies in the 
recognition of the general norm of accountability: the State is liable for the failure to 
perform the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution unless it can be shown that 
there is compelling reason to deviate from that norm.”69 Ultimately, based on the 
reasoning in Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden, Harms JA held the state vicariously 
liable for the plaintiff’s harm caused by the negligent and wrongful failure of state 
employees to prevent the crime. 
In summary, the reasoning in Van Duivenboden, as applied in subsequent cases, led 
to the expansion of the state’s delictual liability for harm in situations where its 
employees negligently and wrongfully failed to prevent crime.70 The following section 
will evaluate some of the aspects of this development that have received critical 
attention from scholars, including the nature of the state’s delictual liability as well as 
the consequences of the SCA’s reasoning in Van Duivenboden.  
 
                                                          
67 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA) para 36. 
68 Para 37. 
69 Para 43. 
70 Recent cases that have followed the reasoning in these cases include PE v Ikwezi Municipality 2016 
(5) SA 114 (ECG); Minister of Safety and Security v Booysen (35/2016) [2016] ZASCA 201; Terblanche 
v Minister of Safety and Security 2016 (2) SA 109 (SCA); Minister of Defence v Von Benecke 2013 (2) 
SA 361 (SCA); Giesecke & Devrient Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 
(2) SA 137 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Venter 2011 (2) SACR 67 (SCA); Ntombenkosi 
Hlomza v Minister of Safety and Security 2011 JDR 0030 (ECM); Minister of Safety and Security v 
Madyibi 2010 (2) SA 356 (SCA). 
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2.2.1.1.3 An evaluation of the state’s expanded delictual liability for harm due 
to the negligent and wrongful failure of state employees to prevent 
crime 
a. Introduction  
In this section attention will be given to aspects of the Van Duivenboden series of 
cases that have received critical commentary from scholars. The first issue to be 
considered is whether the nature of the state’s delictual liability was indeed vicarious.71 
This issue receives attention because some scholars have argued that these cases 
are “in truth imposing direct liability”72 on the state. To examine this contention, the 
differences between vicarious and direct liability as well as the common-law 
requirements for vicarious liability are briefly restated.     
 
b. The distinction between direct and vicarious liability 
If through A’s conduct he wrongfully and culpably causes B harm, then A has 
committed a delict in respect of which he is directly, or personally, liable towards B. In 
other words, liability is imposed directly upon A because it was he who wrongfully and 
culpably caused B’s harm. It may therefore be said that the driving force behind the 
imposition of direct liability is the notion of personal responsibility.73 If B’s harm was 
not wrongfully caused by A’s culpable conduct, then it would be unfair to oblige him to 
compensate B. When considering imposing direct liability on a primary wrongdoer, a 
court will have regard to the nature of his conduct and will provide him with the 
opportunity to avoid liability by providing justifiable reasons for his conduct.  
However, if A commits a delict against B, but C is required to compensate B for his 
harm, then C is held vicariously liable. Vicarious liability may be described as an 
instance of strict liability in delict, where one person is held liable for the harm 
wrongfully and culpably caused by another person.74 As an example of strict liability, 
it is therefore an exception to the fault-based rule of personal responsibility that may 
                                                          
71 See Du Bois (2010) Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 174-175; Fagan (2008) SALJ 668-669; S 
Wagener “K v Minister of Safety and Security and the increasingly blurred line between personal and 
vicarious liability” (2008) 125 SALJ 673 675; L Boonzaier “State Liability in South Africa: A More Direct 
Approach” (2013) 130 SALJ 330 330-368. 
72 Boonzaier (2013) SALJ 342. 
73 P Giliker Vicarious Liability in Tort – A Comparative Perspective (2010) 16-18. 
74 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) para 24; Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law 
of Delict 383-392; Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 379-402. 
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be said to ground delictual liability in general.75 The imposition of vicarious liability on 
such a party may be justified on the basis of a variety of policy-based reasons which 
will be discussed in paragraph 2.2.1.2.5 below.76  
When considering the potential vicarious liability of a defendant, a court will not pay 
attention to his culpability and he will not be afforded the opportunity of advancing his 
reasonable conduct as a justificatory defence to evade liability. Lastly, as indicated in 
further detail below, to hold the defendant vicariously liable, it must nevertheless be 
proven that the primary wrongdoer committed a delict.  
 
c. The common-law requirements for vicarious liability 
Vicarious liability may be attributed to a defendant on the basis of a legal relationship 
that exists at the time of the wrongdoing between himself and the primary wrongdoer.77 
The common-law doctrine of vicarious liability is complex and has been a controversial 
topic within South African law.78 Its requirements, scope and application have been 
widely debated, especially in the post-Constitutional era.79 Although the application of 
these requirements in recent case law will only be discussed in detail in paragraph 
2.2.1.2.3 below, they are briefly summarised here to give a proper background against 
which to respond to the question whether the recent judicial expansion of state 
delictual liability involves direct or vicarious liability.  
First, a plaintiff is required to prove a relationship between the wrongdoer and another 
person, which warrants the imposition of liability.80 Second, it must be proven that the 
wrongdoer committed a delict.81 Lastly, the delict must have occurred in the course 
and scope of performing the defendant’s instructions and it must be for the defendant’s 
                                                          
75 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 5; P Cane The Anatomy of Tort Law (1997) 51-52. 
76 See also K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) paras 21-22; J Neyers “A Theory 
of Vicarious Liability” (2005) 43 Alberta Law Review 1 1-15.  
77 S Wagener An Assessment of the Normative Bases for the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability in South 
African Law, and the Implications for its Application Unpublished PhD thesis University of Cape Town 
(2011); Giliker Vicarious Liability 6-7. 
78 See H Wicke Vicarious Liability in Modern South African Law Unpublished LLM thesis University of 
Stellenbosch (1997); Wagener Vicarious Liability.  
79 Wagener Vicarious Liability. See also A Fagan “The Confusions of K” (2009) 126 SALJ 158; Wagener 
(2008) SALJ 673; JA Linscott “A critical analysis of the majority judgment in F v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC)” (2014) 17(6) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2916-2949. 
80 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 30; Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 389. 
81 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 30; Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 389.  
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benefit, or fall within the risk created by the defendant when establishing the 
relationship with the wrongdoer.82 Although the common law recognises various 
relationships akin to employment as potentially giving rise to vicarious liability,83 it is 
the employer-employee relationship that is most likely to give rise to the delictual 
liability of the state for harm arising from crime.84  
Plaintiffs who wish to hold the state vicariously liable for their harm are therefore 
required to prove that (a) an employment relationship existed between the primary 
wrongdoer and the state, (b) the employee committed a delict and (c) that the delict 
was committed during the course and within the scope of employment.85 The failure 
to meet any of these requirements absolves the state from liability.  
 
d. The nature of the state’s delictual liability in Van Duivenboden, Van Eeden, 
Hamilton and Carmichele   
This section contains a critical engagement with the views of academics regarding the 
nature of the state’s delictual liability for harm arising from crime. This has been done 
because these views, and the questions that they have prompted, have formed a 
substantial part of the academic debate in the context of the state’s expanding delictual 
liability for harm arising from crime and therefore merits analysis. Furthermore, it is 
pointed out that the established scholarship does not provide a satisfying solution to 
the problem of expanding state delictual liability on a practical level. Accordingly, it 
may be said that there is a link between the nature of the state’s delictual liability 
arising from crime and the creation of a statutory crime victim compensation scheme. 
Although it is not the sole foundation of state liability,86 section 1 of the State Liability 
Act 20 of 1957 provides that the state is liable for “any wrong committed by any servant 
                                                          
82 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 30; Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 389. 
83 The relationships recognised under South African law include employer and employee, principal and 
agent, and motorcar owner and motorcar driver. See Neethling & Potgieter 389-400; Van der Walt & 
Midgley Principles of Delict para 19; D Visser “Delict” in Francois du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 9 ed (2007) 1224–1227; H Wicke “Vicarious liability for agents and the distinction between 
employees, agents and independent contractors” (1998) 61 THRHR 609 610–611. 
84 Wicke Vicarious Liability 209-232. 
85 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA); K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 
(6) SA 419 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA); F v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). 
86 For example, see section 60(1) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. 
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of the state acting in his capacity and within the scope of his authority as such a 
servant”. The orthodox interpretation of this section is that the state may only be held 
vicariously liable for the delicts of its employees and that, on the wording of the Act, 
there is no room for direct liability of the state.87  
However, a different interpretation of the wording of the Act is conceivable, i.e. one 
that would allow for imposing direct liability on the state.88 Because the state as a 
juristic person can conduct itself only through its organs and employees (or “servants”, 
in the language of the Act), it may be argued that it could be held directly liable if it is 
proved that the state organ or employee acted within the formal scope of its authority 
or when it acted in its official capacity as state organ or employee.  
Recently, scholars have reconsidered the nature of the state’s delictual liability in Van 
Duivenboden as well as the line of cases that followed in its wake. An overview of this 
debate, and a critical evaluation thereof, is set out below. 
Du Bois has described the decision in Van Duivenboden as follows:89   
“A subtle but vital shift takes place here, in which state liability is no longer viewed in terms of 
the traditional vicarious liability paradigm of the common law model, but rather, á la civilian 
systems, as a form of direct liability arising from an organizational failure or faute de service. It 
is this implicit and unwitting paradigm shift that explains the very broad contours of liability 
envisaged in this decision and the departure from the common law tradition, where liability 
principles do not mark out the state as bearer of special responsibilities.”   
This paradigm shift has been explained by reference to the emphasis which Nugent 
JA placed on the duties of the state as employer as opposed to the duties of the 
individual state employees and the expressed desire to give effect to the norm of state 
accountability.90 This emphasis, it is argued, appears out of place in the context of 
determining vicarious liability where the pertinent question is whether the employee 
had acted wrongfully and culpably in causing the victim’s harm, and not whether the 
employer itself had so acted. Wagener summarises the argument as follows:91   
“A breach of an employer’s duties […] can only affect its personal liability. The breach of its 
duty cannot make any difference to its vicarious liability, which is concerned with the duties of 
                                                          
87 J Neethling “Liability of the state for rape by a policeman: The saga takes a new direction” (2011) 
Obiter 437; J Neethling & JM Potgieter “Deliktuele staatsaanspreeklikheid weens polisieverkragting” 
2012 (9) Litnet Akademies 73 77. 
88 WE Scott Middellike Aanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1983) 200-201. See also 
Froneman J’s minority judgment in F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). 
89 Du Bois (2010) Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 174-175 (references omitted).  
90 Du Bois (2010) Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 174-175; Wagener (2008) SALJ 675. 
91 Wagener (2008) SALJ 675. 
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the tortfeasant employee; that is, her delictual duties and employment duties. Her delictual 
duties define whether she acted wrongfully, a finding of which being a necessary condition for 
her liability (and her liability being a necessary condition for her employer’s vicarious liability).”  
This argument has received limited judicial support. In an obiter comment in a 
subsequent case, Minister of Safety and Security v F92  (“F (SCA)”), Nugent JA 
seemed to agree with Du Bois and Wagener and remarked that his judgment in Van 
Duivenboden, as well as the judgments in Van Eeden, Hamilton and Carmichele 
(SCA) “purport to be founded upon vicarious liability but might better be said to have 
been founded upon direct liability of the State, acting through the instrument of its 
employees.”93  
The argument was further endorsed in Froneman J’s minority judgment in F v Minister 
of Safety and Security94 (“F (CC)”), which dealt not with the state’s liability for the 
negligent, wrongful failure of its employees to prevent crime, but with its liability for the 
intentionally-committed crimes of its employees.95 Froneman J was of the view that it 
was time to “recognise that State delictual liability in circumstances where the State 
has a general constitutional and statutory duty to protect people from crime is usually 
‘direct’, and not ‘vicarious’ in the sense traditionally understood by that term.”96 This 
was because the state invariably acted via its organs, i.e. state officials, when 
performing public duties.  
In other words, because the state is a juristic person that fulfils its public duties through 
its various organs and employees, the execution of these public duties may be 
attributed to the state and the state may therefore be held responsible for any such 
acts which attract delictual liability. Froneman J thus suggested that the question 
whether the state should be delictually liable in both the Van Duivenboden type of 
cases as well as cases resembling the facts of F (CC) should “no longer be dealt with 
as an aspect of vicarious liability but rather as part of the normal direct enquiry into 
whether the elements of our law of delict are present when instruments of the State 
act.”97 
                                                          
92 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA). See paragraph 2.2.1.2.3 (c) below. 
93 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA) para 34. 
94 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). See paragraph 2.2.1.2.3. (d) below. 
95 See paragraph 2.2.1.2 below. 
96 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) para 89. 
97 Para 89. 
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Neethling and Potgieter summarise the argument in favour of direct state liability as 
follows:98 the state is a juristic person that can only act through its organs as 
instruments and the officials who form a part of those organs. The police service 
functions as a state organ and its members are subjected to specific constitutional and 
statutory duties. Conduct of the police service and various police officers is conduct 
for which the state is held liable because it constitutes the state’s conduct. This means 
that because the conduct of the police service or its officers constitutes the state’s 
conduct, the latter may be held directly liable.  
These scholars reject the argument that the Van Duivenboden series of cases may be 
said to have imposed direct state liability.99 Referring to the remarks made by Nugent 
JA and Froneman J, they correctly emphasise the failure of both judges to explain the 
difference between establishing whether the conduct of state employees qualify as the 
conduct of state organs for the purposes of direct state liability and determining 
whether a state employee conducted himself within the course and scope of his 
employment for the purposes of vicarious liability.100 In light of this shortcoming, they 
appropriately contend that the shift to direct state liability can only lead to confusion 
and create legal uncertainty in an area where clarity existed beforehand.101 According 
to them, it was clear that, in Van Duivenboden, Van Eeden, Hamilton and Carmichele 
SCA, it was the employees who, while acting in course and scope of their employment, 
negligently breached their duty to prevent crime and that the state was thus correctly 
held vicariously liable.102  
They also contend that certainty and precedent has been established in the series of 
cases dealing with the negligent wrongdoing of police employees and that, in these 
cases, courts have “consistently maintained”103 that the state should be held 
vicariously liable for the negligent wrongdoing of police officials. They conclude that, 
                                                          
98 Neethling & Potgieter Litnet Akademies (2012) 78. See also Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg (1968) 
468; D’Oliviera State liability for the wrongful exercise of discretionary powers Unpublished LLD 
dissertation. University of South Africa (1976) 477-488. 
99 See Neethling & Potgieter (2012) Litnet Akademies 77-82. 
100 Neethling & Potgieter (2012) Litnet Akademies 77-82; Scott (2011) TSAR 777-784; Neethling (2012) 
THRHR 627-631; Scott Middellike Aanspreeklikheid 200-201. 
101 Neethling & Potgieter (2012) Litnet 79. See also Neethling (2011) Obiter 436-437. 
102 Neethling (2011) Obiter 436-437. 
103 436-437. 
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in these cases, the vicarious liability approach “has delivered satisfactory results”104 
and that it “is questionable whether a radical deviation from this approach is 
justified.”105  
Nevertheless, Neethling and Potgieter appear to accept the argument that the state 
may be held directly liable where its employees intentionally deviate from their 
employment duties (the category of cases examined in paragraph 2.2.1.2 below).106 
Such an exception centres on Froneman J’s argument that factors that have typically 
been used to determine whether an employee’s intentional crime may be regarded as 
a delict committed during the course and scope of employment are “at odds in 
determining the secondary, vicarious State liability”,107 but can “legitimately be 
assessed in determining the primary wrongfulness of the conduct of the State, through 
its officials, in a delictual action based on direct liability”.108 Neethling and Potgieter 
therefore contend that direct state liability, with an enquiry into the wrongfulness of the 
state’s direct liability, potentially provides a more acceptable basis for the state’s 
liability when compared to vicarious liability.109 
Notwithstanding this possibility, the CC has clearly opted for vicarious liability as the 
preferred paradigm for state liability in the context of the negligent, wrongful failure of 
their employees to prevent harm as well as in cases where their employees 
intentionally commit crimes. Courts evidently regard the nature of the state’s liability 
as vicarious and therefore continue to apply vicarious liability requirements to 
determine the state’s delictual liability in both contexts.110 Support for Froneman J’s 
argument therefore seems to have academic interest only and it appears likely that 
vicarious liability will continue to form the basis of the state’s liability in future cases.111  
                                                          
104 Neethling & Potgieter (2012) Litnet Akademies 74. See also J Scott “Die Hoogste Hof van Appèl 
Smoor Heilsame Regsontwikkeling” (2011) 4 TSAR 773 777-784; Neethling (2012) THRHR 627-631. 
105 Neethling & Potgieter (2012) Litnet Akademies 74. 
106 Neethling & Potgieter (2012) Litnet Akademies 82-83. See also Scott (2011) TSAR 777-784; 
Neethling (2012) THRHR 627-631. 
107 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) para 116. 
108 Para 116. 
109 Neethling & Potgieter (2012) Litnet Akademies 82; F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (1) SA 
536 (CC) paras 112-113. 
110 See also paragraph 2.2.1.2 below. 
111 See also PE v Ikwezi Municipality 2016 (5) SA 114 (ECG); Minister of Safety and Security v Booysen 
(35/2016) [2016] ZASCA 201; Terblanche v Minister of Safety and Security 2016 (2) SA 109 (SCA); 
Minister of Defence v Von Benecke 2013 (2) SA 361 (SCA); Giesecke & Devrient Southern Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (2) SA 137 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Venter 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
55 
 
At any rate, the debate concerning the preferred paradigm for state liability will not 
provide a practical contribution towards solving the problem of the continued 
expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising from crime. Essentially, the 
theoretical nature of the state’s liability does not change the fact that, in cases like 
those discussed above, it is the state that is held liable for harm actually committed by 
criminals rather than the criminals themselves. Indeed, it fails to pay attention to the 
question whether the expanded state delictual liability provides a satisfactory solution 
to the issue of crime victim compensation. Therefore, the reasons for Froneman J’s 
preference for direct state liability will not be analysed in further detail in this 
dissertation. 
Lastly, attention may be given to the argument by Boonzaier, who regards the 
argument that the nature of the state’s liability in the Van Duivenboden cases is 
vicarious as “startling”, “unconvincing” and as taking “no account of the grave 
problems” posed by the reasoning in these cases.112  
Agreeing with the argument that these cases are “in truth imposing direct liability”,113 
Boonzaier argues that the only duties identified by the court in Van Duivenboden were 
the state’s constitutionally-imposed duties, and because the imposition of vicarious 
liability upon the state necessitates the recognition of a legal duty on the police officers 
in question, the state’s liability cannot be regarded as vicarious in nature.114 In order 
to reach a vicarious liability outcome in these cases, one would have to “manufactur[e] 
a legal duty resting on the police officers”.115  
He goes further, arguing that there was no legal duty116 resting on the police officers 
in Van Duivenboden and “[w]here there is no duty grounded on recognised principles 
of private law, and as such there is no delict which can be imputed to the state, one 
may not manufacture one simply to generate the right outcome on vicarious 
                                                          
2011 (2) SACR 67 (SCA); Ntombenkosi Hlomza v Minister of Safety and Security 2011 JDR 0030 
(ECM); Minister of Safety and Security v Madyibi 2010 (2) SA 356 (SCA) 
112 Boonzaier (2013) SALJ 354. See also Neethling (2011) Obiter 437. 
113 Boonzaier (2013) SALJ 342. 
114 340. 
115 340. 
116 341: With regard to the situation in which a policeman fails to deprive “known threats of their 
weapons”, Boonzaier argues that “the official’s duties should be grounded on the common-law duty to 
take reasonable care in the exercise of one’s profession” and then notes that “[in] South African law no 
general such duty has yet been recognised.” 
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liability.”117 Correspondingly, the SCA’s decision to impose vicarious liability on the 
state in Hamilton is rejected on the basis that Van Heerden AJA apparently 
“convert[ed] a duty which in truth rested on the state generally (that is, the duty to 
prevent dangerous people receiving firearm licences) into a duty resting on the 
relevant individual officers.”118  
Continuing this line of criticism on the characterisation of the state’s liability as 
vicarious, Boonzaier rejects the court’s reasoning in Van Eeden as “even more 
incongruous”119 since, in this case, the court apparently failed to identify the individual 
employee responsible for having committed the delict. Instead, the “court refers in 
general terms to the wrongdoing of ‘the police’ [with the] result that vicarious liability is 
imposed following almost exclusive discussion of the state’s duties and no mention 
whatsoever of any individual tortfeasant employee.”120 Similarly, the decision in Van 
Duivenboden is faulted on the basis that the omission on the part of the police “was 
never ascribed to any police officer”121 and that it was the “negligence of ‘the police’ 
generally which was ultimately found to have caused the harm to the plaintiff.”122 
Boonzaier’s outright rejection of the decision to regard the state’s delictual liability as 
vicarious in nature is not well founded. Although the court in Van Duivenboden does 
not expressly ascribe the failure on the part of the police to a specific police officer, 
considerable time is spent in describing the nature of various specific police officers’ 
conduct.123 The court set out the relevant provisions of the Arms and Ammunition Act 
which allowed for the deprivation of firearms, and noted that “various police officers 
were in possession of information that reflected upon Brooks’s fitness to be in 
possession of firearms.”124 The court also referred to the circumstances under which 
superintendent Hefer and several members of the Internal Stability Unit came to have 
knowledge of Brooks’ threats to kill himself and members of his family.125  
                                                          
117 341. 
118 345. 
119 342. 
120 342. 
121 342. 
122 342. 
123 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) paras 12-20.  
124 Para 4. 
125 The court takes note of the fact that Hefer spoke to Brooks’ wife, who told him that Brooks should 
not be in possession of firearms. Hefer had explained the statutory procedure for Brooks’ disarmament 
and offered to take a statement from Brooks’ wife.  
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Furthermore, the court considered the conversations that occurred between one of the 
deceased and sergeant Goldie, responsible for the administration of matters relating 
to firearms at the Milnerton Police Station, who, after being informed of Brooks’ 
drinking problems and propensity for violence, advised the deceased of certain 
available measures to be taken.126 Finally, Brooks’ deceased wife also approached 
sergeant Roos at the Bothasig Police Station, who referred her to warrant officer 
Jenkins, who was in command of the police station and advised her to lay a charge 
against Brooks so as to allow the police to act against the latter.127 All of this suggests 
that the court did take into account the conduct of the police officers involved as well 
as their respective legal duties.  
Similarly, in Van Eeden the court did not point out specific police officers by name. 
Nonetheless, taking into consideration the fact that vicarious liability had been 
conceded by the state, it would be reasonable to infer that, when the court considered 
whether “members of the South African Police Service owed [the plaintiff] a legal 
duty”,128  it had in mind those officers who were, at the time, responsible for securing 
the relevant criminal’s cell door.  
Furthermore, Boonzaier’s argument that the SCA “manufactured” a legal duty which 
did not exist and similarly “converted” a legal duty of the state into a legal duty resting 
on specific employees in Hamilton should be rejected on the basis of prior decisions 
of the same court in which it held that, as expressed in Van Duivenboden, “it was the 
law that assault is unlawful, that the police are under a positive duty in law to protect 
citizens from assault when in a position to do so and that, if they negligently fail to do 
so, the State will be liable in damages.”129  
In conclusion, the following remarks may be made in response to the academic 
debate. Du Bois, Wagener, Boonzaier, Nugent JA in F (SCA) and to some extent 
Froneman J in F (CC) hold that a possible interpretation of the expansion of the state’s 
                                                          
126 Goldie asked her whether her husband had firearms and, when she replied in the affirmative, advised 
that if she felt threatened she should make a sworn statement and an enquiry would be held in terms 
of section 11 of the Arms and Ammunitions Act.  
127 Jenkins told her that she would need to prefer a charge against Brooks and that unless she did so 
the hands of the police were tied. Dawn told Jenkins that she was unwilling to prefer charges because 
to do so would jeopardise her marriage and there the matter was left. 
128 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) 394. 
129 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) para 33. See also Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A). 
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delictual liability for the wrongful and negligent causation of harm arising from crime is 
that, despite the court’s references to vicarious liability, its reasoning was nevertheless 
confused. These scholars take this position because the judgments of the SCA in the 
Van Duivenboden series of cases focused on the legal duties of the state as employer 
as opposed to the employee’s duties. For the reasons set out below, their argument 
is not persuasive. 
It may be conceded that none of the abovementioned cases expressly applied the 
requirements of vicarious liability to the facts. Emphasis was placed on the legal duties 
of the employer and the necessity of holding the employer accountable. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that the court sought to hold the state directly liable. 
Indeed, it ought to be remembered that these cases focused on only one of the three 
requirements for vicariously liable, namely whether the state employees had 
committed a delict. More specifically, the central question was whether the respective 
employees’ negligent failure to prevent harm could be regarded as wrongful. The other 
two requirements – the existence of an employer-employee relationship and 
determining whether the employee’s delict had occurred in the course and scope of 
their employment – was not in issue and therefore required no attention. If they did, it 
would perhaps have been more apparent that the court dealt with vicarious liability, 
which would have placed an end to any question regarding the nature of the state’s 
liability then and there. 
It was in the context of determining wrongfulness that the court took into account 
various legal and public policy considerations, constitutional rights and norms. The 
focus on the nature of the state’s legal duties was a relevant consideration within this 
framework, because, at the very least, it also shaped and informed the duties of its 
employees and thus the wrongfulness of their respective failures to execute their 
duties to prevent crime. The reference by the SCA to the state’s legal duties is not 
convincing evidence that the court sought to hold the state directly liable, but may be 
regarded as a relevant consideration in the determination of wrongfulness and 
ultimately whether a delict had been committed – one of the three requirements for 
vicarious liability. 
It is contended that this interpretation of these cases, and therefore also the nature of 
the state’s delictual liability in cases dealing with the negligent, wrongful failure of state 
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employees to prevent crime, is aligned with the actual statements recorded in the 
various judgments. For instance, in Van Duivenboden, Nugent JA concluded his 
reasoning on the question of wrongfulness as follows: the “negligent conduct of police 
officers in [the] circumstances [of the case was] thus actionable and the State [should 
therefore be held] vicariously liable for the consequences of any such negligence”.130 
In Van Eeden the court was not requested to consider the nature of the state’s delictual 
liability because the Minister of Safety and Security conceded vicarious liability. 
Accordingly, Vivier ADP did not deal with any of the requirements for vicarious liability. 
Likewise, in Carmichele SCA, Harms JA paid no attention to the requirements for 
vicarious liability and quoted extensively from Nugent JA’s judgment in Van 
Duivenboden to confirm the existence of legal duties on the part of the state employer. 
This was done in an attempt to determine wrongfulness. Harms JA concluded that the 
“vicarious liability of the Ministers is not in issue.”131  
In conclusion, this dissertation supports the argument made by Neethling and 
Potgieter, namely that the nature of the state’s delictual liability in the Van 
Duivenboden series of cases is, and continues to be, vicarious. Whereas it might be 
possible to hold the state directly liable in the line of cases dealing with the 
intentionally-committed crimes of state employees, the courts do not appear likely to 
entertain this notion. At any rate, as mentioned above, the debate is of an academic 
nature and it has failed to address the pertinent issue, which is that, whether direct or 
vicarious, the state’s liability for harm arising from crime – actually committed by third 
parties – have expanded considerably and continue to do so. From a crime victim 
compensation perspective, the focus should therefore be on the following question: is 
this a satisfactory situation or should it be rethought with a view to investigating an 
alternative solution? Before concentrating specifically on answering this question,132 
this section of the chapter (focusing on the expansion of state delictual liability for the 
negligent, wrongful failure of state employees to prevent crime) will be concluded with 
an evaluation of the criticism of the SCA’s reasoning in Van Duivenboden. 
 
                                                          
130 2002 (2) SA 431 (SCA) para 22 (own emphasis).  
131 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA) footnote 14 (own emphasis).  
132 This question receives specific attention in paragraphs 2.2.1.1.4 and 2.2.1.2.5 below. 
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e. An evaluation of criticism of the state’s expanded delictual liability for the 
negligent and wrongful failure of its employees to prevent crime 
 
i. Fagan’s criticism: the instrumentalisation of state employees and the 
production of arbitrary outcomes   
Besides inviting a debate on the nature of its liability, the expansion of the state’s 
delictual liability arising from the negligent, wrongful failure of its employees to prevent 
crime has received criticism which, briefly stated, maintains that the reasoning in Van 
Duivenboden instrumentalises state employees and suggests that it may produce 
arbitrary outcomes in future cases.  
Fagan has criticised the Van Duivenboden reasoning as “instrumentaliz[ing] the state 
employee whose failure properly to do his or her job happens to cause the state’s 
failure to discharge its constitutionally-imposed protective duty.”133 In line with the 
argument raised by Du Bois and Wagener and discussed in the preceding section, 
Fagan suggests that, in its decision to impose vicarious liability on the state, the court 
was required to consider the conduct of the state’s employees and whether their 
negligent failure to act amounted to the wrongful causation of the plaintiff’s harm. 
However, he argues, the court failed to do so and, according to him, imposed vicarious 
liability on the basis of certain legal duties owed by the state employer to the public.  
He maintains that, because the court emphasised the nature of the employer’s duties, 
paid little attention to the nature of their employees’ conduct and paid almost no 
attention to the question whether the employees breached their respective legal 
duties, the court’s approach ultimately amounts to treating the state employees as the 
mere instruments of their employers. The employees are treated not as ends in 
themselves but as a means to an end; “that end being the need to hold the state 
accountable for its failure to discharge its duty.”134 This is ironic, he argues, because 
the CC, “applauded for putting dignity at the centre of its jurisprudence”,135 has 
herewith “initiated a development in the law of delict which is wholly at odds with 
                                                          
133 Fagan (2008) SALJ 669-670. 
134 670. 
135 671. 
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that.”136 Before evaluating this criticism, consider the example he uses to illustrate his 
argument.137  
Suppose that the Mountain Club of South Africa (“MCSA”), having grown weary of the 
ongoing criminal activity on Table Mountain, decided to employ security guards to 
improve the safety on the mountain. Suppose further that security guard A is required 
by his employment contract to secure a specific area on the mountain each morning 
on weekdays. If he fails to do so, the MCSA may terminate his contract. B, a hiker, is 
assaulted one morning during the week in the area which A is required to secure. At 
the time A was sleeping under a bush while he was supposed to be on duty in a 
neighbouring ravine.  
Fagan contends that an attempt by B to argue that A has committed a delict (and thus 
to hold the MCSA vicariously liable) would fail because, although A’s failure to prevent 
the crime may be regarded as negligent, the causation of B’s harm cannot be viewed 
as wrongful.138 In contrast, he suggests, if A’s employer was not a private organisation 
aimed at improving security on the mountain but the Minister of Safety and Security, 
then B’s prospects of success with a delictual claim against A would improve 
significantly. The likelihood of successfully instituting such a delictual claim increases 
because, according to him, B would then be entitled to rely on the reasoning developed 
in Van Duivenboden. Fagan explains:139 
“So, [the security guard] did not act wrongfully and thus committed no delict because he was 
employed by the MCSA. But he would have acted wrongfully and would thus have committed 
a delict if he had been employed by the state. And the only reason for the difference in the law’s 
treatment of [the security guard] is one that has nothing to do with him or what he did or did not 
do. For the only reason for the difference is that, in the latter but not the former case, [the guard] 
is capable of being used as an instrument or vehicle for attributing liability to the state.”   
Fagan therefore implies that the reasoning by the court in Van Duivenboden may 
produce arbitrary outcomes in the application of the vicarious liability doctrine: 
whereas the state may be held vicariously liable for the negligent failure of the police 
officer to prevent crime, vicarious liability will not be imposed on the MCSA for their 
guard’s similar negligent failure. Also, he objects to the reasoning because it 
                                                          
136 671. 
137 670-671. 
138 670.  
139 670-671. 
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instrumentalises the employee, as a result of which the employee’s dignity is also 
undermined. The following section responds to these criticisms.  
 
ii. An evaluation of Fagan’s criticism regarding the reasoning in Van 
Duivenboden   
First, in reaction to the argument that the Van Duivenboden reasoning may produce 
arbitrary outcomes: the assertion that the crime victim’s claim against the MCSA would 
fail because the plaintiff would not be able to prove wrongfulness is not substantiated 
other than by implying that the plaintiff would not be entitled to rely on the Van 
Duivenboden reasoning. However, it is not self-evident that the security guard’s 
negligent failure to prevent harm could not be viewed as wrongful and that the MCSA, 
in turn, could not be held vicariously liable.   
To assess his argument, it is worthwhile to restate the approach to determining 
wrongfulness. In Le Roux v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative 
Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) the CC held as follows:140  
“In the more recent past our courts have come to recognise […] that in the context of the law 
of delict: (a) the criterion of wrongfulness ultimately depends on a judicial determination of 
whether — assuming all the other elements of delictual liability to be present — it would 
be reasonable to impose liability on a defendant for the damages flowing from specific 
conduct; and (b) that the judicial determination of that reasonableness would in turn depend 
on considerations of public and legal policy in accordance with constitutional norms.” 
Therefore, whether a specific guard’s negligent failure to prevent crime may be 
regarded as wrongful for the purposes of determining his personal delictual liability will 
depend on an array of policy considerations and constitutional norms. Arguably, one 
relevant consideration is the nature of the employee’s duty, which, in turn, may be 
deduced from the employment contract concluded by the employer and the employee 
as well as paying attention to the nature of the employer’s duties. In other words, one 
of the considerations that may inform the court’s value judgment concerning the 
reasonableness of imposing delictual liability on the employee may be the nature of 
the employer’s duties.  
                                                          
140 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 122. See also Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
2016 (3) SA 528 (CC) para 23; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department Of Infrastructure 
Development 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 21; Loureiro v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 
394 (CC) para 53. 
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Returning to Fagan’s example, the question seems to be whether, having regard to 
legal and public policy considerations as well as constitutional norms, it would be 
reasonable to impose delictual liability on the MCSA guard for his negligent failure to 
prevent the crime in the gorge. On the facts given in his example, it may be that a court 
would not impose delictual liability on the guard. However, this does not mean that the 
application of the reasoning in Van Duivenboden will result in arbitrary outcomes in 
different cases. It merely illustrates the application of the criteria laid down for 
wrongfulness: because the policy considerations and constitutional norms that are at 
play in establishing wrongfulness may differ from one factual scenario to another, 
different outcomes may be reached. When dealing with a police officer, the 
considerations mentioned in Van Duivenboden will necessarily be applicable, while 
they do not necessarily find application when the court assesses the MCSA guard’s 
negligent failure.  
In other words, the different outcomes that may be reached in similar situations are a 
function of the application of the broader wrongfulness enquiry. The production of 
different results is not because the law’s treatment of the MCSA security guard is due 
to a reason that has “nothing to do with him or what he did or did not do.”141 On the 
contrary, the application of the wrongfulness enquiry takes due notice of what he did 
and what he was required to do. In this context it is worthwhile to emphasise that a 
MCSA guard, unlike a police officer, is not tasked with a statutory and constitutional 
duty to protect members of the public from crime. The fact that delictual liability may 
be imposed on a police officer in any of the abovementioned cases, but refused with 
regards to the MCSA guard in Fagan’s example – despite the fact that both negligently 
fail to comply with their respective duties – may therefore be justified on the basis that 
what they are required to do differ in a fundamental way.  
Lastly, it might also be said that, under different factual conditions, a MCSA guard’s 
negligent failure to prevent crime could be regarded as wrongful, notwithstanding the 
fact that his employer is not tasked with the same constitutional duties as the state. 
This could occur where there are other policy considerations that warrant the 
imposition of delictual liability. For example, it may be the case that a special 
relationship of trust comes to exist between the MCSA, its guards and hikers on Table 
                                                          
141 Fagan (2008) SALJ 670-671. 
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Mountain.142 Furthermore, it could be argued that the expectation was created that the 
plaintiff’s interests would be protected, at least insofar as his bodily integrity is 
concerned and that such a consideration warrants the imposition of delictual liability.143 
Perhaps the fact that the area in which the assault occurred was under the control of 
the MCSA could be taken into account.144 Fagan’s apparent view that a MCSA guard’s 
negligent failure to prevent the harm could never be considered as wrongful must 
therefore be rejected. 
 
iii. Testing Fagan’s criticism of the reasoning in Van Duivenboden against 
recent judgments relating to the negligent failure of private security guards 
to prevent crime 
Moving attention slightly away from Fagan’s example, it may be considered what the 
situation would be if the guard in question was appointed by a private security 
company. Could the negligent failure of such a guard to prevent harm be regarded as 
wrongful? If not, would it mean that the Van Duivenboden reasoning indeed produces 
arbitrary outcomes?  
To answer these questions, we may first examine the judgment of the SCA in Viv’s 
Tippers (Edms) Bpk v Pha Phama Staff Services (Edms) Bpk t/a Pha Phama Security 
(“Viv’s Tippers”),145 where the plaintiff’s motor vehicle was stolen from premises in 
respect of which the occupier had contracted with a company to provide security 
services. The SCA had to consider whether the owner of the vehicle could institute a 
delictual claim against the security services company for the harm it had suffered as 
a result of the negligent failure by the company’s security guard to keep the vehicle 
safe. Categorising the theft of the vehicle as pure economic loss, the court considered 
whether it would be reasonable to impose delictual liability on the security guard and, 
                                                          
142 Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 901 (N); Bayer 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 559 (A).  
143 Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 520 (W); Longueira v 
Securitas of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 258 (W). 
144 Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe 1994 (4) SA 347 (A).  
145 (2010) (4) SA 455 (SCA). 
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in turn, vicarious liability, on his employer.146 Accordingly, the court considered the 
following policy reasons. 
First, Lewis JA held that the guard’s control over the truck at the time of the theft, the 
reasonable foreseeability of the harm as well as its preventability were irrelevant legal 
considerations within this context.147  Further, she took the view that imposing liability 
in casu might lead to an unwarranted increase in the fees charged by private security 
firms and, also that it may potentially expose the providers of security services to 
unlimited liability.148 In the judgment of Lewis JA, these policy considerations weighed 
against the imposition of liability on the security guard and wrongfulness was thus 
denied. 
In addition, the court took into account the role played by an exclusion clause in the 
contract between the security services company and the party in occupation of the 
premises. This clause excluded the security services company’s liability against third 
parties for any harm arising from the provision of security services. Despite earlier 
judgments that stated otherwise, Lewis JA held that the exclusion clause in the 
security services agreement operated effectively as against the non-contracting 
plaintiff:149 
“How can the contractual arrangement between the owner of the premises and the security 
provider be irrelevant to the question whether a duty should be imposed on the security provider 
to third parties whose property is stolen? [...] The terms of that contract must, in my view, play a 
role in assessing what the convictions of the community would be in relation to affording a claim 
for compensation to a non-contracting party.” 
 
Therefore, even though the SCA seemed to indicate that, on policy grounds, the 
security guard’s negligent failure to prevent crime did not amount to wrongfulness, the 
court held that the exclusion clause in any event indemnified the security services 
company from any potential delictual claim brought against it by a third party victim of 
crime.  
                                                          
146 This categorisation was subsequently rejected by the SCA in Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v 
Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) para 37. 
147 Viv’s Tippers (Edms) Bpk v Pha Phama Staff Services (Edms) Bpk t/a Pha Phama Security (2010) 
(4) SA 455 (SCA) para 12. See also A Price “The Contract/Delict Interface in the Constitutional Court” 
(2014) 25 Stellenbosch Law Review 501-510. 
148 (2010) (4) SA 455 (SCA) para 26. 
149 Para 13. 
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At first glance, one may regard the outcome reached in Viv’s Tippers in respect of 
wrongfulness as giving support to Fagan’s claim that the Van Duivenboden reasoning 
may produce arbitrary outcomes. Along this line, it may be argued that, if the security 
guard was employed by the Minister of Safety and Security, then his negligent failure 
to prevent crime would have been regarded as wrongful which, in turn, would have 
facilitated the imposition of vicarious liability. However, because A is employed by a 
private security services company, the court cannot rely on the Van Duivenboden 
reasoning.  
For the reasons set out below, it is argued that the SCA’s conclusion regarding the 
wrongfulness of the security guard’s negligent failure to prevent crime in Viv’s Tippers 
does not mean that Fagan is correct in implying that the application of the Van 
Duivenboden reasoning produces arbitrary outcomes in similar factual scenarios. 
First, in Viv’s Tippers, the SCA arguably reached the wrong conclusion regarding 
wrongfulness. It may be argued that the control which the guard exerted over the 
relevant truck was a consideration pointing in favour of imposing liability.150 
Furthermore, Lewis JA’s contention that reasonable foreseeability and reasonable 
preventability were irrelevant considerations in the context of wrongfulness is not in 
line with established precedent.151 In fact, it is at odds with her own earlier judgment 
in Premier, Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd, where she 
asserted that the “foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is also a relevant consideration 
in the determination of lawfulness”.152 Additionally, it could be argued that the creation 
of an expectation or impression that the security services company would protect the 
plaintiff’s interests was a policy consideration pointing towards imposing delictual 
liability.153 
Another consideration that led the court to deny wrongfulness, the so-called fear of 
unlimited liability, is exaggerated. Since the court first handed down a decision in this 
                                                          
150 Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard 1990 (2) SA 520 (W) 526-527; Leon Bekaert 
Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Rauties Transport (Pty) Ltd 1984 (1) SA 814 (W). 
151 See Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 223; Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 65-66. 
152 Premier, Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd (41/2002) [2003] ZASCA 42 paras 
42, 46 (references omitted).   
153 Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard 1990 (2) SA 520 (W); Loubser & Midgley (eds) The 
Law of Delict 222; Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 72-73. 
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context in Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard,154 there has only been 
one other decision in which a plaintiff has brought a delictual claim for damages 
following the theft of his motor vehicle after the negligent, wrongful failure of a security 
guard to prevent crime.155 This hardly constitutes a flood of litigation.  
In other words, if the court had taken the above considerations into account, it could 
easily have arrived at the conclusion the security guard’s negligent failure to prevent 
crime was wrongful on the facts, regardless of the Van Duivenboden reasoning or the 
fact that the guard was not an employee of the state.  
Lastly, the court’s interpretation of the role which the exclusion clause played may be 
rejected on the basis that it seems contestable to argue that an exclusion clause in a 
contract between A and B may affect the delictual liability of A as against C.  
There is another reason why the judgment in Viv’s Tippers should not be seen as 
providing support for Fagan’s argument, which comes to the fore in a subsequent 
judgment by the CC and which also dealt with the provision of security services by a 
private security company. In Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 
(“Loureiro”),156 the plaintiffs instituted delictual and contractual claims against the 
defendant, a private security company for the harm it had suffered after an on-duty 
security guard employed by the latter had allowed armed robbers, pretending to be 
police officers, into the plaintiffs’ residence whereafter they assaulted the plaintiffs and 
stole some of their property totalling approximately R11 million.  
The CC held that, taking into account policy considerations and constitutional norms, 
the security guard’s negligent failure to prevent crime was wrongful.157 It reasoned as 
follows:158  
“There are ample public policy reasons in favour of imposing liability. The constitutional rights 
to personal safety and protection from theft of or damage to one’s property are compelling 
normative considerations. There is a great public interest in making sure that private security 
companies and their guards, in assuming the role of crime prevention for remuneration, 
succeed in thwarting avoidable harm. If they are too easily insulated from claims for these 
harms because of mistakes on their side, they would have little incentive to conduct 
themselves in a way that avoids causing harm. And policy objectives (such as the deterrent 
                                                          
154 1990 (2) SA 520 (W). 
155 Longueira v Securitas of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 258 (W). 
156 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC). 
157 Para 55. 
158 Para 56. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
68 
 
effect of liability) underpin one of the purposes of imposing delictual liability. The convictions 
of the community as to policy and law clearly motivate for liability to be imposed.” 
This conclusion was reached despite the fact that the role of the private security 
service industry was distinguished from that of the state, even though it fulfilled 
functions comparable to those falling within the domain of the police.159 Nevertheless, 
this distinction – concerning the difference in the duties of the state and a private 
security services company as employers, and the resultant, differentiating effect this 
may have on the duties of respective entities’ employees – did not lead the court to 
produce a different outcome to the one reached in Van Duivenboden.  
Loureiro therefore provides a positive answer to the first question phrased above: the 
negligent failure of a private company’s security guard to prevent crime could be 
regarded as wrongful. In fact, it is arguable that this extract suggests that some of the 
constitutional rights highlighted in the Van Duivenboden series of cases may similarly 
apply where the guard is appointed by a private security services company and not 
the state. The court makes reference to the “constitutional rights to personal safety 
and protection from theft of or damage to one’s property”,160 which conceivably 
includes those rights referred to in Van Duivenboden (see paragraph 2.2.1.1.2 above). 
In summary, this judgment undermines the validity of Fagan’s argument.  
 
iv. Concluding remarks on Fagan’s criticism regarding the reasoning in Van 
Duivenboden   
Recent case law appears to support the view that the difference between the identity 
of a private security guard and a police officer does not automatically mean that the 
reasoning in Van Duivenboden produces arbitrary outcomes. If the Minister of Safety 
and Security is held vicariously liable because on certain facts his employee’s 
negligent failure to prevent crime is regarded as wrongful, but a private security 
services company is not held vicariously for the negligent failure of one of its guards 
to prevent crime in comparable circumstances, it does not mean that the different 
outcomes may be labelled as arbitrary. Instead, the different outcomes will be a 
                                                          
159 Paras 3-4. 
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function of the application of the established criteria for wrongfulness, i.e. relevant 
policy considerations and constitutional rights.  
Furthermore, this appears to be theoretically sound considering the fact that there may 
very well be significant differences between scenarios where the Minister of Safety 
and Security is the employer as opposed to a private security company. One such 
difference lies in the fact that a police officer has a constitutional duty to protect all 
members of the public from crime, whereas a private security guard’s duties are set 
out in the contract which it concludes with his employer.161 As opposed to a general 
duty to promote safety and security for all members of the public and to prevent crime 
to all members of the public, the private security guard’s duties are circumscribed by 
the contract it (or typically its employer) concluded with a contracting party who pays 
for those limited services. In addition to limiting the number of people to whom the duty 
is owed, the security services contract may also limit the manner, place and time in 
which such a duty is required to be performed. Although both the security services 
company and the state have crime prevention duties, there is a considerable 
difference in the nature and scope of these duties. This, in turn, may have a significant 
impact on the duties expected to be performed by the employees of the two entities. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that, when determining whether the employee’s 
negligent failure to prevent harm is wrongful, courts may have regard to the 
constitutional norm of state accountability. This consideration is absent in the case of 
a private security services company, presumably because, among other things, these 
companies do not exercise a public power and do not owe their duties to all members 
of the public. If a security services company breaches the terms of its contract, 
accountability will follow in the form of contractual liability.  
Against this background, it does not appear problematic that in one case a police 
officer’s negligent failure to prevent crime will be regarded as wrongful whereas a 
security guard’s negligent failure may not be so regarded.  
Fagan also criticised the Van Duivenboden reasoning because it apparently 
instrumentalises employees. In response, as argued above, an employee’s 
contractual duty to his employer should also be a relevant legal consideration when 
                                                          
161 See also Price (2014) Stellenbosch Law Review 509.  
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determining wrongfulness for the purposes of delictual liability towards third parties. 
Obviously, the nature of the employee’s duties will be informed by the nature of his 
employer’s identity. Therefore, the court will focus on the work that the employee has 
elected, and is required to do, as well as other relevant considerations related to his 
failure to prevent harm. Viewed from this perspective, the employer’s identity becomes 
a relevant consideration without instrumentalising the employee and it accordingly 
cannot be said that the court will ignore the employee’s dignity. For these reasons, 
Fagan’s instrumentalisation argument should also be resisted.  
In summary, the finding of delictual liability in respect of a police officer who negligently 
fails to prevent harm is a function of the application of the wrongfulness enquiry, i.e. 
taking into account legal and public policy considerations and constitutional norms to 
decide whether it is reasonable to impose liability on the relevant negligent officer. 
Consequently, it may be said that the reasoning in Van Duivenboden does not produce 
arbitrary outcomes insofar as the employer’s identity and the concomitant legal duties 
may be interpreted as influencing the question whether the failure to prevent harm 
from crime is wrongful. Similarly, taking these considerations into account as a part of 
the wrongfulness enquiry does not amount to the instrumentalisation of the state 
employee.   
 
2.2.1.1.4 Conclusion: the expansion of the state’s delictual liability due to the 
negligent and wrongful failure of state employees to prevent crime 
Carmichele CC was widely recognised as introducing a favourable development within 
the South African law of delict.162 It also paved the way for the expansion of state 
delictual liability for its employees’ negligent and wrongful failure to prevent crime. 
This expansion occurred by developing the law relating to the wrongfulness of an 
omission, with the courts holding that the existing common-law criterion had to be 
informed by constitutional rights, duties and underlying norms. It was the constitutional 
imperatives relating to the promotion of safety and security, the norm of state 
accountability, and other fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights that 
ultimately proved decisive. Essentially, these considerations persuaded courts to 
                                                          
162 Neethling (2005) TSAR 409; Midgley & Leinius (2002) SALJ 27.  
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impose delictual liability on negligent employees and, because the other requirements 
for vicarious liability had also been satisfied, it was uncontentious to take the additional 
step and impose vicarious liability on the state.  
Various aspects of the series of cases which has had the effect of expanding state 
delictual liability have received attention from scholars. As explained above, the nature 
of the state’s liability in delict (direct or vicarious) has been questioned. However, 
despite academic and limited judicial support, courts have continued to impose 
vicarious liability on the state where its employees negligently and wrongfully failed to 
prevent crime.163 Furthermore, in this debate the broader question whether the 
continued expansion of state delictual liability provides a satisfactory solution to the 
issue of crime victim compensation, has not been considered. That question will be 
examined here and also in paragraph 2.2.1.2.5 below.  
The point of view supported in this dissertation is that the constitutional development 
of this branch of the law is theoretically sound and that the individual outcomes 
reached in each of the discussed cases is unproblematic insofar as it has provided 
compensation to the individual plaintiffs involved. However, for the reasons set out 
below, it is argued that the continued expansion of state delictual liability for harm 
arising from crime in this context is undesirable.  
In all four of the cases the direct cause of the plaintiff’s harm was the wrongful and 
culpable conduct of a criminal: Coetzee was responsible for assaulting Carmichele, 
Mohamed assaulted, raped and robbed Van Eeden, Brooks shot Van Duivenboden 
and McArdell shot Hamilton. Notwithstanding the possibility of instituting a delictual 
claim against the criminal, all of the plaintiffs elected to follow a more indirect route in 
pursuit of the reparation of their harm and they argued that the state should be held 
delictually liable on the basis that its employees negligently and wrongfully failed to 
prevent crime. Considering the likelihood of success of instituting a delictual claim 
against each of the respective criminals, the decision to sue the state, in all probability, 
must have been made for financial reasons. Compared to the potential impecuniosity 
                                                          
163 For example, see PE v Ikwezi Municipality 2016 (5) SA 114 (ECG); Minister of Safety and Security 
v Booysen (35/2016) [2016] ZASCA 201; Minister of Defence v Von Benecke 2013 (2) SA 361 (SCA); 
Giesecke & Devrient Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (2) SA 137 (SCA). 
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of the various criminals, the state, with its deep pockets, could offer successful litigants 
full compensation for all of the harm they had suffered.  
The expanding state delictual liability presents a particularly thorny financial dilemma: 
in holding the state vicariously liable for the culpable wrongdoing of an employee and 
ordering it to pay the crime victim’s full damages, it is the taxpayer who ultimately bears 
the cost. However, if tax-money allocated for the furtherance of safety and security 
(e.g. employing more police officials) is used to pay the victim’s compensation or to 
settle civil litigation suits, then less funds will obviously be available, in the case of the 
police, to prevent crime and promote safety and security.164 For instance, it is thought 
that the increasing civil litigation against the SAPS may lead to the retrenchment of 
3000 police officials in the next three years.165 Increased litigation, which follows the 
widening of the state’s liability, may therefore result in a decreased ability to prevent 
crime. This, in turn, serves to further increase the likelihood of a higher crime rate and 
the accompanying litigation which may be instituted against the state on the basis that 
it failed to prevent crime. 
This state of affairs is reflected in a report which asserts that between 2007/2008 and 
2014/2015, “claims made annually against the SAPS increased by 533% if considering 
the original rand value, or 313% if adjusted to the same rand value”.166 This report, 
and its implications, will be discussed in further detail in chapter 4.167 For present 
purposes, it suffices to note that the practical and financial implications of a persistently 
expanding state liability, may significantly undermine crime prevention efforts and, if 
left unaltered, may eventually completely exhaust the resources allocated for safety 
and security, potentially also rendering future crime victims without compensation in 
the process.   
Finally, it is important to note two recent judgments which further emphasise the 
continuing expansion of state delictual liability and which illustrate the potentially 
crippling effects that may accompany it. Consider Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
                                                          
164 See P Atiyah The Damages Lottery (1996) 80-81. 
165 L Prince “R14,6 mjd. se siviele eise teen polisie in boekjaar” (20 April 2017) available at 
<http://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Politiek/r146-mjd-se-siviele-eise-teen-polisie-in-boekjaar-
20170420> (accessed on 20 April 2017). 
166 31.  
167 Paragraph 4.2.3.5. 
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Development v X (“X”),168 the facts of which closely resembled those in Carmichele 
(SCA). Here the court held the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development as 
well as the Minister of Safety and Security vicariously liable on the basis that the 
wrongful and negligent failure of their employees to oppose the bail application of one 
Steyn caused him to be released on his own recognisance, allowing him the 
opportunity to abduct and rape the plaintiff’s minor daughter.  
In the cases preceding X, the court clearly took the view that the state employees’ 
negligent failure to prevent the crime victims’ harm was not prima facie wrongful for 
the purposes of delictual liability,169 which meant that the plaintiff was required to prove 
wrongfulness in each case. This was achieved by making and proving factual 
allegations from which wrongfulness can be determined.170 The reports of these cases 
also illustrated that, in the process, courts took into account, and weighed against each 
other, relevant legal and public policy considerations and constitutional norms to 
determine whether delictual liability should be imposed on the state employee (which 
would enable it to impose vicarious liability on the employer).  
That approach is commendable because it proves that the court is conscious of the 
possibility that the continued expansion of state delictual liability may have a chilling 
effect on policing resources and the effective combating of crime.171  In X, however, 
although the court mentioned the constitutional rights highlighted in Van Duivenboden, 
it failed to pay any attention to the policy considerations that were underlined by the 
earlier series of cases, or to mention the constitutional norm of accountability. Instead, 
it held “that unless public-policy considerations point in the other direction, an action 
for damages would be the norm.”172  
The meaning of the statement that an action for damages has become the norm under 
these circumstances is not entirely clear. The statement stops short of suggesting that, 
in instances where police officers have negligently failed to prevent crime, 
wrongfulness will be presumed. Nevertheless, it could be interpreted as implying a 
                                                          
168 2015 (1) SA 25 (SCA).  
169 See also Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 (2) SA 150 (SCA) 
156; Le Roux v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 
2011 (3) SA 274 (CC). 
170 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 143. 
171 See Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) para 19. 
172 Para 18.  
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subtle shift towards that development. If the remark by the SCA in X is interpreted in 
this way, it indeed signals the court’s readiness to continue the further expansion of 
the state’s vicarious liability in delict for harm arising from crime.  
In Bridgman NO v Witzenberg Municipality,173 a young woman aged 18 who suffered 
from a mild mental disability, was abducted and raped by three youths on the premises 
of Pine Forest Holiday Resort in Ceres.  The resort was owned, managed and 
controlled by the Witzenberg Municipality. In his capacity as the curator ad litem of the 
rape victim, the plaintiff instituted a common-law delictual claim against the 
Municipality, arguing that the rape was caused by the negligent and wrongful omission 
of the Municipality. The High Court commenced its judgment with the following 
statement:174  
“It is the duty of the state, as well as the courts, to address the conditions that enable and continue 
to underlie this violence, and to prevent its repetition. This duty arises from the constitutional 
obligation upon the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights; from 
the binding nature of the Bill on the legislature, executive, judiciary and all organs of state; and 
from the duty upon courts to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill when developing 
the common law. The Constitutional Court has held that the Constitution and international law 
oblige the state to prevent gender-based discrimination and to protect the dignity, freedom, and 
security of women. Such constitutional obligations do not only fall on the South African Police 
Service. They must be respected and fulfilled by all organs of state. […] The resort was owned, 
managed and controlled by the Witzenberg Municipality. A municipality is an organ of state within 
the local sphere of government. As such it is bound to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
aforementioned rights in the Bill of Rights. The Municipality failed to protect Ms L from being 
raped. The wrongfulness of this omission is tested by reference to the legal convictions of the 
community, which by necessity are underpinned and informed by the norms and values of our 
society embodied in the Constitution. Because of its constitutional duties, and because it owned, 
managed and controlled the resort in the circumstances described further below, the failure on 
the part of the Municipality to prevent the rape was unlawful.” 
Significantly, the court was of the view that, similar to the SAPS, the municipality has 
a constitutional duty to prevent crime and that this duty was sufficient to conclude that 
the failure to prevent the plaintiff’s harm was wrongful for delictual purposes – without 
considering any other policy considerations. This finding is far-reaching and could 
potentially expose South African municipalities to expansive delictual liability, with a 
multiplicity of similar claims being instituted on a similar basis. If this occurs, 
municipalities may have substantially fewer funds available to provide citizens with 
basic services relating to housing, electricity, water and sanitation.  
                                                          
173 2017 (3) SA 435 (WCC). 
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In addition to the outcome being undesirable from a practical level, the court’s 
reasoning may also be questioned on the basis that it would be illogical to expect all 
state organs to assume the same responsibilities in relation to crime prevention and 
safety and security. In truth, the existence of a variety of state organs bears testament 
to the fact that various organs are assigned different tasks. To expect municipalities 
to perform the duties of the police is unrealistic and, as suggested, could produce 
unwarranted consequences.  
Although not based expressly on the reasoning in the Van Duivenboden series of 
cases, this judgment illustrates the exceedingly broad contours of state liability which 
may follow if the current development of this branch of the law continues. Against this 
background, it is perhaps not unsurprising that, in his initial commentary regarding the 
judgment in Van Duivenboden, Neethling remarked:175  
“The ever expanding responsibility of the state to protect the right to physical-psychological integrity 
in the light of the Constitution and the state's ensuing delictual liability to compensate the victims 
of violent crimes, could eventually lead to the creation of a state compensation scheme, similar to 
the scheme which the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime have 
in mind for European Union member states, for South Africa.”  
It may therefore be considered whether there are other alternatives for providing 
compensation to crime victims in this context. Before doing so, the issue of the state’s 
expanding delictual liability must first be investigated in full and attention must 
therefore be paid to the extension of the state’s liability for harm suffered due to crimes 
intentionally committed by its employees. 
 
2.2.1.2 The expansion of the state’s delictual liability for harm suffered due to 
intentionally-committed crimes of its employees 
2.2.1.2.1 Introduction 
In this section the focus turns to the judicial expansion of state delictual liability for the 
harm arising from intentionally-committed crimes of state employees.176 In contrast to 
                                                          
175 Neethling (2003) TSAR 792 (own translation). Neethling writes: “Die steeds uitdyende 
verantwoordelikheid van die staat om die reg op die fisies-psigiese integriteit in die lig van die grondwet 
te beskerm, en die staat se daaruit voortvloeiende deliktuele aanspreeklikheid om die slagoffers van 
geweldsmisdade te vergoed, kan uiteindelik daartoe lei dat ŉ staatsvergoedingskema, soortgelyk aan 
die skema wat die European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes vir Europese 
Unie-lidlande in die oog het, ook vir Suid-Afrika in die lewe geroep word.” 
176 See K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA); K v Minister of Safety and Security 
2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA); F v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). 
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the extension of state liability described and evaluated in paragraph 2.2.1.1 above, the 
growth of state liability in this context did not occur through the element of 
wrongfulness. Instead, it was enabled by the development of the third requirement for 
vicarious liability which holds that the delict must have been committed during the 
course and within the scope of employment.  
This development, as indicated below, is significant, and means that the state may 
now be held vicariously liable in delict for harm arising from an intentional, criminal 
abandonment of an employment duty. The CC has thereby departed from the South 
African courts’ initial unwillingness to impose vicarious liability in similar 
circumstances.177 This part of the chapter provides the background against which the 
development occurred and will then evaluate it. 
 
2.2.1.2.2 The background: South African courts’ initial unwillingness to impose 
vicarious liability on employers for the intentionally-committed crimes 
of employees  
Generally, employers may be held vicariously liable for delicts committed by their 
employees during the course and within the scope of their employment, even in the 
event that employees perform tasks authorised by employers in an unauthorised 
manner.178 However, it is often problematic to determine whether a delict occurred 
within the course and scope of employment in so-called deviation cases. Typically, 
these are cases where an employee intentionally engages in conduct that could be 
described as a deviation from the tasks for which he was appointed.179  
For a considerable period of time Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall180 (“Feldman”) was the 
leading case in establishing the third requirement for vicarious liability in deviation 
cases.181 In determining whether this requirement has been met, the Appellate 
Division focused on the nature of the employee’s duties and the degree of deviation 
                                                          
177 Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1998 (4) SA 1102 (W); 
Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 372 (SCA); Minister van Veiligheid 
en Sekuriteit v Phoebus Apollo Aviation BK 2002 (5) SA 475 (SCA); Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 (4) SA 34 (SCA); K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 
(3) SA 179 (SCA). 
178 Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 (4) SA 34 (SCA). 
179 See Loubser & Midgley (eds) Law of Delict 389-392. 
180 1945 AD 733. 
181 Wagener Vicarious Liability 107-108. 
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therefrom. The approach adopted in Feldman has been described as the so-called 
abandonment of duty-approach,182 and is explained as follows:183  
“It must be established whether the actions of the employee boils down to ‘a complete 
relinquishment or abandonment of his duties in favour of some activity of his own’. For the 
purposes of answering this question, it does not matter whether the employee deviated so as 
to pursue his exclusively subjective purposes. It is important, however, to determine whether it 
may reasonably be stated that the employee, despite deviating for his own interest, completely 
distanced him from his obligations.”  
After Feldman, the Appellate Division formulated the so-called standard test for 
establishing vicarious liability in deviation cases in Minister of Police v Rabie184 
(“Rabie”):185  
“It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes, although 
occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course and scope of his employment, and 
that in deciding whether an act by a servant does so fall, some reference is to be made to the 
servant’s intention. The test in this regard is subjective. On the other hand, if there is 
nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the servant’s acts for his own interests and 
purposes and the business of his master, the master may yet be liable. This is an objective 
test.”   
Applying this test, the court held that a police sergeant, employed by the South African 
Police Service as a mechanic, had wrongfully assaulted, arrested and detained the 
plaintiff, while also fabricating charges against the latter. The assault and arrest had 
taken place when the sergeant had been off-duty, dressed in civilian clothing, in his 
private vehicle and in pursuance of his own private interests.  
In determining whether the Minister should be held vicariously liable for the harm 
arising from the sergeant’s intentionally-committed crime, the court held that, although 
the sergeant’s work as a mechanic was limited to a time and place, his work as a 
policeman was not so restricted.186 In the absence of specific instructions to the 
contrary, the sergeant could at any time and place perform his functions as a 
policeman, and, in certain circumstances, he might have been called upon to do so in 
the line of duty.187 On the facts, he had identified himself as a policeman to the plaintiff 
and intended to act as such in effecting the arrest. As such, it seemed reasonable and 
fair to infer that the sergeant intended to exercise his authority as a policeman, and 
                                                          
182 Scott Middellike Aanspreeklikheid 159-160; Wagener Vicarious Liability 105-106, 117-118.  
183 Scott Middellike Aanspreeklikheid 159-160. Own translation and sources omitted. See also 
Watermeyer CJ in Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733 735-736. 
184 1986 (1) SA 117 (A). 
185 134. 
186 133. 
187 133. 
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was therefore acting in the course and within the scope of his employment.188 This 
illustrates that an employer may be liable even in the event that his employee appear 
solely to act in his own interests and for his own purposes in a situation occasioned 
by his employment.189  
In terms of this approach, it is therefore possible, despite the employee’s subjective 
state of mind, to hold an employer vicariously liable for his employee’s delict if the 
court is able to establish a sufficiently close connection between the employee’s 
conduct and the purposes and business of his employer.  
The decision in Rabie is not the only one in which an employer was held vicariously 
liable for the harm caused by the intentional, criminal wrongdoing of an employee. 
There are other instances in which the courts have reached similar conclusions, 
including Hirsch Appliance Specialists v Shield Security Natal (Pty) Ltd,190 Minister 
van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Japmoco BK h/a Status Motors191 and Minister van 
Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Phoebus Apollo Aviation BK.192  
Fagan and Wagener argue that these cases were wrongly decided and that, where an 
employee abandons his employment duty through intentional and criminal 
wrongdoing, the overwhelming likelihood is that there cannot be vicarious liability on 
the part of the employer.193 Their argument may be summarised as follows. South 
African courts, both before and after Rabie, have never approached vicarious liability 
in deviation cases by applying the standard test developed in Rabie.194 Specifically, 
courts, both before and after Rabie, never approached the question whether an 
employee had acted in the course and within the scope of his employment by applying 
the Rabie test.195 Rather, determining whether an employee acted in the course and 
within the scope of his employment, or whether his criminal, intentional wrongdoing 
removed him outside the scope of his employment has always occurred alongside a 
“different, more specific, criterion [namely] whether the employee, in committing the 
                                                          
188 133-134. 
189 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 390.  
190 1992 (3) SA 643 (D).  
191 2002 (5) SA 649 (SCA). 
192 2002 (5) SA 475 (SCA).  
193 See Wagener Vicarious Liability 104-107, 111-115; Fagan SALJ (2009) 158-159.  
194 See Wagener Vicarious Liability 104-107, 111-115; Fagan SALJ (2009) 158-159. 
195 See Wagener Vicarious Liability 104-107, 111-115; Fagan SALJ (2009) 158-159. 
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wrongdoing, nevertheless discharged his employment duty”.196 Fagan argues as 
follows:197  
“[The] common law never determined whether an employee’s delict had been committed within 
the course and scope of his employment by asking whether he had intended only to promote 
his own interests and, if so, whether there nevertheless was a sufficiently close connection 
between his delict and his employment. Instead, it always did so by asking whether the 
employee’s delict had been committed in the discharge of a duty imposed by his employer and 
defining his employment rather than the manner wherein it was to be carried out.”  
Wagener has stopped short of suggesting that, because an intentional wrongdoing 
always amounts to the abandonment of an employment duty, or, could never amount 
to the discharge of an employment duty, there can never be vicarious liability in these 
cases. However, he does argue that, where vicarious liability had been imposed in 
instances of intentional wrongdoing, “these decisions rest on a flawed understanding 
of [the] rules [of vicarious liability]”.198 Attention may be paid to three SCA judgments 
which, in line with Wagener’s argument, reflect the South African courts’ unwillingness 
to impose vicarious liability for the intentional wrongdoing by employees.  
In Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd199 (“Absa Bank”), the 
employee in question had paid cheques payable to his employer into a bank account 
in the defendant’s bank and which he operated. The employee thereby effectively stole 
from his employer. In answering the question whether the employee’s intentional and 
criminal wrongdoing took place during the course and within the scope of his 
employment, the majority of the SCA referred to the decision in Columbus Joint 
Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd,200 and held that the employee’s unauthorised and criminal 
conduct was an abuse of his position that resulted in the defrauding of his employer.201 
This wrongdoing lacked any connection with the duties he was empowered or 
authorised to perform. The court reasoned that this was not a case of an improper 
execution of employment duties, but rather a case that the employee was not 
performing his duties at all.202 Although it refrained from laying down a general 
                                                          
196 Wagener Vicarious Liability 107. Authority for this argument is apparently drawn from the decision 
in Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 400, the earliest South African case on vicarious liability, where it was 
held that “[t]he whole question is whether the delict was committed […] in the exercise of the functions 
entrusted [to the wrongdoer]”. 
197 Fagan (2009) SALJ 158.  
198 Wagener Vicarious Liability 115. 
199 2001 (1) SA 372 (SCA).  
200 2000 (2) SA 491 (W) 512. 
201 2001 (1) SA 372 (SCA) paras 10-11. 
202 Para 9. 
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principle that an employer can never be responsible for the intentional wrongdoing of 
an employee which causes the employer harm, the SCA affirmed that an employee 
who steals from his employer is the “antithesis of an act carried out in the course and 
scope of his employment”.203 
Shortly thereafter, in Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of Southern 
Africa Ltd204 (“Ess Kay”), the SCA considered whether the defendant should be held 
vicariously liable for the misappropriation of blank bank drafts by its clients. The court 
reasoned that an employee’s act that promotes his own interests and purposes, and 
done outside the employee’s authority, is not performed within the scope of 
employment, even if it was performed during the course of employment.205 The SCA 
argued that it was the employee’s extreme self-interest that meant that his wrongdoing 
could not be considered to have been completed during the course and within the 
scope of his employment.206  
Later, in Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy207 
(“Costa”), the court again indicated its unwillingness to hold an employer vicariously 
liable for the intentional and criminal abandonment of his employment duty. Here the 
plaintiff was assaulted by the defendant’s employee after a confrontation between the 
two had occurred inside the premises of the tavern. The assault, however, took place 
outside the premises. In determining whether the defendant should be held vicariously 
liable for the intentionally-committed crime of its employee, the court reaffirmed the 
extract from Watermeyer CJ’s judgment in Feldman208 and stated that the “critical 
consideration is therefore whether the wrongdoer was engaged in the affairs of 
business of his employer.”209 In reaching its conclusion, it was held that the assault on 
the plaintiff outside the tavern occurred after he had abandoned his duties. It was a 
personal act of aggression done neither in furtherance of his employer’s interests, nor 
                                                          
203 Para 9. 
204 2001 (1) SA 1214 (SCA). 
205 Para 7. 
206 Paras 12-20. 
207 2003 (4) SA 34 (SCA). 
208 1945 AD 731 743-744: “Another form in which the law is sometimes stated is that a master is liable 
for those wrongful acts of a servant which are done while he is on his master's business but not for 
those which are done while he is on a frolic of his own. This statement of the principle is misleading. 
The question is not whether the servant was on a frolic of his own at the time when the wrongful act 
was done but whether the act causing damage was an act done by the servant in his capacity as servant 
and not as an independent individual.” 
209 2003 (4) SA 34 (SCA) para 5. 
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under his express or implied authority, nor as an incident to, or in consequence of, 
anything that the employee was employed to do.210 Whereas the reasons for, and the 
circumstances leading up to, the assault may have arisen from the fact that the 
employee was employed by the defendant as a barman, the personal vindictiveness 
which led to the assault removed the possibility of the employer’s vicarious liability.211 
Notwithstanding the above, the SCA has applied the standard test formulated in Rabie 
in several cases since then.212 Criticism that there is no such a test is therefore 
misplaced and fails to address the problems which its application raises in deviation 
cases. Furthermore, these cases illustrate that it is possible to impose vicarious liability 
where there has been intentional and criminal wrongdoing.213 Nevertheless, the 
general tendency, as emphasised by the cases discussed above, appears to have 
been that an intentionally-committed crime removes an employee outside the course 
and scope of his employment. Analysing the reasoning of these cases to determine 
their correctness falls outside the scope of this dissertation. Instead, the next section 
will pay attention to the more recent judgments of the CC, which indicates a new 
willingness to hold the state vicariously liable for crimes committed intentionally by its 
employees and which have significantly expanded the state’s delictual liability. These 
cases call for further investigation because they require us to consider whether there 
are alternatives to expanding the state’s delictual liability to ensure that crime victims 
are properly compensated.  
 
2.2.1.2.3 The judicial expansion of the state’s vicarious liability for the harm 
caused by the intentionally-committed crimes of police officers  
a. The decision of the SCA in K v Minister of Safety and Security 
In K v Minister of Safety and Security,214 three uniformed, on-duty police officers raped 
the plaintiff after offering to give her a lift home. The question for consideration was 
whether the Minister of Safety and Security, as employer of the three policemen, could 
be held vicariously liable for the conduct of these employees. Scott JA, writing for the 
                                                          
210 Paras 5-8. 
211 Paras 5-8. 
212 For example, K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) and F v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). 
213 See further paragraph 2.2.1.2.3 below. 
214 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA). 
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majority of the SCA, interpreted this to be a deviation case, but did not apply the Rabie 
standard test for determining vicarious liability. Instead, he adopted the approach set 
out in Feldman and focused on the question whether the police officials’ deviating 
conduct could be regarded as the execution of the duties for which they were 
appointed.215  
Holding that the policemen’s deviation was of such an extreme degree that it could not 
be said that they were still exercising the functions for which they were appointed,216 
the SCA refused vicariously liable for the intentionally-committed crimes of the 
policemen. Scott JA’s judgment was primarily based on the view that the policemen’s 
conduct had been entirely self-serving and unauthorised, and that it could not be said 
that the employees were discharging their employment duties.217 The decision was in 
conformity with Absa Bank, Ess Kay and Costa.  
Following a previous decision of the CC in another deviation case, Phoebus Apollo 
Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security218 (“Phoebus Apollo”), the SCA also 
held that the test for vicarious liability is constitutionally consistent and that the 
application of the requirements for vicarious liability does not raise a constitutional 
issue.219  
It was notable that, in contrast to the subsequent judgment of the CC, the court did not 
place any emphasis on the notion that the trust which the victim may be said to have 
placed in the police officials could justify a finding of vicarious liability. The court also 
rejected the argument that each of the policemen failed to comply with a legal duty to 
protect the plaintiff, the breach of which may be used to justify a finding of vicarious 
liability.220 Based on the evidence and the findings in the criminal case against the 
wrongdoers, Scott JA held that it was clear that the policemen had conspired to act in 
a positive, intentional and reprehensible manner.221 The argument that each police 
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officer’s conduct simultaneously amounted, on the one hand, to a positive, intentional 
act of rape and, on the other hand, a failure to act in accordance with legal duties while 
watching the other police officers raping the victim, was therefore rejected as being 
artificial and not anchored in practical reality.222 
 
b. The judgment of O’Regan J in K v Minister of Safety and Security 
On appeal in K v Minister of Safety and Security223 (“K (CC)”), O’Regan J, who wrote 
the unanimous judgment of the CC, confirmed that this was a deviation case and 
applied the standard test, as developed in Rabie. At the time that the judgment was 
handed down, the CC’s jurisdiction was confined to constitutional matters and issues 
connected therewith. Therefore, to establish jurisdiction, she was forced to distinguish 
the judgment of Kriegler J in Phoebus Apollo, where it was held that the application of 
the standard test for vicarious liability “is not a question of law but one of fact, pure 
and simple [and, as such] is of course not ordinarily a constitutional issue.”224  Kriegler 
J held that it is not for the CC “to agree or disagree with the manner in which the SCA 
applied a constitutionally acceptable common law test to the facts of the present 
case.”225   
To circumvent Phoebus Apollo, O’Regan J reasoned that the application of the 
requirements for vicarious liability, when applied to a new set of facts, amounted to a 
development of the common law. Therefore, in accordance with the CC’s interpretation 
of section 39(2) of the Constitution in Carmichele CC, the development of the common 
law should be consistent with constitutional rights and norms contained in the 
Constitution.226 The court took the view that applying the standard test without having 
regard to the normative influence of the Constitution would sterilise the common 
law.227 Accordingly, it held that the application of the test had to be developed within 
a constitutional context and in pursuit of the socio-economic project which gives effect 
                                                          
nonetheless have been convicted of rape. They were at all times acting in pursuance of a common 
purpose.” 
222 Para 7.  
223 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
224 Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (2) SA 34 (CC) para 9. 
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to the spirit, purport and objectives of the Constitution.228 In the process it emphasised 
that Rabie’s standard test did not raise purely factual questions, but mixed questions 
of fact and law:229 “The questions of law it raises relate to what is ‘sufficiently close’ to 
give rise to vicarious liability. It is in answering this question that a court should 
consider the need to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”  
The CC held that, although the policemen’s conduct was subjectively in their own 
interest, there was, objectively, a sufficiently close connection between their 
wrongdoing and their employment so as to hold the Minister vicariously liable in terms 
of the Rabie test.230 The court identified the following factors in reaching its conclusion.  
First, the CC emphasised that the constitutional rights to security of the person, dignity, 
privacy and equality are of paramount importance.231 It also reaffirmed the policemen’s 
constitutional duty to promote safety and to protect members of the public and 
highlighted women’s right to be free from sexual violence.232  
Secondly, the fact that the employees were on-duty, uniformed policemen driving a 
marked police vehicle was highlighted.233 O’Regan J held that it had therefore been 
objectively reasonable for the applicant to accept their offer of assistance and to place 
her trust in them.234  
Thirdly, although the three policemen had each acted positively in raping the plaintiff, 
the court held that each of them individually also failed to perform their constitutional 
duties to protect the plaintiff from harm and that such a failure, together with the 
aforementioned factors, provided a sufficient basis for establishing the necessary link 
between their intentional wrongdoing and their employment as policemen.235  
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230 Para 51. 
231 Para 51. 
232 Para 52. 
233 Para 52. 
234 Para 52. 
235 Para 53. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
 
Lastly, the court referred to the potential role that risk may play as a factor in the 
application of the standard test,236 but it was not used as a factor in reaching the court’s 
conclusion. 
 
c. The majority judgment of Nugent JA in Minister of Safety and Security v F  
In Minister of Safety and Security v F237 (“F (SCA)”), the plaintiff instituted a delictual 
claim for damages against the Minister of Safety and Security after one of his 
employees, a police detective in plain clothes and on standby duty, raped the plaintiff 
in the process of giving her a lift home in an unmarked police vehicle. Nugent JA, who 
wrote the majority judgment of the SCA, sought to distinguish this case from K (CC) in 
the following way.  
First, he interpreted O’Regan J’s omissio-commissio argument as identifying two 
delicts: the positive, intentional delict of rape and, on the other hand, the wrongful and 
negligent failure on the policemen’s part to fulfil their legal duties in preventing the rape 
of the victim. According to Nugent JA, the court’s reasoning in K (CC) was based on 
the latter delict.238  
Against this background, he held that the SCA would only be bound to the reasoning 
in K (CC) if it could be said that the police detective was under a similar legal duty as 
the policemen in K (CC) and that he similarly failed to comply with such a duty.239 In 
this regard, Nugent JA stated that a police detective cannot be said to have duties 
capable of being breached when he is on standby duty.240 Therefore, he decided that 
there was no possibility of maintaining that the police detective had breached a 
constitutional duty in raping the plaintiff, which wrongdoing could form the basis for 
drawing the necessary link with his employment.241  
In reaching this conclusion, the SCA therefore noted the decision in K (CC), 
distinguished it on significant factual differences and accordingly did not apply the 
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239 Paras 37-46. 
240 Paras 37-46. 
241 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA) paras 37-48. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
86 
 
reasoning in that case. In short, the court held that there was no possibility of vicarious 
liability. 
 
d. The majority judgment of Mogoeng J in F (CC)  
The SCA’s judgment, based on the facts that the police detective was not uniformed, 
drove an unmarked police vehicle and was not on duty at the time which the delict 
occurred, was not followed by the CC in F (CC).242 The majority of the CC adopted a 
line of reasoning which echoed that of O’Regan J in K (CC). Mogoeng J confirmed 
that the standard test developed in Rabie should be used in the event of a deviation 
case. In its application of this test the court highlighted the following “normative 
components”243 relevant for establishing if a sufficiently close connection existed 
between the detective’s employment and his wrongdoing.  
First, the court emphasised the constitutional obligations of the state to promote 
members of society’s rights to freedom and security of the person and dignity as well 
as the police’s duty to prevent, combat and investigate crime and promote safety and 
security.244  
Secondly, the court underlined the role played by trust: “the trust that the public is 
entitled to repose in the police also has a critical role to play in the determination of 
the Minister's vicarious liability in this matter.”245 Furthermore, Mogoeng J took the 
view that, by focusing on trust, the distinction between on-duty and standby duty 
became “less significant”.246 Because he found that there was convincing evidence on 
the basis of which to conclude that the victim indeed placed her trust in the detective 
as a police official,247 there was seemingly no further need to analyse the nature of the 
detective’s duty.248  
Thirdly, the court rejected the SCA’s interpretation of K (CC), namely that the delict 
was based only on the wrongful failure to comply with a legal duty.249 Although the 
                                                          
242 F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). 
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court did not explain exactly how the intentional delict of rape assisted in establishing 
a sufficiently close connection between wrongdoing and employment, Mogoeng J 
nonetheless emphasised that it is an important factor.250 
In conclusion, the majority applied the reasoning in K (CC) and held the state 
vicariously liable. In the following section, the widened state delictual liability in the 
case of intentionally-committed crimes will be evaluated.  
 
2.2.1.2.4 An evaluation of the widened vicarious liability of the state for the 
harm caused by the intentionally-committed crimes of police officers 
In this section it will specifically be considered whether the abovementioned 
development within the law of delict may be criticised for producing arbitrary outcomes, 
and to what extent O’Regan J’s commissio omissio-argument and the applicability of 
human rights in drawing a sufficiently close connection between employment and 
wrongdoing is tenable. The role of trust will also be investigated. Lastly, it will be 
examined whether this development may produce uncertainty for future litigants.  
 
a. Arbitrary outcomes produced by the judgments in K (CC) and F (CC) 
i. The strength of the connection between wrongdoing and employment is 
made a function of the employer’s identity 
In the course of its judgment in K (CC), the court stated that the police officers’ duties 
to prevent crime also rested on their employer and, when the employees breached 
these duties, the employer seemingly also breached its similar but independent 
duty.251 Such a double breach apparently assisted in justifying the conclusion that a 
sufficient connection has been established between the employees’ crimes and the 
employer’s business for purposes of establishing vicarious liability.252  
To assess this reasoning, consider the following example.253 Suppose a cleaner 
employed by the Minister of Safety and Security assaults a member of public. Fagan 
                                                          
250 Paras 69-73. 
251 Para 51.  
252 Para 51. See also Fagan (2009) SALJ 197-198; Wagener (2008) SALJ 674. 
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argues that, based on the CC’s “double-breach-of-duty-ground”,254 one may conclude 
that the Minister has also breached his duty to prevent crime. Furthermore, such a 
double breach may now form the basis for connecting the cleaner’s assault with his 
employment, rendering the Minister vicariously liable. However, suppose that a 
cleaner employed by the Minister of Agriculture assaults a member of public in exactly 
the same way, place and time that the cleaner employed by the Minister of Safety and 
Security has done. In this example, however, no “double breach” is present. There is 
no duty owed by the Minister of Agriculture to protect members of the public and to 
prevent crime and, therefore there can be no breach of the employer’s duty capable 
of laying the basis for connecting the cleaner’s assault with his employment. This 
eliminates the possibility of drawing a sufficiently close connection between the 
employee’s wrongdoing and his employment on the basis of the double-breach-of-
duty-ground – despite the fact that the nature of the respective employees’ wrongdoing 
was identical.  
Fagan’s interpretation and rejection of the double-breach-of-duty-argument is similar 
to his criticism of the Van Duivenboden reasoning insofar as it seems to suggest that 
it could produce arbitrary outcomes: if the double-breach-of-duty-argument is to be 
used as a valid reason in ascertaining whether the employee’s intentionally-committed 
crime occurred during the course and within the scope of his employment, then the 
assault by the cleaner employed by the Minister of Safety and Security “would be more 
closely connected […] to his employment than would an identical assault by a cleaner 
employed to do exactly the same job, but [employed] by the Minister of Agriculture 
rather than Safety and Security.”255  
To the extent that Fagan’s critique dismisses the importance of the employer’s identity 
and duties as indicator of the duties of the employee, it is not persuasive. It is argued, 
to the contrary, that whether or not an employer will be held vicariously liable for an 
employee’s intentional, criminal wrongdoing may depend to some extent on the 
identity of the employer. 
It is submitted that the employer’s identity is a factor that can help the court to establish 
whether the employee’s wrongdoing falls within the scope of his employment. The 
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nature, function and duties of an employer are relevant as the matrix within which the 
employee’s scope of duties must be evaluated. In other words, to understand whether 
or not the employee’s conduct fell within the scope of his employment, regard must be 
had to what his employment entails. To do so, it would be necessary to pay attention 
to the nature of the employer.  
 
ii. Arbitrary protection of certain legal interests 
In K (CC) the court emphasised that it was of “profound constitutional importance”256 
to protect the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, which statement was approved and 
confirmed in F (CC).257 Together with the notion of trust placed in the police, the desire 
to protect these constitutional rights laid the basis to conclude that there was a 
sufficiently close connection between the policemen’s respective delicts and their 
employer’s business.258 The court referred to the rights relating to security of the 
person, dignity and the right to be free from sexual violence – all of which is principally 
aimed at protecting bodily integrity.  
Wagener has argued that the Bill of Rights is a statement of a priority of a certain set 
of interests and that, arguably, within this priority, the right to personal safety and 
security ranks higher than the right to property.259 He argues that, according to the 
CC’s reasoning, therefore, it might be that the nature of the relevant human right could 
influence the question whether there is a sufficiently close connection between 
employment and wrongdoing. However, if the nature of a right, and therefore also the 
legal interest protected by the recognition of such a right, is determinative of the 
existence of a sufficiently close connection, it would render the application of the 
vicarious liability doctrine arbitrary:260   
“The nature of the interest infringed cannot make a delict closer to or further away from the 
harmdoer’s employment. What matters to the question is rather the nature of what the harmdoer 
was asked to do, in terms of her employment contract, and the nature of her tortious act. On 
the reasoning of O’Regan J, however, we come to the counter-intuitive conclusion that the 
infringements of different types of interests will be either closer within or further outside the 
course and scope of employment; also, that the degree of the infringement of a particular 
interest will affect the answer to this question.”  
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258 Para 58. 
259 Wagener (2008) SALJ 676; Wagener Vicarious Liability 138-140. 
260 Wagener (2008) SALJ 676; Wagener Vicarious Liability 138-140. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 
 
The arbitrary impact of making the standard test for vicarious liability dependent upon 
the nature of the legal interest at stake may be illustrated by the following example, 
based on one provided by Wagener.261 Suppose that an employee, tasked with 
delivering a package by vehicle, negligently drives the vehicle into an innocent passer-
by so that the latter is seriously injured. Suppose further that the same employee, a 
month later, while delivering a package by vehicle, drives negligently again, but this 
time manages to miss any innocent  passers-by, but collides with a third party’s garden 
wall. Upon the reasoning of the court in K (CC), it would seem that the employee’s 
conduct in the latter example will be regarded as further outside the course and scope 
of his employment merely on the basis of the nature of the legal interest that was 
harmed.  
The law of delict aims to protect proprietary interests and, significantly, courts have 
emphasised that a positive infringement of a right to property, like a positive 
infringement of the right to bodily integrity, is prima facie wrongful.262  One could 
therefore arguably expect the application of the vicarious liability doctrine to render 
similar and predictable results, regardless of whether a policeman infringes a victim’s 
right to her bodily integrity or if he merely steals her wallet or jewellery.  However, on 
the distinction which the CC draws, theft, although also a crime committed 
intentionally, would be considered further outside the scope of employment than 
raping someone. This development within the law of delict is undesirable. 
  
b. O’Regan J’s omissio commissio-argument 
One of the most important reasons for the court’s finding in K (CC) is O’Regan J’s 
interpretation of each of the individual policemen’s actions as simultaneously 
constituting both a positive, intentional delict in the form of rape as well as a wrongful 
and negligent failure to comply with their legal duties to protect the victim from crime.263 
The CC used the policemen’s apparent failure to comply with their legal duties to 
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prevent crime to find a sufficiently close link between their employment and 
wrongdoing for the purpose of holding their employer vicariously liable.  
This reasoning suggests that, if there is a breach of a legal duty, it may point towards 
a sufficiently close connection between the fact of employment and an employee’s 
delict.264 However, as the court intimated in K (SCA) and in line with Fagan’s 
argument, a possible implication of this reasoning may be that the greater the breach 
by the employee of his duty, the closer the relationship between employment and the 
delict.265 For logical reasons, this is an undesirable development of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability. In a comparable decision in Lister v Hesley Hall Limited,266 the then 
House of Lords held that the application of this omissio commissio-argument to infer 
a sufficiently close connection between the wrongdoing and the fact of employment 
amounts to “indulging in sophistry,” adding that this type of approach to vicarious 
liability is “both artificial and unrealistic”.267  
This argument may also lead to untenable outcomes from an employer’s perspective. 
It could mean that the probability of holding a conscientious employer vicariously liable 
would be greater than the probability of vicarious liability being imposed on an 
indifferent employer.268  
To illustrate: suppose that A is the type of employer who is focused on ensuring that 
his employees perform their duties in the proper manner.269 He decides to impose 
several legal duties to ensure that his employees effectively perform their functions. In 
contrast, suppose that B is the type of employer who is unconcerned about the manner 
in which his employee’s perform their functions. Accordingly, he decides not to impose 
a great number of legal duties on his employees, and provides them a large degree of 
discretion to act as they see fit.  
All things being equal, because the breach of a legal duty now provides a reason to 
conclude that a sufficiently close connection exists between the employee’s delict and 
his employment, it is more likely that employer A will be held vicariously liable than 
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employer B. This amounts to an undesirable development of the vicarious liability 
doctrine as it could potentially discourage the discharge of employment duties in a 
diligent and thorough manner. 
Although the majority of the court did not expressly apply this argument in F (CC), it 
did not reject it either. Mogoeng J did, however, reject the SCA’s interpretation of the 
ratio in K (CC) and held that the policemen indeed committed both a positive, 
intentional delict (in the form of rape) as well as failing to prevent the crime. Without 
proffering an explanation, he held that such a fact contributes to the conclusion that a 
sufficiently close relationship exists between the employee’s wrongdoing and the fact 
of his employment.  
This line of reasoning may be questioned. What needs to be determined is whether 
an intentional deviation from employment duties falls within the course and scope of 
employment. The very aspect that typically presents problems in the context of 
vicarious liability, namely the fact that there has been a positive, intentional deviation 
from employment duties, cannot also serve as a factor in determining whether the 
conduct occurred in the course and scope of employment. Mogoeng J does not explain 
how the fact that the employee committed a positive, intentional delict may assist the 
court to infer a sufficiently close connection in these problematic deviation cases. 
Indeed, it is submitted that it should not be a factor in this regard. As argued further 
below, this kind of reasoning is theoretically unsound. 
 
c. The applicability of human rights contained in the Bill of Rights 
In both K (CC) and F (CC) the court emphasised the significant role that certain human 
rights may play in determining whether the state should be held vicariously liable for 
the intentional and criminal wrongdoing of its employees. The role which the CC 
envisages for fundamental human rights requires further examination.  
First, it may be questioned whether the application of the standard test for vicarious 
liability in K (CC) and F (CC) constituted a constitutional issue. Prior to the decision in 
K (CC), the same court found in Phoebus Apollo that the standard test for vicarious 
liability is constitutionally justifiable and, furthermore, that the application of its 
requirements did not amount to a constitutional issue.  
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In an attempt to circumvent that decision, O’Regan J argued that, whereas rules 
pertaining to the doctrine of vicarious liability were not problematic in Phoebus Apollo, 
it was placed in issue in K (CC).270 O’Regan J held that, when applying the objective 
component of the Rabie test to new deviation cases, the court had to take sufficient 
notice of constitutional imperatives, because the application of the latter with regard to 
new factual circumstances amounted to a development of the common law, bringing 
section 39(2) of the Bill of Rights into play.  
O’Regan J’s argument may be questioned. It practically means that the application of 
any common-law rule or principle to a new set of facts will present constitutional issues 
and call for the development of the law. This may place a burden on the courts to hear 
an inordinate number of cases dealing with the constitutional development of the 
common law, which would be prejudicial to the administration of justice. In addition, it 
may seriously undermine the legal certainty pertaining to the existence and application 
of established common-law rules.       
Secondly, it has been argued that the CC has misinterpreted section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. According to Fagan, this provision, if properly interpreted, does not 
impose a duty on courts to develop the common law whenever that would promote 
human rights.271 Instead, section 39(2) only obliges a court which has decided to 
develop the common law for other reasons (e.g. commercial convenience) to ensure 
that this independently justified development also promotes human rights, and the 
values underlying them.272 Accordingly, those rights and values are said to play merely 
a “secondary role”, i.e. it only helps courts to choose between competing, 
independently justified changes to the common law while it cannot play the primary 
role of driving the common law’s development.273  
Rightly, this argument has not been accepted by the courts. Courts have clearly 
indicated that section 39(2) may be interpreted as providing a justification for 
developing the common law to promote fundamental human rights contained in the 
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Bill of Rights.274 This dissertation will therefore not focus on determining the role that 
section 39(2) plays, or ought to play, in the South African private law, generally.  
It is accepted that, generally, fundamental human rights may be taken into account 
when developing the common law. The focus here is rather on what role the 
constitutional rights and duties play in determining whether the state should be held 
vicariously liable for the intentionally-committed crimes of its employees. In 
considering this question, the following two points are relevant.  
As mentioned above, the CC has insisted that the protection of the public’s human 
rights to safety and security of the person, dignity, privacy and equality is of “profound 
constitutional importance” in this context.275 Such a statement may generally be 
supported insofar as it seeks to give greater effect to rights pertaining to bodily 
integrity. However, the court’s assertion that those rights are important because they 
assist not only in determining the nature of the course and scope of employment 
enquiry but also because they constitute substantive factors that needed to be 
considered in terms of that enquiry, is questionable.276  
An appeal to any of the above constitutional rights cannot assist a court in determining 
whether certain conduct occurred within the course and scope of employment. In this 
regard, K (CC) and F (CC) must be distinguished from Carmichele, Van Duivenboden, 
Van Eeden and Hamilton, where the court had to determine whether the state 
employees’ negligent omission was wrongful for the purposes of the law of delict. In K 
(CC) and F (CC), however, the policemen’s positive and intentional infringement of the 
respective plaintiffs’ right to bodily integrity was prima facie wrongful.277 It was 
therefore unnecessary to have regard to any of the above human rights to prove 
wrongfulness in the same way that it had been necessary in Van Duivenboden, Van 
Eeden, Hamilton and Carmichele.  
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For this reason, Loubser has made the point that the “constitutional arguments 
advanced by the court in K, such as they are, add nothing meaningful to the principles 
of vicarious liability. The references to constitutional rights, duties and values are 
vague and general and appear to be a constitutional garnish added to a conclusion 
reached on other grounds.”278  
 
d. Trust in the police as basis for the decision in F (CC) 
In both K (CC) and F (CC) the court held that the respective rape victims trusted the 
relevant wrongdoers as policemen. In K (CC) this trust was regarded as objectively 
reasonable on the basis that the policemen were on duty, uniformed, drove a marked 
police vehicle and offered the plaintiff a lift home. These factors assisted the CC in 
justifying its conclusion that a sufficiently close connection could be established 
between the delicts of the policemen and the fact of their employment. The finding of 
trust was inferred from the surrounding evidence. Importantly, the court did not identify 
a relationship of trust ex post facto merely on the basis that it transpired that the 
wrongdoers were employees of the Minister of Safety and Security. The relationship 
of trust was not identified and applied retroactively so as to justify the compensation 
of an innocent victim of crime.  
In F (CC) the court attached even greater value to the role that trust may play in the 
application of the standard test for vicarious liability. However, considering that the 
police detective was merely on standby duty, in civilian clothes and not driving a 
marked police vehicle, the role assigned to trust in this case may be questioned. From 
the evidence it appears that the victim only became aware of the fact that the 
wrongdoer may be a member of the police after she had accepted an offer for a lift 
home and while driving to the purported destination. This occurred after she had 
noticed what appeared to be a police radio and police dockets in the vehicle. During 
the course of the ride home, the victim grew suspicious and decided to climb out of 
the vehicle. After a while, when the detective returned to the area where the victim had 
climbed out, she once again decided to accept a lift and got into the detective’s car for 
a second time. Clearly, at this stage there could be no question of any trust. In fact, 
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the victim had chosen to get out of the detective’s vehicle exactly because she 
distrusted him. It is suggested that there was no convincing evidence from which the 
court could have inferred that the victim trusted the wrongdoer as a policeman.  
It therefore appears that, in F (CC), the majority inferred trust in the absence of 
convincing evidence and arguably on the basis of knowledge that crystallized only 
after the event, namely that the detective was employed by the Minister of Safety and 
Security. This factor was then retrospectively applied in order to justify the 
compensation of an innocent victim. The conclusion that a person in plain clothes, in 
an unmarked, ordinary vehicle and on standby duty could inspire trust that he was a 
member of the police and thus clothed with certain legal duties is far-reaching. If the 
harm occasioned by a criminal who, in plain clothes and an unmarked vehicle, is 
pursuing his self-centred interests in a reprehensible manner, may be shifted towards 
the criminal’s employer on the basis of the fact that it later became apparent that the 
employer was the state, it may potentially expose the state to near absolute delictual 
liability for any intentional and criminal wrongdoing by its employees. 
In summary, there was no convincing evidence to suggest that the criminal in F (CC) 
was a policeman at the time of committing the crime. Nevertheless, the state was held 
delictually liable for the harm suffered by a crime victim and caused by a criminal in 
plain clothes, driving an unmarked vehicle and who was not on duty. It may be 
considered why the state should then not compensate all crime victims who have 
suffered harm at the hands of criminals in plain clothes, driving unmarked vehicles and 
acting in their self-interest. 
  
e. The relevance of “standby duty” in determining a sufficiently close 
connection 
The fact that the three policemen in K (CC) were on duty when they raped the victim 
contributed to the CC’s conclusion that the victim’s decision to trust them was 
objectively reasonable. One of the major factual differences between K (CC) and F 
(CC) is the fact that, in the latter case, the police detective was merely on standby 
duty. The trial court found that a police officer on standby duty is effectively on duty 
and that the detective accordingly owed the victim a legal duty to prevent harm and to 
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promote safety and security. This enabled the trial court, in the light of O’Regan J’s 
omissio commissio-argument in K (CC), to conclude that the detective had negligently 
and wrongfully failed to comply with his duties, which failure was a factor in 
establishing a sufficiently close connection between the fact of his employment and 
his wrongdoing.  
In F (SCA), the court rejected this conclusion for a variety of reasons.279 The court 
highlighted the absence of any evidence of characteristics of employment while a 
detective was on standby duty.280 The court specifically mentioned the fact that there 
was no evidence that the Minister of Safety and Security had exercised any control 
over the detective while he was on standby duty.281 It also emphasised certain policy 
considerations which weighed against the trial court’s argument. For example, the 
court’s conclusion implied that a police officer can never be off duty since his duties 
were apparently of a continuing nature.282 Most importantly, the SCA pointed out that 
the court’s conclusion would effectively make the state the guarantor of good and 
virtuous behaviour of police officers at all times, simply because of their 
employment.283 
The nature of the policeman’s standby duty is therefore relevant in determining a 
sufficiently close connection between wrongdoing and employment. If it is taken to 
mean that the detective was off duty, it undermines the possibility that a relationship 
of trust could have been established between the victim and the wrongdoer as a 
policeman. However, if it may be equated to being on duty, the opposite follows. 
Similarly, if it means that the detective was off duty, it further undermines the possibility 
to conclude that the employer created the risk for the victim’s harm via his employment. 
However, if it is interpreted as on duty, it facilitates the functioning of the risk theory in 
this regard. In his majority judgment in F (CC), Mogoeng J held that, based on his 
finding that the victim did, in fact, trust the wrongdoer as a policeman, it was not 
necessary to come to any conclusion regarding the nature of the detective’s standby 
duty.  
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Nevertheless, towards the end of his judgment, Mogoeng J remarked that the 
detective’s “duty to protect the public while on standby was incipient [...] He could be 
summoned at any time to exercise his powers as a police official to protect members 
of the public.”284 While it is trite that a police officer can place himself on duty while he 
was off duty or on standby duty, thereby assuming certain legal duties, it does not 
follow logically that such a person, if he fails to do so, assumes any such legal duties. 
Any conclusion to the contrary would undermine the need for a distinction between on 
duty, off duty and standby duty and would effectively mean that those in service of the 
Minister of Safety and Security are under a constant and inescapable set of legal 
duties. 
 
2.2.1.2.5 Conclusion: the expanded delictual liability of the state for the harm 
caused by the intentionally-committed crime of its employees 
Whereas the state’s delictual liability for harm arising from its employee’s negligent 
failure to prevent crime was driven by a development of the law relating to 
wrongfulness, the widening of state liability in this context occurred through the court’s 
reinterpretation of the requirements for vicarious liability, in particular the requirement 
that the employee’s delict must occur in the course and within the scope of 
employment. Unlike the development described in paragraph 2.2.1.1 above, which 
may be described as theoretically sound but practically and financially problematic, 
the development of the law as described in paragraph 2.2.1.2 is problematic from both 
a theoretical and practical perspective. These issues are highlighted below.   
Vicarious liability of an employer is aptly described as an exception to the fault-based 
point of departure of the law of delict.285 One of the significant implications of imposing 
strict liability upon the state as employer is that the latter may be held liable regardless 
of the nature of its conduct. In other words, irrespective of whether the Minister of 
Safety and Security may be said to have conducted himself reasonably by, for 
example, incurring costs in providing appropriate training to each of his employees, 
properly instructing them to prevent crime and warning them to avoid causing harm to 
                                                          
284 F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) 556. 
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innocent citizens, he may still be held vicariously liable for the intentionally-committed 
crimes of his employees.  
As an exception to the ordinary fault-based regime for delictual liability, the imposition 
of vicarious liability appears counter-intuitive and seems to stand in contrast with the 
notion that personal responsibility underpins the common law of delict. Such an 
exception to the rule, however, may be justified on the basis of a variety of policy 
considerations.286  
In the first instance, it may be justified on the basis that, by employing certain 
individuals, employers expose other members of society to the risk of harm that may 
realise in the execution of the employee’s duties. In other words, vicarious liability may 
be justified on the basis that, “where an employer creates or materially enhances the 
risk of a particular type of wrongdoing being committed, he should be held liable where 
one of his employees commits such a wrong.”287 To this may be added the normative 
consideration that the employer receives the benefit of the employee’s work, including 
the opportunity to generate a financial profit.288  
It has also been justified on the basis that it is fair, reasonable and just to impose 
vicarious liability on an employer since such an imposition would motivate him to take 
certain steps to prevent future harm. This means that deterrence may justify the 
imposition of vicarious liability.289 In addition, courts and commentators have remarked 
that vicarious liability is justifiable because it is the employer who is in the best possible 
position to spread the loss by compensating innocent victims of harm. This may be 
done either by means of insurance or through internal measures such as, for example, 
price reductions or wage adjustments.290  
Lastly, there are those who justify vicarious liability based on the desire to compensate 
innocent victims of harm.291 This argument basically centres on the notion that it is fair, 
reasonable and just to ensure the compensation of an innocent victim of harm.292 After 
                                                          
286 Scott Middellike Aanspreeklikheid 12. 
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all, it is argued, the victim of harm stands removed from the employer-employment 
relationship, and does not benefit from it, but may nonetheless be the victim of a delict 
committed by a person who may not be able to compensate him.293  
Because vicarious liability is an exception to the ordinary fault-based point of departure 
for the law of delict and defendants may be held liable despite conducting themselves 
reasonably and lawfully, there is a desire to keep its scope within clearly defined limits. 
It is equally important that the doctrine of vicarious liability continues to protect and 
balance the respective interests of employer, employee and innocent victim. The need 
to ensure the clear demarcation of its scope and to maintain the necessary balance 
between the various interests demand the principled application of requirements for 
the imposition of vicarious liability. One of these requirements is that the delict must 
have been committed by an employee within the course and scope of employment. 
In K (CC), the court mentions two policy-based considerations that justify the 
imposition of vicarious liability: the compensation of innocent victims of harm and the 
prevention of similar future incidents, i.e. deterrence.294 O’Regan J also warned that 
the imposition of absolute liability on employers must be avoided, thereby indicating 
the desire to maintain the balance between the various policy considerations as well 
as the competing interests of the employer, the employee and the victim of harm.295  
Despite doing so, in both K (CC) and F (CC) the court focused predominantly on the 
compensation of the victim of harm. Such a shift in emphasis, especially considering 
the particular facts of F (CC), upsets the balance that was previously struck between 
the opposing interests of employer, employee and innocent victim within the context 
of the vicarious liability doctrine. This is an undesirable development of the doctrine. 
In her judgment in K (CC), O’Regan J expressed the reservation that the expansion of 
the vicarious liability doctrine should not, without more, lead to holding the state 
vicariously liable merely on the basis that a state employee inflicted harm on an 
innocent victim in a reprehensible manner.296 Such a reservation was not followed in 
Mogoeng J’s judgment in F (CC). On the contrary, his judgment displays a willingness 
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to expand the application of the doctrine and the state’s delictual liability for harm 
arising from crime on the basis that an innocent plaintiff has fallen victim to a serious 
crime and requires compensation. 
Against this background, it would appear that the true justification, or at least an 
important reason, for imposing vicarious liability on the state in K (CC) and F (CC) was 
to provide an innocent crime victim with compensation payable by a solvent employer. 
Indeed, one may argue that the reasoning of the CC went along these lines: the 
“plaintiffs have been wronged; they deserve compensation; the state can afford to pay; 
the state in any event has constitutional duties to protect and assist the vulnerable, but 
its functionaries acted unreasonably; therefore, it should pay.”297 If this is in fact the 
underlying basis for the judgments in K (CC) and F (CC), it has arguably established 
a de facto compensation fund for harm arising from certain crimes on the basis that 
the state was somehow involved in the harm suffered by the victim of the crime.298 
Such a judicial development of the vicarious liability doctrine and the expansion of the 
state’s delictual liability to provide compensation for harm arising from crime should 
be questioned on a variety of grounds. First, as indicated above, it over-emphasises 
the interests of the innocent victim at the cost of striking a balance between the 
competing interests of the employer, employee and innocent victim.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that it achieves the compensation of crime victims, it fails 
to provide an adequate reason for electing the employer as the most likely candidate 
for compensation:299 it is not obvious why the victim must look towards the employer, 
and not alternative sources of compensation, such as a fund set up for this purpose 
or insurance.  
Also, it fails to assist in drawing the established distinction between an employee and 
an independent contractor:300 if compensation is indeed the goal that must be 
achieved, why is compensation not also demanded from those who appoint harm-
causing independent contractors?  
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Lastly, the judicial development fails to justify the limiting function of the course and 
scope requirement for the imposition of vicarious liability. On the contrary, as the 
evaluation of particularly F (CC) indicated, it does not contribute towards the 
demarcation of the scope of application of vicarious liability. 
In addition to the above, the development of the doctrine is problematic insofar as the 
reasoning developed by the CC in these cases may expose future litigants to 
uncertainty, thereby undermining the constitutional principle of the rule of law.301 In K 
(CC) and F (CC), the court developed the vicarious liability doctrine, and thereby 
expanded the state’s delictual liability, by relying on certain factors to satisfy the course 
and scope of employment requirement. In both judgments, the CC focused on the 
constitutional duties of the state as employer, the relationship of trust between 
members of the police and the public and the dual nature of the delict as omission and 
commission, while in F (CC) the nature of the primary wrongdoer’s employment at the 
time that the crime was committed also received attention.  
Although the court in K (CC) did not hold that any of those factors were requirements 
for state vicariously liability, Mogoeng J seems to treat them as such in F (CC):302  
“Accordingly, several interrelated factors have an important role to play in addressing the 
question whether the Minister is vicariously liable for the delictual conduct of Mr Van Wyk. The 
normative components that point to liability must here, as K indicated, be expressly stated. 
They are: the State's constitutional obligations to protect the public; the trust that the public is 
entitled to place in the police; the significance, if any, of the policeman having been off duty and 
on standby duty; the role of the simultaneous act of the policeman's commission of rape and 
omission to protect the victim; and the existence or otherwise of an intimate link between the 
policeman's conduct and his employment. All these elements complement one another in 
determining the State's vicarious liability in this matter.” 
To establish a sufficiently close connection and award compensation to the innocent 
victim, Mogoeng J narrows his focus to find a relationship of trust. He refers to trust as 
the factor that “creates the connection between employment and the wrongful 
conduct”.303 Furthermore, “if his employment as a policeman secured the trust the 
vulnerable person placed in him, and if his employment facilitated the abuse of that 
trust, the State might be held vicariously liable for the delict.”304  
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However, what would be the outcome in a future case where such a relationship of 
trust is clearly not present? Would the court be able to reach the same outcome as it 
does in K (CC) and F (CC)? It may be argued that, considering its treatment of the 
relationship of trust as a near requirement for vicarious liability, courts would be 
pressed to deny an otherwise deserving plaintiff a remedy where a relationship of trust 
is not present. This may particularly be the case where the primary wrongdoer is not 
employed by the Minister of Safety and Security. In other words, the focus of the court 
on the identified factors set out above may potentially deny deserving plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims compensation if those factors are not present. This may render the 
future application of the vicarious liability doctrine arbitrary on the basis that the 
judgments have established a type of “tax-funded, de facto insurance scheme for a 
small sub-set of victims of crime”,305 i.e. only those who can successfully prove a 
relationship of trust.  
Alternatively, courts may continue along this track and try to seek out other factors 
present in different circumstances to justify the compensation of innocent victims of 
crime where the orthodox application of the vicarious liability requirements would result 
in the denial of a remedy. If so, the application of the vicarious liability requirements 
will be determined by the implementation of arbitrary factors, identified on a casuistic 
basis and driven by the desire to compensate crime victims. This may expose future 
litigants to uncertainty.  
Therefore, although it may be said that the results produced by these specific 
judgments may be acceptable insofar as a victim of a violent crime received 
compensation, these results were reached by following an undesirable route, creating 
equally undesirable consequences.  
As alluded to in paragraph 2.2.1.1.4, an additional problem that may accompany the 
expanded delictual liability of the state is a financial one. When the state employer is 
held vicariously liable for the culpable wrongdoing of an employee and ordered to pay 
the plaintiff’s damages, it is the taxpayer who ultimately has to bear the cost. However, 
if taxpayer money is used to pay damages, then less money is available for performing 
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the State’s ordinary tasks, i.e. in the case of the police, preserving law and order and 
promoting safety and security.306  
The continued expanding state delictual liability therefore presents the dilemma that, 
with less of the available tax monies being used to promote safety and security and to 
prevent crime, the likelier further failures to prevent crimes become. In addition, it may 
be asked whether it is fair, just or reasonable for courts to award substantial damages 
to one or two particular plaintiffs when this may contribute towards a less effective 
policing force and, potentially, the causation of harm to other crime victims, who will 
then be forced to shoulder the burden of harm themselves if they are not in a financial 
position to institute legal proceedings against the state or the primary wrongdoer.307  
To conclude, it should be remembered that everyone has a right to personal safety 
and security. The state has a corresponding, all-embracing duty to promote safety and 
security and to prevent crime. In the event that the state fails to do so and an 
individual’s right to his safety and security is infringed upon, the state should be held 
accountable. Under certain circumstances such a norm of accountability may give rise 
to a delictual claim to compensate a crime victim’s harm. In K (CC) and F (CC) the 
court held that the circumstances warranted an award of damages and thus utilised 
tax-funded money to this effect. In doing so, a crime victim received an award of 
damages funded by taxpayers and the primary wrongdoer, the criminal, did not have 
to pay the victim’s damages. Therefore, as suggested earlier, it may be argued that 
these judgments have created a type of de facto insurance scheme for a small sub-
set of crime victims.308 
However, it is conceivable that future crime victims may argue that the harm they 
suffered due to crime should be compensated without having recourse to the 
application of the rules relating to vicarious liability. This argument flows from the norm 
of state accountability, the state’s comprehensive duty to ensure the safety and 
security of its citizens, as well as their fundamental right to personal safety and 
security. The reasoning of the courts in the recent state delictual liability cases – both 
in the Van Duivenboden branch and the judgments in K (CC) and F (CC) – indicate 
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that, where the state, through its employees, has negligently failed to comply with its 
constitutional duty to prevent crimes against the victim’s bodily integrity, or where 
crimes were intentionally committed, compensation should be awarded to innocent 
victims of violent crime. Of course, it is arguable that all crimes which amount to an 
infringement of the victim’s bodily integrity ultimately involve the state because it is the 
consequence of the state’s failure to comply with its duties in preventing such crimes. 
If this argument is further pursued, the state should be regarded not only as the de 
facto insurance scheme for the small sub-set of crime victims assisted thus far by the 
courts, but as the ultimate insurer for harm arising from crime, at least insofar as the 
harm is due to the infringement of the victim’s bodily integrity. 
It may be pointed out that, while the recent developments relating to vicarious liability 
could have the effect of providing compensation to some victims of crime, the creation 
of such a de facto scheme was not the reason for extending liability. However, 
notwithstanding the fact that the reason for extending liability might not have been the 
establishment of a de facto scheme, it may be possible to describe the development 
of this area of the law along these terms and to question its desirability from a practical 
and theoretical perspective. 
For the reasons above the expanded state delictual liability for intentionally-committed 
crimes of its employees may not be a desirable development.  
In the following section, a description is provided of a further evidentiary problem that 
may confront a crime victim who elects to institute a delictual claim directly against the 
state in pursuit of compensation.  
 
2.2.2 Evidentiary problems that may confront a crime victim who institutes a 
common-law delictual claim directly against the state for compensation 
of harm arising from crime 
Cases where a crime victim has elected to institute a delictual claim and argued that 
the state itself (as opposed to any specific employee) negligently and wrongfully 
caused his harm and should thus be held directly liable in delict may present 
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considerable evidentiary challenges to potential crime victims. These cases will be 
discussed and evaluated in this section. 
In Shabalala v Metrorail309 (“Shabalala”), three passengers shot and robbed the 
plaintiff while he was aboard one of the defendant’s trains. The plaintiff instituted a 
delictual claim against the defendant, arguing that it was negligent in failing to employ 
sufficient security measures to ensure the safety of the public generally and, more 
specifically, in failing to take adequate steps to avoid the incident in which he was 
injured.310 It was the plaintiff’s case that this negligent omission had wrongfully caused 
his injuries. 
The plaintiff testified that there were no security officials on the train or on the platform 
before the train left the station on the evening in question. There were thus no security 
officials that evening to check the authenticity of train tickets and control who boards 
the trains. The court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that none of the people on the 
platform waiting to board the train looked suspicious. Further, the plaintiff was unable 
to indicate whether the robbers were in the group of people on the station or whether 
they were on the train already and he was not capable to indicate what steps the 
defendant should have taken to prevent the attack from occurring.   
The SCA correctly pointed out that the question for consideration was whether the 
defendant’s conduct was negligent. In his judgment, Scott JA therefore correctly 
sought to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable in the 
circumstances.311 In conducting this enquiry, the court focused on two questions. First, 
would the reasonable person in the position of the defendant have foreseen the harm 
which the plaintiff suffered and, secondly, would the reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant have prevented the harm if it was indeed foreseeable? In evaluating 
these questions, Scott JA noted that the grounds of negligence that the plaintiff relied 
upon were of a “general nature and relate[d] to a systemic failure on the part of [the 
defendant].”312 In other words, this was not a case where a specific employee had 
allegedly caused the plaintiff’s harm through his negligence, but, rather, an instance 
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of direct liability and it was the conduct of the defendant itself – specifically whether 
the system it had designed to keep railway passengers safe – that was the focus of 
the enquiry.  
Having held that the plaintiff’s harm was foreseeable,313 the SCA had to establish 
whether the alleged general failure on the defendant’s part to put measures in place 
that would guarantee the safety of commuters was reasonable. To this extent, it was 
apparent that the defendant had adopted measures to minimise or prevent crime on 
the trains by employing some security guards on trains and on station platforms. The 
pertinent question was whether the plaintiff had discharged the burden of establishing 
that those measures were unreasonable in the circumstances.  
The court concluded that, to prevent the harm in this case, the defendant would have 
had to employ at least one security guard on each of its coaches, especially in light of 
the assailants’ willingness to use their guns and frequent armed attacks on security 
guards. Loubser and Midgley summarise the situation as follows:314 
“Moreover, assuming that the presence of a security guard in the coach would have prevented 
the harm from occurring, the question then arises of whether [the defendant] could reasonably 
be required to employ a guard on every coach on every train. The court found that such 
requirement would be unreasonable because of the large number of coaches involved, and in 
terms of the cost and effort. It might have been reasonable to require security guards on every 
coach where lines have been identified as being particularly vulnerable to criminal activities, but 
no evidence to this effect had been tendered.” 
The reasoning of the SCA cannot be faulted. It applied the established common-law 
test for negligence on the facts and arrived at the conclusion that, although the harm 
befalling the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable, a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant would not have taken the steps required to prevent such harm 
because it would have placed upon it an unreasonable burden to incur an inordinate 
amount of costs.  
The unreasonable burden and costs of preventing harm in this case stems from the 
fact that the defendant operated a nation-wide railway structure, with thousands of 
coaches falling under the scope of its responsibility. It would have had severe 
economic consequences for the defendant to employ the necessary steps to prevent 
                                                          
313 Para 7. 
314 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 129. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
the plaintiff’s harm. As a result, however, an otherwise deserving victim of crime was 
left without a remedy to repair the harm he suffered arising from crime.  
Subsequently, in Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa315 
(“Mashongwa”), the plaintiff boarded a train operated by the defendant. Shortly after 
its departure, four unarmed men entered the plaintiff’s coach and demanded his 
mobile phone, wallet and money. After he handed these to his assailants, they 
assaulted him, picked him up and threw him off the train through the open doors of the 
coach as the train approached the next station.  
Seeking damages in delict, the plaintiff argued that the defendant “did not adopt 
reasonable measures for his safety”316 and that, “as an organ of state, [it] had a duty 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil his constitutional rights by reason of its 
responsibilities in terms of the [South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989].”317 
The High Court found that the defendant had been negligent in failing to ensure that 
the train doors were closed when the train initially departed and in failing to deploy at 
least one armed guard on each train. The SCA overruled this decision by applying the 
reasoning in Shabalala insofar as the defendant’s alleged negligent failure to deploy 
security guards in each train was concerned:318 
“Whether there were security guards on the other coaches is unclear. What is clear is that there 
were no guards in his coach. It is also clear that to avert the attack there would have had to have 
been at least one security guard in his coach. I say at least one because, given the number of 
attackers, a single security guard may well have made no difference. But even if one were 
sufficient to avert the attack, the question remains whether it would be reasonable to require 
Prasa to have a security guard in every coach. To insist on such a requirement would exceed by 
far the precautionary measures to be expected of Prasa […] In Shabalala Scott JA accepted that 
in order to avert the attack on the appellant, there would have had to be, at least, one security 
guard in Mr Shabalala’s coach. But in view of the brazen nature of the attack, where the assailant 
had shot Mr Shabalala three times when he said he had no money on him, the learned judge 
found that it was doubtful that one guard, even if armed, would have made any difference. Like 
Scott JA, I too have my doubts whether the presence of a guard in the particular coach would 
have made any difference in this case.” 
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The SCA held that the defendant’s failure to provide adequate security measures to 
ensure the plaintiff’s safety was reasonable and, further, that its failure to ensure that 
the coach doors were closed while the train was in motion was also not negligent.319  
On appeal, the CC focused its attention on determining whether the defendant’s 
alleged negligent failures wrongfully caused the plaintiff’s harm.320 Mogoeng CJ’s 
reasoning may be questioned on other bases,321 but for present purposes it is 
sufficient to note that the court held that the defendant wrongfully caused the plaintiff’s 
harm and then considered whether (a) the defendant’s failure to deploy security 
guards in the plaintiff’s train and/or (b) its failure to close the train’s doors could be 
regarded as negligent.  
In response to (a), Mogoeng CJ dealt only with the preventability of harm, and it must 
therefore be assumed that the court found that the harm was reasonably foreseeable. 
In this context, the CC seemed to follow the SCA’s reasoning in Shabalala as it 
emphasised the fact that “Prasa is not required to provide measures that will guarantee 
its rail commuters absolute freedom from crimes of violence […] It is only obliged to 
provide measures consonant with a proper appreciation of the constitutional and 
statutory responsibilities it bears.”322  
The court conducted a thorough evaluation of the preventative security measures that 
the defendant undertook in the circumstances, noting that the defendant identified 
specific crime hotspots and analysed crime patterns on the basis of which a particular 
security and deployment plan for the security guards were outlined and confirmed that 
the defendant enlisted the services of 600 security guards in the region in which the 
assault had taken place, although none of them were posted on a train.323 The court 
also took into account the fact that the defendant’s senior security officials met with 
the police on a regular basis to assess the security situation,324 and because criminal 
incidents were more often reported during the festive season, pre-existing security 
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measures were reinforced during this period.325 Lastly, stop, search and seizure 
operations were also conducted on trains during the festive season.326 
Against this background, the court correctly weighed the risk of harm (and its 
magnitude, if materialising) against the burden and costs associated with taking 
preventative steps.327 In his evaluation, Mogoeng CJ stated that the plaintiff “was 
thrown out of a train that operated in a region that had very few incidents of violent 
crime.”328 In fact, “[s]o low was the risk that the highest incidence reported in the entire 
region was five per month.”329 In relation to the financial implications of preventing 
harm, the CC noted the defendant’s evidence that, budgetary constraints taken into 
account, PRASA’s annual budget for security in the northern region stood at about 
R80 million.330 In response to the possibility of deploying security guards on each 
coach or train in the region,331 the defendant noted that the cost of such an exercise 
could easily rise to over R200 million per year for the northern region alone.332  
Ultimately, the CC held that the defendant’s failure to post a security guard on the train 
had not been negligent.333 It should be mentioned that the court found that the 
defendant was negligent in respect of (b) above (i.e. in failing to close the doors) and 
that this negligent failure was the cause, in fact and law, of the plaintiff’s harm. 
Because the court also concluded that the negligent failure to close the door wrongfully 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, the defendant was held liable in delict for the victim’s harm. 
Therefore, the plaintiff – a victim of violent crime – was successful in claiming 
compensation for his harm from the defendant.  
                                                          
325 Para 37. 
326 Para 37. 
327 See Ngubane v South African Transport Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (A); Cape Metropolitan Council 
v Graham 2001 (1) SA 1197 (SCA); Enslin v Nhlapo 2008 (5) SA 146 (SCA); Shabalala v Metrorail 
2008 (3) SA 142 (SCA); Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South Africa 124-129 where the 
following factors are identified as relevant in establishing the preventability of harm: the degree or extent 
of the risk created by the defendant’s conduct, the gravity of the possible consequences if the risk of 
harm materialises, the utility of the defendant’s conduct and the burden of eliminating the risk of harm.  
328 2016 (3) SA 528 (CC) para 39. 
329 Para 39. 
330 Paras 38-39. 
331 Paras 38-39. 
332 Paras 38-39. 
333 Paras 41-43. 
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Nevertheless, Mashongwa, like Shabalala, illustrates that where a crime victim 
institutes a delictual claim based on an alleged systemic failure of the state to prevent 
foreseeable harm, it may face daunting evidentiary challenges. 
First, these judgments illustrate how difficult it is to prove negligence where you are 
dealing with so-called systemic failures of the state to prevent crime. When 
establishing the preventability of harm under the common-law test for negligence, 
courts are required to weigh the risk of harm (as well as its extent, if it materialises) 
against the costs and burden associated with harm prevention.  
Where the defendant that is sought to be held directly liable is a nation-wide train 
operator, with a vast network of trains and railways, the preventative measures 
required to prevent harm on a systemic level may conceivably take on astronomical 
financial proportions. In other words, as these cases indicate, the costs involved in 
preventing harm may simply be too much in these instances. The figures mentioned 
in Mashongwa imply that requiring the state-owned railway operator to prevent harm 
to train passengers by providing a guard in each coach is, financially speaking, 
unsustainable. Further, given the general socio-economic status of train passengers, 
it would not be a viable option to subsidise such preventative measures through an 
increase in the price of train-tickets.  
The result of all of the above is that, unless there is the possibility of pursuing an 
alternative route to compensation, the victim will likely be unable to receive 
compensation.  
Secondly, as illustrated by the level of detail given to specific factual circumstances in 
especially Mashongwa, proving the preventability of harm requires a plaintiff to be able 
to illustrate the measures that were put in place by the defendant as well as other 
steps which a reasonable person would have taken. As will be explained in further 
detail in chapter 3, this is a difficult, time-consuming, costly and protracted exercise 
which most crime victims arguably will not be able to undertake, thereby potentially 
leaving them without a remedy.  
The reasoning in Shabalala and Metrorail thus emphasises the prejudicial effect which 
the principled application of the common-law approach to negligence may have in 
cases where a state entity is sought to be held directly liable for its alleged systemic 
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negligence. Ultimately, this evidentiary burden may prove too much of a stumbling 
block for most victims of crime and, without a viable alternative to provide 
compensation, they are left to shoulder their own costs.  
 
2.3 The statutory response to providing compensation to crime victims  
For a variety of reasons, crime victims may elect not to institute delictual proceedings 
against the actual perpetrator of the crime in a civil court. If so, it may be asked whether 
there are statutory mechanisms that could assist crime victims in receiving 
compensation for harm suffered as a result of crime. In this section, attention will be 
given to answering this question by describing and evaluating the provisions contained 
in the Criminal Procedure Act, which currently represent the sole statutory possibility 
in claiming crime victim compensation. Regard will also be had to the POCA, which 
may provide a source of compensation to a select category of crime victims. 
 
2.3.1 The Criminal Procedure Act  
The Criminal Procedure Act contains provisions that relate to the compensation of 
crime victims. Section 297(1)(a)(i) of the Act authorises a court to postpone the 
sentencing of a convicted person for up to five years on certain conditions, including 
making payment of compensation, providing community service or reparation in 
kind.334 The section also authorises the suspension of the whole or any part of the 
sentence for up to five years, apart from cases where a minimum punishment has 
been prescribed.335  
Section 300 of the Act allows a court, when convicting a person of an offence which 
has caused damage to, or loss of, property (including money) belonging to another, to 
award such a victim of the crime compensation for the damage or loss of his 
property.336 A court will, however, only issue such a compensation order if the crime 
victim has specifically applied for it, or if the state prosecutor is instructed by the victim 
                                                          
334 See also Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 83.  
335 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 47.  
336 Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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of crime to apply on his behalf, or if the state prosecutor has been expressly instructed 
by the state to do so.337 A superior court is not limited to a specific amount when 
making its order, but a regional and a magistrate’s court is limited to an amount 
determined by the Minister of Justice by way of notices in the Government Gazette.338 
An order in terms of section 300 has the status of a civil judgment. Imprisonment 
cannot be imposed in the event of non-payment.339 
In terms of section 300, the victim has a period of sixty days within which to renounce 
the award in writing and to effect repayment of any amount already received. In the 
event that the victim decides to accept the court’s order, however, he will not be 
entitled to institute civil proceedings against the perpetrator in respect of any other 
form of compensation in a civil court.340 In other words, if he does accept the order, it 
“takes the place of any other civil legal remedy that the injured party might have against 
the accused.”341 The reason for this is the so-called once-and-for-all rule, according to 
which a plaintiff has only one opportunity to claim damages arising from a single cause 
of action.342 
Section 301 of the Act states that, where a person is convicted of theft or any other 
offence whereby the person has unlawfully obtained property, and he has sold the 
property or a part thereof to another person who had no knowledge that it was stolen 
or unlawfully obtained, the court may, on application by the purchaser and 
on restitution of the property to the owner thereof, order that, out of any money taken 
from the accused on his arrest, a sum not exceeding the amount paid by the purchaser 
be returned to him. 
 
                                                          
337 Joubert et al Criminal Procedure 346. 
338 R1 000 000 in respect of a regional court and R300 000 in respect of a magistrate’s court – see 
Government Gazette 36111 of 30 January 2013. 
339 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 89.  
340 91. 
341 91. See also JM Potgieter, L Steynberg & TB Floyd Visser & Potgieter’s Law of Damages 3 ed (2012) 
158. 
342 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 91; Visser & Potgieter Law of Damages 
158. 
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2.3.2 Critical evaluation of the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act that 
provide a crime victim with assistance to claim compensation  
The common law of delict’s deficiencies in compensating crime victims have already 
been noted above. It must now be considered whether the Act is effective with regard 
to the compensation of these victims.  
With regards to the sentences that may be imposed in terms of section 297 of the Act, 
it has been remarked that they “are very scarce and the main reason for this is the 
lack of means of offenders.”343 
In S v Seedat,344 the appellant was convicted of raping the 58-year-old complainant, 
to whom he had delivered a bedside lamp and groceries. The High Court referred to 
sections 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) and 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The first section 
permits a court that convicts a person for an offence, “other than an offence in respect 
of which any law prescribes a minimum punishment”, to “postpone” the passing of 
sentence for a period not exceeding five years, and release that person concerned on 
one or more conditions, including compensation.345 On the other hand, section 297(4) 
allows a court that “convicts a person of an offence in respect of which any law 
prescribes a minimum punishment”, to pass sentence in its discretion and to order the 
operation of a part thereof to be “suspended” for a period not exceeding five years on 
any condition referred to in para (a) of sub-section (1).346 As a result, the High Court 
adopted a proposal made at the trial by the complainant that the appellant pay her 
compensation. The court thus suspended the sentencing of the appellant for a period 
of three years on condition that he pay her the amount of R100 000 in instalments. 
The state appealed against the sentence on the grounds that it was incompetent 
and invalid. 
On appeal, the SCA held that the postponement of sentence in terms of section 297(1) 
of the Act was not available as a sentencing option in the matter as it specifically 
                                                          
343 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 88. See also Scott (1967) 8(2) William & 
Mary Law Review 278; B Cameron “Compensation for Victims of Crime, The New Zealand Experiment” 
(1963) 12 Journal of Public Law 368; M Fry “Justice for Victims” (1959) 8 Journal of Public Law 191 192; 
J Goodey Compensating Victims of Violent Crime in the European Union (2003) 11.  
344 2017 (1) SACR 141 (SCA). 
345 Para 33.  
346 Para 33.  
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prohibited postponement of the sentence where the accused was convicted of an 
offence for which the law prescribed a minimum sentence.347 If, however, it was the 
intention of the High Court to invoke the provisions rather of section 297(4) it could 
have done so, but it would then have had to impose a sentence for a specific term of 
imprisonment and then order that the operation of a part of it be suspended for a 
specified period not exceeding five years on any condition, including compensation.348 
The SCA held as follows:349 
“Whilst I accept that the complainant may have thought that it would be appropriate to make the 
appellant rather pay monetary compensation for what he did, her views are not the only factor to 
be taken into account. Rape has become a scourge in our society and the courts are under a 
duty to send a clear message, not only to the accused, but to other potential rapists and to the 
community that it will not be tolerated […] Whilst the object of sentencing is not to satisfy public 
opinion, it needs to serve the public interest […] Criminal proceedings need to instil public 
confidence ‘in the criminal justice system with the public, including those close to the accused, 
as well as those distressed by the audacity and horror of crime’ […] Indeed, the public would 
justifiably be alarmed if courts tended to impose a suspended sentence coupled with monetary 
compensation for rape […] As the state has contended, a sentence entailing a businessman 
being ordered to pay his rape victim in lieu of a custodial sentence is bound to cause indignation 
with at least a large portion of society.”  
The judgment of the SCA in this case illustrates, on the one hand, the limited scope of 
application of section 297 of the Act and, on the other hand, sends a clear message 
to future rape victims about the unlikely possibility of receiving compensation via the 
existing statutory mechanisms.  
Although section 300 of the Act provides the crime victim with some form of procedural 
assistance in being compensated, it also has serious limitations.350 In the first 
instance, it relates only to “damage to or loss of property (including money) belonging 
to some other person” and does not provide a court with the authority to award an 
order in respect of non-patrimonial harm or harm that arises from bodily injuries.351 In 
S v Lekgathe,352 the court noted this shortcoming, remarking that “[t]his seems to be 
a casus omissus in the Act which should be rectified.” However, at the time of writing, 
it has not been amended. It is recommended that this change be made to provide 
more effective compensation to crime victims. However, for the reasons highlighted 
                                                          
347 Paras 35-36. 
348 Paras 35-36. 
349 Paras 39-40. 
350 See also the SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 191, where it is stated that the 
current provisions of the Act is “seldom applied in practice and the majority of civil courts are under-
utilized.” 
351 See also Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 92. 
352 1982 (3) SA 104 (B) 112. 
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below, it is doubted whether this will make a practical difference to the issue of crime 
victim compensation.  
Secondly, as Von Bonde argues, with reference to section 300, the injured party has 
to be the owner of the property or money and the scope of the compensation that may 
be awarded is therefore significantly limited.353 The term “injured person” in section 
300 is strictly interpreted which means that if stolen goods are sold to an innocent 
purchaser and vindicated in his hands, he cannot receive compensation under section 
300 for whatever harm he may have suffered as a result of the sale and subsequent 
vindication, but will have to rely on the normal delictual action or on an order in terms 
of section 301.354  
Thirdly, the application of section 300 is limited to cases where the quantification of 
damages is reasonably “straightforward”.355 In addition, the section is also 
“inappropriate in motor vehicle accident cases because a criminal court will not be in 
a position to determine the contributory negligence of the injured party. For this the 
private law system with its extensive battery of pre-trial pleadings should be utilised to 
clarify the issues between the parties.”356  
It must also be emphasised, again, that crimes are very often committed by members 
of society who are financially unable to compensate the harm which they cause.357 As 
a result, any orders given by a court against a perpetrator may be practically useless, 
thereby exposing the victim of crime to the burden of carrying his loss at his own cost. 
More attention will be given to this issue in chapter 4. For present purposes, it may be 
added that this could result in a crime victim being placed in a vulnerable position, 
                                                          
353 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 92. 
354 92. 
355 92. 
356 92. 
357 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 281-282: “Even where a conviction takes place, 
international experience suggests that emphasising compensation from the perpetrator will produce 
poor results. In South Africa, it has been shown that the majority of accused persons do not have the 
means to compensate their victims. Moreover, it has been argued that it is particularly difficult or 
inappropriate for accused people to be expected to pay compensation when they are imprisoned for an 
extended period and, consequently, have no earnings […] Even in Europe, where criminal justice 
systems are significantly better resourced than in South Africa, payments made by offenders to victims 
occur in relatively few cases. This is because offenders, when apprehended, are generally poor and 
unable to make payments to the victim.” See also Miers (2014) 20(1) International Review of 
Victimology 148-154.  
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whereas the perpetrator’s position is seemingly protected insofar as that he may avoid 
the penalty of incarceration. 
Lastly, as noted in the SALRC Report, section 300 of the Act “is inadequate in that it 
only provides for compensation in cases of damage or monetary loss as a result of 
theft or fraud. It is insufficient for compensation in cases of assault.”358  
It is therefore concluded that the existing statutory mechanisms provided in the Act for 
assisting victims to receive some form of compensation from the wrongdoer is 
inadequate. Even if it were to be reformed to broaden its ambit, this would be cold 
comfort for the victim who is faced with a wrongdoer who lacks the means to provide 
compensation.  
 
2.3.3 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
The Criminal Procedure Act is not the only legislation that may be relevant within the 
context of crime victim compensation. The POCA seeks to introduce measures to 
combat organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities; prohibit 
certain racketeering and money-laundering activities; and criminalise certain gang 
activities. The Act also provides for the recovery of the proceeds of unlawful activities 
(through confiscation orders) and the civil forfeiture of criminal assets that have been 
used to commit an offence (through forfeiture orders).359 
Chapter 7 of the POCA establishes the Criminal Assets Recovery Account (“CARA”) 
as a separate account in the National Revenue Fund.360 The CARA is funded by 
moneys derived from the fulfilment of confiscation and forfeiture orders as well as other 
sources.361 In accordance with section 69A(1) of the POCA, Cabinet, after considering 
                                                          
358 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 160.  
359 A Kruger Organised Crime and Proceeds of Crime Law in South Africa 2 ed (2013) 75-151. 
360 Section 63 of the POCA.  
361 See section 64 of the POCA: the CARA may also be funded by the balance of all moneys derived 
from the execution of foreign confiscation orders as defined in the International Co-Operation in Criminal 
Matters Act 75 of 1996; any property or moneys appropriated by Parliament, or paid into, or allocated 
to, the account in terms of any other Act; domestic and foreign grants; any property or amount of money 
received or acquired from any source; and all property or moneys transferred to the Account in terms 
of this Act. 
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the recommendations of the CARA committee,362 may allocate the property and 
money standing to the credit of the CARA to specific law enforcement agencies; any 
institution, organisation or fund contemplated in section 68(c) of the Act; or the 
administration of the CARA. Section 68(c) of the Act states that one of the objects of 
the CARA committee is “to advise Cabinet in connection with the rendering of financial 
assistance to any other institution, organisation or fund established with the object to 
render assistance in any manner to victims of crime”.  
Significantly, the POCA does not state that the funds in the CARA should be used to 
compensate crime victims. In fact, the Act does not contain any reference to the 
compensation of crime victims. That the purpose of the POCA and the CARA is not 
crime victim compensation is demonstrated by various government publications. For 
instance, in CARA’s annual report for 2010/2011, the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (“DJCD”) notes that the “underlying hypothesis of asset 
forfeiture legislation [like the POCA] is that, by confiscating or forfeiting the profits or 
proceeds of crime, the incentive for committing specific crimes is reduced.”363 In 
Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions,364 the CC also emphasised this as 
the POCA’s main purpose, and explained that the POCA established two mechanisms 
“to ensure that property derived from an offence or used in the commission of an 
offence is forfeited to the State”, namely confiscation and forfeiture orders.365  
In its discussion of confiscation orders in S v Shaik,366 the CC again emphasised the 
primary purpose underlying the POCA, and emphasised the following objective of the 
Act: “[to ensure that] no person convicted of an offence should benefit from the fruits 
of that or any related offence [and that] legislation is [therefore] necessary to provide 
                                                          
362 In terms of section 68 of the POCA, the CARA committee is responsible for advising Cabinet in 
relation to the forfeiture of property to the State that may occur under chapter 6 of the POCA; financial 
assistance offered to law enforcement agencies to combat organised crime, money laundering, criminal 
gang activities and terrorist activities. 
363 The DJCD Criminal Asset Recovery Account (CARA) Annual Report 2010/2011 (2011) 1. Since 
2013, it appears that the information pertaining to the POCA, the CARA and asset forfeiture has been 
included in the annual report of the National Director of Public Prosecutions as well as the DJCD’s 
annual performance plan. In this regard, the DJCD Annual Performance Plan 2017/2018 (2017) 150 
highlights this objective.  
364 2007 (6) SA 169 (CC) para 60. 
365 See chapters 5 and 6 of the POCA.  
366 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC) para 21. 
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for a civil remedy for the restraint and seizure, and confiscation of property which forms 
the benefits derived from such an offence.”367 The CC further held:368  
“From this primary purpose, two secondary purposes flow. The first is general deterrence: to 
ensure that people are deterred in general from joining the ranks of criminals by the realisation 
that they will be prevented from enjoying the proceeds of the crimes they may commit. And the 
second is prevention: the scheme seeks to remove from the hands of criminals the financial 
wherewithal to commit further crimes.” 
Kruger provides the following example to explain the purpose underlying the POCA:369 
“[The POCA] focuses on the events at racketeering, and on assets, in dealing with confiscation 
or forfeiture, not on the perpetrator. Say there is a ‘drug house’ in the community, but there is no 
evidence to link the owner of the house to the selling of drugs. In such case a forfeiture order in 
respect of the house can be obtained (because the house is an instrumentality of an offence) 
under Chapter 6 of POCA. The drug house is thus closed down and the crime stopped. Further 
drug-dealing in that house is prevented. In this manner POCA acts to prevent crime. The new 
paradigm created by Chapter 6 of POCA is one in which the instrumentality or proceeds of crime 
are the target, not the person who committed the offence. This approach creates new possibilities 
for the prevention and detection of crime.” 
Notwithstanding the fact that crime victim compensation is not one of the main 
objectives of the POCA, it has nevertheless made an impact in this context. It does in 
the following way:370  
“[Once the Asset Forfeiture Unit has claimed] the fruits of the crime on behalf of society; it takes 
the profit out of crime. If there is a direct victim of the crime, money from assets forfeited goes to 
that victim. If there is no victim the money goes into the [CARA]. The Cabinet then decides what 
to do with it. By September 2007, R120 million had been deposited in that account and R73 
million paid out to victims of crime.”  
According to the DJCD’s annual report for 2015/2016 (“DJCD 2015/2016 Annual 
Report”), the following payments have been made to victims of crime since 2008: R53 
million (2009/2010), R18 million (2010/2011), R93 million (2011/2012), R28 million 
(2012/2013), R84 million (2013/2014), R1 658 million (2014/2015) and R390 million 
(2015/2016).371 As Kruger indicates, payment from forfeited assets goes to the victim 
of the specific crime. However, the DJCD 2015/2016 Annual Report does not indicate 
the nature of the forfeited assets or to what category of crime victim(s) the payments 
were made. Instead, it states that, regarding organised crime “[p]articular focus was 
on various areas such as illegal precious metals including copper, rhino-related 
                                                          
367 See also the preamble of the POCA; Kruger Organised Crime 1-11. 
368 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC) paras 51-52. 
369 Kruger Organised Crime 1. 
370 Kruger Organised Crime 10. A detailed description and analysis of the confiscation and forfeiture 
procedures under the POCA falls outside the scope of this dissertation. In this regard, see Kruger 
Organised Crime 75-151. 
371 DJCD Annual Report 2015/2016 (2016) 110.  
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offences, drug dealings, illicit mining and tax matters.”372 Elsewhere it states that the 
“cases of higher value were processed. Improved focus [was placed] on high-value 
case[s]”.373  
An overview of case law relating to asset forfeiture and confiscation indicates that 
these cases are predominantly concerned with drug-dealing,374 keeping a brothel,375 
corruption and bribery,376 fraud,377 and cases where motor vehicles were used as an 
instrumentality in the commission of an offence.378  
Against this background, and for the following reasons, it is submitted that the POCA 
does not provide an adequate solution to the broad problem of crime victim 
compensation.  
First, generally speaking, it is clear that asset forfeiture and confiscation cases do not 
focus on instances of violent crime or ensuring the compensation of violent crime 
victims via the available POCA mechanisms. Arguably, this is because, when 
compared to the assets involved in the above “high-value cases”, there are generally-
speaking no significant assets involved in the commission of violent crimes such as 
murder, rape or assault. This means that the general financial impecuniosity of violent 
criminals and the lack of any significant assets being used as instruments in the 
process prevent the POCA mechanisms from being used in this context.  
Secondly, although the amounts paid out to victims in a particular financial year may 
appear as significant (e.g. R390 million in 2015/2016), it ought to viewed against the 
                                                          
372 100. 
373 108. 
374 Kruger Organised Crime 134; NDPP v Cole 2005 (2) SACR 553 (W); NDPP v Parker 2006 (1) SACR 
284 (SCA); Singh v NDPP 2007 (2) SACR 326 (SCA); NDPP v Van der Merwe 2011 (2) SACR 188 
(WCC); Van der Burg v NDPP 2012 (2) SACR 331 (CC).  
375 Kruger Organised Crime 134; NDPP v Geyser [2008] ZASCA 15; Mohunram v NDPP 2007 (4) SA 
222 (CC); NDPP v Bosch 2009 (2) SACR 547 (KZP); NDPP v Salie 2015 (1) 121 (WCC). 
376 Kruger Organised Crime 142; NDPP: In re Appeal 2005 (2) SACR 610 (N); S v Shaik 2008 (2) SACR 
165 (CC); NDPP v Gardener 2011 (1) SACR 612 (SCA); NDPP v Ramlutchman 2017 (1) SACR 343 
(SCA). 
377 Kruger Organised Crime 143; NDPP v Ro Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; NDPP v 37 Gillespie Street 
Durban (Pty) Ltd; NDPP v Seevnarayan 2004 (2) SACR 208 (SCA); Ntsoko v NDPP 2016 (1) SACR 
103 (GP).  
378 Kruger Organised Crime 137-142. For example: drunken driving cases (e.g. NDPP v Van Staden 
2007 (1) SACR 338 (SCA)); cases involving trading abalone (e.g. NDPP v Gouws 2005 (2) SACR 193 
(SE); NDPP v Swart 2005 (2) SACR 186 (SE)); cases where drugs was transported (e.g. NDPP v 
Seleoane [2003] 3 All SA 102 (NC)); and illegal hunting or poaching cases (NDPP v Mniki [2010] 
ZAECPEHC 39 (29 June 2010)). 
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number of successful forfeiture cases for that period (e.g. 389 in 2015/2016). 
Assuming that victims in each of those cases received money from the proceeds of 
unlawful activities, it would arguably still result in a relatively few number of crime 
victims receiving a significant amount of money (e.g., on average, and assuming there 
was one victim per case instituted in 2015/2016, each victim would have received 
approximately R1 million). However, when compared to the substantial number of 
violent crime victims in South Africa on an annual basis,379 the solution offered by the 
POCA appears to be unsatisfactory, at least insofar the legal position relating to the 
compensation of violent crime victims is concerned. 
It may further be noted that, although the POCA’s purpose does not relate to 
compensation, once the proceeds from confiscation and forfeiture orders have been 
paid into the CARA, it could potentially be used for the purpose of crime victim 
compensation if the CARA committee were to advise Cabinet to advance the funds to 
a specific institution, organisation or fund which, in turn, uses the funds to compensate 
certain crime victims. However, as indicated below, this appears not to have been the 
practice up to date.  
A 2014 report by the DJCD concerning the CARA records the history and current 
status of the property and moneys forfeited and confiscated to the state and deposited 
into the CARA (“DJCD 2014 Report”).380 It is clear that the annual amounts collected 
by CARA since its inception in 1999 up to 31 January 2014 has varied considerably.381 
For instance, in the period 1999-2003, approximately R18 million was collected, in 
2008-2009 almost R66 million was collected, while the revenue for the 2013-2014 
period was substantially higher (almost R95 million) “due to the finalization of three big 
cases named Taunenbaum (R53 million), King (R9million) and Rhino Horns 
(R4million) and 15 case [sic] of between R500 000 and R3 million) in the current 
financial year.”382 The 2015/2016 annual report by the National Director of Public 
                                                          
379 See paragraph 1.1 in chapter 1 and paragraph 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4.  
380 DJCD Report to the Criminal Assets Recovery Committee (CARC) on the Property and Moneys 
Forfeited and Confiscated to the State and Proceeds Deposited into the Criminal Assets Recovery 
Account (CARA) (2014). 
381 4. 
382 4. 
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Prosecutions further notes that R58 million and R54 million was paid into the CARA in 
respect of 2014/2015 and 2015/2016.383  
At the time that the DJCD 2014 Report was published, only two allocations of CARA 
funds had been made. In 2006 R73 million was allocated while Cabinet approved an 
allocation of R250 million in 2011, bringing the total amount of CARA funds allocated 
by Cabinet to approximately R323 million.384 As at 31 January 2014, there was 
approximately R182 million left in the CARA.385 In its 2016 annual report, the National 
Director for Public Prosecutions noted that “[t]he CARA-funds are now depleted”.386 
The DJCD 2014 Report provides further details of how the CARA funds have been 
allocated in the past.387 The DJCD received R150 million for the establishment of an 
Anti-Corruption Task Team and R20 million aimed at providing domestic violence and 
victim support services; the Department of Social Development was awarded a total 
amount of R26 million for funding existing shelters for crime victims and vulnerable 
groups as well as funding the Civil Society Organisation; the Department of 
Correctional Services was allocated approximately R23 million that was earmarked for 
the establishment of 53 modern parole board offices that may provide easy access to 
crime victims who “wish to participate in the mediation process with offenders who are 
in the correctional facilities”;388 the SAPS were provided approximately R11 million to 
re-establish 45 victim friendly facilities in police stations; and the National Prosecuting 
Authority was allocated R20 million to cover “curator expenses in high profile 
cases”.389  
Section 4 of the 2014 DJCD Report contains the details relating to the use of the 
allocated funds by each beneficiary.390 None of the beneficiaries refer to crime victim 
compensation or contemplate using its allocated funds to be used to compensate 
those who suffer harm arising from crime. From this report it may therefore be inferred 
that the proceeds collected from forfeiture and confiscation procedures and paid into 
                                                          
383 National Director of Public Prosecutions (“NDPP”) Annual Report 2015/2016 (2016) 51. 
384 DJCD Report to the Criminal Assets Recovery Committee (2014) 5. 
385 7. 
386 NDPP Annual Report 2015/2016 (2016) 54. 
387 DJCD Report to the Criminal Assets Recovery Committee (2014) 7. 
388 7. 
389 7. 
390 DJCD Report to the Criminal Assets Recovery Committee (2014) 8-13. 
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the CARA have thus far had little, if any, effect on the issue of crime victim 
compensation.  
Although it may therefore be possible for CARA funds to be allocated to future 
beneficiaries with the purpose of crime victim compensation, this has not been the 
practice up to date. It is proposed that, if the South African legislature were to establish 
a statutory compensation fund for crime victims, a proposal be made by such a fund 
to the CARA committee in terms of which it is requested that some of the funds in the 
CARA be made available for the purpose of crime victim compensation.391   
Ultimately, the POCA is concerned predominantly with organised crime and provides 
certain procedures to accumulate proceeds from unlawful activities within this context. 
However, this dissertation does not concern the commission of organised crime or the 
potential remedies that may be used in response thereto. This dissertation does not 
focus on crime prevention, deterrence or ensuring that criminals do not benefit from 
their own wrongdoing. It focuses on the issue of crime victim compensation. It is 
submitted that the procedures set in place by the POCA is insufficient and 
unsatisfactory in providing sufficient crime victim compensation.392  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the way in which crime victims may seek compensation 
within the current South African legal system. It is trite that they may institute common-
law delictual claims against the actual perpetrator of the crime and the Criminal 
Procedure Act could potentially also provide limited procedural assistance to claim 
compensation from the actual criminal. For what is arguably predominantly financial 
reasons, crime victims very rarely make use of either of these options. Instead, an 
overview of the South African law reports illustrate that they rather seek to hold other 
financially capable entities vicariously liable, arguing that, in some way or another, 
their harm was wrongfully caused by the culpable conduct of these entities’ 
                                                          
391 See further paragraph 4.2.4.1 in chapter 4, where the potential funding of the proposed 
compensation fund is discussed in further detail.  
392 See paragraph 4.2.4.1 in chapter 4 where it is argued that, if a statutory crime victim compensation 
fund were to be enacted, the fund would be well-advised to approach the CARA with a request to make 
available funds to the proposed crime victim compensation scheme for the purpose of crime victim 
compensation. 
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employees. In this context, victims often attempt to hold the state vicariously liable but 
a private security services company has also been held liable in this way. 
Most of this chapter highlighted particular conceptual problem areas that have arisen 
as a result of the expanded state delictual liability. For the various reasons outlined 
above,393 it may be doubted whether the expansion of the state’s delictual liability for 
the negligent, wrongful failures of its employees to prevent crime is desirable over the 
long term. It may be worthwhile to consider whether there are alternatives for providing 
compensation to crime victims. Similarly, the comparable development of state 
delictual liability in the context of harm caused by intentionally-committed crimes of 
state employees, is regarded as undesirable from a theoretical and practical 
perspective.394  
In addition, it was indicated that, if a crime victim suffers harm as result of so-called 
systemic negligence, he may have severe difficulty in satisfying the evidentiary burden 
of proof in those specific cases. Lastly, considerably less attention was given to 
statutory mechanisms that facilitate the compensation of crime victims. This reflects 
the lack of specific legislation aimed at compensating crime victims, a topic which will 
be discussed in further detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
Criticism of the state’s expanded delictual liability is particularly apposite in the case 
of South Africa. Considering the fact that police resources are already overextended 
by the high levels of crime in South Africa, it seems inappropriate to award substantial 
amounts of damages to individual plaintiffs if this will ultimately result in less of the 
overall budget awarded to the Minister of Safety and Security being used to promote 
general safety and security.395 In addition, taking into account the fact that it is the 
public at large that shoulders the cost of awarding the plaintiff damages while the 
individual wrongdoers are rarely made to pay any kind of damages, the development 
appears to be problematic. 
It may be said that the judgments handed down by the CC which were discussed in 
this chapter illustrate the fact that the law of delict appears to be “uninterested in seeing 
that the parties really responsible for causing the damage should pay for what they 
                                                          
393 See paragraph 2.2.1.1.4 above.  
394 See paragraph 2.2.1.2.5 above. 
395 Atiyah The Damages Lottery 81-82. 
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have done, it is only interested in seeing that every effort is made to enable the injured 
party to recover from someone, no matter who.”396 The desire to compensate the crime 
victim by seeking out a solvent, potentially blameless entity raises questions which are 
not at odds with the view that the law of delict’s primary function is compensation, but 
does require one to reconsider who is to take responsibility for compensation.397 
Indeed, the expansion of state delictual liability, especially where the SAPS is 
concerned, may be regarded as “a very slippery slope”:398 does the fact that courts 
appear more and more willing to hold the Minister of Safety and Security delictually 
liable because its employees negligently fail to comply with their safety and security 
duties, not also mean that courts should similarly hold that it would be negligent of a 
local municipal authority “not to build a new roundabout here, or to install traffic lights 
there, or perhaps to turn a single carriage road into a dual carriage road”?399 Or, as 
the recent judgment in Witzenberg illustrates, for the failure to prevent crime? 
Further, as indicated, K (CC) and F (CC) exhibit the CC’s readiness to adopt strained 
interpretations of the principles relating to vicarious liability of the state for harm arising 
from crime to compensate innocent crime victims. It appears that the courts have 
reached a stage where they are willing to compensate the victims of violent crime in 
any given circumstance – whether their harm arose from the negligent failure of a state 
employee to prevent crime or from the intentionally-committed crime of a state 
employee. It may be said that the courts, mindful of the surge in criminal activity and 
the vulnerability of most crime victims, and cognisant of their duty to give effect to the 
individual’s constitutional right to personal safety and security, as well as the state’s 
constitutional obligation to promote safety and security, have created a de facto 
compensation scheme for harm arising from crime, which, however, compensates only 
a select few. Given the criticism set out in this chapter, this is not a satisfactory state 
of affairs. 
The reasoning by the CC in these cases signals the court’s preparedness to apply 
relevant principles of delict widely in favour of victims of infringement of bodily integrity, 
                                                          
396 83.  
397 See further chapter 6. 
398 Atiyah The Damages Lottery: Atiyah reacts to the potential expansion of state liability in tort in the 
United Kingdom, but the argument is also applicable in the South African context.  
399 83-84. 
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regardless of whether or not the harm arose from a negligent failure of a state 
employee to prevent crime or from the intentional, criminal wrongdoing of the latter. 
As discussed earlier, it is apparent that the court is prepared to search for 
circumstantial factors on an ad hoc basis in order to justify the imposition of vicarious 
liability on the state where a principled application of the common-law requirements 
for vicarious liability would deny the plaintiff a remedy.  
These points of criticism provide the impetus for this dissertation. If they are to be 
heeded, it necessarily raises the question whether an alternative way exists to award 
compensation to crime victims in the position of the respective plaintiffs in K (CC) and 
F (CC) as well as other victims of intentionally-committed crimes.  
One particular alternative that has been adopted in a variety of foreign jurisdictions is 
the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims.400 It may 
therefore be worth considering whether the detrimental development of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability and the expansion of state delictual liability should be pre-empted by 
the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims where, generally, 
victims of crimes are allowed compensation for some, or all of, the harm arising from 
crime. The creation of such a fund as an alternative for the current trend of widening 
delictual liability of the state for harm arising from crime would be a response to the 
implications of the recent judicial development, namely that some or other mechanism 
needs to be put in place to provide compensation for harm arising especially from 
violent crime.  
Before any practical issues relating to the potential development of the law of delict 
may be considered, there is a preliminary question that requires attention:  on what 
basis could the potential preferential treatment of crime victims – as opposed to 
another category of victims of harm – be justified within the South African law of delict? 
The next chapter will seek to assist in answering this question by investigating the 
legal and public policy considerations that have justified the legislative intervention in 
the law of delict in the past. 
                                                          
400 See also chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT JUSTIFY 
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF DELICT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the way in which crime victims may be compensated 
within the current South African legal system. They may institute common-law delictual 
claims against the actual perpetrator in search of compensation, whereas the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides limited procedural assistance in recompensing the 
harm they suffered.  
Chapter 2 identified a number of problems relating to crime victim compensation. For 
financial reasons, crime victims are unlikely to institute delictual proceedings against 
the perpetrator of the crime. Furthermore, the expansion of the state’s liability for harm 
arising appears to be undesirable on theoretical and practical levels. Also, crime 
victims interested in instituting delictual claims directly against the state may likely face 
significant evidentiary difficulties in proving systemic negligence. Further, the 
assistance provided by the Criminal Procedure Act in relation to crime victim 
compensation is unsatisfactory. Lastly, although it provides some degree of relief to 
victims of organised crime, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 does 
not focus on crime victim compensation and fails to provide effective assistance to 
victims of violent crime. 
Chapter 2 highlighted the financial burden imposed on the state as a result of its 
expanded liability and the unwarranted implications which this may hold. Against that 
background, it was concluded that the current legal position relating to crime victim 
compensation is inadequate and it was proposed that an alternative method should 
be investigated to provide compensation for crime victims. One particular alternative 
that has been adopted in a variety of foreign jurisdictions is the establishment of a 
statutory compensation fund for crime victims.1  
However, academics have raised their concern over the lack of a justifiable basis for 
this type of legislative intervention: “the idea of selecting this group of injured and 
                                                          
1 See footnote 59 in paragraph 1.5 in chapter 1 for a list of the jurisdictions that have adopted this 
alternative. 
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disabled people for special treatment is not easily defensible.”2 Academics have 
consequently emphasised a “fundamental problem”3 that confronts reformers of the 
law of delict/tort law in this context, which is that “it is difficult to find a satisfactory 
rationale for singling out violent-crime victims from other groups of unfortunates for 
special treatment by the state.”4 
The problem with justifying statutory development through the enactment of a crime 
victim compensation fund has also been highlighted in South Africa. It will be recalled 
that the South African Law Reform Commission (“SALRC”) examined this potential 
alternative and published a report on their findings in 2004 (“SALRC Report”),5 while 
a doctoral dissertation6 has also examined the establishment of compensation fund. 
However, as indicated in chapter 1, neither of these research projects dealt with the 
issue of justification.7  Against that background, and with chapter 2 concluding that the 
current South African legal position relating to crime victim compensation is 
unsatisfactory, this dissertation will aim to provide a theoretical framework that could 
guide subsequent deliberation on whether legislative development of the law of delict 
relating to crime victim compensation is justified. 
Justifying the potential enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation fund is 
important for a series of reasons. Obviously, as the SALRC itself pointed out, 
“developing a motivation for the establishment of a [statutory compensation fund] in 
                                                          
2 P Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law 8 ed (2013) 303-308.  
3 South African Law Reform Commission Project 82: Sentencing (A Compensation Fund for Victims of 
Crime) (2004) 182-183. See also RE Scott “Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes: An Analysis” 
(1967) 8(2) William & Mary Law Review 277 281; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 303-308. 
4 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 182-183; Scott (1967) William & Mary Law Review 
281; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 303-308. 
5 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime.   
6 See JC von Bonde Redress for victims of crime in South Africa: A comparison with selected 
Commonwealth jurisdictions Unpublished LLD thesis Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (2007). 
7 The SALRC Report provides a summary of the violent crime situation in South Africa, the impact of 
crime on South Africa, outlines the South African legal system’s compensatory regime, provides a 
comparative overview of the compensation funds for violent crime victims established in some foreign 
jurisdictions, deals briefly with the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a compensation fund 
for crime victims in South Africa, examines the role of the criminal justice system in addressing the harm 
done to the victim of crime, but it does not set out the legal and public policy considerations that may 
justify the legislative development of the law of delict. Similarly, Von Bonde’s thesis focuses on the 
rationale underlying the restitution of crime victims, sets out the historical development of the 
compensation fund for crime victims in foreign jurisdictions, provide a comparative overview of the 
compensation funds that have been established in foreign jurisdictions (including England, India and 
New Zealand), examines the role of the criminal justice system (both in South Africa and abroad) in 
providing compensation to crime victims, but does not provide a justificatory framework for the statutory 
intervention in the law of delict.  
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SA remains incomplete, and must be completed if legislation is to be drafted, since no 
law should be passed without its objectives being clearly defined and costed.”8  
As pointed out, intervention of this kind, which necessarily requires taxpayer funding, 
would require a justifiable policy basis to explain why preferential treatment is being 
offered to crime victims as a specific category. Also, one would need a basis of this 
kind to inform the purpose, scope and extent of the statute, if it were to be enacted.  
A clear policy framework would further assist in guiding interpretation of particular 
provisions of the potential act. Indeed, without such a basis, the statute may present 
potential crime victims, administrators and courts with an untenable level of 
uncertainty. For example, in the absence of a coherent and fixed policy basis, the 
statute may create problems of interpretation. And if uncertainty regarding such a 
potential statute should lead to litigation, it will fall to a court to identify the statute’s 
underlying policy considerations. It may, however, be questioned whether it is 
desirable to have judges, who are not privy to the legislative process preceding the 
enactment of a statute, make such a broad determination when adjudicating on a 
specific matter.  
To investigate the justifiability of the proposed fund, the following approach will be 
adopted. This chapter will advance a theoretical framework that provides an outline 
for justifiable statutory reform of the law of delict insofar as compensation of victims is 
generally concerned. This will be done by identifying legal and public policy 
considerations which the legislature have used in the past to develop specific areas 
within the law of delict. To do so, the background to, and policy bases of, the three 
major statutes that have developed the law relating to the compensation of specific 
categories of victims in the past will be examined in this chapter. Once this has been 
done, chapter 4 will concentrate on the more specific issue, i.e. whether the potential 
enactment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims could fit into such a 
framework.  
Regarding the approach outlined above, it may be pointed out that there is a difference 
between the reasons advanced for the justification of the proposed fund and the scope 
of such a scheme. Therefore, the following distinction has been drawn: while this 
                                                          
8 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 318-319. 
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chapter and chapter 4 deal with the issue of justification of the fund, chapter 5 deals 
with the specific issues related to its scope (if it were to be enacted). Accordingly, this 
chapter and chapter 4 deal mainly with legal and public policy considerations justifying 
statutory reform of the law of delict in South Africa, whereas chapter 5 refer to issues 
of policy and administrative convenience. 
This chapter will draw attention to the historical development of specific South African 
statutes which have had a significant impact on the common law of delict. Attention 
will specifically be paid to the historical development of the following statutes: the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (“COIDA”), the 
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (“RAF Act”), as amended by the Road Accident 
Fund Amendment Act 15 of 2005 (“RAFA Act”) and the Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2008 (“CPA”). Although there are several other statutes that have had a significant 
influence on the law of delict,9 the focus will be on these statutes because they 
predominantly deal with the compensation of a specific group of victims of harm: motor 
vehicle accident victims, victims of defective consumer products and those who suffer 
harm as a result of occupational injuries and diseases.  
In some way or another, all of these statutes have singled out a collection of individuals 
for preferential treatment while aligning themselves with the primary function of the 
law of delict, i.e. the compensation of harm.10 In addition, the COIDA and the RAF Act 
have also established statutory compensation funds. Considering that this dissertation 
aims to investigate the feasibility of establishing a similar fund aimed at compensating 
a different group of victims, it is appropriate to examine the legal and public policy 
considerations that have justified the enactment of these similar statutes.  
                                                          
9 For example, the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956, which was described as being the “most 
important piece of law reform that has been carried out in the field of private law since Union”. See RG 
McKerron (1956) The Apportionment of Damages Act 1.  
10 For overviews of the function of the law of delict, see JC Macintosh Negligence in Delict 1 ed (1926) 
1; FP van den Heever Aquilian Damages in South African Law (1944) 3; RG McKerron The Law of 
Delict: a Treatise on the Principles of Liability for Civil Wrongs in the Law of South Africa 7 ed (1971); 
NJ van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 ed (1976) 1-3; J 
Neethling & JM Potgieter Neethling-Visser-Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 3-17; JC van der Walt & 
JR Midgley Principles of Delict 4 ed (2016); MM Loubser & JR Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South 
Africa 2 ed (2012) 8-11. These authors are in agreement insofar as compensation is regarded as being 
the primary function of this branch of the law. The matter of the law of delict’s function will be returned 
to in the final chapter 6. 
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The considerations that will be discussed in greater detail include the following. First, 
the following specific policy considerations which have justified legislative intervention 
within particular areas of the law of delict will be described: the need to combat the 
risk of harm, the role of the Constitution and the need to promote the constitutional 
right to social security and evidentiary problems relating to the application of the 
common-law fault requirement. Thereafter, general considerations which supported 
statutory reform of particular areas of the law of delict will be highlighted, including 
general dissatisfaction with the high transaction costs and levels of 
undercompensation characteristic of the civil procedural system, the preference for 
statutory as opposed to judicial reform and the need to avoid arbitrary outcomes. 
In conducting this investigation, use will also at times be made of legal comparative 
methodology, which has proven to be an instructive tool to understand domestic law 
and to evaluate it in the light of the experiences of other jurisdictions.  
 
3.2 Specific legal and public policy considerations that have justified the 
statutory reform of the South African law of delict 
3.2.1 The need to combat the risk of harm 
3.2.1.1 Introduction  
Generally, the existence and extent of a risk of harm has played an important role in 
the South African legislature’s decision to develop the law of delict.11 This has 
especially been the case in the context of motor vehicle accidents, occupational 
injuries and diseases and defective consumer products. In the following part of the 
chapter, attention will therefore be paid to the role that risk has played in the enactment 
of various statutes that provide compensation for injuries sustained in these contexts. 
 
                                                          
11 See MM Loubser Inleiding tot MMF-Wetgewing (1993) 3; D van der Nest “Motor vehicle accidents” 
in MP Olivier, N Smit & ER Kalula (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 501-516; MP Olivier 
“Social Security: Core Elements” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 13(3) second edition (2007) 
paras 158-159; MM Loubser & E Reid Product Liability (2012) 4-5. For a comparative perspective, see 
also Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 326-357, 459-487; J Stapleton Product Liability (1994) 6; S Deakin, A 
Johnston & B Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law 7 ed (2013) 51-60, 599-604; B Markesinis 
& H Unberath The German Law of Torts 4 ed (2002) 714-717, 724-729.  
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3.2.1.2 Motor vehicle accidents 
The introduction of the motor vehicle towards the end of the 19th century had profound 
consequences of a technical, social, financial and legal nature.12 One of the effects 
that accompanied its introduction to the marketplace was the increased risk of harm 
to especially bodily integrity and property. Arguably, this characteristic of motor 
vehicles provided the dominant reason for legislative reform within this context.13 
Writing about the general impact which motor vehicles have had on the law of delict, 
Cooper states:14   
“A motor car is a potentially dangerous machine. Its technical improvement, with the attendant 
increase in speed, and the increase in the volume of vehicular road traffic, with the inevitable 
increase in the number of accidents (which can be described as the materialization of the risk 
inherent in the operation of the motor car), have confronted the courts with a variety of delictual 
problems requiring judicial determination. In the process the motor car has become the single 
most potent instrument for the development and reform of the law of delict in the twentieth 
century.”  
More specifically, the rise of motor vehicles produced an increase of two types of risk. 
First, the rise in motor vehicle traffic has brought about a significant increase in risk to 
the bodily integrity and property of drivers, passengers and pedestrians.15 This is 
substantiated by the following data in respect of the use of motor vehicles in South 
Africa:16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 W Cooper Delictual Liability in Motor Law 2 ed (1996) 1. 
13 2-3.  
14 2. 
15 Loubser Inleiding to MMF-Wetgewing 3; Van der Nest in Social Security 501-516; Olivier “Social 
Security” in LAWSA 13(3) paras 158-159.  
16 Arrive Alive Motor Vehicle Accident Crash Statistics 1930 – 2000 
<https://www.arrivealive.co.za/stats.aspx> (accessed on 10 March 2016). In addition, it may be noted 
that in 2013 the International Transport Forum reported that the road accident fatality rate in South 
Africa was “among the highest rates worldwide”, while South Africa was ranked worst out of the 36 
countries investigated. See International Transport Forum Road Safety Annual Report (2013) 384. 
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Fatalities, injuries and property damage resulting from motor vehicle accidents 
Year Amount of 
vehicles on 
South 
African 
roads 
South 
African 
population 
(in millions) 
Road 
traffic 
crashes 
Fatal 
road 
traffic 
crashes  
People 
killed in 
road 
traffic 
crashes 
People 
injured in 
road 
traffic 
crashes 
Road 
traffic 
crashes 
resulting 
in 
property 
damage 
only 
1935 284 216 N/A 31 759 719 897 
 
13 532 
 
21 518 
1940 402 757 
 
N/A 36 655 842 910 
 
13 723 
 
25 399 
1950 636 292 
 
11.36 
 
51 966 886 952 17 497 38 081 
1960 1 236 570 
 
16.26 116 688 2 755 3 051 
 
42 416 
 
85 564 
1970 2 121 227 21.50 205 267 7 078 7 948 70 181 155 800 
1980 3 494 748 23.80 319 507 6 589 7 572 
 
88 791 
 
256 796 
1990 5 200 153 
 
30.60 
 
433 287 9 174 11 157 130 773 344 274 
2000 6 814 531 
 
43.33 
 
498 222 6 679 8 494 
 
159 704 
 
401 403 
2010 9 892 400 50.90 N/A17 10 837 13 967 N/A N/A 
 
Generally, when the risk of injury to the person or property materialises as the result 
of the culpable conduct of another, the victim may institute a delictual claim against 
                                                          
17 OA Osidele An Analysis of Patterns and Trends of Road Traffic Injuries and Fatalities in Vhembe 
District, Limpopo Province, South Africa Unpublished LLM dissertation University of Venda (2016) at 
page ii estimates that there were more than 500 000 accidents in 2010. 
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the wrongdoer in search of compensation of his harm.18 Wrongdoers, however, are 
often unable to pay any or all of the damages required to repair the victim’s harm.19 In 
Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport,20 Moseneke DCJ remarked that, 
“[in his] view, the number of drivers and owners who would be able to pay would be 
very small.”21 In turn, this inability may expose a wrongdoer’s victim to the further risk 
of receiving limited or no compensation in respect of the harm they suffered.22 Nugent 
JA referred to the impact that risk has in this context as follows:23 
“People need cars, cars knock people over, people are injured, we cannot bear the cost of 
knocking people over. It is inherently risky for those who knock people over and for those who 
are knocked over. The two problems are: People who are driving cannot afford the risk of 
knocking people over and the people who are using the roads cannot afford the risk of being 
knocked over.”  
To protect road users from the potential realisation of such risks and to ensure the 
compensation of motor vehicle accident victims, the South African legislature decided 
to intervene in the law of delict by enacting motor vehicle accident legislation. The 
remainder of this paragraph contains a brief historical background of the development 
of this legislation, which sheds light on the considerations that could justify a 
legislature’s potential future reform of the law of delict.  
To a certain extent, the South African legislation that was introduced in this context 
was based on similar statutes enacted by the English legislature during the course of 
the 1930’s.24 It might therefore be worthwhile to reflect on the policy reasons that 
influenced the English legislature in this regard.  
During the first part of the 19th century, under traditional “’horse and buggy law’ […] 
the driver or rider was only liable in so far as he was at fault.”25 Following the judgment 
                                                          
18 Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 50. 
Recent amendments to the RAF Act have, however, abolished the motor vehicle accident victim’s 
common-law claim against wrongdoers. See further paragraph 5.5.1.1 in chapter 5. 
19 Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd 1953 (2) SA 
546 (AD) 551; Loubser Inleiding to MMF-Wetgewing 3; Van der Nest in Social Security 502; Olivier 
“Social Security” in LAWSA 13(3) para 158-159. 
20 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC).  
21 Para 50.  
22 Loubser Inleiding to MMF-Wetgewing (1993) 3; Van der Nest Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 
502; Olivier “Social Security” in LAWSA 13(3) paras 158-159. 
23 Road Accident Fund Commission (“RAFC”) Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission (2002) 
103. 
24 Op’t Hof v SA Fire & Accident Insurance Co Ltd 1949 (4) SA 741 (W) 743. 
25 JR Spencer “Rylands & Fletcher: a Chapter of Accidents in the History of Law and Motoring” (1983) 
42(1) Cambridge Law Journal 65 65-66. 
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in Rylands v Fletcher,26 however, the theory of strict liability emerged, as a result of 
which it was held that damages could be payable when injury was inflicted in the 
course of conducting a business for profit, even if there was no question of fault.27 It 
was argued that, if a car damaged people or property, the person who brought the car 
onto the highway should be held strictly liable.28 This development, however, came to 
a halt in Wing v London General Omnibus Company,29 when the Court of Appeal 
dismissed the notion that motor cars were, generally speaking, inherently dangerous 
things. The effect of this judgment was that the law of torts relating to motor vehicle 
accidents in the early 20th century was made to rest “squarely upon the basis of fault 
liability upon which it has rested ever since.”30  
Although the number of motor vehicle accidents in the United Kingdom (“UK”) was 
initially small and ownership of vehicles was restricted to a limited, wealthy class, they 
gradually became cheaper, which meant that ownership became more widespread.31 
The significant rise in motor vehicles in the UK resulted in a substantial surge in the 
number of motor vehicle accidents.32 The fact that the appeal for reform of the branch 
of law dealing with the compensation of harm caused by motor vehicle accidents 
reached a highpoint during this period is therefore unsurprising.33 Bartrip describes 
the increased use of motor vehicles and its accompanying risk of harm as follows:34  
“Whatever the perceived or alleged benefits of motorised transport, it cannot be doubted that 
motor vehicles took a tremendous toll of human life and limb in twentieth-century Britain. Official 
records for the years 1930 to 1939 (inclusive) indicate that 69824 people died on Britain’s roads, 
at an average rate of just over 7000 per year. Between 1920, when records began, and 1930 the 
annual number of road deaths rose at a staggering rate from 4886 to 7305.”   
To address the issue of motor vehicle accidents and related matters, a Royal 
Commission was appointed in 1928. On the basis of its recommendations, a bill was 
proposed and ultimately passed by the English legislature as the Road Traffic Act of 
1930. Significantly, the Act introduced a system of third party compulsory insurance, 
                                                          
26 [1868] UKHL 1.  
27 P Bartrip “No-Fault Compensation on the Roads in Twentieth Century Britain” (2010) 69(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 263 266.  
28 Spencer (1983) Cambridge Law Journal 65-66. 
29 [1909] 2 KB 652 666-667. 
30 Spencer (1983) Cambridge Law Journal 66-73. 
31 R Merkin & S Dzibion “Tort Law and Compulsory Insurance” in TT Arvind & J Steele (eds) Tort Law 
and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change (2013) 303-329 307. 
32 Merkin & Dzibion “Tort Law and Compulsory Insurance” in Tort Law and the Legislature 307. 
33 Bartrip (2010) Cambridge Law Journal 263. 
34 P Bartrip “Pedestrians, Motorists, and No-Fault Compensation for Road Accidents in 1930s Britain” 
(2010) Journal of Legal History 45 45-46. 
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making it unlawful to use a motor vehicle unless an insurance policy in respect of “third 
party risks” was in force.35 This system of compulsory third party insurance has been 
maintained under the Road Traffic Act of 1988.36  
Similar to England, South Africa experienced a dramatic increase in the use of motor 
vehicles during the course of the 1930’s which brought with it an increase in motor 
vehicle accidents.37 Analogous to the situation in England, this led to considerable 
pressure being exercised on the South African legislature to alleviate the plight of road 
accident victims.38 The need was expressed to protect motor vehicle accident victims 
against the possibility of limited or no recovery of harm because the wrongdoer “was 
a ‘man of straw’ and unable to pay the road accident victim’s loss or damage.”39 
Accordingly, the South African legislature followed the lead of the English legislature 
in 1939 when it decided to introduce the first bill aimed at protecting motor vehicle 
accident victims. During a debate of the bill, the Minister of Finance referred to the 
legal and public policy considerations underlying justifiable legislative reform of the 
law of delict within this context:40  
“I am of the view that this Bill may be described as one which is designed to meet a long-felt 
want. Its object is to ensure the payment of compensation for injuries or death caused by 
negligence in the use of motor transport. I think honorable members are aware that there are a 
considerable number of motor vehicles in the Union driven by people who are not insured against 
what are known as third party risks. I think I shall probably be correct in saying that that is the 
case with the majority of the motor vehicles in the Union, and that, of course, means that when 
harm is brought about through the negligence of an uninsured motorist and he is unable to meet 
a claim for compensation, the innocent victim is left without any redress.” 
The Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 29 of 1942 ultimately came into effect in 1946. Its 
aim, as stated in its preamble, was to “provide for compensation for certain loss or 
damage caused unlawfully by means of motor vehicles and for matters incidental 
thereto.” The Act introduced compulsory third party insurance on a national scale and 
compelled the owners of motor vehicles, generally, to take out insurance so that motor 
                                                          
35 F Deak “Compulsory Liability Insurance under the British Road Traffic Acts Of 1930 And 1934” (1936) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 565 566.  
36 See section 143 of the Road Traffic Act of 1988. 
37 See the table in paragraph 3.2.1.2 above. See also the second reading of the draft Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Act 29 of 1942 in Parliament, where the Minister of Finance refers to this consideration as 
legal and public policy consideration justifying the Act: Debatte van die Volksraad Deel 43 (1942) 1255-
1259. 
38 RAFC Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission 108-112. 
39 108. 
40 Debatte van die Volksraad Deel 43 (1942) 1255-1259 (own translation). 
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vehicle accident victims may be properly compensated for the harm which they 
suffered arising from the negligent and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle.41  
In Rose’s Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Grant,42 the Appellate Division confirmed that the 
intention behind the legislature’s decision was to ensure, through the compulsory 
insurance of motor vehicles, that injured persons or their dependants who might not 
be able to recover damages owing to the inability of the parties liable to pay, should 
receive full compensation from insurers in as many cases as possible. Shortly 
thereafter, in Aetna Insurance Co v Minister of Justice, the same court reaffirmed the 
purpose of the legislative intervention as follows:43 
“The obvious evil that [the Act] is designed to remedy is that members of the public who are 
injured, and the dependants of those who are killed, through the negligent driving of motor 
vehicles may find themselves without redress against the wrongdoer. If the driver of the motor 
vehicle or his master is without means and is uninsured, the person who has been injured or his 
dependants, if he has been killed, are in fact remediless and are compelled to bear the loss 
themselves. To remedy that evil, the Act provides a system of compulsory insurance.” 
The 1942 Act underwent regular amendments and was replaced by the Compulsory 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 56 of 1972, which came into operation in 1972. The 
motivation behind the enactment of new legislation was not to pursue a purpose 
different to that outlined above, but rather to amend the mechanics by means of which 
the aim was sought to be achieved.44 As is evident from a series of cases dealing with 
liability under the 1972 Act,45 the legislature’s primary focus was still the protection of 
those who suffer harm46 as a result of motor vehicle accidents and who might be 
unable to recover damages owing to the wrongdoer’s inability to pay compensation.47 
                                                          
41 HB Klopper Law of Third Party Compensation (2000) 3; Cooper Motor Law 3. See also RAFC Report 
of the Road Accident Fund Commission 110: the insurance would cover harm as a result of bodily 
injuries or death of a breadwinner arising from the culpable and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle, but 
did not cover property damage or other harm which may have been suffered as a result of the accident.  
42 1948 (2) SA 466 (A) 471.  
43 1960 (3) SA 273 (A) 285. 
44 The Act required the insurance of the vehicle and not insurance of the owner or driver. It also provided 
cover (through the newly established Motor Vehicle Assurance Fund), for the first time, for loss 
occasioned by uninsured or unidentified motor vehicles. See further Law Society of South Africa v 
Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 20. 
45 See Commercial Union Assurance Company of South Africa Ltd v Clarke 1972 (3) SA 508 (AD) 518; 
AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Biddulph 1976 (1) SA 725 (AD) 738; Webster v Santam 
Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (2) SA 874 (AD) 881; Nkisimane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1978 (2) SA 430 
(AD) 435. 
46 As was the case with its predecessor, the insurance policies taken out as a result of the Act would 
cover only harm arising from bodily injuries or the death or bodily injuries of a breadwinner. 
47 The preamble of the Act reads as follows: “To provide for the compulsory insurance of certain motor 
vehicles in order to ensure the payment of compensation for certain loss or damage unlawfully caused 
by the driving of such motor vehicles; for the payment of compensation where the loss or damage is 
caused by the driving of an uninsured or unidentified motor vehicle; and for incidental matters.” See 
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Similar to its predecessor, the Act was based on the common-law principles of 
delictual liability, which required an accident victim to prove that his harm had been 
caused by the culpable and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle.  
The 1972 Act was substituted by the Motor Vehicle Accident Act 84 of 1986 (“MVA 
Act”). The MVA Act, which came into operation in 1986, introduced a number of 
changes.48 Importantly, it replaced the former system of compulsory third party 
insurance with a system of statutory assumption of liability in respect of harm suffered 
by road users as a result of the negligent and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle.49 To 
achieve this, the legislature established the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (“MVA 
Fund”), financed by fuel levies, to fund the new statutory system of compensation of 
harm. Because the MVA Act was effective only in South Africa and Namibia but not in 
the former so-called independent territories of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and 
Ciskei, the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989 (“MMF Act”) was 
enacted in 1986 with the view to bringing about a uniform system of third party 
compensation.50 The MMF Act remained applicable up to 1997, when the newly 
enacted RAF Act came into operation.  
The RAF Act essentially has the same object as that of its predecessors, namely the 
“payment of compensation for loss or damage wrongfully caused by the driving of 
motor vehicles.”51 It was based on the common-law elements for delictual liability and 
has retained fault as the basis for liability. Although it has been argued that the effect 
of the Act was to “suspend the common law delictual action against the wrongdoer 
and to compel the road accident victim to institute his claim against the Road Accident 
Fund”,52 the delictual claim of the victim was left intact and victims therefore had the 
option of instituting a claim against the wrongdoer in respect of harm that was not 
covered under the RAF Act.  
                                                          
also A Suzman, G Gordes & MW Hodes The Law of Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance in South 
Africa 3 ed (1982) 4-6. 
48 Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 21; Klopper Law of 
Third Party Compensation 4. 
49 Klopper Law of Third Party Compensation 4. 
50 4. 
51 Section 3 of the RAF Act. See also RAFC Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission 111-112: 
Not all damage caused by the unlawful and negligent driving of a motor vehicle can be recovered from 
the RAF. See paragraph 5.7 in chapter 5 for a discussion of the limitation and exclusion of liability under 
the RAF Act.  
52 RAFC Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission 111.  
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In its 2002 report, the Road Accident Fund Commission (“RAFC”) described the fault-
based compensation system established under the RAF Act as “unreasonable, 
inequitable, unaffordable and unsustainable.”53 Among other things, the RAFC found 
that the Act’s insistence on fault-based liability contributed to its financial decline. The 
criticism of the RAF Act’s fault-based liability regime is discussed in further detail in 
paragraph 3.2.3.3.1 below.  
The victim’s common-law right to claim compensation from a wrongdoer for harm that 
is not compensable under the RAF Act was abolished by section 9 of the RAFA Act, 
which came into force on 1 August 2008. In Law Society of South Africa v Minister for 
Transport,54 the Constitutional Court (“CC”) was requested to consider the 
constitutional validity of this amendment.55 As will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 5, the CC held that it passed the necessary rationality test and confirmed that 
the abolition of the common-law claim against the wrongdoer was justifiable.56  
In its judgment, the CC referred also to the dominant consideration that triggered the 
amendment – the need to compensate victims of harm that manifests when the risk 
created by motor vehicles materialises – as well as future reform of the system. In this 
context, reference was made to the legislature’s intention to ultimately replace the 
common-law system of compensation with a set of limited no-fault benefits which 
would form part of a broader social security net as public financial support for people 
who are poor, have a disability or are vulnerable.57  
The amendments introduced by the RAFA Act provide further evidence of the primary 
consideration that underlies the enactment of motor vehicle accident legislation in 
South Africa, namely that it aims to provide compensation where the risk of harm 
associated with motor vehicle accidents materialises.58 As explained by the Minister 
of Transport, although the economic viability of the RAF is an important goal, the 
ultimate vision is that a new system of compensation for motor vehicle accident victims 
                                                          
53 Department of Transport Policy Paper for the RABS (2011) 13. See also paragraph 3.2.3.3.1 below 
for a detailed discussion of the ways in which the fault requirement has provided motivation for 
legislative development of the law of delict. 
54 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC).  
55 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 15. See also paragraph 5.5.1.1 in chapter 5. 
56 Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) paras 35, 75-80, 103. See 
also paragraph 5.5.1.1 in chapter 5. 
57 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) paras 44-45. 
58 See also paragraph 5.5.1.1 in chapter 5. 
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must be established and integrated into a comprehensive social security system that 
offers life, disability and health insurance cover for all accidents and diseases.59 To 
achieve the desired reform, the legislature therefore drafted the Road Accident Benefit 
Scheme Bill (“RABS”) in 2014. Should it be enacted, the current fault-based system 
of liability administered by the RAF will be replaced by a new social security scheme 
for road accidents. 
The need to further the constitutional right to social security as a consideration 
justifying legislative intervention in the law of delict will be analysed in paragraph 3.2.2 
below. For the purpose of this part of the chapter, it is sufficient to note here that the 
proposed RABS is aimed not only at continuing the achievement of the primary aim 
outlined by its predecessors, namely the protection of the victim’s interests by ensuring 
that he is properly compensated, but also at the promotion of the wrongdoer’s interest 
insofar as the victim’s common-law right to claim damages for residual harm has been 
abolished. In doing so, it may be argued that the legislature seeks to address not only 
the risk of no compensation to which road users are generally exposed, but also the 
risk of liability to which culpable road users may be exposed.60 
From the above, it appears that motor vehicle accident legislation may be regarded as 
“social legislation”61 aimed at the “widest possible protection and compensation”62 of 
road users by compensating them against harm that arises from the culpable and 
unlawful driving of a motor vehicle.  
The RAF Act, its predecessors and its proposed successor provides for the 
substitution of a compensation fund or an insurance company in the place of a culpable 
wrongdoer to ensure compensation for a motor vehicle accident victim or his family.63 
These legislative developments resulted in a conceptual shift from protection of the 
wrongdoer to acceptance of the need to provide protection and support for all victims 
of road accidents.64  
                                                          
59 Paras 44-45. 
60 See the statement of Nugent JA in RAFC Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission 103: “The 
two problems [relating to motor vehicle accidents] are: “People who are driving cannot afford the risk of 
knocking people over and the people who are using the roads cannot afford the risk of being knocked 
over.” 
61 Pithey v Road Accident Fund 2014 (4) SA 112 (SCA) para 18 (footnotes omitted). 
62 Para 18. 
63 Olivier “Social Security” in LAWSA 13(3) para 159.  
64 Para 159.  
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The replacement of the wrongdoer by the RAF undermines the notion that the victim’s 
harm should be compensated – or corrected – by the person who culpably and 
wrongfully caused it. The fund’s existence is therefore arguably not aligned with the 
so-called corrective justice account for the South African law of delict.65  
Proponents of the corrective justice account highlight the fact that, properly 
understood, there must be correlativity between the person who has the duty to rectify 
the wrong and the person who has suffered the wrong. The corrective justice account 
of the law of delict may be contrasted with a distributive justice-based justification for 
this branch of the law. Whereas the latter is concerned with the allocation of resources 
throughout society as a whole and the criteria on which such an allocation occurs, the 
basic idea with the former is to do justice between two parties, i.e. it is concerned with 
whether there should be any allocation and if so, to what extent and in what form and 
on what basis from one person back to another. In other words, from a corrective 
justice point of view, the law of delict is concerned with justice as between a plaintiff 
and wrongdoer. Likewise, it is not – and should not – be concerned with a global 
economic picture. Rather, the principles of bipolarity, correlativity and equality should 
obtain.  
Nonetheless, the RAF may be said to fulfil the primary function of the law of delict 
(compensation of harm), remains based on delictual principles for the time being and 
is regarded by courts and academics as constituting a significant part of the South 
African law of delict.66  
                                                          
65 See A Fagan “The right to personal security” in E Reid & D Visser (eds) Private Law and Human 
Rights: Bringing Rights Home in Scotland and South Africa (2013) 130-155. See generally E Weinrib 
The Idea of Private Law (1995); E Weinrib “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell” (2002) 52 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 34; G Fletcher “Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 
537; J Coleman “Corrective Justice And Wrongful Gain” (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 421–440; 
J Coleman “Property, Wrongfulness, and the Duty to Compensate” (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 451-470; J Coleman “The Mixed Conception Of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 
427–444; J Coleman Risks and Wrongs (1992); J Coleman “Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective 
Justice (1992) 67 Indiana Law Review 349–378; J Coleman “The Practice of Corrective Justice” in DG 
Owen (ed) Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1995) 53-73; J Coleman “Doing Away with Tort 
Law” (1995) 41 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1148–1170. See paragraph 6.3.2 in chapter 6 for 
concluding remarks about the function of the South African law of delict and whether it may be 
understood as solely aimed at achieving corrective justice.  
66 For example, a discussion of the salient provisions of the RAF is included in Loubser & Midgley (eds) 
Law of Delict 294-301.  
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Lastly, it may be said that, although the legislative intervention did not result in the 
decrease of the risk of harm arising from the use of motor vehicles, i.e. in securing 
general road safety or deterring future motor vehicle accidents, or in deterring future 
motor vehicle accidents,67 it was successful insofar as addressing the risk of litigating 
“against drivers who often were not in a financial position to compensate accident 
victims for their losses.”68  
 
3.2.1.3 Occupational injuries and diseases  
The exposure to risk of harm and associated risk of no compensation has also served 
as significant motivation for the enactment of legislation aimed at compensating 
employees who are injured or become diseased during the course and scope of their 
employment.69 Generally, legislative intervention within this context may be justified 
on the basis that employers often expose their employees to risks specifically 
associated with their activities as employees, i.e. to suffer an accident at work or to 
sustain an illness that is related to specific health risk of the task assigned to the 
employee.70 
Apart from exposing their employees to specific risks associated with their 
employment activities, an employer exposes the employee to the additional risk of no 
compensation in the event that the risk of harm materialises. Of course, the exposure 
to these risks occur while the employer stands to benefit financially from the efforts of 
his employee.71 
A brief overview of the historical development of legislative intervention within this 
context is provided in the rest of this paragraph, and attention is paid to the policy 
considerations that justified reform of this area of the law.  
 
                                                          
67 See the table in paragraph 3.2.1.2. 
68 Department of Transport Policy Paper for the RABS 6. 
69 See Jooste v Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) 1; Markesinis & Unberath The 
German Law of Torts 728-230; S Deakin, “Tort Law and Workmen’s Compensation Legislation: 
Complementary or Competing Models?” in TT Arvind & J Steele (eds) Tort Law and the Legislature 
(2013) 253 253-257. 
70 Markesinis & Unberath The German Law of Torts 728. 
71 See further below for an explanation of the operation of the enterprise risk theory in this context. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
146 
 
Prior to legislative intervention, the position of South African employees who were 
injured at the workplace was similar to that of motor vehicle accident victims in the pre-
legislation era, i.e. they had to institute a common-law delictual claim against their 
employer to obtain compensation for the harm they had suffered.72 In doing so, they 
were required to prove that, amongst other things, their employer was at fault, which 
typically meant that they had to prove their employer’s negligence. As was the case 
with motor vehicle accident legislation, the South African statutes that were enacted 
to develop the law of delict in this context were based on similar English statutes 
enacted during the course of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.73 
Despite it being possible for employees in 19th century England to institute tort claims 
against their employers for personal injuries suffered in the workplace as a result of 
their employers’ negligence, employees generally did not do so.74 This may be as a 
result of a variety of legal considerations, including the difficulty in proving fault in the 
form of negligence,75 and the existence of “several draconian defences”,76 i.e. the 
doctrine of common employment, contributory negligence and volenti non fit iniuria 
which, to a large extent, enabled employers to evade tortious liability for harm caused 
to an employee during the course and scope of employment.77 Additional social, 
political and economic considerations that made it problematic for English employees 
to institute tort claims against their employers have been described as follows:78  
“[M]any workers never thought of suing because they were not even aware that a wrong had 
been done to them. An accident was an everyday occurrence and part of their way of life, and 
the risk of injury was seen as in the hands of Fate rather than the employer. If workers were 
aware that a wrong had been done, they were often ignorant of the possibility of bringing a claim. 
Those who knew of the tort system found it very difficult to get legal advice. If they did sue, they 
faced the prospect of incurring legal costs. A more significant deterrent was the likelihood that a 
tort claim would lead to the loss of work-related benefits such as employer’s sick pay, or 
continued employment in an easier job, or medical treatment from work doctors. Suing an 
employer often meant antagonising the most powerful men in the region and jeopardizing not 
                                                          
72 Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd 1953 (2) SA 
546 (AD) 551. 
73 Victoria Falls Power Co. Ltd v Lloyd No. 1908 TS 1164 1165, 1182; Select Committee of the House 
of Assembly Report of the Select Committee on Compensation to Workmen (1904) 15, 17-18. 
74 MA Stein “Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries” (2008) University of Illinois Law Review 935 
submits that, in England, the first reported decision of an employer being sued in tort by his employee 
for a personal injury suffered at the workplace may be traced to 1837. 
75 See paragraph 3.2.3 below. 
76 R Lewis “Employer’s Liability and Workers’ Compensation: England and Wales” in K Oliphant & G 
Wagner (eds) Employer’s Liability and Workers’ Compensation (2012) 137 138. 
77 Deakin et al Tort Law (2013) 541-545; Deakin “Tort Law and Workmen’s Compensation Legislation: 
Complementary or Competing Models?” in Tort Law and the Legislature 253-257. 
78 Lewis “Employer’s Liability and Workers’ Compensation: England and Wales” in Employer’s Liability 
and Workers’ Compensation 139. 
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only one’s employment prospects, but also one’s housing, church membership and even access 
to town poor relief. Nor could workers easily endure the lengthy, complicated and uncertain 
litigation process itself. Their claims then were opposed by the best lawyers and by morally 
questionable defence strategies. The final difficulty faced by the workers was that they often 
needed what tort could not supply: urgent recompense to replace their wage loss.” 
Other policy considerations that influenced the English legislature to interfere with the 
status quo and to develop the law relating to harm suffered by employees in the course 
and scope of their employment, may be summarised as follows: the demand for 
workplace safety, the continuing pressure exerted by trade unions and industrial 
disputes, the courts’ reaffirmation of workers’ entitlement to a high degree of 
protection, the steady growth of litigation concerning workplace accidents that became 
an accepted part of the employment system and the fact that liability insurance 
became readily available for employers after 1880.79 In addition, the industrial 
revolution in 19th century England caused a significant increase in industrial accidents 
in the form of railroad crashes, coalmine explosions, steamboat fires, etc.80 
The English legislature responded by enacting the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 
1897. It thereby introduced a no-fault based compensatory system outside tort.81 The 
1897 Act imposed a statutory duty on employers to make limited payments to the 
victims of industrial accidents, irrespective of whether those injuries resulted from the 
culpable wrongdoing of the employer – as long as the accidents arose out of and in 
the course of employment.82 The decision to hold the employer liable regardless of 
whether or not they acted culpably may be explained with reference to the concept of 
enterprise risk or enterprise liability.83 In this regard, Deakin writes:84  
“The employer as ‘enterprise’ has a duty of care to have regard for the safety and welfare of its 
employees and incurs liability to third parties injured by the negligence of those employees not 
simply because it has ‘deep pockets’ or because of a supposed symmetry between risks and 
profits, but because its organisational capacity enables it to manage the risks of injury internally, 
through the bureaucratic structures of the firm, while its financial resources and position in the 
market make it possible for it to absorb and channel potential liabilities through insurance. 
                                                          
79 S Hedley “Tort and Personal Injuries, 1850 to the Present” in TT Arvind & J Steele (eds) Tort Law 
and the Legislature (2013) 235 235-242.  
80 JM Kleeberg (2003) “From Strict Liability to Workers’ Compensation: The Prussian Railroad Law, the 
German Liability Act, and the Introduction of Bismarck's Accident Insurance in Germany, 1838-1884” 
Journal for International Law and Politics 57-58. 
81 Lewis “Employer’s Liability and Workers’ Compensation: England and Wales” in Employer’s Liability 
and Workers’ Compensation 140. 
82 Lewis “Employer’s Liability and Workers’ Compensation: England and Wales” in Employer’s Liability 
and Workers’ Compensation 140; D Brodie Enterprise Liability and the Common Law (2010) 2.  
83 Brodie Enterprise Liability 2-7.  
84 Deakin “Tort Law and Workmen’s Compensation Legislation: Complementary or Competing 
Models?” in Tort Law and the Legislature 254. 
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Insurance […] makes it possible for firms to shift certain losses, but also sets implicit standards 
of care, which operate through the monitoring activities, undertaken by liability insurers.”  
The first local legislation aimed at addressing the issue of compensation for employees 
was the Cape Employer’s Liability Act 35 of 1886, which was replaced by the 
enactment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 40 of 1905 (Cape of Good Hope).85 
Many of the policy considerations underlying the 1905 Act as well as succeeding 
legislative interventions are reflected in the 1904 Report of the Select Committee on 
Compensation to Workmen.  
From its report, it is clear that there was significant concern about securing 
compensation for injured employees and doing so as “quickly and as cheaply as 
possible.”86 It was stated that one of the chief advantages of introducing statutory 
reform would be that it would provide what the law of delict failed to do at the time, i.e. 
the speedy provision of a fixed amount of money in lieu of the lost wages and to 
“ensure that the sum shall be paid with as little litigation as possible.”87  
Another consideration that justified the legislature’s intended development of this 
branch of the law was the fact that, in “ninety-nine cases out of every hundred the 
workman does not know what he can demand, and if his employer pays him anything 
at all he considers it as an act of charity. In the great majority of cases he has an 
action, and does not bring it.”88  
It was also argued that the enactment of legislation would undermine the influence 
which the defence of contributory negligence had on an employee’s potential common-
law delictual claim for damages, i.e. to give the employee an action despite the fact 
that his negligence contributed towards the accident.89  
                                                          
85 The Act is based on the English Act of 1897: Select Committee Report of the Select Committee on 
Compensation to Workmen (1904) 15, 17. See JJ Jansen van Vuuren A Legal Comparison between 
South African, Canadian and Australian Workmen’s Compensation Law Unpublished LLM thesis 
University of South Africa (2013) 25.  
86 Select Committee Report of the Select Committee on Compensation to Workmen 2. See also at 9, 
14 where it is made clear that all relevant parties sought a way to deal with employer and employee 
disputes as quickly and cheaply as possible and that what is required is “simple machinery” for securing 
compensation for the injured employee.  
87 Select Committee Report of the Select Committee on Compensation to Workmen 12.  
88 14. 
89 14. It may be noted that the doctrine of common employment was not considered to be a part of the 
South African common law of delict: Waring & Gillow v Sherborne 1904 TS 340. Accordingly, unlike the 
position in England, it did not play the same role in motivating legislative change.  
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Lastly, the employees sought to improve their safety:90  
“From a workmen’s point of view the Bill is a most desirable one in every respect. At the present 
time workmen are entirely dependent on the generosity of their employers for compensation. 
Now, gentlemen, it is but natural that an employer of labour should desire to obtain the utmost 
amount of work for the least possible cost; in the pursuit of that object he is apt to overlook certain 
precautionary measures which he should take to ensure the safety of his workmen, and we 
maintain that there should be such an Act so based that it would compel the employer to take 
these precautionary measures.”  
Therefore, it seems that the decision by the legislature to develop the law of delict 
relating to the compensation of employees were motivated by similar policy 
considerations than those underlying the English legislature’s development of law of 
negligence regarding workplace injuries and diseases.  
A similar statute, the Workmen’s Compensation Act 36 of 1907, was enacted in the 
Transvaal.91 The Transvaal Act was “almost identical”92 to the English Workmen’s 
Compensation Act of 1906. The Act applied to the whole country after unification in 
1910, but was replaced by the Workmen’s Compensation Act 25 of 1914 which, in turn 
included a series of industrial diseases following an amendment in 1917 through the 
Workmen’s Compensation (Industrial Diseases) Act 13 of 1917.93 Importantly, both 
these Acts required employees to prove fault on the part of the employer.94  
In its early form, the Workmen’s Compensation Act was ineffective at providing 
adequate compensation because employers were not compelled to insure their 
employees against the risk of workplace injuries.95 As a result, employers that did not 
have insurance could face insolvency if they were held liable for their employees’ 
harm. Also, injured or diseased employees were exposed to the risk that the employer 
would not be in a position to provide compensation, thereby rendering the employee 
potentially unable to earn further income.96  
By 1930, and with the benefit of using the English statute as example, employees, 
industry and the South African government recognised the need for compulsory 
                                                          
90 Select Committee Report of the Select Committee on Compensation to Workmen 64-65. 
91 Van Vuuren Workmen’s Compensation Law 25. 
92 Victoria Falls Power Co., Ltd v Lloyd, No. 1908 TS 1165, 1172. 
93 Van Vuuren Workmen’s Compensation Law 26; Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 (3) SA 237 
(CC) paras 45-46. At that stage, similar statutes were also in place in France, Germany, New Zealand 
and certain Australian states. See Select Committee Report of the Select Committee on Compensation 
to Workmen 14.  
94 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC) paras 45-46. 
95 Van Vuuren Workmen’s Compensation Law 26. 
96 26. 
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insurance.97 The 1914 and 1917 statutes were accordingly replaced by the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act 59 of 1934, which provided for a system of compensation to be 
paid by the employer if an employee suffered harm as a result of an accident arising 
in the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to the passing of the Act, 
employees were no longer required to prove fault on the part of the employer to obtain 
compensation.98 Importantly, the Act made insurance compulsory through private 
companies rather than a state fund favoured by workers and trade unions.99 The office 
of the Compensation Commissioner was established and tasked with the mediation of 
compensation settlements between employees and employers that was ultimately 
funded through the compulsory insurance obtained by employers.100  
The Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941 replaced the 1934 Act and introduced 
a new system of compensation by establishing a state “accident fund”101 to which all 
employers would contribute on the basis of employer’s wage budgets102 and 
from which employees were to be compensated.103 Employees were entitled to 
compensation from the fund if they could prove that they had suffered harm as a result 
of an “accident arising out of and in the course of […] employment and resulting in a 
personal injury”.104 While the Act established a compensation fund, it also indemnified 
employers against potential delictual claims which employees may have had against 
them.105 In R v Canquan,106 the court summarised the purpose of the Act by stating 
that it was “designed to protect the interests of employees and to safeguard their rights, 
and its effect is to limit the common law rights of employers and to enlarge the common 
law rights of employees.”  
                                                          
97 See D Budlender “The Workmen’s Compensation Act” (1984) South African Labour Bulletin 9(4) 22 
22-41. 
98 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2010 (5) SA 137 (SCA) para 16. 
99 United States Agency International Development Worker’s Compensation in the Republic of South 
Africa (2008) 3. 
100 Van Vuuren Workmen’s Compensation Law 26. 
101 See section 64 of the Act.  
102 See section 68 of the Act.  
103 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2010 (5) SA 137 (SCA) para 17. 
104 Section 2 of the Act. 
105 Section 7: “(a) no action at law shall lie by a workman or any dependant of a workman against such 
workman's employer to recover any damages in respect of an injury due to accident resulting in the 
disablement or the death of such workman; and (b) no liability for compensation on the part of such 
employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of any such disablement or death.” 
106 1956 (3) SA 355 (E) 368. 
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The COIDA repealed the Workmen’s Compensation Act and came into operation in 
1994. It provides for the compensation of employees injured in accidents107 that arose 
out of and in the course of their employment,108 or who contracted occupational 
diseases.109 In accordance with section 15 of the Act, a statutory compensation fund 
was established to which employers are required to contribute110 and from which 
compensation and other benefits are paid to employees.111 In addition to establishing 
a fund from which an employee may obtain limited compensation, section 35(1) of the 
Act abolished the employee’s common-law right to institute a delictual claim against 
his employer for any harm resulting from accidents suffered during the course and 
scope of the employment.112 When instituting his statutory claim against the 
compensation fund, an employee is not required to prove fault.113  
In the leading judgment on the matter, Jooste v Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd, the 
CC described this development as follows:114  
                                                          
107 “Accident” is defined as an “accident arising out of and in the course of an employee's employment 
and resulting in a personal injury, illness or the death of the employee.”  
108 See MEC for Health v DN 2015 (1) SA 182 (SCA) for a discussion on the course and scope of 
employment requirement within the context of the COIDA. It may be noted that, apart from the COIDA 
and its antecedent legislation, which relates to the interests of all employees in industry generally 
(including commerce and services), another strand of legislative development concentrated specifically 
on the interests of mineworkers. The Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 (and 
its predecessors) was a legislative response to the deleterious diseases contracted by mineworkers. Its 
history may be briefly summarised as follows: the Miners' Phthisis Allowances Act of 1911 was first 
enacted in 1911, and succeeded in 1912 by the Miners' Phthisis Act of 1912. The 1912 Act was 
amended by the Miners’ Phthisis Amendment Act of 1914. The Miners’ Phthisis Amendment Act of 
1914 was succeeded by the Miners' Phthisis Act of 1916 (1916 Act). It repealed parts of the 1912 Act 
and the whole of the Miners’ Phthisis Amendment Act of 1914. The Miners' Phthisis Acts Consolidation 
Act of 1925 was enacted in 1925 and was in turn repealed by the Silicosis Act of 1946. The 
Pneumoconiosis Act of 1956 superseded the Silicosis Act. The 1956 Act was superseded by the 
Pneumoconiosis Compensation Act of 1962. In 1973, the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works 
Act 78 of 1973 repealed previous legislation and consolidated the law relating to the payment of 
compensation in respect of certain diseases contracted by persons employed in mines and work. See 
further Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC) paras 26-35. 
109 See section 65 of the Act. 
110 See section 87 of the Act. 
111 See section 16 of the Act. 
112 Section 36 of the Act preserves and regulates an employee’s rights against a third party who may 
incur liability to the employee.  
113 Although the Act therefore continues its predecessor’s abandonment of the fault requirement, it does 
play a limited role. Section 56(1) of the Act provides that, if a person has met with an accident or 
contracted an occupational disease owing to his or her employer’s negligence, the employee may apply 
to the commissioner to receive increased compensation in addition to the compensation normally 
payable in terms of this Act. 
114 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 15. See also MEC for Education, Western Cape Province v Strauss 2008 
(2) SA 366 (SCA) paras 11-12; Healy v Compensation Commissioner 2010 (2) SA (E) 470 para 11; 
Sanan v Eskom Holdings Ltd 2010 (6) SA 638 (GSJ) para 8; MEC for Health, Free State v DN 2015 (1) 
SA 182 (SCA) paras 6-7; Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans 2015 (1) 253 (SCA) para 
6. 
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“The Compensation Act supplants the essentially individualistic common-law position, 
typically represented by civil claims of a plaintiff employee against a negligent defendant 
employer, by a system which is intended to and does enable employees to obtain limited 
compensation from a fund to which employers are obliged to contribute.”  
As was the case with motor vehicle accidents, the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund appears to undermine the idea that compensation should be paid 
by the person who culpably and wrongfully caused it, in an attempt to thereby correct 
his wrong. The existence of a compensation fund in this context is therefore similarly 
not aligned with the so-called corrective justice explanation for the law of delict.115 
Notwithstanding, it is successful in achieving the function set out by the law of delict – 
compensation of harm. Arguably, more injured and diseased employees receive 
compensation from the fund than would otherwise have been the case if they were 
required to institute common-law delictual claims against their employers. As will be 
expanded upon in chapter 6, it is proposed that the COIDA constitutes an important 
part of the South African law of delict,116 and that it requires that ideas about the role 
of the law of delict in the South African context be revisited.  
Against this background, it may be said that the development of the law of delict by 
the enactment of legislation that provides compensation for workplace-related injuries 
and diseases may be regarded as a response to the risk of injury to which the 
employee is exposed as a result of his employment as well as the potential risk of not 
being able to recover any compensation for the harm that is suffered once the risk 
materialises. In Jooste v Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd,117 the CC confirmed the role 
of risk and remarked that, in the absence of any legislation “there would be no 
guarantee that an award would be recoverable because there would be no certainty 
that the employer would be able to pay large amounts in damages. It must also be 
borne in mind that the employee would incur the risk of having to pay the costs of the 
employer if the case were lost.” 
The exposure to risk has also played a significant role in the adoption of workplace 
legislation in foreign jurisdictions. The adoption of the no-fault based legislation to 
                                                          
115 See Fagan “The right to personal security” in Private Law and Human Rights: Bringing Rights Home 
in Scotland and South Africa 130-155. As indicated earlier, see paragraph 6.3.2 in chapter 6 for 
concluding remarks in this context. 
116 For example, a discussion of the salient provisions of the COIDA is included in Loubser & Midgley 
(eds) Law of Delict (2012) 196-200.  
117 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 15. 
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compensate injured and diseased employees is “consistent with a widespread moral 
idea that it is not unjust to impose a strict liability on those who cause loss while taking 
risks in pursuit of commercial profit, even where the risk is unforeseeable or cost-
justified.”118  
In conclusion, it appears that the leading policy consideration underlying legislative 
development of the law of delict in this field is the attempt to ensure that employees 
will receive compensation, albeit limited, in respect of the materialisation of an 
employment risk during the course and scope of employment.119 It appears that the 
notion of enterprise liability best explains why to impose liability for harm specifically 
on employers.  
 
3.2.1.4 Defective consumer products  
The design, manufacture, distribution and sale of products and services are, generally, 
central to the wealth and welfare of any society, but bring about disease, injury and 
even death for a wide range of individuals.120 The rise of industrialisation in the 19th 
century and consumerism in the 20th century led to a substantial increase in the 
manufacturing and distribution of consumer products.121 This meant that, more than 
ever before, consumers were being exposed to an unremitting series of manufactured 
goods. Because technology grew more sophisticated and often coupled with expertise, 
consumers knew very little about the products that reached them. It is therefore 
unsurprising that many of these products posed a significant risk to the wellbeing of 
consumers who chose to make use of them.122 Even where the risk of harm was not 
particularly great, it was accepted that, should it materialise, the harm suffered by the 
consumer would be severe.123  
In response to the rise in consumer products, the growing risk of exposure to harm 
and the difficulty of holding manufacturers liable for the harm suffered by consumers 
as a result of defective products, the South African legislature introduced a strict 
                                                          
118 Stapleton Product Liability (1994) 195. 
119 Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 332. 
120 E van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 367. 
121 Stapleton Product Liability 9-16.  
122 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law 370.  
123 W van Gerven, P Larouche & J Lever J (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational 
and International Tort Law (2000) 599. 
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liability regime for harm suffered as a result of defective products when it enacted the 
CPA.124 Set out below is a brief overview of the historical development which 
culminated in the statutory reform of the law of delict in this context.  
As is the case with the rise of product liability as a distinct area of the law in a variety 
of other jurisdictions, this development in the South African law may be traced back to 
progress made by the courts in the United States of America (“USA”). Indeed, the 
judicial development of the law by American courts is generally regarded as the 
precursor to the global increase of legislative intervention aimed at compensating 
victims of defective consumer products.125 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the American judicial innovations enabled 
these victims to litigate against the sellers and manufactures of defective products 
through alterations of the existing tort or contract law.126 The courts’ approach was 
ultimately captured in the American Law Institute’s Second Restatement of Torts in 
1965, whereafter, as Reimann describes:127  
“[in] the 1960s and 1970s, the principle of strict product liability swept through the United States, 
and became the rule in most, though not all, states of the Union. European scholars and policy 
makers watched this development with great interest. In part, they were fascinated by the 
activism of the American courts, which fashioned a new consumer protection regime”.  
Because the rise of the strict liability regime is generally regarded as originating within 
the American courts,128 special attention will be placed on the judicial expansion of 
liability for defective consumer products within this jurisdiction. 
The economic expansion that industrialisation produced in especially the USA, was 
accompanied by a significant increase in the volume of consumer transactions.129 The 
types of products manufactured and sold by way of these transactions posed a 
                                                          
124 The Act came into effect in 2010.  
125 M Reimann, “Product Liability” in M Bussani & AJ Sebok (eds) Comparative Tort Law: Global 
Perspectives (2015) 250-279 251. See also Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa 1-5, 
21-22; M Reimann, “Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: 
Emergency of a Worldwide Standard?” (2003) 51(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 751 756, 
761; Stapleton Product Liability 3-36.  
126 Reimann “Product Liability” in Comparative Tort Law 251. 
127 Reimann “Product Liability” in Comparative Tort Law 251. See also Van Eeden Consumer Protection 
Law in South Africa 1-5, 21-22; Reimann (2003) American Journal of Comparative Law 756; Stapleton 
Product Liability 3-36. 
128 Reimann “Product Liability” in Comparative Tort Law 251. See also Van Eeden Consumer Protection 
Law in South Africa 1-5, 21-22; Reimann (2003) 51(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 756-761, 
835; Stapleton Product Liability 3-36. 
129 Stapleton Product Liability 10. 
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significantly higher risk of bodily injuries or property damage than was the case earlier 
during the 19th century:130  
“Sometimes the nature of the new type of good made inspection difficult or impossible at least 
without expert technical advice, which was often in short supply. Even if the intrinsic nature of the 
good did not produce this situation, the volume of transactions and the new forms in which 
products were packaged and delivered often did. But most importantly of all, inspection was often 
rendered difficult if not impossible – at least for commercial buyers in the chain – by the increasing 
number of contracts formed between parties acting at a distance, in some cases before the 
relevant goods had come into existence, and the speed at which goods were passed down the 
lengthening commercial chain.” 
Most American consumers who were harmed by manufactured products were faced 
with a stumbling block; because they were not contractually linked to the manufacturer 
in question, they lacked a contractual remedy.131 In cases where a consumer did have 
the option of instituting a contractual claim against a manufacturer, there was the 
possibility that it did not have sufficient funds or insurance to compensate the injured 
consumer for the harm suffered. In other words, much like the victims of motor vehicle 
accidents or those who suffered from injuries or diseases sustained during the course 
and scope of their employment at the turn of the previous century, consumers were 
exposed to an increased risk of harm and its accompanying risk of receiving limited or 
no compensation. 
To deal with this problem, American courts developed contract law in a series of cases 
in the early 20th century132 so that the requirement of privity of contract was partially 
relinquished and less reliance was placed solely on contract to protect consumers from 
harm as a result of defective products.133 The courts expanded the liability of 
manufacturers by relying on the idea of a transmissible warranty that goods are free 
of defects.134 As a result, the action for breach of warranty was ultimately made 
available not only to the immediate purchaser of a product, but also to other persons 
who may reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.135  
                                                          
130 11. 
131 See Stapleton Product Liability 9-16; Loubser & Reid Product Liability 4-9. 
132 Deakin et al Tort Law (2013) 590-607.  
133 See Loubser & Reid Product Liability 24.  
134 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 24. 
135 The abandonment of privity of contract in favour of protecting a broader consumer interest is reflected 
in the well-known judgment of Traynor J in Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Fresno 24 Cal.2d 453, 
150 P.2d 436, where it was noted that privity should be abandoned and that the public policy 
considerations underlying the implied warranty of merchantability should be used to construct an 
independent and strict liability for defective products in tort. Further extension took place in Henningsen 
v Bloomfield Motors Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 6. See also Loubser & Reid Product Liability 24; 
Stapleton Product Liability 21. 
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In Greenman v Yuba Products,136 the Supreme Court of California took the first steps 
to move away from the contractual route and laid down a principle of strict liability in 
tort for defective consumer products.137 The gradual development of the 
manufacturer’s liability in American courts ultimately led to the adoption in 1965 of 
section 402A of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
purported to provide a strict liability regime for defective products.138  
During this time, victims of defective consumer products in European jurisdictions 
generally had to seek refuge in the law of contract and tort law if they intended to seek 
compensation for their harm.139 In the UK, for example, Stapleton writes that “[l]ittle 
changed in the relevant UK common law from the removal of the privity barrier to tort 
claims for physical loss in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) until the turn of the 1960s.”140  
A victim of a defective product could thus sue a retailer for the harm to his person or 
property under the warranties as to the quality of the product implied under the Sale 
of Goods Act.141 However, courts continued to give effect to the privity requirement in 
contract law and a third party who suffered harm, regardless of the foreseeability 
thereof, was therefore not entitled to sue for breach of contract.142  
Further, consumers who intended to sue someone other than the immediate seller of 
the defective product, could do so only in the event that such a person had made an 
express warranty with regard to the quality of the product.143 Despite the House of 
Lord’s confirmation in Donoghue v Stevenson144 that the ultimate consumer had a tort 
claim against the ultimate manufacturer of the defective product, the plaintiff was still 
required to prove negligence.145 The end result therefore was that, compared to the 
developments initiated by American courts, victims of defective consumer products in 
                                                          
136 59 Cal 2d 57. 
137 G Howells, “Product Liability” in J Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2006) 578-
587 579. 
138 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 7.  
139 See generally Stapleton Product Liability 37-45; Markesinis & Unberath German Tort Law 748-749, 
881-883; Reimann “Product Liability” in Comparative Tort Law 251-253. 
140 Stapleton Product Liability 37.  
141 Stapleton Product Liability 37; Deakin et al Tort Law 590. 
142 Deakin et al Tort Law 590. 
143 Stapleton Product Liability 37-38. 
144 [1932] AC 562. 
145 Deakin et al Tort Law 590.  
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the UK received considerably less protection against the risk of harm which 
manufactured products carried with them.  
The legal position was similar in Germany, where, prior to the legislature’s ultimate 
intervention in 1989,146 liability for harm arising from defective consumer products was 
regulated by tort and contract law.147 In 1956 the German Bundesgerichtshof148 
denied the driver of a new bicycle a remedy in tort when the handlebar broke because 
of the technical deficiency of the steel, resulting in the plaintiff’s bodily injuries. The 
court held that the weakness in the steel was practically undiscoverable and that the 
manufacturer had not breached its duty of care and was therefore not negligent. 
However, in 1968, the same court brought about a “fundamental change”149 when it 
held that, “if the cause of the damaging factor can only be located within the premises 
of the producer, his negligence is presumed.”150  
This judicial attempt at developing the law to assist the victim of a defective consumer 
product in finding compensation for his harm was borne out of considerations related 
to fairness: “[i]t would be unjust for the victim […] to be forced to prove circumstances 
within the enterprise which would only allow the conclusion that the producer was 
negligent. The factory of the manufacturer is not accessible to him. It is therefore the 
defendant who must show that he did not act negligently.”151 This change in the legal 
position “was no doubt influenced by the developments in the USA […] and the 
adoption of s 402A of the Restatement of Torts Second.”152 
Despite the judicial development to assist victims of defective products in claiming 
compensation, Taschner maintains that the German courts provided only “half-way 
solutions [which] showed the need to change the law, [and that] they were not definite 
ways to reach a satisfactory result.”153 Similarly, writing about European jurisdictions 
generally, Reimann states that the “courts in Western Europe struggled to protect 
                                                          
146 The Products Liability Act of 1989.  
147 R Grote “Product Liability under German and European Law” in M Wendler, B Buecker & B Tremml 
(eds) Key Aspect of German Business Law (2006) 111-120 111.  
148 BGH VIZR 36/55, ‘Der Betrieb’ 1956 at 592.  
149 D Fairgrieve Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 100. 
150 HC Taschner “Product liability: basic problems in a comparative law context” in D Fairgrieve (ed) 
Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 155 159.  
151 159. See also Reimann “Product Liability” in Comparative Tort Law 252. 
152 Fairgrieve Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 100.  
153 Taschner “Product liability: basic problems in a comparative law context” in Product Liability in 
Comparative Perspective 159. 
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victims of defective products without openly breaking with the traditional rules of 
contract […] and tort.”154  
Dissatisfaction concerning the inability of existing liability regimes to provide redress 
for consumers therefore grew steadily.155 The concern was amplified by the 
thalidomide drug disaster of the 1960s. During 1961 it was recognized that the 
pregnancy drug thalidomide had caused birth defects in the children of some of its 
users. Almost 8 000 children in over 30 countries were affected.156 The difficulties that 
were experienced by the deformed children in obtaining compensation from the 
manufacturer assisted in focusing attention on the uncertainties and difficulties 
experienced when instituting a tort claim for negligence as well as the slow and 
expensive process of litigation.157  
Therefore, at the time that proposals for a European Community directive on Products 
Liability were first considered in the 1970s, it was not possible to speak of product 
liability law as such in either Germany or England.158 In both countries, the legislature 
intervened by adopting product liability legislation subsequent to the Member States 
of the European Community adoption of Council Directive 85/374/EEC on 25 July 
1985. The directive had the “dual aim of harmonising the conditions of competition in 
the internal market and ensuring adequate protection for victims of unsafe products 
across the Member States.”159 Broadly, the directive provides that, where someone 
can prove that his bodily integrity or property has been physically harmed by a 
defective product that was put into circulation in the ordinary course of business, he 
can institute a claim against its manufacturer, importer, own-brand supplier or a mere 
supplier, without having to prove negligence against any specific party or that the 
defendant caused the defect.160  
In England, the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act of 1987 can be traced to 
this directive and it seeks to give effect to its principles. Generally, this Act, as read 
with the directive, imposes strict liability on manufacturers, distributors and retailers 
                                                          
154 Reimann “Product Liability” in Comparative Tort Law 252.  
155 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 9.  
156 Stapleton Product Liability 42.  
157 42.  
158 Deakin et al Tort law 590; Markesinis & Unberath German Tort Law 748-749, 881-883. 
159 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 9.  
160 See Stapleton Product Liability 49.  
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for harm arising from defective products. Similarly, in Germany, the Products Liability 
Act of 1989 followed the 1985 Directive and introduced a strict liability on 
manufacturers for harm arising from defective products.161   
In contrast to the American, English and German legislatures, the South African 
legislature took significantly longer before it finally decided to develop the delictual 
principles relating to harm suffered as a result of defective products. The CPA was 
enacted in 2008 and only became operative in 2010. Section 61(1) of the Act 
introduced a framework in terms of which producers, importers, distributors or retailers 
may be held strictly liable for bodily injuries or property damage which has been 
brought about by the supply of unsafe goods or a product failure, defect or hazard, or 
inadequate instructions or warnings for the use of certain goods.  
Prior to its enactment, however, the legal position was that a consumer who suffered 
harm as a result of a defective product could institute either a contractual claim against 
the seller of the product in question or, alternatively, pursue a delictual remedy against 
a member of the supply chain. The South African law of contract, however, did not 
undergo a similar development with regard to the extension of warranties and 
consumers who pursued this route remained bound by the principle of privity of 
contract.162 In terms of the South African common law of contract, a manufacturer may 
be held liable to a purchaser for breach of warranty on the basis of agency or a contract 
for the benefit of a third party.163 However, these contractual mechanisms ultimately 
have limited practical effect in assisting consumers who have suffered harm as a result 
of a defective product against manufacturers.164  
On the other hand, a plaintiff who instituted a delictual claim165 is bound to prove all of 
the common law elements for delictual liability. In the context of defective consumer 
                                                          
161 Markesinis & Unberath The German Law of Torts 748. 
162 D Hutchison & CJ Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 21-32. See also Van 
Eeden Consumer Protection Law 73-87, 372; Loubser & Reid Product Liability 23-35.  
163 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 24; M Dendy “Agency and Representation” in WA Joubert & JA 
Faris LAWSA 1 3 ed (2014) para 175. 
164 Loubser & Reid Product Liability (2012) 24; ADJ van Rensburg, JG Lotz & T van Rhijn “Contract” in 
WA Joubert & JA Feris LAWSA 9 3 ed (2014) para 425. 
165 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 24: an action based on the manufacturer’s pre-contractual 
representations.  
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products, the elements of fault (in the form of negligence), causation166 and fault167 
are particularly difficult to prove. In Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v 
Pharmacare Ltd (“Wagener”),168 the SCA was requested to develop the common law 
of delict by doing away with the requirement of fault.169 However, the court refrained 
to do so, stating that any reform of the law of delict in this context was better left to the 
legislature.170  
The apparent lack of an effective remedy with which to compensate harm suffered by 
a consumer may therefore be said to have been a convincing policy-based 
consideration for the legislative development of this branch of the law, both in South 
Africa and elsewhere. Of course, as stated above, a desire for an effective remedy 
was the result of the risk of harm to which consumers were exposed by especially 
modernised, technologically-advanced manufacturers and the accompanying risk of 
potentially receiving no compensation should the harm materialise.  
The legislative development of the delictual remedies in respect of harm caused by 
defective consumer products occurred through the introduction of a strict liability 
regime for producers, importers, distributors and retailers. The most convincing policy-
based justification for the legislature’s development of the law of delict may arguably 
be found in the notion of enterprise liability. Consumers are exposed to risks inherent 
to certain products from which manufacturers stand to make a profit. Therefore, the 
costs of accidents should be imposed on the manufacturers, who, additionally, often 
are best placed to take steps to avoid the risk of damage (by taking precautions at the 
design and manufacturing stages of production)171 or to minimise its effects (through 
the adoption of insurance or through pricing of products).172 This point has also been 
illustrated in the landmark American decision Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co:173  
“Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards 
                                                          
166 See Loubser & Reid Product Liability 53-55 for the difficulties relating to proving causation in this 
context.  
167 See Loubser & Reid Product Liability 46-50 for the difficulties relating to proving fault in this context. 
See also Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (4) SA 285. 
168 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) para 10.  
169 Paras 17, 27-30.  
170 See below in paragraph 3.3.2. 
171 Deakin et al Tort Law (2013) 590-591.  
172 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 5; Stapleton Product Liability 162-184. 
173 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462 (1944) (emphasis added).  
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and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from 
defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss 
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, 
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a 
cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having 
defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the 
market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause 
upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is 
responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and 
however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general 
one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer 
is best situated to afford such protection.” 
 
In conclusion, it may be argued that, as was the case with statutory intervention in the 
area of motor vehicle accidents and workplace-related injuries and diseases, the most 
prominent underlying consideration for the development of the fault-based common 
law of delict in relation to harm suffered as a result of a defective product is the creation 
of a risk of harm and the additional risk that the injured consumer may not find 
compensation as a result of an insolvent manufacturer, evidentiary difficulties or 
ineffective legal remedies. The introduction of strict liability by the legislature has been 
justified by the notion of enterprise liability in the context of both occupational injuries 
and diseases as well as defective consumer products.174 
 
3.2.1.5 Conclusion: the need to combat the risk of harm   
At the advent of the previous century, the protection from the risk of potential harm 
was still largely assumed to be a matter which people had to attend to themselves. 
Upon the materialisation of such a risk, people were similarly presumed to take 
responsibility for obtaining compensation for their harm by instituting legal action 
against the wrongdoer.175 In other words, those who suffered harm as a result of the 
culpable wrongdoing of others were largely dependent on the remedies available in 
the common law of delict. Generally, this meant that the victims of harm had to find 
the time and funds to institute legal proceedings against a wrongdoer and provide 
sufficient evidentiary proof that the wrongdoer’s culpable conduct was indeed the 
cause of their harm.  
                                                          
174 See Stapleton Product Liability 20.  
175 For a comparative perspective, see Hedley “Tort and Personal Injuries, 1850 to the Present” in Tort 
Law and the Legislature 235.  
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However, over the course of the 20th century, a shift gradually occurred and the law of 
delict was developed by the South African legislature. The shift originated in the 
context of accidents that took place in the workplace, which may be said to have been 
characterised by an initial reluctance to regulate the behaviour of employers,176 and 
the court’s original individualistic approach which saw employers being held liable for 
workplace accidents only in the event that the victim could prove personal fault on the 
part of the employer.177 The development of the law of delict, as driven by the South 
African legislature, ultimately led to a growing demand for workplace safety, legal 
certainty and, most importantly, a cheaper and quicker way of compensating 
employees who suffered harm when an employment-related risk of harm materialised. 
Although there were other compelling considerations, it may be argued that, ultimately, 
the employees’ exposure to an ever-increasing risk of harm and the accompanying 
risk of not being able to receive compensation provided the predominant consideration 
for the legislature’s decision to intervene.  
Similarly, as a result of the increase in the number of motor vehicles during the course 
of the 20th century, the number and frequency of motor vehicle accidents grew 
significantly. Perhaps more than occupational accidents, this upsurge exposed road 
users to a substantial risk of harm and an accompanying risk of receiving no 
compensation in the event that the risk should materialise. Again, the legislature 
intervened by developing the law of delict. This was initially done by retaining the motor 
vehicle accident victim’s delictual remedy against a wrongdoer while also introducing 
the notion of compulsory third party insurance.178 In doing so, the legislature shifted 
the responsibility to compensate the motor vehicle accident victim to a source other 
than the wrongdoer. The legislature’s desire to address the risk of receiving no 
compensation also saw it further develop the law relating to motor vehicle accidents 
by replacing the system of compulsory third party insurance with a centralised 
compensation fund, financed through fuel levies.  
                                                          
176 Select Committee Report of the Select Committee on Compensation to Workmen 64-65. See also 
Hedley “Tort and Personal Injuries, 1850 to the Present” in Tort Law and the Legislature 236.  
177 See further Hedley “Tort and Personal Injuries, 1850 to the Present” in Tort Law and the Legislature 
237.  
178 Hedley “Tort and Personal Injuries, 1850 to the Present” in Tort Law and the Legislature 243: “Third-
party insurance was first offered to carriage drivers in 1875, and to motorists in 1896”. Furthermore, 
compulsory insurance was introduced by the Road Traffic (Compensation for Accidents) Bill in 1934. 
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Recently, the legislature abolished the motor vehicle accident victim’s right to a 
common-law delictual remedy in respect of the harm not covered by the RAF Act. 
Although such a legislative development was held to be constitutionally valid, it 
arguably undermines the initial legislative project of ensuring the compensation of the 
victim’s harm in the case of a risk eventuating, and is furthermore indicative of the 
legislature’s attempt to offer protection also to the wrongdoer. The legislature has 
attempted to justify these amendments as constituting part of greater reform towards 
a comprehensive social security for all individuals.  
The statutory development of the law of delict by the introduction of a strict liability 
regime in respect of producers, importers, distributors or retailers was also, to a great 
extent, driven by the dramatic increase in the production of consumer goods which 
brought about an ever-increasing risk of harm associated with a modern, mechanised 
society that produces potentially hazardous products.  
Although the utility of motor vehicle transport, increased labour forces and a growing 
manufacturing sector is clearly visible, the benefit is accompanied by an amplified risk 
of harm. The South African legal system produced a solution in which these activities 
were permitted, but only on condition that the most appropriate enterprise were 
saddled with the cost of the risks they produced.179  
The previous chapter highlighted the increasing expansion of the state’s delictual 
liability for harm that arises from crime. The development is disquieting also from a 
crime prevention perspective because, with more of available tax-payer funds being 
spent on litigation and the payment of full compensation to crime victims, less of the 
funds are directed to promoting safety and preventing crime. In turn, this creates 
greater possibilities for the further extension of the state’s delictual liability. In other 
words, the current judicial trend indirectly contributes to the increased risk of crime by 
diminishing available resources intended for crime prevention. At the same time, the 
recent development responds to the risk of receiving no or limited compensation in the 
event of suffering from crime – but only in respect of a limited number of crime victims 
who are able to institute litigious proceedings against the state. Therefore, the ongoing 
tendency to expand the state’s delictual liability indirectly contributes to the increased 
                                                          
179 See also Markesinis & Unberath The German Law of Torts 716. 
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likelihood of being a victim of crime while it provides a compensatory solution only to 
those who are capable of proving liability in court.  
Viewed against the background of statutory development, which highlights the 
potentially more effective victim compensation strategy that exists through the 
legislative reform of the law of delict, the current judicial development pertaining to 
crime victim compensation appears unattractive. 
 
3.2.2 The role of the Constitution and the need to promote the constitutional  
right to social security 
3.2.2.1 Introduction 
In this part of the chapter, attention will be given to the role which the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa,1996 (the “Constitution”) has played in justifying the 
statutory development of the law of delict. As discussed in greater detail below, the 
Constitution has been particularly important insofar as it has promoted the right to 
social security through the legislative reform of the law of delict. 
  
3.2.2.2 Salient provisions of the Constitution  
Before attention is given to the promotion of the right to social security, it would be 
appropriate to summarise the salient provisions of the Constitution.  
The Constitution is the supreme law of the country,180 central to the country’s legal 
system and it determines the validity of all law, including the law of delict.181 The Bill 
of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and 
all organs of state.182 It also applies to the conduct of natural persons and juristic 
persons, when appropriate.183 The Constitution also enjoins every court, tribunal or 
forum to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting 
                                                          
180 Section 2 of the Constitution.  
181 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 32.  
182 Section 8(1) of the Constitution.  
183 Section 8(2) of the Constitution.  
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any legislation and when developing the common law.184 Section 7(2) of the 
Constitution imposes upon the state a positive duty to protect and promote the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights. Importantly, section 27(1)(c)185 refers to the right to 
social security and section 27(2)186 imposes upon the state a mandatory duty to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of these rights.  
In the following paragraphs, the statutory development of the law of delict will be 
examined to establish the role which the constitutional right to social security has 
fulfilled as a legal consideration that justifies the legislative intervention in the law of 
delict. Particular attention will be given to the development of the area of the law that 
relates to motor vehicle accidents and occupational injuries and diseases. 
 
3.2.2.3 The constitutional right to social security  
Academic literature reflects the difficulty in providing an adequate definition for social 
security that may be applied consistently.187 South African legislation, international 
legislation and academics provide different definitions of the concept.188 Some 
sources concentrate on an enumerated list of social risks to which a legislative 
response is required, whereas others focus on the nature of the state’s involvement in 
addressing the risk or the aims that are to be served by providing social security.189 A 
detailed analysis regarding the nature of social security falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation and the remainder of this section will describe its meaning for the purpose 
of this dissertation.  
First, it would be appropriate to distinguish the promotion of social security as a policy 
consideration from the need to combat risk.190 The promotion of social security is not 
                                                          
184 Section 39(2) of the Constitution.  
185 This section states that everyone has the right to access to “social security, including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.” 
186 This section states that the “state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.” 
187 Olivier “Social Security: Framework” in LAWSA 13(2) (2012) para 15. 
188 Olivier “Social Security: Framework” in LAWSA 13(2) (2012) para 15.  
189 Olivier “Social Security: Framework” in LAWSA 13(2) (2012) para 20 provides a list of the risks 
addressed. See also MP Olivier, MC Okpaluba, N Smit & M Thompson (eds) Social Security Law: 
General Principles (1999) 9-17. 
190 See paragraph 3.2.1 above. 
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only focused on addressing the risk of a specific type of harm and the accompanying 
risk of potentially receiving no or limited compensation. Legislation that is aimed at 
promoting social security typically casts the net wider and attempts to support 
individuals with no or low income, provide adequate standard of living and puts in place 
a social safety net against destitution.191 As alluded to in its policy paper regarding the 
proposed RABS, the right to social security system does not focus only at 
compensating harm that arise within a specific context.192  
Instead, social security arrangements consist of a range of collective and individual 
social, fiscal, occupational and welfare measures of private, public and mixed origin 
aimed at providing social cover to members of society.193 In other words, the 
consideration discussed in this part of the chapter is not the same as the one 
discussed in paragraph 3.2.1 above. While the latter concentrated solely on the issue 
of compensation of the victim’s harm (once a particular risk has materialised), the 
promotion of the constitutional right to social security has a broader scope which 
embraces other non-compensatory objectives, including empowering the historically 
disadvantaged,194 promoting fundamental human rights (particularly human 
dignity),195 addressing past injuries,196 and seeking to provide an adequate standard 
of life to all individuals.197     
In the following part of the chapter, attention will be given to instances of legislative 
development of the law of delict that were justified in part by the need to advance the 
constitutional right to social security.  
 
                                                          
191 7-8. 
192 Minister of Transport Policy Paper 5-6. 
193 5-6. 
194 In doing so, the legislation addresses poverty and social exclusion, which may be regarded as a key 
to social protection. It also enhances other constitutional values and principles, such as equality, non-
sexism and non-racism. See Olivier, Smit & Kalula Social Security 35.  
195 See Olivier, Smit & Kalula Social Security 36: “There is some Constitutional Court authority for the 
view that social security-related rights are aimed at more than simply restoring material disadvantage 
[...] In Grootboom, the court emphasised the strong link between human dignity and the giving effect to 
access of adequate housing.” 
196 See Olivier, Smit & Kalula Social Security 53: “Fundamental reform of South Africa’s social security 
system aims to redress past injustices, particularly the country’s legacy of poverty and equality.” 
197 See Minister of Transport Policy Paper 5-6. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
167 
 
3.2.2.4 Legislative intervention that gives effect to the constitutional right to 
social security  
3.2.2.4.1 Legislative intervention in the area of motor vehicle accidents that 
gives effect to the constitutional right to social security 
Referring to the statutory motor vehicle accident compensation scheme established to 
cover the risks to which road users are exposed, the CC held that it “seems plain that 
the scheme arose out of the social responsibility of the State. In effect, it was, and 
indeed still remains, part of the social security net for all road users and their 
dependants.”198  
During the parliamentary debate concerning the introduction of the 1942 Act and 
accompanying compulsory third party insurance scheme, it was stressed that, 
regardless of the accompanying cost which a compulsory third party insurance system 
may bring, members of society should realise that the Act “aims at the protection of 
those who cannot look after themselves.”199 In particular, the “principle of security”200 
was emphasised to ensure protection of the road users’ interests and safety. Those in 
favour of the legislation stressed the impact of injury and disability upon road users:201  
“Those people who were injured are suffering day in and day out in their work; they are unable 
to look after their families, and because those families have to endure great hardships while the 
children are young, they cannot enjoy their legitimate share in life. Those are the people we 
should primarily think of. They must be looked after. The people who are injured must first of all 
be nursed back to health, which means an enormous amount of work for the hospitals and for 
the nursing services, and also for the medical services of this country.” 
Because of its adherence to fault-based liability, the RAF Act, however, has been 
criticised as a failed system that is “unreasonable, inequitable, unaffordable and 
unsustainable.”202 As discussed elsewhere in this chapter,203 the requirement for fault 
has a significantly detrimental impact on the successful pursuit of compensation by a 
motor vehicle accident victim. In turn, it is argued, a significant amount of those victims 
are left uncompensated and without the ability to earn income. To address this 
concern, and to provide greater effect to the right to social security, the legislature has 
                                                          
198 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 17.  
199 RAFC Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission 109.  
200 109.  
201 109.  
202 Minister of Transport Policy Paper 13. 
203 See paragraph 3.2.3.3. 
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proposed the RABS. In Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport,204 the 
purpose of the proposed scheme was described as follows:  
“[T]he ultimate vision is that the new system of compensation for road accident victims must be 
integrated into a comprehensive social security system that offers life, disability and health 
insurance cover for all accidents and diseases. [The Minister] acknowledges that a fault-based 
common-law system of compensation for road accident victims would be at odds with a 
comprehensive social security model. The intention is therefore to replace the common-law 
system of compensation with a set of limited no-fault benefits which would form part of a broader 
social security net as public financial support for people who are poor, have a disability or are 
vulnerable. […The] new scheme is a first step to greater reform.”  
Furthermore, the policy paper for the RABS makes it clear that the proposed no-fault 
based compensatory scheme must be understood against the social and economic 
reality of South African society, which is characterised by great disproportions in 
income and lifestyle.205 The RABS is cognisant of historical disadvantages prevalent 
in the South African society and is a legislative attempt to develop the existing common 
law of delict as it relates to compensation of motor vehicle accidents as well as an 
attempt to contribute to the state’s broader social security reform process.206 By 
removing the requirement of fault, the legislature makes provision that social security 
benefits will be made available to a wider group of road accident victims,207 in the 
process seeking to provide an adequate standard of life to all citizens. In doing so, the 
legislature strives to promote the principle of social inclusion as well as the notion that 
the “risk of misfortune should become the comprehensive and collective responsibility 
of society as a whole.”208  
 
3.2.2.4.2 Legislative intervention in the area of occupational accidents and 
injuries that gives effect to the constitutional right to social security 
Occupational injury and disease schemes are generally considered to be the oldest 
form of social security coverage in the world.209 It is also regarded as the most 
widespread system of social security, and if the “various branches of social security 
from different countries are examined it is clear that almost every country […] has an 
                                                          
204 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) paras 45-46. 
205 Minister of Transport Policy Paper 6-7. 
206 6-7. 
207 6-7. 
208 7. 
209 International Labour Office Strengthening the Role of Employment Injury Schemes to Help Prevent 
Occupational Accidents and Diseases (2013). 
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insurance scheme to cover these risks.”210  Generally, these schemes give effect to 
the right to social security by promoting workplace safety and providing compensation, 
medical care, vocational rehabilitation, and further benefits to employees as well as 
survivors’ benefits for families of victims of occupational accidents.211  
As noted above, the COIDA introduced significant changes in respect of the protection 
of employees’ rights and, although it did not intend to provide a kind of general health 
cover for every accident or disease which an employee may suffer from, it may 
nevertheless be regarded as social security legislation, aimed at the provision of a 
more equitable compensation dispensation in regard to injuries suffered and diseases 
contracted by employees.212 Specifically, where earlier legislation was based on the 
principle of individual employer liability as covered by private insurance, the 
subsequent legislation introduced the principle of no-fault based liability and limited 
benefits covered by a public scheme.213 The introduction of such a scheme, which 
does not require an employee to prove fault on the part of the employer, weakens the 
likelihood of lengthy and costly legal disputes and provides a more streamlined 
administrative process for the effective compensation of injured employees. As such, 
this piece of “social legislation”214 promotes the social and economic welfare of 
employees.  
Therefore, taking into account that it sought to promote workplace safety, rehabilitate 
injured or diseased employees and provide compensation to those who have fallen 
victim to accidents that have occurred during the course and scope of employment, it 
may be said that the legislative development of a no-fault based compensation 
scheme for occupational injuries and diseases in South Africa is an example of the 
promotion of the constitutional right to social security.215 
                                                          
210 Olivier et al Social Security Law 312. 
211 International Labour Office Strengthening the Role of Employment Injury Schemes. 
212 For example, the exclusion of higher-income earners was removed.  
213 Olivier “Social Security: Framework” in LAWSA 13(2) para 9.  
214 In Molefe v Compensation Commissioner and Another (25579/05) [2007] ZAGPHC 365 para 5, Seriti 
J found that the “Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act […] is a social legislation 
and according to section 39(2) of the Constitution, it must be interpreted in such a manner that the said 
interpretation promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the social security right as enshrined in section 
27 (l)(c) of the Constitution.” 
215 P Myburgh, N Smit & D van der Nest “Social security aspects of accident compensation: COIDA and 
RAF as examples” Law, Democracy and Development (2011) 43 43.  
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3.2.2.5 Conclusion 
Social security arrangements consist of a range of collective and individual social, 
fiscal, occupational and welfare measures of private, public and mixed origin aimed at 
providing social cover to members of society and at combating certain risks.  
The statutory compensation schemes that provide compensation for harm arising from 
motor vehicle accidents and occupational injuries and diseases constitute a part of the 
broader social security project in South Africa. These schemes afford a variety of 
victims the possibility to obtain compensation in a relatively affordable and quick 
manner and without having to pursue a more costly, time-consuming litigious route. In 
doing so, they protect people from misfortune, distress and the significant risks to life 
caused by unemployment, illness, injury, disability and death of a breadwinner, and 
thereby give effect to the constitutional right to social security.  
The Constitution has been particularly important in developing the law of delict by 
promoting the constitutional right to social security. It may be argued that the COIDA 
and the RAF Act are aimed at giving effect to this constitutional imperative insofar as 
they afford victims of motor vehicle accidents, workplace injuries and diseases the 
fullest possible protection of their legal interests.216 Furthermore, the proposed no-fault 
based compensatory model sought to be introduced under the RABS has pertinently 
been justified on the basis that it seeks to give “effect to the [right to] reasonable 
access to social security and health care.”217  
The South African legislature’s development of the law of delict pertaining to the 
compensation of accident victims is therefore justified insofar as it addresses particular 
and pervasive social risks to which all members of society are exposed and responds 
to the broader constitutional project that includes empowering the historically 
disadvantaged,218 promoting fundamental human rights (particularly human 
                                                          
216 MP Olivier, JF Khoza, L Jansen van Rensburg & E Klinck “Constitutional Issues” in MP Oliver, N 
Smit & E Kalula (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 49-119; Van Eeden Consumer Protection 
Law 92; Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC).  
217 Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC).  
218 See footnote 193 above.  
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dignity),219 addressing past injuries220 and seeking to provide an adequate standard 
of life to all individuals.221  
 
3.2.3 Evidentiary problems with applying the common-law requirement of fault  
3.2.3.1 Introduction 
Although the law of delict recognises exceptional circumstances where it is not 
required, a plaintiff must, generally, prove fault. This means that, first, the victim is 
required to prove that the wrongdoer had the capacity to be at fault.222 To do so, a 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant had the mental ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong and to act in accordance with that distinction.223 If the wrongdoer is 
shown to be accountable, the plaintiff must prove that the wrongdoer acted either 
intentionally or negligently. With regard to the former, it must be proven that the 
defendant had the direction of will to cause him harm and that the wrongdoer was 
conscious of the wrongfulness of his act.224 In respect of the latter, the plaintiff must 
prove that the wrongdoer’s conduct failed to measure up to the standard of the 
objective reasonable person.225  
 
3.2.3.2 Reasons for fault-based liability 
Despite strong arguments that may be raised in support of the departure from fault-
based liability, the South African courts have reiterated the requirement for proving 
fault when establishing delictual liability.226 There are convincing reasons in favour of 
such a general position, and these may briefly be summarised as follows. First, the 
fault principle embodies and gives effect to fundamental ideas about personal 
responsibility: a person who injures another through his culpable conduct ought to be 
                                                          
219 See footnote 194 above. 
220 See footnote 195 above. 
221 See footnote 196 above. 
222 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 131; Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 104. 
223 Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 2005 (5) SA 503 (SCA) 511. 
224 Le Roux v Dey; Freedom of Expression Institute Amici Curiae 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC). 
225 Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 (1) SA 827 (SCA); 
Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A); Loureiro and Others v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd [2014] 
ZACC 4. 
226 Oppelt v Department of Health, Western Cape 2016 (1) SA 325 (CC); Jacobs and Another v Transnet 
Ltd t/a Metrorail and Another 2015 (1) SA 139 (SCA); H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) SA 193 
(CC). 
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held responsible for the harm caused by his conduct by being required to compensate 
the injured person.227 This view, namely that the wrongdoer is called on to correct the 
harm suffered by the victim precisely because he was the one who culpably and 
wrongfully caused it, is in line with the corrective justice rationale for the compensatory 
function of the law of delict.228 The insistence on fault-based liability therefore echoes 
the moral notion of dessert, i.e. the idea that only those who have caused another 
person’s harm by acting in a blameworthy manner, should be made to pay 
compensation.  
To explain and justify the role of the fault requirement, emphasis is sometimes placed 
on its relationship with deterrence, a function which the law of delict may be said to 
fulfil.229 Doing away with the requirement of fault would mean that the reasonableness 
of someone’s conduct would be largely irrelevant when establishing delictual liability, 
potentially impacting on the role that deterrence may play as well as the motivation to 
act reasonably, particularly when doing so may prove to be a costly and time-
consuming affair.  
Law-and-economics scholars have argued that the primary goal of fault-based liability 
is not that it encourages the avoidance of all harm, regardless of costs, but, rather, 
that it seeks to achieve an optimal balance between the number of injuries and the 
social benefits of the activities which produce them.230  
The appraisal of the fault requirement for delictual and tortious liability, generally, has 
evoked a vast amount of academic writing.231 Further analysis of the philosophical, 
legal and economic arguments in respect of the fault requirement falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. Instead, the focus will be placed on specific considerations 
regarding the fault requirement that have motivated the South African legislature to 
develop the law of delict.  
                                                          
227 Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 189.  
228 Weinrib (2002) The University of Toronto Law Journal 349-356; J Gardner “What is Tort Law For? 
Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice‟ (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1-14; Coleman “The Practice of 
Corrective Justice” in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law; Fagan “The right to personal security” in 
Private Law and Human Rights: Bringing Rights Home in Scotland and South Africa130-155. 
229 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 10. 
230 C Brown “Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience” (1985) California Law 
Review 73(3) 976 976-977. 
231 See in particular Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 174-199.  
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3.2.3.3 Legislative intervention: doing away with the fault requirement 
Notwithstanding the above, and despite the fact that fault is generally required for 
delictual liability, the South African legislature has nevertheless elected to develop the 
law of delict by abolishing the fault requirement in specific contexts. In this part of the 
chapter, attention will be given to the reasons that have justified the legislative 
development in these instances.  
 
3.2.3.3.1 The evidentiary difficulty in proving fault in the context of motor 
vehicle accidents 
In its report, the RAFC, tasked with conducting an inquiry into and making 
recommendations regarding a “reasonable, equitable, affordable and sustainable 
system for the payment by the Road Accident Fund of compensation or benefits in the 
event of the injury or death of persons in road accidents in the Republic”,232 noted that 
it “is increasingly felt that fault cannot really be determined accurately and there is also 
a growing social concern for accident victims regardless of the role they played in 
causing the accident.”233  
In the RABS policy paper dealing with the potential legislative intervention in the law 
of delict in the context of motor vehicle accidents, the Minister states that this 
requirement may lead to a delay in providing victim compensation, because it is often 
necessary to resort to litigation to obtain clarity on the question of fault.234 This, in turn, 
results in extensive legal costs for both the accident victim and the RAF.235 During the 
delay, victims have to pay for medical and other expenses themselves and, if they are 
disabled, they are not in a position to pursue gainful employment, which means that 
their families could also suffer.236 In a developing country, such as South Africa, “a 
significant proportion of road users have not had the financial means to pay for 
appropriate healthcare and rehabilitation themselves while waiting for the legal 
                                                          
232 RAFC Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission 1. 
233 119. 
234 Department of Transport Policy Paper for the RABS 13. 
235 1-7. 
236 1-7. 
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process to be finalised.”237 For these reasons, the fault-based system of liability under 
the RAF Act has been described as “unreasonable, inequitable, unaffordable and 
unsustainable.”238 
In response to these difficulties, the RABS has been proposed. The preamble of the 
proposed legislation for motor vehicle accidents therefore states that “there is a need 
to expand and facilitate access to benefits by providing them on a no-fault basis”. The 
suggested no-fault model under the RABS will potentially ease the “administrative load 
[…] and speed up service delivery. Long delays in the settlement of claims will be 
eliminated by the fact that possible disputes over the fault requirement and which 
frequently required legal intervention will be removed and by the resulting streamlined 
administrative process.”239  
The introduction of a no-fault liability model under the proposed RABS provides an 
example of where the evidentiary difficulties in proving fault (in the form of negligence) 
has been used as a justifiable policy reason for legislative reform of the law of delict.240 
It is envisaged that the proposed no-fault model will ease the administrative load 
regarding the process of statutory claims, increase the speed with which those claims 
are processed and prevent lengthy, costly legal disputes concerning the existence of 
negligence. 
 
3.2.3.3.2 The evidentiary difficulty in proving fault in the context of occupational 
injuries and diseases 
The introduction of a strict liability regime in the context of occupational injuries and 
diseases was similarly motivated by the desire to assist the victims of occupational 
injuries and diseases so that they are not required to prove fault.241 Upon tabling the 
COIDA to the extended public committee in parliament, the Minister of Manpower aptly 
remarked:242  
“Under common law an injured employee or the dependents of a deceased employee may get 
compensation from his employer if it can be proved that the injury or death was due to the 
                                                          
237 7. 
238 6.  
239 Minister of Transport Policy Paper 5.  
240 See Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 45; Minister of 
Transport Policy Paper (2011) 5. 
241 Markesinis & Unberath The German Law of Torts 727-731. 
242 Proceedings of the Extended Public Committee Debates of Parliament 1993-1994 (1994) 12305.  
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negligence of the employer, but in a modern industrial set-up in which, for example, a number of 
employees jointly use sophisticated machinery, it may be virtually impossible for an injured 
employee to prove negligence.” 
With the introduction of the COIDA and by doing away with proving fault within this 
context, the employee is therefore able to obtain compensation much easier and 
quicker from a solvent entity.243 It may therefore be argued that the compensation fund 
more effectively compensates victims than a delict/tort system that requires proof of 
fault.244 
 
3.2.3.3.3 The evidentiary difficulty in proving fault in the context of defective 
consumer products 
Proving fault, especially negligence, is difficult and places a burden on the plaintiff that 
is often hard or impossible to discharge.245 This evidentiary difficulty has been a major 
policy consideration in favour of statutory intervention in the field of product liability, 
where the consumer is usually unable to analyse or scrutinise the products for 
safety.246 In Wagener, the SCA was requested to develop the rules of the common 
law of delict so that it was no longer required for victims of defective products to prove 
that the manufacturer had been culpable (in this case, negligent) in manufacturing the 
product in question. Although the court ultimately opted to leave the development of 
this branch of the law to the legislature, it took cognisance of the difficulty in proving 
fault:247  
“A plaintiff has no knowledge of, or access to the manufacturing process, either to determine its 
workings generally or, more particularly, to establish negligence in relation to the making of the 
item or substance which has apparently caused the injury complained of. And, contrary to what 
some writers suggest, it was urged that it is insufficient to overcome the problem that the fact of 
the injury, consequent upon use of the product as prescribed or directed, brings the 
maxim res ipsa loquitur into play and casts on the defendant a duty to lead evidence or risk 
having judgment given against it. The submission is that resort to the maxim is but a hypocritical 
ruse to justify (unwarranted) adherence to the fault requirement.” 
                                                          
243 For a German perspective on this point, see Markesinis & Unberath The German Law of Torts 727. 
244 See also Stapleton Disease and the Compensation Debate (1986) 12, who writes about English 
legislation that provides an occupational injuries scheme: “The principal advantage the scheme has 
over tort […] is that fault in an identifiable wrongdoer need not be shown, nor, in most cases, need the 
claimant affirmatively prove medical causation, as he or she can take advantages of presumptions to 
this effect.” 
245 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 4.  
246 4.  
247 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) para 10. 
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A by-product of a strict liability regime in this context is the fact that it assist in 
promoting consumer safety and deterring the manufacturing of dangerous products. 
In the product liability context, the abolition of the fault requirement appears to perform 
the instrumental function of creating safety incentives.248 Imposing strict liability on 
manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing defects encourages greater 
investment in product safety than does a regime of fault-based liability under which 
sellers may escape their appropriate share of responsibility.249 In its 1985 directive, 
the European Union also emphasised the fact that the imposition of a strict liability 
regime relating to defective products is the “sole means of adequately solving the 
problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the 
risks inherent in modern technological production”.250  
These considerations have prompted the South African legislature to shift the harm 
suffered by consumers as a result of defective products onto the risk creator which 
directly stands to benefit from the risk-taking.251 The introduction by the South African 
legislature of the strict liability regime for defective products under section 61(1) of the 
CPA assists consumers practically in protecting their legal interests in cases involving 
complex products and where it would otherwise have been difficult or impossible to 
attain expert evidence to prove the defendant’s fault.252  
 
3.2.3.4 Conclusion 
The argument against fault (especially in the form of negligence) has been successful 
in both South Africa and foreign jurisdictions in spurring legislative development of the 
law of delict/tort law in a variety of contexts, notably harm resulting from defective 
consumer products, workplace-related injuries and diseases and motor vehicle 
accidents.253 It is submitted that the requirement to prove fault, especially negligence, 
in some instances may place a burden on victims of harm that is very difficult, or 
                                                          
248 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 5. 
249 5. 
250 5. 
251 See also Stapleton Disease and the Compensation Debate 92.  
252 Loubser & Reid Product Liability 4.  
253 See also S Sugarman “Serious Tort Law Reform” (1987) Vol. 24 San Diego Law Review 795 804-
805. 
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potentially impossible to satisfy, thereby potentially leaving them without 
compensation. 
 
3.3 General legal and public policy considerations that have justified the 
statutory reform of the South African law of delict 
The previous three sections concentrated on specific considerations that have justified 
the statutory development of the law of delict: the need to combat the risk of harm, the 
need to promote the constitutional right to social security and evidentiary problems 
relating to the application of the common-law fault requirement. In the following three 
sections, the focus will shift to three general considerations that may be said to have 
supported the legislative reform within the highlighted areas of the law of delict. These 
include the general dissatisfaction with the nature of the civil procedural system in 
claiming damages, the preference for statutory reform (as opposed to judicial 
development) and the need to avoid arbitrary outcomes.  
 
3.3.1 The nature of the civil litigation process: under-compensation and high 
transaction costs 
From a comparative perspective, the common law of tort has been criticised as being 
ineffective in its principal aim of compensating harm resulting from especially personal 
injury, disease and death.254 Dissatisfaction with the operation of the tort system 
received widespread academic attention during the 1960s and 1970s.255 During the 
same time, mass tort litigation drew public attention to the clumsy, time-consuming 
and costly nature of obtaining compensation by instituting civil proceedings.256  
The vigorous academic and public debates in the UK about the shortcomings of the 
tort system as a compensation mechanism was further buoyed by the enactment of 
the Accident Compensation Act in New Zealand in 1972.257 The Act abolished the tort 
system insofar as the compensation for harm resulting from personal injuries is 
                                                          
254 Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law 7 ed (2006) 461-499; Deakin et al Tort Law 
51-59. 
255 T Ison The Forensic Lottery (1967); DW Elliot and H Street Road Accidents (1968); P Atiyah 
Accidents, Compensation and the Law 1 ed (1970).  
256 Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 459.  
257 This Act has since been replaced by the Accident Compensation Act of 2001.  
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concerned, and replaced it with a general compensation scheme which provided 
compensation for harm resulting from all accidents and some diseases.258 It was 
argued that such a legislative development would, inter alia, alleviate the concerns 
relating to the high transaction costs of the civil litigation system. Within this framework 
the UK government established the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury to investigate the need for reform of the common 
law of tort (“Pearson Report”).259  
The Pearson Report revealed that out of the total number of some 3 million persons 
estimated to have suffered from personal injury each year, only approximately 1,7 
million received financial assistance from any source, with some of the victims 
receiving compensation from more than one source.260 Significantly, it was found 
that:261  
“[out of the] estimated 3 million persons suffering some injury in each year, only some 125,000 
(approximately 7 per cent) received any compensation in the form of tort damages. However, the 
total value of the damages paid to this 7 per cent was almost half of the total value of the social 
security payments made to the 1.5 million recipients of those payments. When account is taken 
of the administrative costs of the differing compensation systems, the position is even more 
striking, because the tort system is much more expensive to administer […] of the total cost of 
compensation paid (on average in each of the years 1971-1976) some £1 billion, the tort system 
accounted for no less than £377 million. Thus, 7 per cent of the accident victims accounted for 
perhaps 37 per cent of the total cost (payments plus administration) of the compensation paid 
out (making some allowance for the estimated administrative costs).” 
The Pearson Report indicated the high costs associated with the tort system which, in 
relation to other sources of compensation, seemed “less significant if its importance is 
assessed not in relation to accident victims alone, but in relation to the tentimes larger 
group of people who are disabled from all causes, these predominantly being illness 
and disease.”262 
Although there are no up-to-date statistics to put alongside those provided in the 
Pearson Commission’s report, it has been argued that “there is little reason to think 
that the basic picture is significantly different now”.263 In addition, it has been stated 
                                                          
258 Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 459.  
259 The Pearson Report was published in 1978. 
260 19-21.  
261 19-21.  
262 R Lewis “Recovery of State Benefits from Tort Damages: Legislating For and Against the Welfare 
State” in Arvind & Steele (eds) Tort Law and the Legislature (2013) 288. 
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that, although “[f]igures for South Africa are not known, they are likely to show similar 
trends.”264 
In the South African context, it may be argued that, similar to the position in England265 
and elsewhere,266 civil litigation is expensive267 and only a limited number of plaintiffs 
can afford the accompanying legal transaction costs,268 thereby restricting the right of 
general access to justice.269 Legal costs and fees in South Africa are substantial, 
leading some to argue that “the major barrier to access to justice in South Africa 
remains the high cost of legal services.”270 It is therefore unsurprising that in EFF v 
Speaker of the National Assembly; DA v Speaker of the National Assembly,271 
Mogoeng CJ recently emphasised the fact that “[l]itigation is prohibitively expensive 
and therefore not an easily exercisable constitutional option for an average citizen”. 
                                                          
264 MM Loubser & JR Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South Africa 1 ed (2010) 9. 
265 Lord Justice Jackson was appointed to carry out a fundamental review of the costs in civil litigation 
in England and Wales. He published his final report in 2010, in which he found that the costs relating to 
civil litigation (especially in respect of personal injuries) are excessive and has recommended 
substantial changes in this regard. See Lord Justice Jackson Report: Review of Civil Litigation Costs 
(2010) 14-18; Lord Justice Jackson “Reform of the Costs Regime” (2011) Advocate 37 37-42. In their 
comparative study, analysing data from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, England and Wales, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Scotland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the USA, Hodges, Vogenauer and 
Tulibacka note that, generally speaking, litigation costs are expensive and time-consuming and 
encourages further reform so as to improve access to justice: C Hodges, S Vogenauer & M Tulibacka 
“Costs and Funding in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study” (2009) University of Oxford Legal Research 
Paper Series (55/2009) 3-9.   
266 Hodges et al University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series 3-9; Sugarman (1987) San Diego 
Law Review (1987) 795: Tort law is “an intolerably expensive and unfair system of compensating 
victims.” 
267 See M Wallis “Reform of the Costs Regime – A South African Perspective” (2011) Advocate 33 33-
37; J Klaaren “The Cost of Justice” (2014) Briefing Paper for Public Positions Theme Event, 24 March 
2014 WiSER, History Workshop & Wits Political Studies Department 1 1-6. 
268 In other words, costs relating to the investigation of claims and the overall litigious process. See 
Wallis Advocate 33-37; Klaaren Briefing Paper for Public Positions Theme Event 1-6. For a comparative 
perspective see also Deakin et al Tort Law 53; Hodges et al University of Oxford Legal Research Paper 
Series 3-9. See also Sugarman San Diego Law Review 798: “The money available for compensation 
is paid into insurance companies as liability insurance premiums finds its way into the pockets of victims. 
The rest is ground up in lawyers' fees and the associated costs that litigation generates. The money 
also is consumed in the marketing, general overhead and claims administration costs of the insurers, 
as well as their profits in years when they make profits. Furthermore, there are public costs to the judicial 
system that the tort system imposes, both financial and through delay in the handling of other cases.” 
269 See SALRC A Compensation fund for victims of crime 236. See Wallis (2011) Advocate 33-37; 
Klaaren Briefing Paper for Public Positions Theme Event 1-6; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 461-499; Cane 
The Anatomy of Tort Law 231-237; S Sugarman “Doing Away with Tort Law” (1985) 73 California Law 
Review. 555 558-622. 
270 AfriMAP and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa South Africa: Justice Sector and the Rule 
of Law (2005) 2, 108. 
271 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC) para 52. 
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To illustrate, in 2005 the average South African household would have had to use a 
week’s income to afford a one-hour consultation with an average attorney.272 More 
recently, in 2013, it was recorded that “clients with a monthly income of R600 […] are 
frequently charged fees in the region of R1,500 […] just for an initial consultation.”273 
In accordance with the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985, a 15-minute 
consultation may cost anything between R144,50 and R235,50 while the cost of 
drafting one page of a legal document may be charged at R50.274 It also restricts 
access to justice for the poor, especially civil justice which is largely not available from 
Legal Aid South Africa.275 These fees restrict access to justice across the board for 
the not-so-poor, for instance persons in a household earning over R6000 a month and 
thus not qualifying for Legal Aid.276  
There are additional factors that may contribute towards the high cost of instituting a 
civil claim in a South African court. There are approximately 26,000 legal practitioners 
in South Africa, serving at least 53 million people.277 However, around 2,500 of these 
practitioners are advocates who rarely have direct interaction with clients, especially 
poor ones. Furthermore, the vast majority of these practitioners are situated in the 
urban areas, with relatively few practising in small towns or rural areas which means 
that “the cost and distance required to physically access lawyers makes pursuing 
litigation an overwhelmingly impractical option.”278  
Although the number of legal practitioners continues to grow, it has not led to greater 
competition, lower fees, more affordable legal assistance and greater access to 
justice.279 In addition, as noted above, the civil litigation process is very time-
consuming, resulting in many plaintiffs electing not to institute their claims at all.280 As 
                                                          
272 Klaaren Briefing Paper for Public Positions Theme Event 2. 
273 J Dugard & K Drage, “To Whom Do The People Take Their Issues?” Justice and Development 
Working Paper Series (2013) 2. 
274 See also D Holness “Recent Developments in the Provision of Pro Bono Legal Services by Attorneys 
in South Africa” (2013) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 16(4) 129 129-130. 
275 Legal Aid “Who Qualifies for Legal Aid?” available at <http://www.legal-aid.co.za/?p=956> (accessed 
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a result, taking into account the high cost and time-consuming nature of litigation in 
this regard, private insurance has assumed an increasingly important role, relieving 
victims of loss of their financial burden.281 However, considering the levels of poverty 
in South Africa, the vast majority of citizens are probably not in a position to afford 
insurance.  
The concern over the costly and time-consuming nature of civil proceedings is not new 
to the South African legal landscape. In its Report on Compensation to Workmen in 
1904, the Select Committee already took note of the problems raised by employees 
that the litigation process “has undoubtedly lengthened the time between the occurring 
of the accident and the receiving of the compensation”282 and that the proposed 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1905 had to provide compensation “to poor men 
quickly, and as cheaply as possible.”283 The same sentiment was echoed when the 
legislature decided to introduce a no-fault based compensatory system for 
occupational injuries and diseases via the COIDA: “In exchange for [forfeiting his 
common-law claim against his employer, the employee] gets an immediate remedy in 
the form of a statutory right to compensation without having to prove negligence on 
the part of the employer.”284 
In its judgment relating to the constitutionality of the abolition of the motor vehicle 
accident victim’s common-law claim against a wrongdoer in Law Society of South 
Africa v Minister for Transport,285 the CC commented on the nature of the civil litigation 
process:  
“The right of recourse under the common law proved to be of limited avail. The system of recovery 
was individualistic, slow, expensive and often led to uncertain outcomes. In many instances, 
successful claimants were unable to receive compensation from wrongdoers who had no means 
to make good their debts. On the other hand, it exposed drivers of motor vehicles to grave 
financial risk.” 
The legislature has aimed to remedy this concern by, among other things, introducing 
a no-fault basis for compensation of harm arising from motor vehicle accidents. 
                                                          
the individual who injured him. Instead, he will recover from an insurance company or a large impersonal 
enterprise, such as a corporation or a government entity.” 
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Furthermore, as the preamble to the proposed RABS indicates, the legislature has 
identified the “need to simplify claims procedures, reduce disputes and create certainty 
by providing defined and structured benefits […] and there is a need to establish 
administrative procedures for the expeditious resolution of disputes that may arise and 
to alleviate the burden on the courts.”  
Lastly, the time-consuming nature and high transaction costs characteristic of the civil 
litigation process was also taken into account when drafting the provisions of the CPA 
that relate to its regulatory framework and access of justice.286 With the introduction 
of the CPA, the legislature has changed not only the substantive law relating to 
defective consumer products, but it also effected changes to the administration of 
justice insofar as the adjudication of consumer rights and disputes involving 
consumers and business are concerned. For example, under the new regulatory 
framework, the National Consumer Tribunal (“NCT”) and the National Consumer 
Commission (“NCC”) have important roles.287 While the NCT is an adjudicative body, 
empowered to adjudicate on applications and allegations of prohibited practice,288 the 
NCC is primarily an investigative body that aims to enforce the provisions by the 
Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”).289 The establishment of these bodies, as well as 
consumer courts, may be regarded as a response to the need for a cheaper, quicker, 
speedier, more flexible and informal regulatory system.290  
It is argued that the nature of the civil litigation process, notably its potential under-
compensation of harm and the accompanying high transaction costs, has played a 
significant role in justifying the legislative reform of the law of delict, in the areas where 
the need for this type of reform is most pressing and the effect of reform can be most 
widespread and cost effective. 
                                                          
286 Van Eeden Consumer Law 93-105; 387-447. 
287 See section 69 of the CPA.  
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notices and make referrals to the NCC. In practice, however, many of these functions are now fulfilled 
by the industry ombuds.  
290 Van Eeden Consumer Law 98-99. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
183 
 
 
3.3.2 The ability of the legislature to regulate liability more comprehensively 
than the judiciary 
Another further consideration that have justified the statutory development of the law 
of delict is the ability of the legislature to regulate liability more comprehensively than 
the judiciary.  
In Wagener, the SCA took account of the debate surrounding the potential introduction 
of a strict liability regime for harm caused by defective consumer products. The court 
noted that product liability reform in foreign jurisdictions had largely been achieved 
through legislation and ultimately concluded that South Africa should adopt the same 
route: “[i]f strict liability is to be imposed, it is the Legislature that must do it.”291 In its 
judgment it held that the legislature was better equipped to investigate the variety of 
questions that would have to be answered prior to introducing a strict liability regime 
in the context of defective products:292   
“1. What products should be included […] when it comes to determining the extent of the 
liability? 2. Is a manufacturer to include X, the maker of a component that is part of the whole 
article manufactured by Y; and which is liable if the component is defective? 3. Does defect mean 
defect in the making process only or, in the case of a designed article, also a defect of design? 
Should it include the failure, adequately or at all, to warn of possible harmful results? 4. Should 
the liability be confined to products intended for marketing without inspection or extend even to 
cases where the manufacturer does, or is legally obliged to, exercise strict quality 
control? 5. What relevance should the packaging have - should liability, for example, be limited 
to cases where the packaging precludes intermediate examination or extend to cases where the 
manufacturer stipulates that a right such as a guarantee would be forfeited if intermediate 
examination were made? 6. Is a product defective if used innocuously on its own, but which 
causes damage when used in combination with another's product? 7. What defences should be 
available? […] 8. Should the damages recoverable be exactly the same as in the case of the 
Aquilian claim or should they be limited, as in some jurisdictions, by excluding pure economic 
loss or by limiting them to personal injury?”  
The court held that single instances of litigation could not provide the opportunity for 
conducting the thorough investigation, analysis and determination that was necessary 
to produce a cohesive and effective structure by which to impose strict liability.293 The 
court’s recommendation was ultimately heeded and the legislature, with the benefit of 
more empirical data, time and product liability expertise, enacted the CPA.294  
                                                          
291 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) paras 30-36. 
292 Paras 30-36. 
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In addition to the CPA, the COIDA and the RAF Act are further examples of where the 
legislature reformed major areas of the law of delict. The enactment of these statutes 
enabled major legislative reform of the law of delict, as opposed to incremental judicial 
development of an element of delictual liability. It is submitted that, whenever large-
scale development of a specific area within the law of delict may be required by specific 
policy-based considerations as those discussed in paragraph 3.2 above, it appears 
more appropriate to follow the legislative route. Indeed, this much was also recognised 
by the CC, which stated as follows:295  
“In exercising their powers to develop the common law, Judges should be mindful of the fact that 
the major engine for law reform should be the Legislature and not the Judiciary. In this regard it 
is worth repeating the following dictum […] ‘Judges can and should adapt the common law to 
reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick 
to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since disappeared. Nonetheless there are 
significant constraints on the power of the Judiciary to change the law […] In a constitutional 
democracy such as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which has the major responsibility 
for law reform […] The Judiciary should confine itself to those incremental changes which are 
necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society.’” 
 
 
3.3.3 The need to avoid arbitrary outcomes 
In Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd,296 Brand JA 
reaffirmed the fact that any “legal system in which the outcome of litigation cannot be 
predicted with some measure of certainty would fail in its purpose […] We therefore 
strive for certainty.” This section prompts us to consider how the need to avoid arbitrary 
outcomes in litigation, and thus to ensure legal certainty, could motivate legislatures 
to develop the law of delict (or in common law parlance, tort law).  
Scholars have argued that the tort system is essentially a “lottery”297 and that it 
“produces arbitrary outcomes.”298 Sugarman summarises this argument as follows: 
“[W]hat count considerably are: the talents of the lawyer one happens to have; the tenacity of the 
defendant (or insurance adjuster) one happens to be up against; whether the defendant happens 
to be a motorist, a company, or a governmental entity; how attractive (but not too attractive) and 
how well spoken (but perhaps not too well spoken) the claimant happens to be; what race the 
claimant is; what state and community the victim lives in; how well one is able to hold out for a 
larger settlement; the whim of the jury if the case gets that far; and whether one is lucky enough 
to have available the right sort of witnesses or other evidence of the injury and the defendant's 
wrongdoing. In short, our current tort system is not a system of justice; it is a lottery.” 
                                                          
295 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 36 (references omitted). 
296 2009 (2) SA 150 (SCA) paras 16-17. 
297 Sugarman (1987) San Diego Law Review 796. 
298 MA Franklin “Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement” 
(1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 774: “[T]he fault system is little more than an immoral lottery for both 
plaintiffs and defendants.” See also Atiyah The Damages Lottery 143. 
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From this perspective, the imposition of tortious (or in our case, delictual) liability and 
the payment of damages are impacted on by considerations unrelated to what the 
parties deserve.299 The outcome of litigation may be substantially determined by 
contingent factors, including the availability of evidence, the quality of counsel, the 
limits of insurance coverage, the financing of litigation, the whims of judges and juries, 
and many other factors that are not conducive to the consistent and principled 
application of law.300  
The argument that the tort system is unfair and unpredictable has been advanced to 
justify reform proposals in some way or the other. For example, in New Zealand these 
arguments eventually won the day and secured the development of the law relating to 
the compensation of personal injuries arising from accidents. In its 1967 report, the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
asserted that “[t]he toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous incidents of social 
progress”.301 The commission identified a number of weaknesses with the 
mechanisms available for dealing with personal injury, including particular problems 
with tort law. One of the problems with tort law in cases of personal injury included “the 
difficulty of establishing liability for loss and of attaching a monetary value to that loss, 
resulting in the law being seen as, at best, uncertain and in some cases arbitrary and 
capricious.”302 Eventually, as indicated in paragraph 3.3.1, the legislature introduced 
the Accident Compensation Act in New Zealand in 1972, thereby abolishing the tort 
claim for harm arising from accidents.  
Arguably, the statutory development of the law of delict by the CPA, the COIDA and 
the RAF Act has been motivated by similar considerations. For instance, with regard 
to the introduction of a strict liability regime for defective consumer products, the SCA 
implied that such a development should be driven by the legislature, because it could 
provide a more principled, logical and fair solution for the particular problem.303  
                                                          
299 TD Lytton, RL Rabin & PH Schuck “Tort as litigation lottery: a misconceived lottery” Boston College 
Review Vol. 52 (2010) 267 269. 
300 Lytton, Rabin & Schuck Boston College Review (2010) 268-269. 
301 New Zealand Law Commission Report Compensating Crime Victims (2008) 3. 
302 3. 
303 Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) paras 28-31. 
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Furthermore, in line with the arguments raised in foreign jurisdictions, the statutory 
development of the COIDA and the RAF Act (and the proposed RABS) appears to be 
motivated by the general consideration to ensure that the outcome of litigation is not 
influenced by the contingent factors mentioned above. After all, the likelihood of a 
victim receiving compensation under those statutes is not dependent on the quality of 
counsel, the limits of insurance coverage, the financing of litigation, or the whims of a 
particular judge. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The previous chapter investigated the legal position of South African crime victims 
insofar as the compensation of their harm is concerned and concluded that the status 
quo is unsatisfactory. It was therefore proposed that an alternative method should be 
investigated to provide compensation for crime victims.  
One particular alternative that has been adopted in a variety of foreign jurisdictions is 
the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims. Should such an 
alternative be adopted by the South African legislature, it will amount to the statutory 
development of the law of delict insofar as the compensation of a specific group of 
victims is concerned. However, for the reasons mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, the adoption of such an alternative and subsequent development of the 
common law requires a justifiable theoretical framework.  
To establish such a framework, this chapter has examined the historical backgrounds 
of important statutory developments within the law of delict. This investigation has 
identified legal and public policy considerations which have justified the earlier 
instances of legislative reform. It is proposed that these considerations may also aid 
in providing the necessary theoretical framework on the basis of which the law of delict 
may justifiably be developed in the future, at least insofar as the issue of compensation 
is concerned.  
The first consideration that was highlighted was the role played by the increased risk 
of harm and the associated risk of no recovery of compensation. This consideration 
was paramount in developing the law of delict’s compensatory response to victims of 
motor vehicle accidents, defective consumer products and occupational injuries and 
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diseases. Although there is an undeniable utility associated with motor vehicle 
transportation, enlarged labour forces and a growing manufacturing sector, these 
benefits were accompanied by a substantial increase in the risk of harm arising from 
those sectors. This required the South African legislature to produce a solution in 
which these activities were permitted, but only on the condition that the most 
appropriate enterprise were saddled with the cost of the risks they produced. 
Ultimately, it decided that, in order to more effectively secure the compensation of a 
victim’s harm, the compensatory mechanism would have to be reconfigured within a 
statutory context.  
The decision to do so was informed also by the significant desire to promote social 
security. Prior to the advent of the Constitution, the achievement of greater social 
security was already identified as a clearly pronounced goal that justified the statutory 
interference with the common law of delict. The legislature’s desire to provide a variety 
of accident victims with remedies that gave quicker and more cost-effective access to 
compensation and to distribute the risk of certain risk-related activities throughout 
society may therefore be regarded as an important consideration that have justified 
the development of the law of delict in a variety of contexts.  
With the enactment of the Constitution, and the entrenchment of the right to social 
security as a fundamental human right, the legislature has openly committed itself 
towards the notion of spreading risk to promote social inclusion and social solidarity. 
The statutory establishment of compensation funds in respect of motor vehicle 
accidents and occupational injuries and diseases – arguably two spheres in which 
most individuals are most frequently exposed to the risk of harm – achieves these 
goals.  
Furthermore, the evidentiary difficulties involved in satisfying the common-law 
requirement of fault, specifically in the form of negligence, has been criticised as 
imposing a significant stumbling block on the pathway to obtaining compensation. 
Otherwise deserving victims of harm have been struggling to satisfy this requirement 
and, where the matter has been argued in court, a clear preference has been given 
for the reform to be driven by a legislative process. Statutory reform provides an 
advantage that single instances of litigation do not: it enables all the relevant stake-
holders to partake in the thorough processes of investigation, analysis and 
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determination that are required to produce a cohesive and effective structure for the 
development of the law of delict. 
By removing fault as a requirement for obtaining compensation, victims of workplace 
injuries and diseases and defective consumers now have a greater theoretical chance 
in succeeding with finding redress for the harm they have suffered. Similarly, as 
indicated above, the proposed RABS will provide comparable opportunities. In addition 
to achieving greater compensation levels than the fault-based system of delictual 
liability, the statutory development of the law of delict have clearly been informed by 
considerations of time and money.  
Other general considerations that have been used to justify the statutory development 
of the law of delict has also been considered justified where it has enabled a more 
time-efficient and cost-effective route to compensation and where it has succeeded in 
providing a principled, consistent approach to compensation. 
It is proposed that the legal and public policy considerations identified in this chapter 
aid in providing a justifiable theoretical framework for the statutory development of the 
law of delict insofar as compensation of victims is generally concerned. However, by 
itself it does not yet justify why crime victims should be singled out as a specific 
category of victims that may come into consideration for statutory compensation (as 
opposed to any other category of victim). Indeed, as alluded to in the introduction of 
this chapter, where statutory compensation funds for crime victims have been enacted, 
some concern has been expressed about the singling out this specific group of victims 
for preferential treatment. 
In the following chapter, attention will be given to the question whether the specific 
development of the law of delict through the enactment of a statutory compensation 
fund for crime victims can be justified on the basis of the considerations identified in 
this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: JUSTIFYING THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF 
DELICT BY ESTABLISHING A STATUTORY COMPENSATION FUND FOR 
CRIME VICTIMS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Thus far it has been argued that the position of crime victims under the current South 
African legal regime is unsatisfactory as far as their compensation is concerned and 
that it may be worthwhile to consider an alternative solution.  
To improve the legal position of crime victims regarding their compensation, various 
other jurisdictions have enacted statutory compensation funds.1 Notwithstanding its 
wide use in these jurisdictions, it cannot be assumed that this solution would also work 
in a South African context. Statutory development of this kind requires justification.  
Chapter 3 alluded to the “fundamental problem”2 that confronts reformers of the law of 
delict/tort law in this context, which is that “it is difficult to find a satisfactory rationale 
for singling out violent-crime victims from other groups of unfortunates for special 
treatment by the state.”3 Some authors have gone so far as to argue that “[o]ften the 
rationale behind the setting up of a compensation scheme is, in itself, weak and 
unsubstantiated”.4 Brooks summarises the central issue as follows:5 
“When one first confronts a proposal to alleviate the suffering of victims of crimes of violence, all 
his humanitarian instincts are aroused. Reflection, however, forces him to ask: ‘Why alleviate the 
suffering of victims of crimes of violence and not, for instance, that of the farmer who while 
working in his field, is struck by ligtening [sic] and rendered a helpless invalid?’ This question is 
not an easy one to answer. It is not enough to say ‘First things first,’ or “One thing at a time.’ By 
what criterion may we justify the priority implicit in such a response?” 
One of the central aims of this dissertation is to consider whether it is justifiable to 
single out crime victims for preferential treatment as far as compensation is concerned.  
To do so, the approach is as follows. First a general theoretical framework to constitute 
                                                          
1 See D Greer (ed) Compensating Crime Victims: a European Survey (1996); footnote 59 in paragraph 
1.5 in chapter 1. 
2 South African Law Reform Commission (“SALRC”) Project 82: Sentencing (A Compensation Fund for 
Victims of Crime) (2004) 182-183. See also RE Scott “Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes: An 
Analysis” (1967) 8(2) William & Mary Law Review 277 281; P Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation 
and the Law 8 ed (2013) 303-308. 
3 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 182. See also Scott (1967) William & Mary Law 
Review 281; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 303-308. 
4 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 318; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 30. 
5 J Brooks “The Case for Creating Compensation Programs to Aid Victims of Violent Crimes” (1976) 
11(4) Tulsa Law Journal 487. 
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a tenable basis for the potential statutory development of the law of delict in the future 
(regarding compensation of victims generally) was developed in chapter 3. This was 
done by examining the historical background of arguably the three most significant 
statutes that have influenced the compensation of victims in the context of the law of 
delict6 and identifying policy considerations that have justified the legislative reform of 
the law of delict in the past and which may justify future statutory development. What 
remains to be determined is whether the proposed statutory development of the law 
of delict (via the establishment of a statutory crime victim compensation fund) can fit 
within this general theoretical framework.7  
This will be done by referring to the considerations identified in chapter 3, establishing 
whether those considerations are also applicable in the context of harm suffered by 
crime victims and whether they could consequently be used to provide the necessary 
justification for the proposed development of the law of delict. In the process, the 
potential merits and some of the problems with the suggested reform of the law will be 
discussed.  
Before commencing, a final introductory remark may be made. As noted, most foreign 
jurisdictions electing to develop the law in relation to crime victim compensation have 
done so by enacting legislation and establishing compensation funds. This dissertation 
considers whether similar reform of the South African law relating to the compensation 
of crime victims is justifiable. For the sake of clarity, it is emphasised that the approach 
adopted in this chapter is to describe and evaluate various policy considerations that 
could potentially justify statutory development of the law (see paragraphs 4.2.3.1 to 
4.2.3.6 below) as well as considerations that could potentially stand in the way of this 
reform (see paragraphs 4.2.4.1 to 4.2.4.3 below). These considerations will be 
weighed and balanced against each other before a conclusion as to the justifiability of 
a potential statutory compensation fund will be made in paragraph 4.4.  
                                                          
6 The Compensation of Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993, the Road Accident Fund 
Act 56 of 1996 (“RAF Act”) and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
7 As noted in paragraph 3.1 above, a distinction may be drawn between the reasons advanced for the 
justification of the proposed statutory crime victim compensation scheme and its scope. In this regard, 
it should be noted that, while chapters 3 and 4 deal with the issue of justification of the scheme, chapter 
5 deals with the specific issues related its scope (should it be enacted). Therefore, chapters 3 and 4 
deal mainly with legal and public policy considerations justifying statutory reform of the law of delict in 
South Africa, whereas chapter 5 refer to issues of policy and administrative convenience. 
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However, it may be asked whether it has not been assumed that an alternative solution 
to the problem must be steered by the legislature as opposed to the judiciary. The 
reasons briefly mentioned below deal with this concern. 
First, as the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) remarked in Wagener v Pharmacare 
Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd,8 the judiciary may be better placed to develop the law 
of delict on an incremental basis, but, generally speaking, the legislature is better 
placed to develop a significant area within the law. Indeed, for the reasons outlined in 
paragraph 3.3.2 in chapter 3, the legislature is the more appropriate vehicle to deal 
with comprehensive, large-scale development of the law of delict because it may better 
use empirical data and research expertise to develop a framework for the potential 
development of the law. Secondly, as explained in chapter 2, the common law of delict 
provides an unsatisfactory response to the issue of crime victim compensation. As 
explained, for predominantly financial reasons, crime victims choose not to institute 
common-law delictual claims against the criminal, but instead aim to hold the state 
vicariously liable on the basis that their employees wrongfully and culpably caused the 
victim’s harm. However, as illustrated, the judicial expansion of state delictual liability 
may be considered theoretically unsound while, from a practical and financial 
perspective, it arguably undermines the effort to combat crime.9 In other words, the 
common law of delict has already developed an alternative response to holding the 
actual perpetrator of the crime delictually liable, but for the reasons set out in chapter 
2 it may be doubted whether this solution is desirable.  
Therefore, it is proposed that the law relating to crime victim compensation should 
follow the same route that was taken in the cases of harm arising through motor vehicle 
accidents, occupational injuries and diseases and defective consumer products, i.e. 
statutory reform.   
 
                                                          
8 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) para 10.  
9 See paragraph 2.2.1 in chapter 2.  
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4.2 The justifiability of establishing a statutory compensation fund for crime 
victims  
Chapter 3 provided a general theoretical framework that may provide a basis for future 
statutory development of the law of delict. In this part of the chapter, that framework 
of considerations will be used to determine whether the development of the law 
through the enactment of a crime victim compensation fund is justifiable. Before doing 
so, however, the following section will provide a brief historical background relating to 
the potential statutory development of a crime victim compensation fund in South 
Africa. 
 
4.2.1 Historical background: the SALRC Report  
The SALRC set out to investigate the viability of developing the law of delict by 
enacting a statutory compensation fund in 2004.10 It is worthwhile to take note of this 
attempt because it provides further evidence of the need for a justification for this act 
of legislative intervention. 
The examination of this issue was undertaken within a broader framework that related 
to the general treatment of crime victims by the criminal justice system. It therefore 
focused not only on the compensation of crime victims, but also on issues pertaining 
to restorative justice and victim empowerment.11 Nevertheless, the report of the 
SALRC included a synopsis of crime victim compensation under South African law, a 
comparative overview of the legal position of crime victims in the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom (“UK”), a summary of the merits of a statutory 
compensation scheme for crime victims in South Africa as well as other victim 
empowerment issues (“SALRC Report”).    
The commission confirmed that various jurisdictions have adopted strategies that 
extend the right to access compensation for crime victims beyond the realm of the 
common law of delict/tort law.12 Their view is in line with academic writing inasmuch 
as it demonstrates that the development of the law of delict through legislation that 
                                                          
10 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime. 
11 1-7. 
12 11. 
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deals specifically with the compensation of crime victims appears to be the most 
popular method by which reform of this branch of the law has occurred.13  
Taking into account some of the arguments that may be raised for and against the 
establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims, the SALRC 
concluded that, although “there seemed to be substantial support for the creation of a 
compensation fund”14 the establishment of the fund was not a viable option.15 This 
conclusion was reached primarily on the basis that a fund could not be afforded in the 
financial climate of the time and because certain prerequisites required for the effective 
and efficient administration of a crime victim compensation fund were absent at the 
time.16 As a result, the SALRC came to the conclusion that a “compensation scheme 
should rather be seen as an additional component of a comprehensive victim 
empowerment programme.”17 
The SALRC also considered the “possibility of incrementally developing a 
compensation scheme.”18 Briefly stated, it considered that, as opposed to enacting a 
fully-fledged compensation fund for all crimes, a fund may be established which 
provided compensation only in respect of certain crimes; and that other crimes may 
be added on an incremental basis. Despite the fact that there was support for this 
view, “the reality of the lack of funds, the problem of justifying a limitation of eligibility 
for payments from the fund, the problems relating to the administration of the fund and 
the problems with regard to the risks of fraud”19 forced the commission to conclude 
that this too was not a viable option.  
The SALRC criticised the existing crime victim initiatives undertaken by the South 
African government for being inefficient and lacking the ability to deal adequately with 
the needs of crime victims.20 In its view new legislation had to be adopted to provide 
                                                          
13 48-98. See also Greer Compensating Crime Victims; D Miers “Offender and state compensation for 
victims of crime: Two decades of development and change” (2014) 20(1) International Review of 
Victimology 145 146-160. 
14 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 321. 
15 111-118, 321-326. 
16 111-118. 
17 321. 
18 196, 322. 
19 322. 
20 323. See paragraph 4.3.1 below for a discussion of the existing policies and programmes relating to 
crime victim compensation. 
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for a comprehensive framework that would ensure a better deal for victims of crime.21 
Referring to Canada and Australia as providing an example of the way forward for the 
South African legislature in relation to crime victim compensation,22 the commission 
formulated its ultimate proposal as follows:23  
 
“[T]he Commission was of the view that […] legislation should, as a minimum, provide for: (a) the 
creation of a permanent structure, like an office for Victims of Crime within government structures, 
to take care of the needs of victims on a permanent basis; (b) the creation of a permanent body 
or institution (like an Advisory Council) to advise government on policy issues and legislative 
amendments to meet the needs of victims of crime; (c) the introduction of legislative […] principles 
to guide the treatment of victims of crime; and (d) the creation of a dedicated fund to facilitate 
and develop the establishment of victim services. The above principles are supported by all 
commentators to the Commission’s discussion documents.”  
 
However, at present, no comprehensive legislation has been enacted. Furthermore, it 
is contended that the mere fact that the SALRC rejected the creation of a statutory 
compensation fund on the basis of predominantly financial reasons does not prevent 
a further study of whether the enactment of this kind of statutory compensation fund 
may be justified. Indeed, as the SALRC noted, “the establishment of a compensation 
fund should not be abandoned but developed over time as a long term project within 
the broader objective of improved services for victims of crime.”24  
Very important for the purpose of this dissertation, the commission also stated that 
“developing a motivation for the establishment of a [statutory compensation fund] in 
SA remains incomplete, and must be completed if legislation is to be drafted, since no 
law should be passed without its objectives being clearly defined and costed.”25  
The remainder of this section will focus on the gap identified by the SALRC and shift 
its attention to the justifiability of establishing a crime victim compensation fund in 
South Africa. Before examining some of the policy considerations that may apply in 
this context, attention will be paid to two competing rationales for the establishment of 
a crime victim compensation fund. 
 
                                                          
21 323. 
22 334-335. 
23 334. The commission pointed out that the Probation Services Act 11 of 1986 provided a legislative 
basis for establishing victim-centred programmes aimed at the compensation of crime victims. 
24 322. 
25 318-319. 
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4.2.2 The two rationales suggested for the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims 
There is a view that the state owes a legal obligation to its citizens to maintain law and 
order and when it fails to prevent crime, it has a legal duty to compensate the victims. 
This can be called the “legal duty rationale”. By contrast, it has also been suggested 
that a legal duty rationale is not justifiable, and that the state’s duty to compensate 
crime victims is a moral one, which can only be explained on the basis of welfare, 
sympathy and humanitarian reasons. This “moral duty rationale” is aimed at providing 
“practical social security assistance to the victim.”26 These rationales will now be 
considered. 
 
4.2.2.1 The legal duty rationale  
In the run-up to the establishment of the first statutory compensation schemes in New 
Zealand and the UK in the early 1960s, Fry reasoned that there is a legal duty on the 
state to compensate crime victims because the state denied measures that “might be 
thought of [as] self-protective, and then fail[ed] to halt crimes of violence.”27 She 
argued that, because the state “forbids our going armed in self-defence[, it] cannot 
disown responsibility for its occasional failure to protect.”28 The idea was supported by 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Goldberg, who contended that “[t]he victim of a 
robbery or an assault has been denied the ‘protection’ of the laws in a very real sense, 
and society should assume some responsibility for making him whole.”29 
This argument may be criticised on the following bases. First, it seems to carry weight 
only in relation to those jurisdictions where it would be prohibited to arm oneself for 
purposes of self-defence. Contrary to the society to which Fry relates her argument, 
South African citizens are generally allowed to arm themselves and to protect 
                                                          
26 282. 
27 Brooks (1976) Tulsa Law Journal 479. See also M Fry “Justice for Victims” The Observer (7 July 
1957) 8; Williams “The adoption of Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme: Chronology” 5 available 
at <https://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history/downloads/pdfs/Williams_Compensation.pdf> (accessed on 9 
August 2016).  
28 Fry The Observer (1957) 8. See also Scott (1967) William and Mary Law Review 280; D McGills & P 
Smith United States Department of Justice: Compensating Victims of Crime – An Analysis of American 
Programs (1983) 2-6.   
29 AJ Goldberg “Equality and Government” (1964) New York University Law Review 39 205 224; P 
Burns Criminal Injuries Compensation (1980) 99-103.  
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themselves against criminal attacks in a manner that is lawful.30 Within this framework, 
the idea that the state’s failure to prevent harm must necessarily attract legal liability 
loses its appeal.  
Furthermore, the argument seems to suggest that the state’s legal liability for harm 
arising from crime derives from its prohibition of carrying weapons and defending 
oneself. However, there appears to be no convincing evidence in support of the 
argument that owning, possessing or having regular access to weapons would result 
in the decrease of criminal attacks or the scope of harm that may arise from crime. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the use, possession or access to weapons will not only allow 
self-defence against criminal attacks, but may just as likely be used to further such 
attacks.31  
In addition, Fry’s argument assumes that, “if left alone by the state, the individual could 
protect himself.”32 However, as Brooks pointed out: “That the individual was ever able 
to do this seems to be denied by the contentions that governments were established, 
for one reason, to better protect the individual.”33 
 
Another argument in favour of imposing a legal duty to compensate crime victims on 
the state is that it “makes it harder for [crime victims] to secure reparation by 
incarcerating the offender, making it virtually impossible for him to honour any civil 
judgment that might be rendered against him.”34 The implication is that if the offender 
is not incarcerated he would be able to earn income, which could be used to 
compensate the victim. This argument, however, may be dismissed if we consider 
that, even if the state did not take any action against crime victims, it is improbable 
that the offender would be in a position to compensate the crime victim for the harm 
he caused, because of his probable impecuniosity.35  
                                                          
30 JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed (2005) 226-256. 
31 Civilian Secretariat for Police White Paper on Safety and Security (2016) 12-15. 
32 Brooks (1976) Tulsa Law Journal 479-480. 
33 479-480. 
34 Brooks (1976) Tulsa Law Journal 480-481; J Goodey Compensating Victims of Violent Crime in the 
European Union (2003) 11-12. See also AM Linden The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on 
Compensation for Victims of Crime (1968) 5; Burns Criminal Injuries Compensation 103-113; Fry Arms 
of the Law (1951) 125.  
35 Burns Criminal Injuries Compensation 111; SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 315. 
For a comparative perspective see also LJ McQuillan & H Abramyan, “The Tort Law Tax” (2007) Wall 
Street Journal 1 available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117496524456750056> (accessed on 2 
February 2015); Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology 148-154. 
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In conclusion, it is compelling to note that none of the jurisdictions that have elected 
to enact a statutory compensation fund for victims of crime appear to have based the 
legislative development on the argument that the state has a legal duty to compensate 
the crime victim.36 Essentially, we may conclude that this view “is too broad to receive 
widespread support.”37  
 
4.2.2.2 The moral duty rationale  
The “most widely accepted”38 rationale justifying the legislative enactment of a 
statutory compensation scheme for crime victims is centred on the notion that the state 
has a moral duty to compensate victims of crime.39 In its distilled form, this argument 
is based on the idea that the compensation of crime victims by a state-funded 
compensation scheme is the “right thing to do” from a moral point of view.40  
Brooks explains that the moral duty of the state stems from an “inclination toward a 
certain philosophical disposition”41 in terms of which the state’s failure to prevent harm 
arising from crime constitutes a moral “wrong”42 and compensation “by the state is the 
curative [moral] ‘right.’”43 Writing about the rationale underlying the adoption of the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme in the UK in 1964, Miers sheds light on this 
moral duty:44 
“Compensation is given to victims of violent crime in recognition of a sense of public sympathy 
for the pain and suffering of the victim. In an earlier consultation, the Home Office asserted that 
a financial award is society’s way of acknowledging the harm that has been done to the victim as 
a representative of the community.” 
                                                          
36 See SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 282 for reference to a review conducted for 
the criminal compensation scheme in Northern Ireland: “Neither in the United Kingdom, nor in any other 
jurisdiction of which we have knowledge, does the State regard itself as a kind of surrogate offender.” 
37 Burns Criminal Injuries Compensation 115. 
38 116.  
39 See Burns Criminal Injuries Compensation 116-120; Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology 
154-156; Cane Atiyah’s Accidents 299-308. 
40 Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology 155. See also D Miers “Compensating deserving 
victims of violent crime: the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012” (2014) 34 Legal Studies 
242 247. 
41 Brooks (1976) Tulsa Law Journal 483. 
42 483. 
43 483. 
44 Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology (references omitted) 155. See also the Ministry of 
Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses (2012) 49; Home Office Rebuilding Lives: Supporting 
Victims of Crime Home Office (2005) 21. 
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Support for this wording is to be found in the 1964 White Paper,45 which emphasised 
the fact that it cannot be accepted that “the State is liable for injuries caused to people 
by the acts of others,”46 and that “the public does, however, feel a sense of 
responsibility for and sympathy with the innocent victim, and it is right that this feeling 
should find practical expression in the provision of compensation on behalf of the 
community.”47  
In a comparative overview of statutory compensation schemes, Miers reiterates that 
this rationale refers to the “public sense of responsibility for and sympathy with the 
innocent victim, which makes it right for that feeling to be given practical expression.”48 
Similarly, Goodey argues that the establishment of various state compensation 
schemes in many European jurisdictions reflect “the development of the welfare state 
across large parts of Europe”49 and that it may be regarded as a form of social 
assistance to the most vulnerable members of society.50 
In its report, the SALRC rejected the argument that the state should attract legal liability 
for the harm which citizens may suffer as a result of crime. The commission noted that 
compensation “should not be understood as a reward, but rather monetary assistance 
which can aid people in dealing with the impact of a violent crime, and with some of 
the costs associated with a crime”.51 In line with the moral duty rationale, the SALRC 
therefore envisaged that, through the establishment of a compensation fund for crime 
victims, the state may therefore assist citizens in regaining their status as active 
members of society more quickly so that they may contribute towards their own well-
being and that of others sooner than would otherwise be the case.52  
It may therefore be more convincing to argue that the enactment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims is justified by the state’s moral duty to injured 
victims of crime, as opposed to suggesting that the state has a legal duty to 
                                                          
45 White Paper “Compensation of Victims of Crimes of Violence” (1964) (cmnd 2323). 
46 Williams The adoption of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme: Chronology (no date provided) 
6. 
47 White Paper “Compensation of Victims of Crimes of Violence” (1964) (cmnd 2323). See also Burns 
Criminal Injuries Compensation 116; Miers (2014) Legal Studies 246-247.  
48 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 247 (references omitted). 
49 Goodey Discussion Paper of the National Centre for Victims of Crime 11. See also SALRC A 
Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 284; Brooks Tulsa Law Journal (1976) 478-479. 
50 See also Scott (1967) William and Mary Law Review 280. 
51 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 298.  
52 298.  
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compensate victims for the harm they suffer arising from crime. Nevertheless, to 
suggest that there is a moral duty on the state to assist and alleviate the plight of crime 
victims does not go far enough to justify why they, but not other categories of victims, 
should receive statutory compensation for the harm they suffer as a result of the 
conduct of others. The question therefore still remains: are there valid reasons that 
could justify the singling out of crime victims for preferential treatment in South Africa?  
To answer this question, attention will now be given to the policy considerations 
identified in chapter 3 with the view to determining if they could justify the proposed 
statutory reform of the law relating to crime victims through the establishment of a 
crime victim compensation fund.  
 
4.2.3 Policy considerations that may potentially justify a statutory 
compensation scheme for crime victims 
4.2.3.1 The need to combat the risk of falling victim to crime  
In chapter 3, it was argued that the existence and extent of a risk of harm has played 
a key role in the South African legislature’s decision to develop the law of delict in the 
context of motor vehicle accidents, occupational injuries and diseases and defective 
consumer products. Here it will be argued that the risk of falling victim to crime may 
potentially justify the establishment of a crime victim compensation fund in a similar 
way. 
Some of the central national statistics in respect of crimes against the person can be 
summarised as follows:53 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 The statistics are available on the South African Police Services’ website, available at: 
<http://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2015/crime_stats.php> 
(accessed on 31 May 2016). See also: ISS Crime Hub “Fact Sheet: Explaining the official crime 
statistics for 2013/2014” available at <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ISS-crime-statistics-factsheet-
2013-2014.pdf> (accessed on 9 February 2015). 
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CRIME 
CATEGORY 
2006 
- 
2007 
2007 
- 
2008  
2008 
- 
2009  
2009 
- 
2010 
2010 
- 
2011 
2011 
- 
2012 
2012 
- 
2013 
2013 
- 
2014 
2014 
- 
2015 
2015 
- 
2016 
Murder 
 
19 106 18 400 18 084 16 767 15 893 15 554 16 213 17 023 17 805 18 673 
Total Sexual 
Offences 64 071 62 484 69 197 66 992 64 921 60 539 60 888 56 680 53 617 51 895 
Attempted 
murder 19 957 18 643 18 140 17 247 15 360 14 730 16 236 16 989 17 537 18 127 
Assault with 
the intent to 
inflict grievous 
bodily harm 
216 754 208 705 202 328 203 807 197 470 191 612 185 050 182 333 182 556 182 933 
Common 
assault 207 869 195 885 190 709 194 922 184 103 180 165 171 653 166 081 161 486 164 958 
Common 
robbery 70 598 64 417 58 764 56 993 54 442 52 566 53 196 53 505 54 927 54 110 
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances 
126 038 117 760 120 920 113 200 101 039 100 769 105 488 118 963 129 045 132 527 
Total Crimes 
Against The  
Person 
724 393 686 294 678 142 669 928 633 228 615 935 608 724 611 574 616 973 623 223 
 
These statistics confirm that South Africa is overwhelmed by violent crime. It is 
particularly alarming to realise that the murder rate is approximately five times higher 
than the 2013 global average of 6,2 per 100 000.54 The murder rate increased from 
32,9 per 100 000 in 2014/2015 to 33,9 per 100 000 in 2015/2016. To put it differently, 
in 2015/2016 a murder was recorded on average 51 times per day.55 Statistics 
provided by the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control International 
Statistics on Crime and Justice in 2011 indicate that, with around 1 188 assaults being 
recorded for every 100 000 people,56 South Africa has one of the highest assault rates 
in the world. To make matter worse, the official assault statistics of the South African 
Police Services (“SAPS”), as tabled above, may be doubted if it is taken into account 
                                                          
54 Africa Check “Factsheet: South Africa’s 2014/2015 murder and robbery crime statistics” available at 
<https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-201415-murder-and-robbery-crime-
statistics/> (accessed on 26 August 2016).  
55 Africa Check “Factsheet: South Africa’s 2015/2016 crime statistics” available at <https://africa 
check.org/factsheets/factsheet- south-africas-201516-crime-statistics/> (accessed on 2 June 2017). 
56 European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control International Statistics on Crime and Justice 
“Countries Compared by Crime > Assault rate. International Statistics at NationMaster.com” available 
at <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Assault-rate> (accessed on 26 August 
2016). 
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that the “tendency among victims to report assault incidents to the police is 
declining.”57 With this in mind, the incidence of these crimes may be much higher than 
what is asserted by the SAPS.  
The SAPS statistics indicate that there has been a slight decrease in the number or 
rapes from 47 588 in 2008/2009 to 46 253 in 2013/14.58 However, the rape statistics 
must be understood against the background of research done by the Medical 
Research Council, which suggests that only one out of every nine rapes is actually 
reported to the police and that this number is therefore inaccurate. In fact, the council 
alleges that the number of rapes for 2013 was closer to a staggering 416 277.59 Not 
taking into account unreported instances of rape, the European Institute for Crime 
Prevention and Control’s International Statistics on Crime and Justice nevertheless 
indicate that 132 per 100 000 South African citizens are rape victims, which is 
considered as one of the highest rates in the world.60  
These statistics demonstrate that, arguably, with the possible exceptions of poverty, 
unemployment and the struggling economy, “no single issue of governance comes 
close to the levels of attention and concern associated with the problems of crime, 
criminality and victimisation.”61 Although such a high crime rate has social, political 
and psychological effects on victims and the broader society alike, the economic 
consequences have been emphasised as proving especially significant. For instance, 
the report published by the SALRC pointed out that the “sheer volume of crime, as 
well as the proportion of violent crime, ensures that crime in South Africa is inordinately 
expensive to the society and individuals.”62 To get a sense of the economic 
                                                          
57 Africa Check “Fact Sheet: South Africa’s 2014/2015 assault and sexual crime statistics” available at 
<https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-201415-assault-and-sexual-crime-
statistics/> (accessed on 1 June 2016). 
58 ISS Crime Hub “Fact Sheet: Explaining the official crime statistics for 2013/2014” available at 
<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ISS-crime-statistics-factsheet-2013-2014.pdf> (accessed on 9 
February 2015). Statistics provided to Africa Check by the South African Police Service reveal that 
42,596 rapes were reported in 2015/16 – see Africa Check “GUIDE: Rape Statistics in South Africa” 
available at <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/guide-rape-statistics-in-south-africa/> (accessed on 2 
June 2017). 
59 The Independent Police Investigative Directorate Annual Report 2012/2013 (2013) 15-16. 
60 Rape Crisis “Prevalence of Rape” available at <http://rapecrisis.org.za/rape-in-south-
africa/#prevalence> (accessed on 23 June 2016). According to NationMaster, which compared the 
various rape rates of several countries, South Africa has the highest rape rate in the world since 2004: 
“Countries Compared by Crime>Rape rate. International Statistics at NationMaster.com” (available at 
<http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Rape-rate>) (accessed on 23 June 2016).  
61 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 9. 
62 24. 
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consequences for an individual crime victim, consider the following set of costs to 
which he may be exposed:63  
“[P]roductive years lost by victims who are killed or seriously injured[,] working days lost during 
convalescence[,] reduced productivity following violent victimisation[,] working days lost assisting 
the investigating officer and attending court[,] working days lost replacing lost and damaged 
property[,] taxes used to pay for the provision of the services of the criminal justice system[,] 
insurance premiums and payments for private security[,] lost and damaged property[,] medical 
costs[,] lost investments and economic opportunities flowing from the increased costs of doing 
business in a high crime environment [and the] reductions in pleasure derived when activities are 
avoided as a result of a fear of crime.” 
In comparison with the statistics provided in chapter 3 in relation to fatalities that result 
from motor vehicle accidents (for example, 13 967 in 2010) or the number of people 
being injured in motor vehicle accidents (for example, 159 704 in 2000), it becomes 
apparent that the risk which South African citizens face of falling victim to especially 
violent crime (for example, 18 673 murders in 2015-2016 and 182 933 assaults with 
the intent to do grievous bodily harm in 2015-2016) is a very significant one. In fact, 
based on the statistics set out in this dissertation, it appears as though the risk that a 
South African will fall victim to a violent crime is much higher than the risk that he 
would suffer from a motor vehicle accident.  
Similar to victims of motor vehicle accidents, defective consumer products and 
occupational injuries and diseases, crime victims, are exposed to the further risk of 
receiving no compensation if the initial risk of harm materialises. Reference has 
already been made of research indicating the likely impecuniosity of criminals.64 
Of course, a victim who has suffered harm as a result of the culpable conduct of a 
state employee might be successful in holding the state vicariously liable – if the victim 
has the funds to afford private litigation, the luxury to live without compensation for a 
considerable period of time and the means to prove all of the requisite elements of 
delictual liability. However, this option will conceivably not be available to most South 
African crime victims, which means that, without a remedy, they will likely be forced to 
shoulder the burden of the harm by themselves.  
In summary, South African citizens are exposed to the substantial risk of falling victim 
to harm from crime and are equally exposed to a risk of receiving limited or no 
                                                          
63 24-25. See also National Planning Commission National Development Plan (2011) 349-361. 
64 See paragraph 1.3 in chapter 1; SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 74. 
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compensation. This means that the need to combat the risk of harm that operated to 
justify the enactment of the COIDA, the RAF Act and the CPA is also applicable here.65 
Brooks summarised the legislative development of tort law on the basis of this risk as 
follows:66 
“Compensation to victims of crime is a new suggestion in the sense that it represents a recent 
and still current attempt to meet what is felt to be a societal need. [It] represent[s] an attempt to 
secure mutual protection against a risk which is reasonably certain for the large group though 
uncertain for the individual, through the pooling of fixed contributions so that the cost of the 
average risk applies to each member of the group.” 
This extract brings into focus the following related question: who should bear the risk 
of harm? In the case of the COIDA and the CPA, the notion of enterprise liability 
provides an adequate explanation for why the employer and the manufacturer may be 
made to shoulder the financial cost of the risks created by employment and 
manufactured goods, respectively.67 Essentially, the employer and manufacturer 
creates the risk of harm which may materialise while also potentially benefiting the 
most from the respective enterprise and must therefore carry the harm that results 
therefrom. 
In the case of harm arising from motor vehicle accidents, however, the notion of 
enterprise liability fails to explain why innocent road users are asked to make a 
financial contribution towards the RAF in the form of fuel levies.68 Nevertheless, 
although they do not stand to benefit from the use of roads in the same way that a 
manufacturer stands to benefit financially from the manufacture or consumer products, 
the financial contribution that innocent road users are obliged to make is arguably 
justifiable on the basis that they contribute towards the creation of a significant risk of 
harm through their use of motor vehicles.  
Similarly, enterprise liability does not appear to find application in the context of crime 
victim compensation. Most crime victim compensation funds appear to be tax-funded, 
i.e. innocent tax-payers’ monies are used to compensate victims of crime although 
                                                          
65 See paragraph 3.2.1 in chapter 3.  
66 Brooks Tulsa Law Journal (1976) 478. 
67 See paragraphs 3.2.1.3 and 3.2.1.4 in chapter 3. 
68 See Road Accident Fund “Fuel Levy” available at <http://www.raf.co.za/about-us/pages/fuel-
levy.aspx> (accessed on 26 June 2017). 
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they did not create, or stand to benefit from, the risk of harm.69 Therefore, on this point 
they apparently differ from the COIDA or the strict liability regime under the CPA. They 
also differ from the RAF insofar as it may be argued that all road users contribute 
towards the creation of a risk of harm by making use of motor vehicles on roads 
whereas not all South African citizens may be said to contribute towards the risk of 
harm arising from crime.  
In response to the above, it requires emphasis that the need to combat the risk of harm 
arising from crime must be separated from the issue of responsibility for that risk. 
Important as it is to determine who should ultimately take responsibility for the risk of 
falling victim to crime, it remains a valid consideration that, in principle, the existence 
and extent of the risk of harm arising from crime could justify the statutory development 
in the law of delict.  
Furthermore, it is submitted that the following statement by Miers, who writes about 
the justification of a crime victim compensation fund from a comparative perspective, 
also applies in the South African context:70 
“It is an incontestable fact that each one of us has a statistically determinable risk of victimization. 
Where schemes are funded by general taxation we may accept that it is levied for the purpose 
of insuring us against the risk when it eventuates. In that sense, a victim is, on the occasion of 
the victimization, a representative of this actuarially constructed group. This argument for public 
insurance against criminal victimization resonates with some conceptions of the functions of tort 
law that it is socially more just and economically more sensible to distribute losses occasioned 
by criminal activity at large, rather than let them fall on the particular victim.”  
In other words, the enactment of a crime victim compensation fund – and requiring 
innocent members of the public to make financial contributions towards such a fund – 
arguably relies on “the general proposition that crime losses are endemic to the entire 
society and that [those] endemic losses should be spread throughout the entire 
group.”71 Scholars have correctly pointed out that an “obvious analogy”72 may be 
drawn between such risk and the “statistically determinable risk of being injured in a 
                                                          
69 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 119-122. However, in the United States of 
America, legislation has been created to direct the revenue generated through the payment of fines or 
forfeited bail monies towards victim compensation. 
70 Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology 155 (references omitted). 
71 Scott (1967) William and Mary Law Review 282. 
72 Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology 155. 
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road accident […] which, like criminal victimization, falls unevenly across the 
population.”73  
In addition, the fund, if it were to be enacted, may also be financed by the proceeds 
paid into the Criminal Asset Recovery Account, set up under the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, which was discussed in paragraph 2.3.3 in chapter 
2. If this were to be done, it would not only be innocent tax-payers that would contribute 
to the fund, but also those who have benefited from unlawful activities.74  
Lastly, it should be remembered that, under the current regime of expanded state 
delictual liability for harm arising from crime, where the state has been held vicariously 
liable for a series of crimes committed in a divergent range of circumstances, the 
innocent taxpayer is in any event ultimately responsible for the compensation of the 
crime victim. As such, a statutory compensation fund, which would require at least a 
certain category of citizens to contribute towards such a fund, will not be different in 
principle to the current legal regime.  
 
4.2.3.2 The role of the Constitution and the need to promote the constitutional  
right to social security 
In paragraph 3.2.2 of chapter 3, attention was given to the role which the Constitution 
has played in justifying earlier statutory development of the law of delict. Indeed, the 
COIDA, the RAF Act and the proposed RABS has been justified on the basis that it 
seeks to give effect to the constitutional right to reasonable access to social security.75   
The establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims could be used 
to give effect to the constitutional right to social security. This could potentially be done 
because, as the experience with the RAF Act and the COIDA has illustrated, the route 
                                                          
73 Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology 155. See also Scott (1967) William and Mary Law 
Review (1967) 284-286. See further paragraph 3.2.1.2 in chapter 3 above for the statistics relating to 
motor vehicle accidents. See also the concluding remarks made in this regard in paragraph 6.3.2 in 
chapter 6. 
74 Of course, as will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 5.5.1 in chapter 5, it should be emphasised 
that none of the above should mean that the perpetrator of a crime will be absolved from his common-
law delictual liability. 
75 MP Olivier, JF Khoza, L Jansen van Rensburg & E Klinck “Constitutional Issues” in MP Oliver, N Smit 
& E Kalula (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 49-119; Law Society of South Africa and 
Others v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC).  
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to compensation is arguably more cost-effective and quicker if a victim institutes a 
claim against a statutory fund, when compared to instituting a common-law delictual 
claim against the perpetrator of the crime or, alternatively, the state.76  
As indicated above, falling victim to crime may bring about severe financial and 
accompanying social consequences.77 Setting up a more cost-effective route to obtain 
compensation would arguably mean that more crime victims could in this way be 
compensated, thereby alleviating the socio-economic consequences of being a crime 
victim. Doing so along a cheaper, more time-efficient route could assist in the 
empowerment of the historically disadvantaged, promoting fundamental human rights 
(particularly human dignity), addressing past injuries and seeking to provide an 
adequate standard of life to all individuals – all of which constitute part of the right to 
social security.  
As discussed in chapter 2, the judgments of the CC in K v Minister of Safety and 
Security78 and F v Minister of Safety and Security79 show the significant role which the 
court assigns to the Constitution in the development of the vicarious liability doctrine. 
It was argued in chapter 2 that in both cases the CC applies human rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights to justify the conclusion that the crime of rape was committed by 
police officers during the course and within the scope of their employment. The role 
which these rights play in expanding the state’s delictual liability for harm arising from 
crime was critically evaluated in that chapter and will not be repeated here. It is 
sufficient to reiterate that the reasoning adopted in those cases, especially insofar as 
the application of human rights, is arguably contentious.  
It is therefore proposed that, instead of relying on the Constitution to achieve the 
judicial expansion of the state’s delictual liability, it may rather be used to justify the 
establishment of a compensation scheme of general application, enabling the victims 
of harm to receive compensation without having to litigate and without having to 
                                                          
76 See paragraph 3.3.1 in chapter 3. 
77 See also KPMG Too costly to ignore – the economic impact of gender-based violence in South Africa 
(2014) 2 which states that “the economic impact of that violence is between at least R28.4 billion and 
R42.4 billion for the year 2012/2013, representing 0.9% and 1.3% of GDP respectively.” 
78 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
79 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). 
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expose future litigants to the potential uncertainty that may accompany the 
constitutional development of the law of delict.80  
In doing so, the Constitution would not be given a lesser role to play with the 
development of the law of delict. Rather, it will continue to shape the law insofar as it 
could potentially justify the introduction of a statutory compensation fund specifically 
aimed at compensating crime victims. However, it will do so in a manner that is 
arguably less confined and arbitrary and which may ultimately provide compensation 
to a greater number of crime victims. 
 
4.2.3.3 Evidentiary problems with applying the common-law requirement of 
fault  
In chapter 3 it was explained how the common-law requirement to prove fault (in the 
form of negligence) may present evidentiary problems to the plaintiff when instituting 
a delictual claim for harm arising from crime.81 This requirement may in some 
instances place a burden on victims of harm that is very difficult to satisfy, thereby 
rendering them without compensation. As a result, this consideration has justified the 
legislative development of the law of delict in a variety of contexts, notably harm 
resulting from defective consumer products, workplace-related injuries and diseases 
and motor vehicle accidents.82 
Some of the difficulties experienced by crime victims in proving fault (in the form of 
negligence) to establish a delictual claim against an alleged wrongdoer were 
canvassed in paragraph 2.2.2 in chapter 2. The evaluation of the judgments in 
Shabalala v Metrorail83 and Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa84 
indicated that, where a crime victim’s delictual claim against the state is based on so-
called systemic negligence, he may particularly struggle to prove that the harm he 
suffered, if foreseeable, was indeed preventable. The analysis will not be repeated 
here and it will suffice to reaffirm that the institution of common-law delictual claims for 
harm arising from crime may likely present a formidable evidentiary burden of having 
                                                          
80 See paragraphs 2.2.1.2.4 (a) and 2.2.1.2.4 (c) in chapter 2. 
81 Paragraph 3.2.3 in chapter 3. 
82 See paragraph 3.2.3 in chapter 3. 
83 2008 (3) SA 142 (SCA). 
84 2016 (3) SA 528 (CC). 
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to prove that the state could and should have undertaken a system of effective and 
affordable measures which would have prevented the crime – a challenge which may 
very difficult, if not impossible, for most crime victims.  
Obviously, it may be argued that, as is the case with the proposed statutory reform of 
the law in the context of motor vehicle accidents85 and the COIDA in respect of 
occupational injuries and diseases, the establishment of a no-fault based statutory 
compensation fund could provide a viable alternative that is also less time-consuming 
and costly. Most crime victim compensation funds seek to compensate harm arising 
from intentionally-committed violent crimes.86 As will be indicated in paragraph 5.8 in 
chapter 5, these funds do not require crime victims to prove intention in the same way 
that a victim would have to prove it (on a balance of probabilities) to satisfy the fault 
requirement for delictual liability, or in the manner in which the state would have to 
prove this element (beyond reasonable doubt) for the purposes of the criminal law. 
Instead, victims are typically asked to place enough information in front of the 
administrative entity responsible for handling the statutory claim (as well as the police) 
so as to allow them to conclude that, on a balance of probabilities, the person was 
indeed a victim of a violent crime, i.e. that the victim’s harm arose from an intentionally-
committed crime.87  
For example, a rape victim would not have to prove that the perpetrator of the crime 
had the requisite intention to cause her harm, but merely that harm had been suffered 
as a result of being raped. Conceivably, this may be easier for the crime victim than 
what it would otherwise have been to prove all of the elements of delictual liability in a 
civil trial. The reason for this is that, at the very least, it is not necessary to find the 
perpetrator and prove fault for the purposes of delictual liability. Similarly, it would also 
                                                          
85 See the discussion of the proposed Road Accident Benefit Scheme Bill of 2014 in paragraph 3.2.1.2 
in chapter 3.  
86 See paragraph 5.8 in chapter 5. 
87 See paragraph 5.8 in chapter 5.  
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be easier than what it would be for the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the perpetrator had the requisite intention to rape the victim of crime.   
 
4.2.3.4 Avoiding legal unpredictability and promoting legal certainty 
It may be recalled that, in chapter 2 it was argued that the judicial expansion of state 
delictual liability for crimes that were intentionally caused by state employees may 
produce arbitrary outcomes.88 As argued there, it is conceivable that this development 
may expose future litigants to an element of unpredictability and thereby undermine 
the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which demands not only that everyone 
should be treated equally under the law, but also that future litigants should not be 
taken by surprise by any uncertainty or vagueness regarding specific aspects of the 
law of delict. In this regard, Gardner’s argument is worth quoting in full:89 
“The ideal of the rule of law is the ideal according to which the law should be capable of guiding 
those who are subject to it. People should not be ambushed by the law; it should be possible for 
them reliably to anticipate the legal consequences of their actions and reliably to obtain or to 
avoid those consequences by following the law. So understood, the ideal sets a wide range of 
disparate standards for all legal systems to live up to. The ones that mainly concern us here are 
standards for legal norms to live up to. Legal norms should not, according to the ideal of the rule 
of law, be secret, retroactive, unclear, impossible to conform to, or forever in a state of flux; and 
particular legal norms (rulings) should be applications of general legal norms (rules).” 
If future litigants are uncertain about the application of a foundational legal rule, they 
are likely to be taken by surprise which, in turn, will result in unnecessary litigation with 
the corresponding financial losses and time wastage. This line of development not 
only introduces ambiguity regarding legal doctrine, but consequently diminishes future 
litigants’ right to access to justice.  
It is proposed that the establishment of a statutory compensation fund could provide 
a “clearer ‘road map’ towards obtaining suitable redress”90 in the context of harm 
arising from crime. This could be done by enacting a specific statute that clearly 
stipulates the eligibility criteria for instituting a claim against a compensation fund, in 
much the same way as the RAF Act and the COIDA has done. 
                                                          
88 See paragraph 2.2.1.2.4 (a) in chapter 2 above.  
89 Gardner “Some Rule-of-Law Anxieties About Strict Liability in Private Law” in LM Austin & D Klimchuk 
(eds) Private Law and the Rule of Law (2014) 207-224 211. 
90 Scottish Government Social Research No-Fault Compensation Schemes For Medical Injury: A 
Review (2010) 9. 
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4.2.3.5 Higher compensation and lower transaction costs 
One of the main arguments employed by the proponents of compensation schemes 
generally is that the law of delict provides a time-consuming, expensive and 
cumbersome route by which victims of harm may be compensated through the civil 
procedure system.91 As argued in chapter 3, the civil procedural system is 
accompanied by high legal transaction costs92 and provides a significant barrier to 
access to justice, especially in a country where the majority of people cannot afford 
the services of legal practitioners.93  
As an alternative to the civil procedure system, sections 297 and 300 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act provide procedural assistance in obtaining compensation or restitution 
from the perpetrator. However, as was argued in chapter 2, the Act affords very little 
support in practice.94 The SALRC Report recorded that, at the time of writing that 
report, only 5,4% of crimes reported to the police resulted in a conviction, which 
indicates the practical insignificance of the statutory mechanisms discussed in chapter 
2.95  
Further, as was mentioned earlier, even if a crime is reported to the police and 
culminates in a successful prosecution and sentencing, the majority of accused 
persons are unlikely to have the means to compensate their victims, rendering the 
compensatory provisions under the Act without much of a practical effect.96  
Ultimately, this means that the majority of South African crime victims are left un- or 
undercompensated for the harm which they have suffered as a result of crime.97 
Against this background, it may be argued that the establishment of a statutory 
                                                          
91 Cane Atiyah’s Accidents (2006) 461-499; Deakin et al Tort Law 51-59; Hedley “Tort and Personal 
Injuries, 1850 to the Present” in Tort Law and the Legislature 249. 
92 For example, costs relating to investigating of claims and costs relating to litigation – see Deakin et 
al Tort Law 53. See also paragraph 3.3.1 in chapter 3.  
93 See paragraph 3.3.1 in chapter 3.  
94 See paragraph 2.3 in chapter 2. 
95 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 18, 281-282; Miers (2014) International Review 
of Victimology 148-154. 
96 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 74. 
97 For a comparative perspective see S Shapiro “Overcoming Under-Compensation and Under-
Deterrence in Intentional Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages the Best Remedy?” (2011) 62 (2) 
Mercer Law Review 449 449-499; M Faure et al Tort Law and Economics (2009) 14. 
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compensation fund would be a practical manner to improve on these shortcomings in 
the same way that, for example, the COIDA fund provides quicker and cheaper access 
to compensation to victims of occupational injuries and diseases.98  
Furthermore, seeking compensation from a statutory fund may not only increase 
efficiency in terms of both the time and costs spent on compensating crime victims, 
but it may also result in the reduction of the right to take legal action in the courts, thus 
lessening the cost and administrative burden on the courts and interested parties.  
As referred to in chapters 2 and 3, it should be kept in mind that the overwhelming 
majority of delictual claims based on harm arising from crime are instituted by crime 
victims against some or other organ of the state, which is in a stronger financial 
position to compensate harm when compared to impecunious perpetrators. As is 
illustrated below, if the state chooses to defend its employees’ conduct, it may very 
likely have severe financial consequences for the state’s resources.  
In this regard we may take note of a report regarding the extent and impact of civil 
claims against the SAPS, in which it is stated that, in recent years, the SAPS have 
“reported a substantial annual increase in civil claims filed for damages as a result of 
actions or omissions by its officials, and an even larger increase in claims pending. 
The 2014/2015 SAPS annual report showed that pending claims stood at over R26 
billion, which is equivalent to over a third of the SAPS budget.”99 The report alleges 
that between 2007/08 and 2014/15, “claims made annually against the SAPS 
increased by 533% if considering the original rand valued, or 313% if adjusted to the 
same rand value”.100 Lastly, the report records that, in a parliamentary reply, the 
Minister of Police indicated that “just under R570 million had been spent by the SAPS 
on legal costs relating to civil claims between 2011/12 and 2013/14.”101  
Dereymaeker’s report alleges that the “principal reason for the increasing pending 
claims is the length of court proceedings”,102 which, as indicated in chapter 3, are 
                                                          
98 See the reasonably effective compensation of injured and diseased employees: Department of Labor 
The Annual Report of the Compensation Fund 2014/2015 (2015) 11, 21-35. 
99 G Dereymaeker “Making sense of the numbers: civil claims against the SAPS” (2015) SA Crime 
Quarterly (54) 29 29.  
100 31.  
101 34. 
102 32. 
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cumbersome and expensive. Without going into any further detail, it is conceivable 
that the institution of civil claims against the state has significant financial implications 
on the financial resources of the SAPS. In turn, this may significantly prejudice the 
operation of the SAPS and their ability to effectively prevent crime and promote safety 
and security, thereby potentially resulting in further claims being instituted and an even 
greater need for victim compensation.    
The establishment of a statutory compensation fund may potentially result in limiting 
the state’s exposure to protracted litigation, thereby allowing for state funds to be spent 
on resources and enabling the state to combat the risk of crime more effectively, e.g. 
by employing more police officers, purchasing more police vehicles, etc. This, in turn, 
may decrease the likelihood of harm manifesting through the culpable conduct of the 
state’s employees.103  
It may be noted that if the proposed fund will be funded by using monies allocated to 
the budget of the SAPS, the latter would arguably have less financial resources 
available to combat crime and to promote safety and security, thereby undermining 
the previous argument. However, in this regard, it should be noted that “[i]n general, 
the bulk of funds for compensation schemes internationally are sourced through the 
relevant budgetary authority at national, state/provincial or local level.” It is therefore 
also proposed that, if the South African legislature elect to enact a crime victim 
compensation scheme, it should be funded by monies received from the national 
budget and not by using the funds available to the SAPS for the purposes of promoting 
safety and security. After all, crime victim compensation is not the responsibility of the 
SAPS and bestowing on it such a financial onerous burden, could potentially 
undermine the national crime prevention strategy.  
 
4.2.3.6 Improving the status of the criminal justice system 
The discussion in paragraphs 4.2.3.1 to 4.2.3.5 illustrates that the policy 
considerations that have justified the legislative reform of the law relating to motor 
vehicle accidents, occupational injuries and diseases and defective consumer 
products may potentially also justify legislative reform of the law of delict in relation to 
                                                          
103 See SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 119. See further paragraph 4.2.4.1 below.  
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harm arising from crime. In this section, attention is given to additional considerations 
that further serve to justify the proposal.  
The SALRC Report records that crime victims have “certain emotional and practical 
needs, including trauma counselling, advice and referral, information on court 
procedure, and compensation.”104 Furthermore, it notes that, if these needs are not 
met, and “the victim’s position in the criminal justice system is not drastically reformed, 
it will further contribute to [a] legitimacy crisis of the criminal justice system in South 
Africa.”105  
Therefore, another motivation for the legislature’s interference with the status quo is 
that it could contribute towards addressing the concern highlighted in the SALRC 
Report insofar as it will ensure that crime victims may receive some form of 
compensation. After all, as the report argues, “a compensation scheme could build 
confidence in the criminal justice system by demonstrating that it is a system that is 
sensitive to the needs of victims. This could encourage victims to form a partnership 
with the State to combat crime and would clearly enhance reporting rates.”106 
It is therefore submitted that the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for 
crime victims will enhance the legitimacy and status of the criminal justice system. This 
has also been a reason used to justify the establishment of similar funds in other 
jurisdictions.107 
Furthermore, as was stated above, the moral duty rationale, broadly speaking, entails 
that the state is morally obligated to assist crime victims in some way, e.g. by 
compensating them for the harm they have suffered.  In the process of conducting its 
research, the SALRC maintained that this argument is:108   
“commensurate with the victim empowerment approach, which stresses that those victimised 
by violent crime should be treated with dignity and assisted in whatever way possible. In this 
respect, comprehensive victim empowerment would include not only assistance through the 
provision of service and assistance, but, in some cases, financial compensation for losses 
endured.”  
                                                          
104 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime (2004) 27. 
105 310: “At the very least, compensation has to be seen as a complementary component of victim 
support that is vital to ensuring the efficacy of the whole criminal justice system.” 
106 281. 
107 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 308-311; Burns Criminal Injuries Compensation 
120-129. 
108 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 281. 
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Providing more victims with compensation, in a quick and relatively cost-efficient 
manner presents a practical way in which crime victims may be assisted by the state, 
contributing thereby to the notion of victim empowerment.109  
 
4.2.4 Considerations that potentially count against a statutory compensation 
scheme  
4.2.4.1 Financial considerations that relate to the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims 
This section notes the financial concern related to the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims and will attempt to determine whether there are 
convincing reasons why the SALRC’s final recommendation against the establishment 
of a statutory compensation fund for the victims of crime should be reconsidered. For 
the sake of clarity it may be noted at the outset that, as the conclusion of this section 
emphasises, it is not yet clear whether or not the establishment of a statutory crime 
victim compensation scheme is affordable or not and this section should not be 
understood as making a conclusive statement in this regard.  
In its report, the SALRC recorded the concern of the National Council of Women of 
South Africa who recognised that a state-funded compensation scheme for crime 
victims seems “ideal”,110 but argued that the potential funding of such a scheme 
through public taxation would cast a “further burden on the taxpayer”111 and that it 
should therefore be avoided. Similarly, the “fiscal constraints”112 led the Lawyers for 
Human Rights to state its reservations about a potential scheme because its 
establishment would mean “that the amounts paid would have to be limited.”113 They 
further argued that a “system which would work like the Workmen’s Compensation 
Fund, where it takes years for the matter to be set down for a hearing, will only 
exacerbate the frustration of victims.”114 
                                                          
109 285-286, 308-310, 333.  
110 159. 
111 159. 
112 161. 
113 161. 
114 161. 
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The commission also referred to the argument that, although compensation for harm 
that results from a rape or violent robbery makes “moral sense, [it is] difficult to justify 
in a context of limited resources, where poverty alleviation, combating Aids and 
providing employment all demand increased resourcing.”115 For these reasons, the 
SALRC concluded that, at the time, the scheme was “something South Africa cannot 
afford.”116  
For the following reasons it is argued that the SALRC’s final recommendation against 
the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for the victims of crime should be 
reconsidered.  
First, as the SALRC itself emphasises, the determination of the financial implications 
regarding the establishment of a statutory compensation fund proved to be extremely 
difficult, since “an accurate estimate depended on a number of variables, too difficult 
to verify or to define with certainty”.117 We should further note that the attempt to 
determine the cost implications was based on “[e]stimates and assumptions”118 and 
done “in spite of much of the necessary data being unavailable.”119 Therefore, any 
conclusions reached about affordability would be premature until an authoritative 
financial analysis has been completed on this issue.  
It should also be remembered that the cost implications of violent crime to the state 
are “enormous in terms of the loss of productive human resources and other costs 
such as providing health care for victims.”120 Therefore, it is arguable that the payment 
of compensation to a crime victim may allow them to contribute towards the generation 
of wealth by re-entering the market-place.  
In addition, as was pointed out above, the cost implications of the current judicial 
expansion of the state’s vicarious liability in delict is significant and could provide fresh 
impetus for a reconsideration of the financial implications of establishing a 
compensation fund for crime victims.  
                                                          
115 188. 
116 29. 
117 2.  
118 118. 
119 118. 
120 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 303. 
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The conclusion reached in the SALRC Report that a compensation fund is financially 
unaffordable was based on a model fund which sought to provide full compensation 
for victims of violent crime, which included murder, attempted murder, rape, assault 
with the intent do grievous bodily harm, indecent assault and aggravated robbery.121 
The commission determined that, at the time, it would require R4,7 billion to sustain 
such a fund.122  
However, the SALRC did not adequately investigate the possibility of lower levels of 
compensation, e.g. limiting the type of injuries or harm in respect of which a statutory 
claim may be instituted against the fund or limiting the amount of compensation 
claimable against such a fund. It also failed to determine whether it would be financially 
viable to adopt more limited eligibility criteria, e.g. recognising only those claims 
brought by victims of intentionally-committed violent crimes who have suffered serious 
bodily or psychiatric injuries. Indeed, considering the fact that most crime victim 
compensation funds provide a capped amount of compensation and generally only in 
respect of intentionally-committed violent crimes, this may have a significant impact 
on the affordability of the proposed fund. 
Recent amendments introduced by the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 
2005 provides an example of where the legislature has intervened to limit the amount 
of compensation payable by a statutory compensation fund. The amendments 
introduced a limitation with regards to claims for loss of income and a dependant’s 
loss of support arising from the bodily injury or death of a victim of a motor accident.123 
It also abolished the victim’s common-law right to claim compensation from a 
wrongdoer for losses which are not compensable under the RAF Act.124 In Law Society 
of South Africa v Minister for Transport,125 the CC rejected the applicant’s 
constitutional challenge in respect of the above amendments and remarked:126  
“It became necessary to amend the legislation in order to give effect to the constitutional 
requirements regarding (a) expenditure which is efficient, effective and economical; (b) 
prohibition of irrational differentiation; and (c) reasonable access to social security and health 
                                                          
121 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 111-114: it culminates to an amount of R4.7 
billion, calculated for the year 1998.  
122 Taking inflation into account, this amounts to approximately R10 billion in 2017: see Inflation 
Calculation available at <http://www.inflationcalc.co.za/> (accessed on 26 June 2017). 
123 See section 17(4)(c) of the RAF Act. See further paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6 in chapter 5.  
124 See section 21 of the RAF Act. 
125 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC).  
126 Paras 44-45. 
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care [... while] the economic viability of the Fund and the removal of unfair differentiation were 
important goals, the ultimate vision is that the new system of compensation for road accident 
victims must be integrated into a comprehensive social security system that offers life, disability 
and health insurance cover for all accidents and diseases. [The Minister of Transport] 
acknowledges that a fault-based common-law system of compensation for road accident victims 
would be at odds with a comprehensive social security model.” 
Against this background, it is arguable that the proposed crime victim compensation 
fund could be more cost-efficient than the current liability system, which continues to 
expand insofar as the state is concerned. However, as emphasised in the opening 
paragraph of this section, the affordability of the proposed scheme is a matter for later 
determination and the previous statement about the fund’s cost-efficiency is therefore 
not conclusive, but merely an opinion based on the reasons set out in this section. 
Lastly, if the legislature were to enact the proposed crime victim compensation 
scheme, it is proposed that the fund would be well-advised to approach the Criminal 
Assets Recovery Account, as set up under chapter 7 of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act 121 of 1998, with a request to make available monies to the scheme for the 
purpose of funding crime victim compensation.127 
From the above, we may conclude that it has not yet been clearly established that the 
establishment of a fund will be unaffordable. However, it has also not been proven that 
the creation of such a fund will be affordable. As the SALRC Report indicates, without 
a thorough financial investigation into this matter, it is not possible to indicate with 
sufficient finality whether the fund may be a viable option in the current financial 
climate. Such financial analysis falls outside the scope of this dissertation, but further 
investigation into this matter in future would be a worthwhile project in its own right. 
For the sake of clarity, it may be emphasised that the aim here is not to provide an 
economic analysis of the cost implications of establishing a statutory compensation 
fund, but, rather, to determine whether there are convincing policy considerations that 
may justify the enactment of a crime victim compensation scheme. 
 
                                                          
127 See further paragraph 2.3.3 in chapter 2.  
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4.2.4.2 Administrative problems with the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims 
The SALRC Report recorded several problems with the administration of a statutory 
compensation fund that weigh against the proposal to establish such a fund for crime 
victims. The commission notes that, given “the current infrastructural situation in South 
Africa’s public service, it is likely that the establishment of a compensation scheme 
could be hampered by the lack of effective inter-sectoral co-operation and co-
ordination, as well as by the underdeveloped administrative systems in some 
government departments.”128  
Based on the protracted nature and difficulties involved in handling “18 000 Truth and 
Reconciliation urgent reparation claims”,129 the report states that “there may be little 
realistic prospect for setting up a new bureaucracy with the purpose of compensating 
thousands of potential victims.”130 Highlighting fraudulent claims and ineffective 
reporting of crimes as further reasons weighing against the success of a statutory 
compensation fund, the SALRC Report concludes that the necessary prerequisites of 
the effective and efficient administration of such a fund is absent.131  
The commission also documented its concerns that the creation of a statutory 
compensation scheme may “encourage criminals to further their actions and it may 
lead to fraud and corruption by the community with a resultant increase in workload 
on the functionaries in the criminal justice system.”132 Although the compensation 
scheme for crime victims would find support in principle, “it would of necessity lead to 
actions being instituted on false charges for the sole purpose of financial gain.”133 It is 
argued that it would be “very difficult to identify such cases prior to the eventual hearing 
                                                          
128 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 354. 
129 354. 
130 355.. 
131 354-355. 
132 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 160. See also Brooks (1976) Tulsa Law Journal 
501. 
133 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 161. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
221 
 
and it would have a definite effect on court roles [sic] and could well lead to a significant 
number of additional courts having to be established to handle the extra work.”134  
Notwithstanding the above, this dissertation argues that the SALRC’s conclusion on 
this matter does not by itself dictate against the creation of a statutory compensation 
fund for crime victims. Brooks points out that “establishing an efficient machinery of 
investigation”135 and “stringent requirements of proof”136 could go some way in 
addressing the concerns raised above. Finally, it is worth remembering that:137  
“[It is] not as though governments have never undertaken programs which involved monetary 
payments upon a showing of injury. There are multitudes of activities where the potential for fraud 
exists. It is most desirable to prevent fraud and to punish fraud when it occurs, but this has been 
the business of government for centuries. It is germane to note that problems of fraud or attempted 
fraud have occasioned no mention of difficulties for those jurisdictions that presently administer 
crime compensation programs.” 
 
4.2.4.3 Concerns that the establishment of a statutory compensation fund 
raises about the function of the law of delict 
It is generally agreed that the law of delict is primarily concerned with the 
compensation of harm.138 Nonetheless, compensation might be the primary function, 
but it is “not the sole function of the law of delict.”139 Other functions which it is said to 
fulfil include the protection of certain interests, the promotion of social order and 
cohesion, the education and reinforcement of values, providing socially-acceptable 
compromises between conflicting moral views, deterring the injurer from behaving 
similarly in future and reallocating and spreading losses.140 Arguably, the law of delict, 
                                                          
134 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 161. See also Scott (1967) William and Mary 
Law Review 286-287. 
135 Brooks (1976) Tulsa Law Journal 502. See also SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 
160.  
136 Brooks (1976) Tulsa Law Journal 502.  
137 502. 
138 For overviews of the function of the law of delict, see JC Macintosh Negligence in Delict 1 ed (1926) 
1; FP van den Heever Aquilian Damages in South African Law (1944) 3; RG McKerron The Law of 
Delict: a Treatise on the Principles of Liability for Civil Wrongs in the Law of South Africa 7 ed (1971); 
NJ van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 ed (1976) 1-3; J 
Neethling & JM Potgieter Neethling-Visser-Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 3-17; JC van der Walt & 
JR Midgley Principles of Delict 4 ed (2016); MM Loubser & JR Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South 
Africa 2 ed (2012) 8-11. 
139 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 8. 
140 8-11. 
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as a fault-based system of liability, is founded on the central moral notion of personal 
responsibility.  
The question that requires answering is whether the establishment of a crime victim 
compensation fund would undermine any of these functions. From a comparative 
perspective, most of the attention that focus on this question concentrate specifically 
on whether a compensation scheme might undermine the function of deterrence or 
the notion of personal responsibility.141 This dissertation will also focus on these two 
issues. 
Regarding the potential undermining of personal responsibility, the following should 
be considered. First, as described in chapter 2, without a statutory compensation fund, 
a crime victim is entitled to institute a delictual claim against the criminal or, if the harm 
was wrongfully caused by the culpable conduct of a state employee, a state organ 
may be held vicariously liable. In the case of the former, research and practical 
experience provides evidence that delictual claims are seldom successfully instituted 
because the criminal is not in a position to pay damages.142 In other words, in these 
circumstances the law of delict is incapable of ensuring that criminals are held 
personally responsible for their wrongdoing.  
If a crime victim decides to rather institute his delictual claim against the state, and 
where he succeeds in holding the state vicariously liable, the criminal is also not held 
personally responsible for the harm that he caused to the victim.143 In this type of case, 
the tax-payer ultimately provides the funds for the payment of damages by the state. 
                                                          
141 See also Scott (1967) William and Mary Law Review 281. 
142 See paragraph 2.2 in chapter 2. From a comparative perspective, see FP Hubbard “The Nature and 
Impact of the ‘Tort Reform’ Movement” (2006) Hofstra Law Review (35) 437 441: “[T]he system does 
not provide compensation where a wrongdoer has no insurance or no personal assets to pay 
compensation, or where the amount of loss is too small to be worth the cost of litigation. Even where a 
wrongdoer has assets or insurance, the tort system will not provide recovery for injury unless the victim 
brings a claim.” 
143 This statement accurately reflects the legal position under South African law. However, it has also 
been noted in foreign jurisdictions. For example, J Schwarz “How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, 
and Police Reform” (2016) UCLA L. Rev. (63) 1144 1147 states: “In prior research, I found that police 
officers in eighty-one law enforcement agencies across the country are virtually always indemnified. 
Officers personally satisfied just 0.02 percent of the more than $735 million awarded to plaintiffs over a 
six-year period in suits alleging constitutional violations and corresponding state tort claims, including 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Officers were even 
more likely to be indemnified in cases involving auto accidents, property damage, and employment-
related disputes. Accordingly, when a plaintiff sues a police officer, any amount she recovers is almost 
certain not to come from the pocket of that officer.” 
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Again, it may be argued that, in this situation, the law of delict does little to give effect 
to the notion of personal responsibility for causing harm.  
Against this background it is arguable that the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund would conceivably do little to undermine the principle of personal 
responsibility.  
The argument that, unlike a compensation fund, delictual liability will promote socially 
desirable behaviour and deter dangerous conduct may be summarised as follows:144 
“It is first assumed that, absent tort law [or the law of delict], people would selfishly pursue their 
own interests, putting their personal desires ahead of the safety of others. As a result, people 
(and property) would be unreasonably damaged. By contrast, since tort law [or the law of delict] 
threatens people with having to pay for the harms they cause, it is seen to force them to take the 
interests of others into account. In other words, it is assumed that in order to avoid tort liability [or 
delictual liability], people will alter their behavior in a socially desirable, less injury-producing way.” 
 
In New Zealand it was argued that the establishment of a general accident 
compensation fund for harm arising from personal injuries and the abolishment of tort 
actions in respect of personal injuries would produce an increase in the number and 
severity of accidents giving rise to personal injury. However, in a study dated 1985, 
Brown found that the available statistics at the time suggested the opposite, namely 
that “no significant increase in motoring activity […] occurred; and (2) no noticeable 
increase in accident rates.”145  
More recently, Schuck pointed out that “the empirical evidence documenting the effect 
of liability rules and compensation practices on deterrence remains inconclusive [and 
that all] systems, therefore, have had to adopt auxiliary measures - information, 
education, administrative regulation, instinct for self-preservation, technology, market 
effects (including reputation), professional discipline, and other behavioral influences 
- to augment the call for accident prevention.”146  
In a study conducted by Cardi, Penfield and Yoon,147 the authors refer to the attention 
that has been given to the potential deterrent effects of the common law of tort and set 
                                                          
144 Sugarman (1985) California Law Review 560. See also C Brown, “Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: 
The New Zealand Experience” (1985) California Law Review 73(3) 976-1002. 
145 Brown (1985) California Law Review 1002.  
146 P Schuck, “Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style” (2008) 27 Yale Law and Policy Review 187 200.  
147 W Cardi, R Penfield and AH Yoon “Does Tort Law Deter?” (2011) Wake Forest University Legal 
Studies Paper No. 1851383 1 1. See also MJ Moore & WK Viscusi Compensation Mechanisms For Job 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
224 
 
out to test the validity of the assumption that tort liability deters tortious conduct. They 
explain that the “study’s most surprising and provocative finding”148 is the failure of tort 
liability to deter. Similarly, McEwin notes:149 “Accident law does not deter, it is argued, 
because any deterrent effect is swamped by imperfect insurance that does not 
properly penalize careless or unsafe behaviour […] Instead, deterrence is better 
achieved by safety regulation. No-fault schemes re-allocate costs away from lawyers 
to accident.” 
The potential of delictual liability to deter people from risky conduct is premised on the 
assumption that people behave rationally, i.e. that they know what the legal 
consequences of their risky conduct would be and, further, that they consider such 
consequences (delictual liability) prior to engaging in their conduct. As Cardi, Penfield 
and Yoon demonstrate, there is little evidence to substantiate such an assumption.150  
There are further intuitive reasons to question the law of delict’s ability to act as 
deterrent:  “if negligent behavior consists of an actor’s accidental disregard of moral 
imperatives to take reasonable care, perhaps legal incentives are superfluous. 
Moreover, even  if people might be influenced by threat of tort liability [or delictual 
liability] were they aware of the law’s mandates, evidence shows that people are 
typically ignorant of the law – and even if aware of law’s content, people commonly 
discount the chance of being held liable.”151  
Fleming refers to a further convincing reason why deterrence plays little role in tort law 
(or again, the law of delict):152  
“[T]he admonitory effect of an adverse judgment is today largely diffused by liability insurance 
which protects the injurer from having to pay the accident cost and instead distributes it among 
a large pool of premium payers and thereby socializes the loss. In many countries the victim no 
longer even in form addresses his claim to the injurer but proceeds directly against the latter's 
insurance carrier or compensation fund, thereby eliminating even the symbolic tokens of 
individual blame.” 
                                                          
Risks (1990) 133; JR Chelius, “Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict 
Liability Systems” (1976) J. Leg. Stud. (5) 293 303-306. 
148 Cardi, Penfield & Yoon (2011) Wake Forest University Legal Studies Paper No. 1851383 24. 
149 RI McEwin “No-fault compensation schemes” in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (2000) 736-
737. See also Fleming “The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law” (1967) 52 Virginia Law Review 
815 823.  
150 Cardi, Penfield & Yoon (2011) Wake Forest University Legal Studies Paper No. 1851383 3-4. 
151 3-4. 
152 Fleming “Is There a Future for Tort?” (1984) 44 Louisiana Law Review 1193 1197 (references 
omitted).  
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From the above, we may conclude that deterrence plays a marginal role as a function 
of the law of delict. In reality, it seems like “government regulation, criminal sanctions 
and ordinary economic pressures”153 would be the best way to educate and deter. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the question whether deterrence would be undermined 
by the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims “should play 
a minor role in determining whether to abolish or modify tort law and replace it with a 
no-fault compensation system.”154 
In conclusion, in this section it has therefore been argued that, in principle, the 
establishment of a statutory compensation fund could be justified. Assuming that the 
proposed statutory intervention is justifiable in principle, a final issue will be given 
attention, namely whether the potential statutory reform of the law of delict should take 
place by adapting existing statutes or policies or whether new, stand-alone legislation 
should be enacted. 
 
4.3 Should the statutory reform of the law relating to crime victim 
compensation take place by adapting existing statutes or policies or 
should a new, stand-alone statute be enacted?  
Most of the foreign jurisdictions that have elected to develop the law relating to the 
compensation of crime victims have done so through the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims.155 These funds have generally been enacted in 
new, stand-alone statutes. Of course, it does not automatically follow that the same 
solution should be adopted for the South African legal system. The following section 
involves a discussion on what may be the best strategy for the proposed statutory 
reform of the South African law relating to crime victim compensation.  
                                                          
153 1198: “Regulations can play an educational role in prescribing clear procedures designed to avoid 
accidents. Negligence law by contrast condemns people after it is too late. Also, while regulatory 
standards are established by experts, tort law leaves to inexpert juries or judges the bewildering task 
of resolving disputes between partisan expert witnesses. While tort law has come to take advantage of 
statutory standards by sometimes although quite erratically) treating their violation as fault without more 
(per se), it is unwilling to treat compliance with prescribed standards as conclusively.” 
154 Brown (1985) California Law Review 979. 
155 See Greer Compensating Crime Victims for an overview of the European jurisdictions that have 
enacted state-funded compensation schemes for crime victims: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Other jurisdictions that followed this route include the United States of 
America and certain states and territories in Australia and Canada, respectively. 
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4.3.1 The existing policies and programmes that have a bearing on the position 
of crime victims 
In response to the serious threat imposed by significant levels of violent crime, the 
National Crime Prevention Strategy (“NCPS”), which articulated a new approach to 
the issue of crime and the position of crime victims, was approved in 1996. The NCPS 
may be described as a strategic policy document rather than an operational 
programme156 and its adoption displays the shift in the government’s general response 
to the increasing levels of crime from a retributive justice approach157 to one that is 
aimed at achieving restorative justice.158  
The NCPS identified the establishment of the Victim Empowerment Programme 
(“VEP”) as one of the key programmes aimed at making the criminal justice system 
more “efficient and effective”,159 deterring future criminals and providing a source of 
relief and support to crime victims.160 The Department of Social Development (“DSD”) 
describes the VEP as follows:161 
“It is a multi-faceted and inter-sectoral [programme…] based on a partnership between 
national, provincial and local government departments and civil society organisations, 
volunteers, business, religious sector, institutions of higher learning and research institutions. 
The programme focuses on promoting a victim centred-approach to crime prevention.”  
The VEP identifies a wide range of objectives; these include: enhancing victim 
empowerment, improving the access of disempowered groups to the criminal justice 
system, redesigning the criminal justice system to empower victims, providing a 
greater and more meaningful role for victims in the criminal justice system, improving 
                                                          
156 AM Singh “Changing the soul of the nation? South Africa’s National Crime Prevention Strategy” 
(1997) 2 The British Criminology Conference: Selected Proceedings 1 1.   
157 In broad terms, retributive justice theories may be regarded as centred on the notion that “persons 
who have caused harm should themselves suffer harm”. See J Burchell Principles of Criminal law 3 ed 
(2005) 69. 
158 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 215-219; Department of Social Development 
(DSD) Integrated Victim Empowerment Policy (4th draft) (2007) 3. Broadly speaking, this approach may 
be described as involving “an essentially non-punitive resolution of disputes arising from the infliction 
of harm, through a process involving the victim, the offender and members of the community. The 
process is directed at restoring the parties to the condition that was disturbed by the criminal conduct”. 
See Burchell Principles of Criminal law 7. 
159 South African Government “National Crime Prevention Strategy: A Summary” available at 
<http://www.gov.za/documents/national-CRIME-prevention-strategy-summary#6> (accessed on 7 
June 2016).  
160 DSD Victim Empowerment Policy (2007) 17. 
161 17. 
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the service delivered by the criminal justice process to victims of crime, and dealing 
with the damage arising from criminal acts by providing remedial interventions for 
victims.162  
In 1998 the Department of Justice developed the first draft of the Service Charter for 
Victims of Crime in South Africa (“Victim Charter”), which was based on international 
standards of victims’ rights and focused on promoting justice for crime victims.163 The 
Victim Charter is regarded as constituting part of the government’s holistic policy on 
victim empowerment and is aimed at reducing incidents of secondary victimisation, 
experienced by victims within the criminal justice system.164  
The Victim Charter states that the following rights of crime victims, “as contained in 
the Constitution and relevant legislation,”165 will be upheld during their interaction with 
the criminal justice system: the right to be treated with fairness, respect and dignity, 
the right to offer information and to be heard, the right to receive and offer information, 
the right to legal advice and timely processing of criminal proceedings following the 
arrest of an accused, within reasonable bounds and the right to protection.166  
In terms of the right to compensation, which is defined as “an amount of money that a 
criminal court awards the victim who has suffered loss or damage to property, 
including money, as a result of a criminal act or omission by the person convicted of 
committing the crime”,167 the charter reaffirms crime victims’ current rights under the 
Criminal Procedure Act: “You can request to be present at court on the date of 
sentencing of the accused and request the prosecutor to apply to court for a 
compensation order in terms of section 297 and 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act”.168  
Similarly, the charter notes the crime victim’s right to restitution, which refers to the 
right granted to crime victims in terms of section 301 of the Act, i.e. those cases where 
“the court, after conviction, orders the accused to return your property or goods that 
have been taken from you unlawfully, or to repair the property or goods that have been 
                                                          
162 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 215-219. 
163 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (“DJCD”) Service Charter of Victims of Crime 
in South Africa (1998) 3. 
164 DJCD Victim Charter 4-5. 
165 6. 
166 6-9. 
167 8. 
168 8. 
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unlawfully damaged, in order to restore the position you were in prior to the 
commission of the offence.”169   
Sections 297, 300 and 301 of the Criminal Procedure Act were discussed in 
paragraphs 2.3.1-2.3.2 in chapter 2 and for present purposes it will suffice to 
emphasise the point that the charter does not envisage further rights for victims in 
addition to existing rights under the Criminal Procedure Act and the common law of 
delict.170 Further, as pointed out in chapter 2, the assistance offered by the Act may 
be regarded as inadequate in compensating crime victims because, generally, the 
perpetrators of criminal activities are not in a financial position to repair the harm which 
they have caused their victims.171  
With regard to compensation by way of a “civil action”,172 the Victim Charter merely 
states that this can be instituted against the accused “where the criminal court did not 
grant a compensation order”,173 which will “usually happen where the damages are 
not easily quantifiable in financial terms, for example, in the case of psychological 
damages or pain and suffering.”174 Therefore, although reference is made to the crime 
victim’s rights to compensation and restitution, it is important to note that it “does not 
include a broad right to compensation, i.e. a unilateral right to compensation from the 
state if one is a victim of crime. At this stage the right to compensation […] only exists 
in so far as the victim has a right to receive [money] from the offender, with the court 
having discretion about whether or not to grant a compensation order to this effect.”175 
In 1998 the government set out a policy framework for general safety and security in 
its White Paper on Safety and Security. In its foreword, the Paper states that “[a]t the 
heart of the White Paper lies the challenge of enhancing the transformation of the 
police so that they are able to function effectively within the new democracy; and 
                                                          
169 9. 
170 JC von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa: A comparison with Selected 
Commonwealth Jurisdictions Unpublished LLD thesis Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
(2007)148.  
171 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 315. For a comparative perspective see LJ 
McQuillan & H Abramyan, “The Tort Law Tax” Wall Street Journal 1 available at 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117496524456750056> (accessed on 2 February 2015); Miers (2014) 
20(1) International Review of Victimology 148-154. 
172 DJCD Victim Charter 8.  
173 8.  
174 8.  
175 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 30. 
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enhancing social crime prevention activities to reduce the occurrence of crime.”176  The 
objectives of the 1998 White Paper were to define the strategic priorities to deal with 
crime, articulate the roles and responsibilities of various role-players in the safety and 
security sphere, clarify the role of the DSS within a constitutional framework and 
consider institutional reform of the SAPS.177 However, it failed to consider the issue of 
crime victim compensation.  
The NCPS was replaced by the Justice Crime Prevention Strategy (“JCPS”) in 1999, 
which intended to further broaden the NCPS’s scope to cover issues beyond the 
criminal justice system.178 The JCPS’s main objectives are to focus the state’s efforts 
and resources jointly in addressing the incidents of crime, public disorder, 
inefficiencies in the justice system and “all those aspects of society with the most 
negative effects on development.”179  
In 2007, the DSD stated that there was no policy that informs, guides, regulates and 
co-ordinates the services rendered to victims of crime and violence and which 
promotes a common understanding and participation of all relevant state departments 
and civil society in victim empowerment initiatives.180 As a result, it formulated and 
published a draft victim empowerment policy aimed at guiding and facilitating the 
provision of services to victims of crime.181 The DSD’s draft policy specifically 
emphasised the need to provide a framework to integrate the multi-disciplinary 
services offered to crime victims at the time and to co-ordinate future activities and 
efforts offered by the state and civil society.  
The draft policy identified a variety of stakeholders and service providers that are to 
play an important role in empowering victims,182 but failed to provide any details as to 
how these services were to be practically co-ordinated or implemented. It did, 
however, provide the basis for a subsequent policy document issued by the DSD in 
                                                          
176 Department of Safety and Security (“DSS”) White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) 2. 
177 DSS White Paper on Safety and Security; Civilian Secretariat for Police White Paper on Safety and 
Security (2016) 34. 
178 DSD Victim Empowerment Policy 5. 
179 10. 
180 18. This may be seen as part of the government’s “criminal justice system revamp” - see Civilian 
Secretariat for Police White Paper on Safety and Security 32. 
181 I.e. the DSD Victim Empowerment Policy. 
182 22-23. 
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2009, namely the National Policy Guidelines for Victim Empowerment (“Policy 
Guidelines”).  
The Policy Guidelines criticised the earlier attempts of the police, the judiciary, the 
private sector, government and civil society to address victim empowerment as 
“arbitrary”183 and “not prioritised”184 and stipulates that it failed to provide a “structured 
plan to manage and coordinate policy development and implementation.”185 As a 
result it sets out to provide:186 
“[A] framework for sound inter-departmental and intesectoral [sic] collaboration and for the 
integration of effective institutional arrangements for a multi-pronged approach in managing 
victim empowerment [, which it defines as] an approach [that] facilitates the establishment of 
partnerships in the victim empowerment sector to effectively address the diverse and sensitive 
needs of victims holistically.” 
The establishment of Victim Empowerment Management Forums at national, 
provincial and local levels that will be tasked with providing “strategic direction to the 
programme” is envisaged in the Policy Guidelines.187 These forums’ functions and 
responsibilities are broadly formulated and wide-ranging.188  
The guidelines further refer to certain “core intervention strategies”,189 which include 
the “development of plans for the implementation”190 of certain policies and legislation. 
In this regard, the document refers to the Victim Charter, the Domestic Violence Act 
116 of 1998, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 32 of 2007 and the management protocol and legislation for the management of 
victims of human trafficking.191 However, no mention is made of legislation specifically 
aimed at compensating crime victims.  
                                                          
183 DSD Policy Guidelines (2009) 4. 
184 4. 
185 4. 
186 6. 
187 13. 
188 For example, they include the following:  “co-ordination and management”, “providing inter-
departmental solution to challenges”, “ensuring an effective information flow”, “monitoring of VEP 
processes”, “sharing of information, for example best practices”, “networking, encouragement and 
mutual support” and “other functions as and when appropriate”. Furthermore, they are given a variety 
of mandatory managerial responsibilities such as, for example, managing the “development, monitoring 
and evaluation of the implementation of a comprehensive, integrated legislative and policy framework 
related to the empowerment of victims.” See further DSD Policy Guidelines 14-16. 
189 16. 
190 16. 
191 16. 
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The Policy Guidelines provide a vague indication of how the DSD, which is described 
as the “lead department”192 responsible for ensuring the successful implementation of 
the VEP, should go about in formulating, co-ordinating and managing the 
comprehensive new VEP. The document reflects the vast range of services, functions 
and responsibilities of all the relevant stake-holders, which will not be further discussed 
in this dissertation.193  
Lastly, the National Development Plan (“NDP”) was published in 2011 and accepted 
by the National Cabinet in 2012. It “proposes an integrated approach to resolving the 
root causes of crime that involves an active citizenry as well as inter-related 
responsibilities and co-ordinated service delivery from state and non-state actors.”194 
It formulates the following vision for South Africa in respect of safety and security:195  
“In 2030 people living in South Africa feel safe and have no fear of crime. They feel safe at home, 
at school and at work, and they enjoy an active community life free of fear. Women can walk 
freely in the street and the children can play safely outside. The police service is a well-resourced 
professional institution staffed by highly skilled officers who value their works, serve the 
community, safeguard lives and property without discrimination, protect the peaceful against 
violence, and respect the rights of all to equality and justice.” 
The NDP articulates a vision for a safe and secure South Africa, and identifies building 
safer communities as central in achieving an integrated and developmental approach 
to safety and security, which involves all government departments and tiers of 
government.196  
To give effect to this vision, the Civilian Secretariat for Police developed a White Paper 
on Safety and Security in 2016 (“White Paper”).197 The White Paper is the culmination 
of a series of policy documentation that seeks to give effect to the vision developed in 
the NDP.198 It reaffirms that it is the collective responsibility of the state and its citizens 
to construct safer communities and to ensure that safety and security is “located within 
                                                          
192 18. 
193 17-21. 
194 Civilian Secretariat for Police White Paper on Safety and Security 30-31. 
195 National Planning Commission National Development Plan 349. 
196 National Planning Commission National Development Plan 349-361; Civilian Secretariat for Police 
White Paper on Safety and Security. 
197 Civilian Secretariat for Police White Paper on Safety and Security.  
198 For instance, it refers to the National Security Strategy (2012), the Rural Safety Strategy (2010), the 
Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy (2011), the Community Safety Forums Policy (2011), the 
Early Childhood Development Policy (2015), the White Paper on Families (2012) and the Draft 
Integrated Urban Development Framework (2015). 
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the broader developmental agenda of government”.199 The White Paper affirms the 
need for “an active citizenry, civil society, and private sector to contribute to the on-
going efforts of government in safety, crime and violence prevention”.200  
It identifies the following objectives. First, to provide an overarching policy for safety, 
crime and violence prevention that will be articulated in a clear legislative and 
administrative framework to facilitate synergy and alignment of policies on safety and 
security.201 Secondly, to facilitate the creation of a sustainable, well-resourced 
implementation and oversight mechanism, which will co-ordinate, monitor, evaluate 
and report on implementation of crime prevention priorities across all sectors.202 
The White Paper notes that there has been “an over-reliance on criminal justice 
approaches [which] risks [the] prioritisation of increasingly repressive and punitive 
responses to crime that are ultimately reactive and limited in their ability to achieve 
longer term results.”203 It notes the reactive nature of the criminal justice system and 
emphasises that it needs to be “complemented by long-term developmental strategies 
to reduce incidents of people in conflict with the law and to increase levels of safety in 
communities.”204 The focus of the White Paper is “crime and violence prevention”205 
and to further this goal, it seeks to intervene in the individual, familial, community and 
structural domains in order to build resilience against crime and violence, putting in 
place protective measures, implementing broad structural and environmental change 
to the South African socio-economic landscape and involving a wide range of stake-
holders to construct and promote safer communities. 206  
An evaluation of these policies and programmes is set out in the next section. 
 
                                                          
199 Civilian Secretariat for Police White Paper on Safety and Security 9. 
200 9. 
201 7. 
202 7. 
203 8. 
204 8. See also 9-17. 
205 9. 
206 9. 
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4.3.2 The shortcomings of the existing policies and programmes as well as 
further reasons that support the enactment of a stand-alone statute that 
deals with the compensation of crime victims 
The NCPS, JCPS, the VEP, the Victim Charter, the Policy Guidelines, the NDP and 
the White Paper are overly broad with regard to the formulation of their goals. It may 
be argued that the various governmental agencies responsible for drafting these 
documents have been too ambitious in identifying the wide range of objectives. Not 
only do the documents present a multitude of goals to achieve, but their successful 
implementation requires that several role-players co-ordinate their isolated attempts 
in fulfilling these goals without a clear outline of the procedure for doing so. All in all, 
the existing policies and programmes confront the state and other entities with an 
overwhelming responsibility that is vaguely formulated and impractical to implement.  
It may be said that the existing policy documentation has a single or definite goal, 
insofar as it indicates a shift in the government’s approach from retribution to 
restorative justice, and it thereby introduced a victim-centred attitude towards the 
criminal justice system generally. However, the identification of a shift in the stance 
toward the criminal justice system is hardly sufficient to ensure the successful 
formulation and implementation of the multitude of goals referred to above.  
In pursuit of achieving restorative justice, the policies are, among other things, focused 
on empowering victims in a variety of ways. One way in which victims are to be 
empowered is apparently by compensating them for the harm they suffer. Accordingly, 
the Victim Charter refers to victim’s rights in relation to compensation and restitution. 
However, as referred to above, the Charter does not provide crime victims with any 
rights other than those which already exist at common law or in legislation.  
In its report, the SALRC identified the following concerns with the VEP and Victim 
Charter. First, it is argued that victim support service delivery under the policies for 
certain groups and in certain areas would remain limited:207  
“The majority of the projects funded by the government are concentrated in the urban, peri-urban 
and semi-rural areas; the rural areas still remain under-resourced […] There is a serious gap in 
the provision of professional services and those that do exist are based in major cities. Rural and 
outlying areas do not have access to such services.”  
                                                          
207 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 31.  
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Another problem with the existing policy documentation is that the victim support 
services that it envisages fail “to evaluate levels of service delivery” and to define the 
standards of the services that are required to be provided.208 The SALRC correctly 
pointed out that this makes it difficult to determine whether existing services are 
adequate or not.209 Related to this point is the significant concern that state service 
providers such as the SAPS, social workers and primary health care practitioners are 
“expected to include victim empowerment as part of their day-to-day job function, in 
addition to their other responsibilities. Most frontline workers are already overstretched 
and under-resourced without this additional responsibility.”210   
The SALRC Report also notes that the inter-sectorial co-operation that appears to be 
a crucial element of the proposed strategy remains “an ongoing problem”211 and that 
an “imbalance exists between various departments in their engagement with providing 
victim support services.”212 We may therefore state that a significant gap persists 
between the policy-making on the one hand and the implementation of the various 
policies, programmes and strategies on the other hand. 
It is arguable that legislative intervention which is more specific in its scope, and which 
focuses solely on the compensation of crime victims by establishing a statutory 
compensation fund may be a more practicable, albeit less ambitious solution than the 
policy documentation referred to above. If the statutory reform of the law of delict is to 
follow this route, it may hold the following advantages.  
Considering the narrow, focused objective of such a statute, it is conceivable that it 
will require considerably fewer stake-holders and participants to implement. In theory, 
this will require less co-ordination and correlation between various state departments 
and civic organisations. It is therefore probable that the administration and costs 
involved in operating a compensation fund may be more achievable in practice than 
the implementation of all the objectives identified in the policy documentation.  
                                                          
208 31.  
209 31.  
210 32. 
211 32. 
212 32. 
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A more modest objective of enacting a stand-alone statute that concentrates solely on 
setting out the provisions relating to a statutory compensation scheme will not require 
the SAPS, social workers and primary health care practitioners to include victim 
empowerment as part of their daily functions. As such, it will not interfere or impose 
an additional burden on any of these entities. 
The existing policies and programmes do not provide any practical assistance to crime 
victims insofar as the compensation for harm is concerned and a statute aimed at 
achieving this specific purpose appears to be the only practical solution to meet this 
need.  
Further, the following critique of the VEP and Victim Charter that was set out in the 
SALRC still remains true and provides a succinct summary of the current policies and 
programmes:213 
“[T]he Commission questions the justification for locating the VEP programme in the Department 
of Social Services. While the Department can take responsibility for the development of services 
to victims of crime, it cannot take full responsibility for an improved deal for victims of crime in the 
criminal justice system. Victims of crime are connected to the criminal justice process and they 
do not think of themselves as clients of the Department of Social Development. Secondly, in 
foreign jurisdictions either the Department of Justice or the prosecution takes responsibility for 
victim services. Therefore, in the Commission’s view, building on the VEP programme alone is 
not the solution to the problem. Appropriate legislative provisions should be developed to 
strengthen existing provisions to ensure a better deal for victims of crime.”  
 
In addition, it may be worth emphasising that a statutory compensation fund may 
nevertheless be regarded as constituting a part of the broader objectives of the NCPS, 
JCPS and VEP, but falling outside its immediate scope, extent and administration. In 
other words, it may still contribute towards the goals identified by these documents in 
a practical and achievable manner. 
An overview of the policy documentation discussed above reflects a scatter-shot 
approach towards solving a multiplicity of crime-related problems. It identifies various 
concerns arising from the central issue of a soaring crime rate and the high prevalence 
of violent crime. In response, a wide assortment of solutions to those problems was 
proposed and various parties were targeted to assume responsibility for a great 
number of tasks for which none of them necessarily have the capacity or expertise. 
Enacting specific legislation to deal with a specific purpose and limited scope (in the 
                                                          
213 323 (own emphasis). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
236 
 
case of crime victim compensation, a statutory fund established for this purpose) may 
contribute to improve this situation. 
It is unsurprising that the Policy Guidelines criticised the efforts of the role players as 
“arbitrary”214 and “not prioritised”215 and emphasised the “lack of a structured plan to 
manage and coordinate policy development and implementation.”216 However, the 
Policy Guidelines seem to suffer from the same deficiencies as it is also formulated in 
unclear language and intent on simultaneously achieving several unrelated goals. 
Further, it may be worthwhile to emphasise that none of the more recent crime-related 
policy documentation seeks to provide the victim with compensation. For instance, the 
White Paper focuses on crime prevention217 while the National Rural Safety Strategy 
places its attention on providing “direction and guidelines to achieve safety and 
security within the rural environment”.218 The policy documentation is therefore 
inadequate from a crime victim compensation point of view.  
Lastly, it may be considered whether the legislature should consider amending the 
existing Criminal Procedure Act to improve the position of crime victims insofar as their 
compensation is concerned, or whether it would be better to enact a specific, stand-
alone statute. The provisions of the Act that relate to the compensation of crime victims 
have been set out and evaluated in paragraph 2.3 in chapter 2 and will not be repeated 
here. It was concluded that, from a crime victim compensation perspective, these 
provisions are unsatisfactory. Therefore, if this Act were to be used to house the 
statutory reform of the law relating to crime victim compensation, it would have to 
undergo significant amendment. In addition to the benefits mentioned above, there are 
further advantages relating to the enactment of a stand-alone statute that focuses 
specifically on the issue of crime victim compensation. These benefits will be 
discussed in paragraph 5.11 in chapter 5 and will not be canvassed here.   
Various reasons have already been highlighted as to why a new, stand-alone statute 
would be a better solution than merely adopting policies or programmes. Similarly, it 
                                                          
214 DSD Policy Guidelines 4. 
215 4. 
216 4. 
217 Civilian Secretariat for Police White Paper on Safety and Security 2-9. 
218 South African Police Services The National Rural Safety Strategy (2010) 6.  
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is suggested that it would be better to draft specific legislation that deals pertinently 
with the ring-fenced issue of crime victim compensation.  
This section of the chapter has described the shortcomings and the failures of the 
existing policies and programmes insofar as crime victim compensation is concerned. 
Against this background, it may be concluded that they are inadequate for the purpose 
of compensating crime victims for the harm they have suffered and that it would be a 
better option to enact new, stand-alone legislation that deals with the issue.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 concluded that the current legal position relating to crime victim 
compensation is unsatisfactory. Against this background it was considered whether 
there is a potential alternative for crime victim compensation. It was noted that many 
foreign jurisdictions have elected to enact a statutory compensation fund. In its report 
on the viability of enacting a similar type of fund for crime victims in South Africa, the 
SALRC stated that “developing a motivation for the establishment of a [statutory 
compensation fund] in SA remains incomplete, and must be completed if legislation is 
to be drafted, since no law should be passed without its objectives being clearly 
defined and costed.”219 
To determine whether such a fund could be established in the South African context, 
the following approach was adopted. In chapter 3 a general theoretical framework was 
advanced on the basis of which future statutory reform of the law of delict may be 
justified. This was done by identifying policy considerations which the legislature have 
used to reform specific areas within the law of delict.  
This chapter sought to respond to the particular gap left open in the SALRC Report,220 
namely the identification of considerations that may justify the legislature’s 
development of the law of delict relating to crime victim compensation through the 
enactment of a statutory fund. It was argued that the significant risk of falling victim to 
crime, and the accompanying risk of receiving no compensation in respect of harm 
suffered, may justify the enactment of a fund in a similar way that the risk of harm 
                                                          
219 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 318-319. 
220 318-319.  
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justified the development of compensation funds in the context of motor vehicle 
accidents and occupational injuries and diseases. Similarly, the proposed 
development of the law in this context also fits within the framework identified in 
chapter 3 inasmuch as it could promote the constitutional right to social security and 
potentially assist victims in bridging an evidentiary obstacle which they may face when 
instituting common-law delictual claims.  
It was further argued that considerations that thus far have counted against the 
introduction of the fund, namely problems with affordability and administration, as well 
as potential subversion of the deterrence function of the law of delict, do not present 
conclusive arguments against its implementation. 
To conclude, it is submitted that, when compared to the common-law development of 
the law of delict and amending existing legislation, in principle, a statutory 
compensation fund seems a more desirable solution to improve the legal position of 
crime victims insofar as their compensation is concerned. However, it should also be 
noted that, whether such a proposal should ultimately be endorsed, would depend on 
how such a fund would practically work.  
For instance, what would the eligibility criteria be? What type of harm should be 
recoverable? What should be the relationship between a statutory compensation fund 
and the common law of delict?  Should the victim’s claim against the compensation 
fund be limited? Should the compensation fund be no-fault based or should victims be 
required to prove fault? Should the crime be proven, and according to what standard 
of proof? Should benefits received under a statutory compensation fund be deducted 
from compensation received under a residual common-law delictual claim?  
In the following chapter, attention will therefore be given to practical considerations 
related to the enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation fund.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
239 
 
CHAPTER 5: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE RELEVANT WHEN 
DEVELOPING A STATUTORY COMPENSATION FUND FOR CRIME VICTIMS 
 
5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………243 
5.1.1 General outline of chapter………………………………………………….243 
5.1.2 Comparative legal methodology…………………………………………..245 
5.1.3 Relevant previous studies dealing with the establishment  
of a South African statutory compensation fund for crime victims…….247 
 
5.2 Categories of victims eligible to institute a statutory claim against  
the proposed compensation fund…………………………………………………...249 
5.2.1 Victims of violent crimes caused intentionally……………………………250 
5.2.1.1 The UK 2012 Scheme…………………………………………………250 
5.2.1.1.1 Giving meaning to the term “a crime of violence”………….250 
5.2.1.1.2 The meaning of “direct victim” and “directly attributable”….255 
5.2.1.1.3 The focus on blameless victims…………………………….256 
5.2.1.2 The Dutch Fund………………………………………………………..259 
5.2.1.2.1 Giving meaning to the term “a crime of violence”…………259 
5.2.1.2.2 Causation……………………………………………………..260  
5.2.1.2.3 Focus on the blameless victim………………………………261 
5.2.1.3 Conclusion: victims of violent crimes caused intentionally…………263 
5.2.2 Witnesses of violent crimes who sustain mental injuries……………….267 
5.2.2.1 The UK 2012 Scheme…………………………………………………267 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
240 
 
5.2.2.2 The Dutch Fund………………………………………………………..268 
5.2.2.3 Conclusion: witnesses of violent crimes who sustain  
mental injuries………………………………………………………….269 
5.2.3 Relatives of the deceased victims of violent crime……………………..272 
5.2.3.1 The UK 2012 Scheme…………………………………………………272 
5.2.3.2 The Dutch Fund………………………………………………………..275 
5.2.3.3 Conclusion: relatives of the deceased victims of violent crime……276 
5.2.4 People who sustain injuries as a result of taking risks………………….277 
5.2.4.1 The UK 2012 Scheme…………………………………………………277 
5.2.4.2 Conclusion: people who sustain injuries as a result of taking  
Risks…………………………………………………………………….278 
5.2.5 Conclusion: categories of victims eligible to institute a  
statutory claim against the proposed compensation fund………………280 
  
5.3 The nature of the harm recoverable from a statutory compensation  
fund for crime victims…………………………………………………………………283 
5.3.1 The UK 2012 Scheme……………………………………………………...283 
5.3.2 The Dutch Fund……………………………………………………………..284 
5.3.3 Harm covered under the RAF Act and the COIDA………………………285 
5.3.4 Conclusion: recommendation in respect of the nature of the  
harm that should be recoverable from the proposed fund………………287 
 
5.4 Nature of the perpetrator’s state of mind and conduct……………………………287 
5.4.1 The UK 2012 Scheme…………………………………………………...…288 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
241 
 
5.4.2 The Dutch Fund…………………………………………………………….289 
5.4.3 Conclusion: recommendation regarding the nature of  
the perpetrator’s state of mind and conduct…………………………….290 
 
5.5 The potential impact of awarding a statutory claim against a  
compensation fund on liability under the common law of delict…………………291 
5.5.1 South African statutes that have developed the law of delict………….291 
5.5.1.1 The RAF Act……………………………………………………………291 
5.5.1.2 The COIDA……………………………………………………………..295 
5.5.2 The UK 2012 Scheme……………………………………………………..297 
5.5.3 The Dutch Fund…………………………………………………………….298 
5.5.4 Conclusion: recommendations regarding the relationship  
between a statutory compensation fund and the common law of  
delict………………………………………………………………………… 299 
 
5.6 Should benefits received under a statutory compensation fund be deducted from 
compensation received under a residual common-law claim of delict?...............303 
 
5.7 Limitation of the victim’s claim against the compensation fund…………………307 
5.7.1 South African statutes that have developed the law of delict:  
the RAF Act and the COIDA………………………………………………307 
5.7.2 The UK 2012 Scheme and the Dutch Fund………………………………308 
5.7.3 Conclusion: suggestions relating to the limitation of the  
victim’s claim against the proposed fund…………………………………308 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
242 
 
5.8 Should the compensation fund require victims to prove fault?............................309 
5.8.1 South African statutes that have developed the law of delict:  
the RAF Act, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (“CPA”)  
and the COIDA……………………………………………………………...310 
5.8.2 The UK 2012 Scheme and the Dutch Fund………………………………310 
5.8.3 Conclusion: recommendation that the proposed fund  
should be a fault-based compensation scheme…………………………311 
 
5.9 Relevance of the perpetrator’s identity……………………………………………..312 
 
5.10 Miscellaneous practical considerations to be taken into account  
when enacting a statutory compensation fund for crime victims…………………314 
5.10.1 The time frame for instituting a statutory claim…………………………..314 
5.10.2 Place where the crime must have been committed…………………….315 
5.10.3 Nationality of applicant…………………………………………………….318 
5.10.4 What is practically expected of prospective applicants?........................318 
 
5.11 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….......318 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
243 
 
CHAPTER 5: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE RELEVANT WHEN 
DEVELOPING A STATUTORY COMPENSATION FUND FOR CRIME VICTIMS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 General outline of chapter 
Broadly speaking, the aim of this chapter is to answer the following question: if it is in 
principle desirable and justifiable to adopt a statutory compensation fund for certain 
categories of crime victims, what practical considerations should the legislature take 
into account when implementing this proposal?1 
The chapter will commence with a discussion on what may be considered to be the 
first issue that any legislature must logically approach once it has decided that it should 
enact a crime victim compensation scheme, namely: who should be eligible for 
compensation? In other words, it will first be investigated who may be regarded as 
crime victims for purposes of the proposed fund. Once this fundamental issue has 
been dealt with, the chapter will consider the next question facing a legislature that 
have elected to establish a compensation fund, namely: what type of harm should be 
recoverable from the proposed statutory fund? Patrimonial harm only, or should the 
fund also provide compensation for non-patrimonial harm?  
Once these central issues relating to eligibility have been discussed, the net will be 
cast somewhat wider and it will be considered what potential impact the availability of 
a statutory claim against the proposed fund would have on a victim’s common-law 
delictual claim against the perpetrator. Specifically, having regard to the legal position 
under other South African compensation funds, the major issue for consideration will 
be whether the crime victim’s common-law claim against the wrongdoer should be 
abolished.  
                                                          
1 As noted in paragraphs 3.1 and 4.1 above, a distinction may be drawn between the reasons advanced 
for the justification of the proposed statutory crime victim compensation scheme and its scope. While 
chapters 3 and 4 dealt with the issue of justification of the scheme, this chapter deals with the specific 
issues related its scope (should it be enacted). Therefore, chapters 3 and 4 deal mainly with legal and 
public policy considerations justifying statutory reform of the law of delict in South Africa, whereas 
chapter 5 refer to issues of policy and administrative convenience. 
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The remainder of the chapter will focus on several important practical matters 
pertaining to the enactment of the proposed fund. For example, it will be discussed 
whether it is preferable for a legislature to cap an eligible victim’s claim and, on a 
related point, whether benefits received from other sources should be taken into 
account when the compensation fund makes an award to the victim. As will become 
clearer from the examination below, these matters have been selected for discussion 
because they have enjoyed considerable attention from foreign legislatures that have 
already enacted compensation schemes for crime victims. These concerns include the 
role which the perpetrator’s state of mind should play in deciding whether the victim 
may claim compensation as well as an assortment of considerations that may 
influence the everyday functioning of the proposed fund.  
As the following section indicates, this chapter involves comparative legal scholarship 
in attempting to answer some of the questions outlined above. However, this 
dissertation will not focus afresh on the question as to whether the principles 
applicable in foreign legal jurisdictions are compatible with current South Africa law. 
Nevertheless, it may be recalled that chapter 3 identified various legal and public policy 
considerations underlying the establishment of South African statutes relating to motor 
vehicle accidents, occupational injuries and diseases as well as defective consumer 
products. In chapter 4, it was examined whether the establishment of a statutory crime 
victim compensation fund could similarly be justified by the considerations identified 
and discussed in chapter 3. In the process, principles and considerations applicable 
in foreign jurisdictions were considered. Therefore, the question whether the principles 
applicable in foreign legal jurisdictions are compatible with current South Africa law 
has received consideration. Furthermore, it may be emphasised that the aim of this 
chapter is to discuss various potential practical concerns which a legislature might 
have to consider if it indeed chose to enact the proposed scheme and not to focus on 
the issue of exactly how these practical proposals will fit into the existing South African 
legal framework. 
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5.1.2 Comparative legal methodology 
It should be noted that throughout this chapter comparisons will be made with the legal 
positions in foreign jurisdictions. Comparative legal scholarship may enlarge the 
“supply of solutions”2 that a South African legislature could apply if it decides to create 
a statutory compensation scheme.3 Indeed, giving consideration to foreign solutions 
and applying comparative legal reasoning may hold great practical value for the 
legislature, if it indeed decides to enact a crime victim compensation scheme.4 
The jurisdictions that have been chosen to illuminate the questions listed above are 
the United Kingdom (“UK”) and the Netherlands. Although New Zealand introduced 
the first state-funded statutory scheme to compensate crime victims for personal injury 
when it enacted the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1963,5 that scheme was 
later subsumed within the accident compensation regime, which was established in 
1975 under the Accident Compensation Act of 1972 (“1972 ACA”). In the process, the 
1972 ACA also abolished the common law tort claim for compensation arising from 
personal injuries. Under the current compensation system, victims of crime, like all 
other accident victims, seek refuge in the general no-fault based compensation 
scheme as opposed to a specific fund set up to compensate harm arising from crime. 
For this reason, New Zealand will not be the focus of attention in this chapter.  
One year after the enactment of the New Zealand compensation scheme, the UK 
adopted and introduced the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme in 1964. The 
1964 non-statutory scheme was amended multiple times and eventually placed on a 
statutory footing in 1995, under the title of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 
1995 (the “CIC Act”). The initial scheme was updated in 2001 (“UK 2001 Scheme”), 
                                                          
2 HP Glenn “The Aims of Comparative Law” in J Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 2 
ed (2012) 57-66; M van Hoecke “Methodology of Comparative Legal Research” (2015) Law and Method 
1 1-3; K Schadbach “The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View” (1998) 16 Boston 
University International Law Journal 331 350. 
3 Schadbach (1998) 387. See also Glenn “The Aims of Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 57-66. 
4 Glenn “The Aims of Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 61. 
5 See S Todd “Forty Years of Accident Compensation in New Zealand” (2011) 28(2) Thomas M Cooley 
Law Review 189 189-193; New Zealand Law Commission Report Compensating Crime Victims (2008) 
2; G Palmer “New Zealand’s Accident Compensation: 20 Years On” (1994) 44 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 223 223-230; BJ Cameron “The New Zealand Criminal Compensation Act, 1963” (1964) 
16(1) The University of Toronto Law Journal 177 177-178. 
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after which it was amended in 2008 (“UK 2008 Scheme”) and once more in 2012 (“UK 
2012 Scheme”).  
There are convincing reasons that justify using the UK as a comparative jurisdiction 
for the purposes of this chapter. First, it is the jurisdiction that has operated a 
compensatory scheme for crime victims for the longest period. During this time, the 
scheme received considerable legislative attention. The developments in the UK may 
therefore provide fertile ground for analysis and a useful background against which to 
examine practical issues pertaining to the establishment of a potential South African 
compensation fund. Secondly, the fact that this compensation scheme has been 
described as “the most creative”6 in its approach to potential applicants and appears 
to be a far more generous scheme when compared to those established in Europe,7 
makes it a suitable jurisdiction for investigation.  
As an example of a civilian jurisdiction that established a statutory compensation fund 
for crime victims, attention will be paid to the Netherlands, where the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Fund Act of 1975 (“Dutch Act”) established the Dutch Compensation 
Fund for Violent Crimes in 1976 (“Dutch Fund”).8 The Netherlands may be regarded 
as representative of a series of European jurisdictions which sought to enact statutory 
compensation schemes following the adoption of the European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes in 1983.9  
It seems appropriate to consider the developments reached in this jurisdiction. Not 
only was it one of the first European jurisdictions to establish a compensation scheme 
for crime victims,10 but it also adopts a “narrow view”11 regarding the eligibility criteria 
for compensation which provides a fitting contrast to the approach adopted in the UK. 
A final reason for electing these jurisdictions is the important role which English and 
                                                          
6 South African Law Reform Commission (“SALRC”) Project 82: Sentencing (A Compensation Fund for 
Victims of Crime) (2004) 87.  
7 D Miers “Compensating deserving victims of violent crime: the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme 2012” (2014) 34 Legal Studies 242 273; House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
Compensating Victims of Violent Crime 2007-2008 HC 251 (2008) 9; New Zealand Law Commission 
Report Compensating Crime Victims (2008) 32-36.  
8 Het Schadenfonds Geweldsmisdrijven (“HSG”) available at <https://schadefonds.nl/> (accessed on 
10 April 2017).  
9 See D Greer “The European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes” in D Greer 
(ed) Compensating Crime Victims: A European Survey (1996) 3-6.  
10 The Netherlands set up its scheme in 1975, prior to the adoption of the European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime (1983). See Greer Compensating Crime Victims 3-6.    
11 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 81.  
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Roman-Dutch civil law has played within the South African legal historical 
framework.12 
While the legislature may therefore make use of comparative analysis to consider the 
practical considerations outlined in the introduction to this chapter, it should also be 
cognisant of South Africa’s unique social context in comparison with those of the 
elected foreign jurisdictions. For example, the different crime levels, standards of 
policing and available state resources could be relevant when drawing on experiences 
in the UK and the Netherlands and may have an impact on whether foreign 
approaches could be adopted by the South African legislature. 
 
5.1.3 Relevant previous studies dealing with the establishment of a South 
African statutory compensation fund for crime victims 
The SALRC’s report on the creation of a compensation fund for crime victims (“SALRC 
Report”)13 as well as a dissertation completed in 2007 by Von Bonde14 deal with some 
of the practical questions raised in paragraph 5.1.1 above. However, for the reasons 
briefly discussed below, these studies still leave a number of issues open for further 
investigation. 
First, not all of the practical issues listed above receive attention in the documentation. 
For example, neither the SALRC Report nor Von Bonde’s dissertation concentrate on 
the relationship between a statutory compensation fund and the common law of delict. 
In addition, neither of these studies explain what role the state of the perpetrator’s 
mind should play in deciding whether the victim may claim compensation. Also, neither 
document makes it clear whether the compensation fund should be no-fault based.  
                                                          
12 RG McKerron The Law of Delict: a Treatise on the Principles of Liability for Civil Wrongs in the Law 
of South Africa 7 ed (1971) 6-11; NJ van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 1 ed (1966) 1-16; Neethling & Potgieter The Law of Delict  7 ed (2015) 3-17; A van 
Aswegen “Aquilian Liability I (Nineteenth Century)” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 559-595; D Hutchison “Aquilian Liability II (Twentieth 
Century)‟ in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South 
Africa (1996) 595-637. 
13 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime.   
14 JC von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa: A comparison with Selected 
Commonwealth Jurisdictions Unpublished LLD thesis Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (2007). 
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Secondly, where the documents do address the questions raised above, they have 
not been finally determined and require further investigation. For instance, Von 
Bonde’s dissertation summarises the UK 2001 Scheme’s requirements as follows: 
“Compensation is paid in the event of criminal injuries sustained in Great Britain and 
directly attributable to: [c]rimes of violence; or [o]ffences of trespass on a railway; or 
[t]he (attempted) apprehension of (suspected) offenders, the (attempted) prevention 
of offences, or the giving of help to any constable engaged in such activity.”15 With 
regard to the first category (crimes of violence), it is reaffirmed that “[w]hat is required, 
is proof that the injuries were caused by a crime of violence and not merely an 
accident.”16  
However, this still calls for an explanation of the meaning of a “crime of violence” or 
the scope of the UK 2001 Scheme’s application. Instead, the study refers to the 
judgment by the Court of Appeal in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel, 
ex parte August and Brown,17 where it was held that the correct approach to 
determining whether an incident may be regarded as a crime of violence is not to ask 
whether it may be so classified as “a question of law, but to treat the inquiry whether 
a crime of violence has been perpetrated as a question of fact, the answer depending 
on ‘a reasonable and literate man’s understanding of the circumstances in which he 
could under the scheme be paid compensation for personal injury caused by a crime 
of violence.’”18 
The SALRC Report pays barely more attention to the eligibility criteria of the UK 2001 
Scheme and focuses on the eligibility criteria for compensation schemes in general. 
Therefore, it provides brief statements of the legal position adopted by a variety of 
jurisdictions on multiple practical issues, e.g. violent crime versus other crime, 
intentional versus non-intentional violence, damages for injury or death versus 
damage to property, etc.19   
                                                          
15 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa (2007) 212. 
16 213-214. 
17 [2001] 2 All ER 874 paras 22-24. 
18 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 214. 
19 These matters are only briefly dealt with in SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 80-
90. 
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Thirdly, the references to comparative jurisdictions in those documents are outdated, 
which undermines their practical value for the purposes of future reform. For instance, 
both documents briefly refer to the eligibility criteria used by the UK 2001 Scheme.20 
However, that scheme was replaced by the UK 2008 Scheme which itself was 
substituted by the UK 2012 Scheme.  
Taking all of the above into consideration, it therefore may be desirable to examine 
these questions afresh and to make specific recommendations for the potential 
legislative project.21 The first practical consideration which will receive attention for 
purposes of making these recommendations is the particularly important one of 
determining whom the legislature should designate as eligible for support under such 
a scheme.  
   
5.2 Categories of victims eligible to institute a statutory claim against the 
proposed compensation fund 
If the legislature were to enact a compensation scheme, it would allow crime victims 
to institute statutory claims against a potentially publicly-funded scheme. Given the 
variety of crimes committed and their prevalence, it becomes vitally important to 
carefully examine the scope of eligibility for compensation by the proposed fund. After 
all, in terms of the common law of delict, plaintiffs are required to prove five basic 
elements of delictual liability: harm, conduct, causation, wrongfulness and fault. The 
question considered in this part of the chapter is what set of criteria should be used to 
ensure that the law relating to crime victim compensation is not merely improved, but 
that it is done in a manner that maintains legal certainty and allows for its consistent 
application.  
The issue of eligibility is further significant if one considers the potential financial 
implications of the proposal. As indicated in chapter 4, the SALRC ultimately rejected 
the notion of a crime victim compensation fund that covers a seemingly unlimited 
                                                          
20 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 62-73. Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime 
in South Africa 212-218. 
21 See the general recommendations made in Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 
287-294.  
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amount of harm suffered by the crime victim.22 Obviously, South Africa does not have 
an unrestricted access to financial resources and, as pointed out elsewhere, there are 
several important socio-economic issues that require the legislature’s and treasury’s 
attention.23 Therefore, should the legislature indeed decide to enact a compensation 
fund, then the issue of eligibility provides a strategic opportunity to determine the 
scope of the proposed fund’s financial exposure and to limit it in a manner that 
contributes towards its viability, while ensuring at the same time that the position of 
crime victims – and the law relating to their compensation – will indeed be improved 
in an effective and practical manner.  
In this section it will be illustrated that both the UK and Dutch legislatures have elected 
to compensate victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes, witnesses of these 
crimes, and relatives of deceased victims.24 In addition, the UK 2012 Scheme regards 
certain risk-takers as compensable. With the eye on the potential enactment of a South 
African compensation scheme, the categorisation of eligible crime victims requires 
further investigation. Specifically, it must be considered what qualifies as a violent 
crime, what relatives of deceased victims should be allowed to claim compensation 
and under what circumstances a witness of a crime should be entitled to approach the 
proposed fund for statutory relief. 
  
5.2.1 Victims of violent crimes caused intentionally 
5.2.1.1 The UK 2012 Scheme 
5.2.1.1.1 Giving meaning to the term “a crime of violence” 
In the White Paper Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence that preceded the 
creation of the first non-statutory based compensation scheme in the UK, it was 
acknowledged that “personal injury might arise from a great variety of offences”25 but 
it did not provide a comprehensive list of crimes whose victims might apply for 
                                                          
22 See paragraph 4.2.4.1 in chapter 4. 
23 See paragraph 1.1 in chapter 1 and paragraph 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4. 
24 See paragraphs 4-6 of the UK 2012 Scheme and section 3 of the Dutch Act. 
25 “Crimes of violence (compensation for victims)” HC Deb 05 May 1964 vol 694 cc1127-243 available 
at <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1964/may/05/crimes-of-violence-compensation-
for> (accessed on 13 April 2017). 
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compensation.26 Predictably, the non-statutory scheme created thereafter did not set 
out such a list either.  
However, amendments to the 1964 scheme saw the introduction of the words “crime 
of violence” in 1969.27 As amended, the scheme sought to provide compensation in 
circumstances where someone had sustained “personal injury directly attributable to 
a crime of violence (including arson and poisoning).”28 The first statutory scheme that 
was created in 1996, as well as the subsequent schemes have used similar wording. 
Paragraph 8 of both the UK 2001 Scheme and UK 2008 Scheme stated that, for the 
purposes of the respective schemes, a “criminal injury” referred to an injury sustained 
in the UK which was directly attributable to  
“(a) a crime of violence (including arson, fire-raising or an act of poisoning); or  
(b) an offence of trespass on a railway; or  
(c) the apprehension or attempted apprehension of an offender or a suspected offender, the 
prevention or attempted prevention of an offence, or the giving of help to any constable who is 
engaged in any such activity.” 
The term “crime of violence” was not defined by either of the earlier schemes. This 
approach presented considerable difficulty to the authorities responsible for 
determining whether compensation may be awarded.29 As a result, various attempts 
were made to define what is meant by the phrase for the purposes of the earlier 
schemes.30 In R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Clowes,31 Wien J held 
that “a crime of violence means some crime which by definition as applied to the 
particular facts of a case involves the possibility of violence to another person.”32 
Widgery J stated that a “crime of violence is a crime which is accompanied by 
violence”33 and agreed with counsel for the Criminal Injuries Board that it “should mean 
a crime of which violence is an essential ingredient.”34 
                                                          
26 R (on the application of Jones) v First-tier Tribunal [2013] 2 All ER 625; [2013] UKSC 19 para 7. 
27 Para 7. 
28 Para 7. 
29 See P Duff “Criminal Injuries Compensation: The Scope of the New Scheme” (1989) 52(4) Modern 
Law Review 518 526. See also P Duff “The Measure of Criminal Injuries Compensation: Political 
Pragmatism or Dog's Dinner?” (1998) 18(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 105 105-142. 
30 R (on the application of Jones) v First-tier Tribunal [2013] 2 All ER 625; [2013] UKSC 19 para 12. 
31 [1977] 3 All ER 854 at 859. 
32 862. 
33 864. 
34 864. 
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In R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Warner,35 the court rejected Wien 
J’s view as being too wide and because “the possibility of violence arising out of a 
criminal offence is not sufficient by itself to make that offence a crime of violence”. The 
court instead endorsed the approach of Widgery J, i.e. the view that a crime of violence 
is one where the “definition of the crime itself involves either direct infliction of force on 
the victim, or at least a hostile act directed towards the victim or class of victims.”36 On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal held that, because the UK government made funds 
available for the payment of compensation without being under a statutory duty to do 
so, it followed that “the court should not construe the scheme as if it were a statute but 
as a public announcement of what the government was willing to do. This entails the 
court deciding what would be a reasonable and literate man’s understanding of the 
circumstances in which he could under the scheme be paid compensation for personal 
injury caused by a crime of violence.”37 What mattered most, the court continued, was 
to determine the nature of the crime, not its likely consequences:38  
“Most crimes of violence will involve the infliction or threat of force but some may not. I do not 
think it prudent to attempt a definition of words of ordinary usage in English which the board, as 
a fact finding body, have to apply to the case before them. They will recognise a crime of violence 
when they hear about it, even though as a matter of semantics it may be difficult to produce a 
definition which is not too narrow or so wide as to produce absurd consequences”. 
The same point was made in C, Petitioner,39 where it was added that the actual or 
probable consequences of the criminal act may be relevant only insofar as they cast 
light on the nature of the criminal act, but that for their own sake the consequences 
will not be determinative. This line of reasoning was adopted in a subsequent 
judgment40 as the “leading authority on the construction of ‘crime of violence’”.41 
More recently, considering the meaning of “crime of violence” under the UK 2001 
Scheme, the Supreme Court noted that it is for the tribunal42 who decides a case to 
                                                          
35 [1985] 2 All ER 1069 at 1073; [1986] QB 184 at 195.  
36 [1977] 3 All ER 854 at 195.  
37 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Warner [1986] 2 All ER 478 at 480. 
38 482. 
39 1999 SC 551 at 557. 
40 See R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel, ex p August, R v Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Appeals Panel, ex p Brown [2001] 2 All ER 874, [2001] QB 774. 
41 R (on the application of Jones) v First-tier Tribunal [2013] 2 All ER 625, [2013] UKSC 19 para 15. 
42 The First-Tier Tribunal (Criminal Injuries Compensation) is responsible for handling appeals by 
victims of violent crime where they disagree with a decision by a claims officer of the CICA about 
compensation: see <https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/first-tier-tribunal-criminal-injuries-
compensation> (accessed on 11 April 2017).  
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determine whether the words “a crime of violence” applies to the facts which have 
been proved:43 
“Built into that phrase, there are two questions that the tribunal must consider. The first is whether, 
having regard to the facts which have been proved, a criminal offence has been committed. The 
second is whether, having regard to the nature of the criminal act, the offence that was committed 
was a crime of violence. I agree […] that it is primarily for the tribunals, not the appellate courts, 
to develop a consistent approach to these issues, bearing in mind that they are peculiarly well 
fitted to determine them. A pragmatic approach should be taken to the dividing line between law 
and fact […] An appeal court should not venture too readily into this area by classifying issues as 
issues of law which are really best left for determination by the specialist appellate tribunals. The 
question whether a criminal offence has been committed is a question for the tribunal, having 
informed itself as to what the law requires for proof of that offence, to determine as a matter of 
fact. The question whether the nature of the criminal act amounted to a crime of violence may or 
may not raise an issue of fact for the tribunal to determine. This will depend on what the law 
requires for proof of the offence. […] The range of acts that fall within the broad definition may 
vary quite widely, so the question whether there was a crime of violence will have to be 
determined by looking at the nature of what was done.”  
The UK 2012 Scheme sought to provide more guidance on this issue. Paragraph 4 of 
the scheme states that persons may be eligible for compensation “if they sustain a 
criminal injury which is directly attributable to their being a direct victim of a crime of 
violence committed in a relevant place.” Although the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Authority (“CICA”) states in its guide to the UK 2012 Scheme (“UK 2012 Scheme 
Guide”) that there is “no legal definition of the term ‘a crime of violence’”,44 paragraph 
2(1) of Annexure B to the scheme states that: 
“a ‘crime of violence’ is a crime which involves: (a) a physical attack; (b) any other act or omission 
of a violent nature which causes physical injury to a person; (c) a threat against a person, causing 
fear of immediate violence in circumstances which would cause a person of reasonable firmness 
to be put in such fear; (d) a sexual assault to which a person did not in fact consent; or (e) arson 
or fire-raising.”  
Paragraph 2(2) immediately adds that an act or omission “will not constitute a crime 
of violence unless it is done either intentionally or recklessly.” The issue of the 
offender’s state of mind will be discussed as a separate matter in paragraph 5.4 below. 
By giving content to the term in this way, the UK 2012 Scheme deviates from the 
approach adopted by its predecessors. The attempt by the legislature to provide a 
more precise description of the term may be understood against the background of 
the courts experiencing difficulty in giving a consistent interpretation to a relatively wide 
                                                          
43 R (on the application of Jones) v First-tier Tribunal [2013] 2 All ER 625, [2013] UKSC 19 paras 16-
18.  
44 CICA A Guide to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (“UK 2012 Scheme Guide”) 
(2012) 7.  
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concept, and should be viewed as a legislative effort to give guidance to the claims 
officers and specialist tribunals who must decide on the issue of eligibility.45  
Arguably, a clearer explanation of the term also provides potential applicants with 
more certainty regarding the success of their claim. It might therefore be said that it 
improves the consistency in adjudication and contributes toward improved access to 
justice, certainty and transparency. These are valuable lessons that should be heeded 
by the South African legislature if it decides to enact a compensation scheme. 
In a consultation document, the Ministry of Justice states that this definition of a crime 
of violence will give effect to the legislature’s core purpose, namely to give priority to 
the following serious crimes: “Murder and manslaughter, rape, sexual violence, 
terrorism, and violent crimes such as wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with 
intent”.46 
The scheme’s scope is limited insofar as sexual assault may only be considered as a 
violent crime if the victim “did not in fact consent”.47 In this regard, the scheme 
therefore excludes those victims who, although they cannot be said to have consented 
in law, had consented in fact to the sexual activity which caused their injuries.48 This 
issue will be discussed further in the recommendation that is set out in paragraph 
5.2.1.3 below.  
Against the above background and when compared to compensation schemes in other 
jurisdictions, the inclusion of arson or fire-raising may appear anomalous. However, 
the UK legislature takes the view that these should always be considered to be a crime 
of violence because they “in almost all cases are nonetheless very likely to cause, or 
create a very serious risk of, bodily injury.”49 Although consistent with previous 
schemes,50 it is not in line with the other examples of a crime of violence listed in the 
paragraph and incompatible with the judicial approach endorsed by the Supreme 
                                                          
45 See generally Miers (2014) Legal Studies 242-258; Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and 
Witnesses (2012) 50-55; Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses: the Government 
Response (2012) 39-48.  
46 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 11.  
47 Paragraph 2(1)(d) of Annexure B of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
48 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 258-259.  
49 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 53. 
50 For instance, see the UK 2001 Scheme and the UK 2008 Scheme. 
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Court, which focuses not on the consequences of an act, but rather on its nature to 
establish its criminality.51  
The term “crime of violence” is further given meaning by the remainder of Annexure 
B, which contains a series of incidents that will not be regarded as crimes of violence 
under the UK 2012 Scheme. For example, where an injury results from suicide or 
attempted suicide, the use of a vehicle or an animal attack, they are excluded from the 
scheme’s cover.52 The current scheme does, however, provide that it may be a crime 
of violence where the suicidal person intended to cause injury. This is a departure from 
earlier schemes which did not deal with this issue in express terms. It has arguably 
been included because it will provide certainty and contribute in avoiding unnecessary 
applications or litigation. 
Furthermore, the scheme expressly excludes conduct that gives rise to injuries 
sustained in the usual course of sporting or other activities to which a person may 
have voluntarily consented.53 Also, injuries which are sustained in utero as a result of 
harmful substances willingly ingested by the mother during pregnancy will not be 
regarded as a crime of violence for the purposes of the scheme.54 
A proposal regarding the meaning of the term “crime of violence” for a potential South 
African compensation scheme will be made in paragraph 5.2.5 once all of the eligibility 
criteria of the UK 2012 Scheme and the Dutch Fund have been discussed. 
 
5.2.1.1.2 The meaning of “direct victim” and “directly attributable” 
Paragraph 4 of the UK 2012 Scheme states that only those individuals who suffer 
criminal injuries that are “directly attributable to their being a direct victim of a crime of 
violence committed in a relevant place” will be eligible for compensation. This differs 
from earlier schemes,55 in terms of which a criminal injury is regarded as a personal 
injury, being “an injury sustained in and directly attributable to an act occurring in Great 
                                                          
51 See R (on the application of Jones) v First-tier Tribunal [2013] 2 All ER 625, [2013] UKSC 19.   
52 Paragraph 4 of Annexure B of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
53 Paragraph 4(1)(d) of Annexure B of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
54 Paragraph 4(1)(e) of Annexure B of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
55 See paragraphs 8-9 of the UK 2001 Scheme and the UK 2008 Scheme.  
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Britain”. In R v CICB, ex parte Williams,56 the court held that “directly attributable” 
implies an approach that is narrower than the concept of causation in the common law 
of negligence.57 It has been understood to mean something narrower than 
foreseeability.58  
A “direct victim” is described as “someone who was directly injured by an assailant”59 
and therefore seems to repeat what is meant with directly attributable. Whether or not 
this additional emphasis on the “directness” of the nexus that is required to exist 
between the victim’s harm and the perpetrator’s conduct will make a practical 
difference may be doubted. At the very least, however, the fact that the new scheme 
contains two references to the nature of the injury’s aetiology (“directly attributable” 
and “direct victim”) highlights the intention to constrain the scope of the UK 2012 
Scheme’s cover to a certain class of victim.  
 
5.2.1.1.3 The focus on blameless victims 
A significant feature of the UK 2012 Scheme is that it “is intended to compensate 
blameless victims of crimes of violence”60 who co-operate with the criminal justice 
process.61 Like its predecessors, the UK 2012 Scheme contains a series of 
circumstances in which an award will be withheld or reduced on the basis that the 
victim of the crime is for some or other reason wholly or partly to blame for their harm.62  
For example, an award may be withheld where the incident giving rise to the criminal 
injury has not been reported to the police “as soon as reasonably practicable.”63 When 
deciding whether something has been so reported, the CICA may consider whether 
the victim was too young to report the incident, lacked the mental capacity to report it, 
                                                          
56 [2000] PIQR Q339 para 40. 
57 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 249.  
58 249.  
59 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 7. 
60 30. 
61 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 50. See also Miers (2014) Legal Studies 
258. 
62 See paragraphs 22-29 read together with Annexure D of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
63 See paragraphs 22(a) and (b) of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
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or if the effect of their injuries meant that they were unable to provide a full report to 
the police immediately.64  
Similarly, an award may be withheld unless the applicant has co-operated as far as 
reasonably practicably in bringing the assailant to justice.65 In this regard, it is 
unnecessary for the offender to be identified or convicted for the victim to receive 
compensation.66 However, the CICA requires victims to have done “everything 
possible”67 to help the police apprehend the assailant, and “bring them to justice.”68 
As justification for such a high level of co-operation, the compensation authority refers 
to the publicly funded nature of the scheme, which implies that victims must be willing 
to cooperate fully with the investigation of crime before receiving money that ultimately, 
albeit indirectly, comes from innocent, tax-paying members of the public.69  
Furthermore, the CICA may withhold or reduce awards where the victims failed to take 
all reasonable steps to assist a claims officer in the consideration of their application.70  
Although the scheme does not provide an indication of what is meant with reasonable 
steps, the UK 2012 Scheme Guide, states that, if the victim failed to inform the CICA 
of a change in address or circumstances, or repeatedly and without reasonable excuse 
failed to respond to CICA communications, or failed to inform the CICA of “something 
that could affect [their] claim”,71 it may justify withholding or reducing their 
compensation award.   
Lastly, awards may be withheld or reduced where the victim provides false or 
exaggerated details about their injuries or if they fail to attend a medical examination 
aimed at a verification of their injuries.72  
The above provisions are rational and could be used to reinforce the criminal justice 
system.73 Indeed, it is conceivable that the incentive of receiving compensation may 
                                                          
64 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 29; paragraph 22 of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
65 See paragraph 23 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
66 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 29. 
67 29. 
68 29. 
69 29. 
70 Paragraph 24 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
71 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 29-30. 
72 30. 
73 See also SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 88-89. 
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actually increase the rate of reporting and co-operation with the police.74 It will be 
proposed that they be included in a South African compensation fund, if it were to be 
established. Of course, the incorporation of this approach by the South African 
legislature should also pay heed to the particular challenges faced by the South 
African context, e.g. numerous crime victims who live in rural areas may find it difficult 
to approach police and to immediately report crimes to the police. This is only one 
example and the legislature would be well advised to examine similar challenges 
posed by South African conditions prior to the enactment of the proposed fund.   
A different ground for reduction or withholding is mentioned in paragraph 25 of the 
scheme. It refers to situations where the conduct of the applicant “before, during or 
after the incident giving rise to the criminal injury makes it inappropriate to make an 
award.”75 A conclusive list is not provided, but the UK 2012 Scheme Guide provides 
the following examples: where the victim acted in an aggressive or threatening way 
and provoked the incident in question, where he intended to provoke an assault or 
fight, or where he willingly took part in a fight or sought revenge.76 The CICA will not 
accept intoxication as an excuse for such conduct77 but at the same time will not 
reduce or withhold a compensation award solely because the victim consumed alcohol 
or used drugs, which made them more vulnerable to being harmed.78  
Significantly, if an applicant has a criminal record, even under circumstances where 
he is blameless in the incident that gave rise to his injury, his application may be 
refused or reduced.79 The current scheme identifies the circumstances in which an 
award will be withheld or reduced and deals with the situation where the applicant has 
“unspent convictions.”80 Broadly speaking, an award will be refused to someone who 
on the date of their application has an unspent conviction which resulted in either a 
custodial sentence or a community order.81 It should be noted, however that an 
applicant with an unspent conviction, who did not receive a custodial sentence or a 
                                                          
74 88-89. 
75 See paragraph 25 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
76 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 30. 
77 Paragraph 25 of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
78 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 30. 
79 Paragraph 26 of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
80 Paragraph 26 of the UK 2012 Scheme. See also Annexure D to the UK 2012 Scheme for a full list of 
such circumstances; CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 49. 
81 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 46. See further paragraph 3 of Annexure 
D of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
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community order, may receive compensation from the scheme in exceptional 
circumstances and compensation authorities are given a degree of discretion to make 
the necessary decision.82  
It is therefore clear that the scheme focuses on compensating “blameless victims of 
crimes of violence.”83 This differentiation between deserving and undeserving victims 
is also characteristic of earlier UK schemes and is justified as follows:84 
“We acknowledge that our proposals in relation to the Scheme rules on unspent convictions […] 
could impact […] on those who have on their record relatively minor unspent convictions. 
However, we consider that tougher rules are warranted. The Scheme is a taxpayer-funded 
expression of public sympathy and it is reasonable that there should be strict criteria around who 
is deemed ‘blameless’ for the purpose of determining who should receive a share of its limited 
funds. We consider that, in principle, awards should only be made to those who have themselves 
obeyed the law and not cost society money through their offending behaviour.”  
 
5.2.1.2 The Dutch Fund 
5.2.1.2.1 Giving meaning to the term “a crime of violence” 
Sections 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Dutch Act states that the fund will compensate the 
victims of violent crimes caused intentionally within the Netherlands and who suffer 
serious bodily or psychiatric injuries, as well as the victims of intentionally-caused 
violent crime that occurred on board a Dutch ship or aeroplane outside the 
Netherlands and who have suffered serious bodily or psychiatric injuries.  
The fund’s accompanying policy document, the Beleidsbundel Schadenfonds 
Geweldsmisdrijven (“Beleidsbundel”),85 provides greater clarity regarding the 
scheme’s eligibility criteria. It states that the term “violent crime” refers to a punishable 
crime, or criminal attempt, as understood in terms of the Dutch Criminal Code, where 
violence is used, or threatened to be used, against the victim.86 Therefore, if an 
incident is not punishable as a crime in terms of the Criminal Code, it cannot give rise 
                                                          
82 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 46. See also paragraph 4 of Annexure 
D of the UK 2012 Scheme.   
83 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 29. 
84 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 59.   
85 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017). 
86 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5. 
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to a violent crime for purposes of compensation under the scheme.87 Violence may 
consist of bodily88 or psychiatric violence.89  
This approach seems to be clearer and simpler than the one adopted by the UK 2012 
Scheme and, as indicated below, it is suggested that the South African legislature 
adopt a similar position, if a compensation scheme were to be enacted.  
Nevertheless, the Beleidsbundel identifies crimes that will always be classified as 
violent crime: assault, public violence, threats of violence, trafficking, harassment, 
rape, violent robbery and murder.90 Unlike the UK 2012 Scheme, arson will only be 
regarded as a violent crime if the fire was started intentionally and then posed danger 
to life or a risk of serious injury to a potential victim.91 Placing a victim under severe 
psychiatric pressure may also amount to a violent crime.92 No definition is given as to 
what would constitute extreme pressure, but the Beleidsbundel expressly states that 
it may include sexual crimes.93 Lastly, violent acts committed against property, theft 
and insult are expressly excluded as violent crimes.94  
Similar to the UK 2012 Scheme, the Dutch Fund also emphasises that conduct may 
only qualify as a violent crime if it was caused intentionally.95 As stated earlier, 
attention will be paid to this topic in paragraph 5.4 below. 
  
5.2.1.2.2 Causation  
A notable difference between the Dutch Fund and its UK counterpart is the fact that 
neither the Dutch Act nor the Beleidsbundel indicate the nature of the causal link that 
is required to exist between the perpetrator’s conduct and the victim’s injury. It is 
therefore unclear whether a victim is expected to prove, in the same way as under the 
UK 2012 Scheme, that he was a “direct victim” of a violent crime or whether his injury 
                                                          
87 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5. See also HSG Beleidsbundel (2016). 
88 “Lichamelijk geweld” – see HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5. See also HSG Beleidsbundel (2016). 
89 “Psychische geweld” – see HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5. See also HSG Beleidsbundel (2016). 
90 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5. 
91 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5. 
92 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5. 
93 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5. 
94 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5. 
95 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5. See also HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
261 
 
was “directly attributable” to the violent crime. Indeed, it is not clear whether another 
causal measure, e.g. reasonable foreseeability, may suffice for the purposes of the 
Dutch scheme. In this regard, as indicated below, the approach adopted by the UK 
Scheme 2012 appears to be preferable. 
  
5.2.1.2.3 Focus on the blameless victim 
When compared to the UK 2012 Scheme, the Dutch Fund does not have the same 
exaggerated focus on blameless victims. For example, the Beleidsbundel states that 
reporting a violent crime is not a requirement when applying for compensation.96 
However, practically speaking, a victim’s statement to the police, as well as the 
ensuing criminal investigation provides the evidentiary basis upon which the Dutch 
Fund determines the plausibility of the incident.97 Therefore, the Dutch Fund advises 
potential victims to report the incident to the police as soon as possible. Unlike the UK 
2012 Scheme, however, it is not a formal ground for potential reduction or withholding 
of an award. Similarly, the Dutch Fund and the Dutch Act is silent on the matter of prior 
convictions.  
Notwithstanding the above, section 5 of the Dutch Act stipulates that compensation 
may be withheld or reduced if the victim’s injury is the result of circumstances for which 
the victim or the relative may be held partly responsible. As in the UK, the underlying 
purpose in this context is to compensate those who, through no fault of their own, fall 
victim to violent crime.98 The Beleidsbundel therefore similarly explains that paying the 
maximum amount of compensation to someone who partly contributed towards his 
own harm is inappropriate, considering the fact that damages are paid with money 
funded from other innocent, tax-paying members of the public.99  
To determine whether the applicant contributed towards his own harm, the Dutch Fund 
will consider whether he could, and should, have foreseen the harm arising and 
whether he could, and should, have taken steps to avoid it.100 Essentially, this appears 
                                                          
96 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 6. See also HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5-6 
97 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 6. See also HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 5-6 
98 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 11. 
99 11. 
100 11. 
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to be a guideline that aims to establish whether the victim was negligent and whether 
such negligent conduct contributed towards the victim’s harm. To provide further 
guidance on the issue, the Beleidsbundel describes a number of situations where it 
may be held that the victim contributed to his own harm and how compensation may 
be calculated in such circumstances.101 
The approach adopted by the Dutch Fund as well as the UK 2012 Scheme 
corresponds with the position in the South African law of delict, insofar as it may be 
said that, broadly speaking, the latter also takes note of victims’ culpable contribution 
towards their own harm when assessing the amount of damages that is ultimately 
payable by a wrongdoer to the victim.102 Generally, the South African legislature, if it 
decides to set up a statutory compensation fund, should consider following a similar 
approach.  
Before elaborating on this suggestion, it should be noted, however, that there is some 
debate as to whether a victim’s contributory negligence should be considered where 
the wrongdoer’s harm-causing conduct was intentional.103 More specifically, should a 
person who acted intentionally in causing harm to another be allowed to rely on the 
other person’s negligence in order to reduce the amount of compensation payable to 
the victim? In this context, Neethling and Potgieter take the view that “a defendant who 
has intentionally caused harm to the plaintiff will not be able to ask for a reduction of 
damages because of contributory negligence [on the part of the plaintiff]”.104 However, 
there is some debate on this topic and it has been suggested that, “in instances of 
voluntary assumption of risk where consent is invalid, contributory intent could be an 
applicable defence leading to the exclusion of liability.”105 A thorough analysis of this 
debate falls outside the scope of this dissertation, but the suggestion made below 
should be informed by this debate and the legislature, if it indeed decides to enact a 
compensation scheme, should consider it before making a final suggestion.106 
                                                          
101 See HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 11-12 for these circumstances. 
102 Section 1(1)(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 allows for the reduction of the 
damages payable by a defendant if the plaintiff’s culpable conduct contributed towards his own harm 
See further MM Loubser & JR Midgley (eds) 2 ed (2012) The Law of Delict in South Africa 436. 
103 See Neethling & Potgieter The Law of Delict 169; R Ahmed Contributory Intent as a Defence Limiting 
or Excluding Delictual Liability (2011) Unpublished LLM thesis University of South Africa. 
104 Neethling & Potgieter The Law of Delict 169; PQR Boberg The Law of Delict Volume One: Aquilian 
Liability (1989) 741. 
105 Ahmed Contributory Intent 150.  
106 For a full discussion of this debate, see generally Ahmed Contributory Intent. 
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It is suggested that, if the legislature were to enact the proposed scheme, it should 
provide for discretion to decide whether compensation may be withheld or reduced in 
the event that the victim’s injury is the result of circumstances for which he was partly 
responsible. To decide whether the victim was so responsible, the proposed fund 
should refer to the common-law tests for intention and negligence. It is further 
proposed that, similar to the UK 2012 Scheme and Dutch Fund, the proposed scheme 
should ultimately make its decision based on the nature and severity of the victim’s 
injuries, the circumstances under which it was inflicted and the degree to which it may 
be said that the victim’s culpability contributed to his harm. To help it make 
assessments, the legislature may further consider providing the fund with a list of 
guiding principles and scenarios in the same way in which the Beleidsbundel offers 
some policy-based guidance to the compensation authorities responsible for the Dutch 
Fund.107 This proposal would allow the proposed fund with flexibility in its decision-
making, which it could implement to ensure the financial viability of the fund and to 
give effect to the notion of protecting innocent tax-payers as well as crime victims.  
 
5.2.1.3 Conclusion: victims of violent crimes caused intentionally 
The Dutch Fund applies the established criminal law meaning to the term “crime of 
violence”. Making use of settled legal concepts and terminology has the following 
advantages. It provides prospective applicants with legal certainty and in doing so also 
promotes the right to access to justice. Furthermore, it is arguably more likely that the 
Dutch Fund would apply settled terminology in a consistent manner than terminology 
that must be given content during its application. In addition, it may provide 
compensation authorities and applicants with certainty about the eligibility of claims on 
this point and thereby decrease the possibility of unnecessary applications or potential 
litigation.  
The Dutch approach seems simpler and clearer than the one adopted in the UK, where 
the tradition seems to be not to define the concept precisely. Although the UK 2012 
Scheme seeks to provide content to the term when compared to earlier schemes, it 
                                                          
107 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017). 
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may still be regarded as a relatively wide concept and it may therefore continue to 
present difficulties insofar as its consistent application is concerned. 
It is therefore recommended that the proposed scheme aligns the meaning of the term 
“crime of violence” with the meaning which may be ascribed to that term under South 
African criminal law. This means that a prospective applicant should be asked to 
provide the compensation authorities with sufficient evidence so as to allow the latter 
to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that he has suffered harm arising from a 
violent crime – as that term is understood in criminal law. The policy outcome achieved 
in this regard is in line with the UK 2012 Scheme and the Dutch Fund as well as most 
other statutory crime victim compensation schemes.108 Furthermore, similar to the 
proposal made below regarding causation, this outcome would enhance the fund’s 
financial viability, while at the same time improving the compensatory regime relating 
to a substantial category of crime victims in South Africa. In this way, a balance might 
be achieved between the interests of crime victims, the financial position of the 
proposed fund as well as the innocent taxpayers who might be indirectly involved in 
the set-up of the compensatory scheme.  
In the South African context, it is suggested that the following crimes should 
specifically be recorded as violent crimes: crimes against life (murder); crimes against 
the person (assault, including common assault and assault with the intention to do 
grievous bodily harm); rape (as defined in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007); and other sexual offences (as the term 
is defined in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act). Furthermore, in line with both foreign compensation schemes, it is recommended 
that the proposed fund should expressly exclude property damage and theft as a form 
of violent crime. 
Under the UK 2012 Scheme, it is generally stated that a person who has consented in 
fact to a sexual assault may not claim compensation from the fund. It is proposed that 
the South African legislature adopt a similar position regarding consent. In this context, 
concern may be noted about the well-being of children, and other vulnerable 
categories of people, who factually consented to sexual offences.109 Therefore, it is 
                                                          
108 See generally Greer Compensating Crime Victims. 
109 See also J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4 ed (2013) 614-618. 
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proposed that the legislature adopt a similar strategy to the one formulated by the UK 
2012 Scheme on this point:110 
“Current practice assumes that a child under 13 who is the victim of sexual assault will be eligible 
for compensation if an offence is reported to the police and the child co-operates so far as 
reasonably practical with the CJS. Between 13 and 15 a more difficult assessment must be made 
in each case. Consensual sexual activity between young people in this age group who are of 
similar age and circumstances should not attract criminal injuries compensation. However, the 
more unbalanced a sexual relationship involving a young person becomes, the more likely it is 
that he or she will suffer harm such that they should be compensated (whether they in fact 
consented or not). Factors that claims officers consider in assessing this include age and 
emotional maturity (and the disparity in either), vulnerability, the reality of consent in all the 
circumstances, and the nature of the relationship between the parties.”   
Under the UK 2012 Scheme, injuries arising from the use of a vehicle is not regarded 
as a crime of violence, unless the vehicle was used with the intent to cause an injury.111 
In this context, it is proposed that, where an injury arises as a result of the driving of a 
motor vehicle, the victim, or his relatives, should have regard to the Road Accident 
Fund Act 56 of 1996 ( “RAF Act”) as it already provides cover for harm arising from 
motor vehicle accidents.112 Furthermore, it is recommended that the proposed fund 
adopt the UK 2012’s Scheme in relation to harm that arises from a suicide.113  
With regards to the question of causation, it is arguable that the degree of strictness 
with which the standard of causation is formulated influences the extent of a 
compensation fund’s exposure, and hence its viability. As a result, setting a stricter 
standard may further the fund’s viability and provide a clear guideline for prospective 
victims. As indicated, the Dutch Act is silent on the question, whereas the UK 2012 
Scheme insists on a direct causal connection between the victim’s injuries and the 
perpetrator’s conduct. In the interest of financial viability, clarity and consistent 
application, it is recommended that the legislature adopt a similar approach to the one 
set out in the UK 2012 Scheme. It may be noted that this proposal would mean that 
there is a difference between the approaches adopted by the statutory compensation 
                                                          
110 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 54.  
111 Paragraph 4(1)(b) of Annexure B of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
112 If legislation for establishment of the fund is enacted, the legislature should consider whether a 
person may claim against the proposed fund where another person has used a motor vehicle as a 
weapon to commit an intentionally-committed crime. If the legislature decides to allow such a claim, it 
must be ensured that the same victim does not receive further compensation under the RAF so as to 
avoid double compensation.  
113 Paragraph 4(1)(a) of Annexure B of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
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scheme and the common law of delict.114 For the reasons mentioned above, it is 
contended that such difference may be justified.  
Both schemes focus on the compensation of innocent victims insofar as it may be said 
that compensation awards may be reduced or withheld where the victim’s culpable 
conduct contributed towards his injury. This approach is commendable, considering 
also that it is in line with section 1(1)(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act, which 
regulates this topic in other cases. As stated above, the proposed scheme should have 
sufficient discretion to reduce or withhold compensation in the event that the victim is 
partly responsible for his own harm, with attention being paid to the circumstances of 
the case, the nature and degree of his injury and the degree of the victim’s culpable 
contribution to his own injury. In addition, it is proposed that the UK 2012 Scheme’s 
stricter stance on criminal convictions be adopted, insofar as the proposed fund should 
be entitled to take any spent or unspent convictions into account when determining 
whether a compensation award should be withheld or reduced. As explained above, 
the differentiation between deserving and undeserving victims may be justified on the 
basis that tough rules are required. Indeed, the justification offered by the UK’s Ministry 
of Justice for the stricter rules introduced into the UK 2012 Scheme is also applicable 
in this context:115  
“The Scheme is a taxpayer-funded expression of public sympathy and it is reasonable that there 
should be strict criteria around who is deemed ‘blameless’ for the purpose of determining who 
should receive a share of its limited funds. [Broadly speaking, it is proposed] that, in principle, 
awards should only be made to those who have themselves obeyed the law and not cost society 
money through their offending behaviour.” 
Lastly, the legislature should consider providing discretionary powers to the 
administrative authority responsible for assessing applications so that it would be 
possible for an applicant with a criminal record who suffered harm arising from crime 
to receive statutory compensation under exceptional circumstances.116  
 
                                                          
114 For a discussion of the principles relating to causation in the common law of delict, see MM Loubser 
& JR Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 69-102; J Neethling & J Potgieter The 
Law of Delict  7 ed (2015) 183-219. 
115 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 59.   
116 See Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 46. See also paragraph 4 of 
Annexure D of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
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5.2.2 Witnesses of violent crimes who sustain mental injuries 
5.2.2.1 The UK 2012 Scheme 
The UK 2012 Scheme allows a claim for mental injury if it is directly attributable to a 
person witnessing, and being present at, an incident in which a loved one sustained a 
criminal injury in the circumstances described in paragraph 5.2.1 above or paragraph 
5.2.4 below.117 Similarly, persons may be eligible for compensation if the mental injury 
they suffer from is directly attributable to witnessing the immediate aftermath of an 
incident in which a loved one was criminally injured in those circumstances.118  
It should not be too difficult to determine whether someone was present and witnessed 
an intentionally-caused violent crime. However, it may be more difficult to give content 
to “immediate aftermath”. In accordance with the UK 2012 Scheme Guide it refers to 
“the period of time immediately following the incident in which a loved one was injured 
and not where someone is later told about the incident either by the victim or another 
person.”119 The CICA states that it “will be taken to mean arriving at the scene of the 
incident before the victim is moved to another location,”120 and expressly excludes 
harm that may befall one as a result of “dealing with the police and medical 
authorities”.121  
In this context, “loved one” refers to a person with whom the applicant had a close 
relationship of love and affection at the time of the incident and if the loved one is alive 
at the date of the application, continues to have such a relationship.122 
Miers notes that under a comparable provision of the UK 2001 Scheme123 
compensation could be awarded to victims who suffered mental injuries in the UK 
when witnessing, in real time, the deaths of their loved ones during the terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001.124 Applicants in that 
case were “involved” in the “immediate aftermath” and therefore satisfied the 
                                                          
117 Paragraph 6 of the UK 2012 Scheme; CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 9. 
118 Paragraph 6 of the UK 2012 Scheme; CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 9. 
119 UK 2012 Scheme Guide available at <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/criminal-injuries-compensation-
a-guide> (accessed on 10 April 2017). 
120 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 9. 
121 9. 
122 See Paragraph 6 of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
123 See paragraph 9(b)(ii) of the UK 2001 Scheme. 
124 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 253. 
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requirements under the UK 2001 Scheme.125 However, this will not be possible under 
the UK 2012 Scheme, which requires the violent crime to have been committed in the 
UK or a “relevant place”.126 
Lastly, as indicated in the UK 2012 Scheme Guide, if an applicant institutes a claim 
because he witnessed a violent crime or its immediate aftermath, he must have 
suffered a mental injury as a result and he will be required to provide the compensation 
authorities with medical evidence from a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist 
confirming that this is indeed the case.127 
 
5.2.2.2 The Dutch Fund 
The Dutch Fund may regard those who have witnessed a violent crime or who have 
been directly confronted with the consequences of a violent crime as victims of a 
violent crime for the purposes of section 3(1) of the Act and therefore award them 
compensation for the psychiatric injuries which they obtain.128  
The Beleidsbundel expressly deal with the following two categories of witnesses: those 
who have witnessed a violent crime in which a “naaste”129 has been seriously 
wounded130 or killed, and where a child is the witness of systematic domestic 
violence.131  
Concerning the first category, the Dutch Fund will presume that the victim has suffered 
a compensable psychiatric injury and the witness will therefore not be required to 
advance any medical information in this regard.132 It may therefore be significant to 
determine whether the primary victim may be described as a “naaste”. The fund 
recognises a “naaste” as married or unmarried life partners, children, parents, siblings 
and those individuals who play such an important role within the family of the witness 
                                                          
125 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 253.  
126 See Miers (2014) Legal Studies 253. See paragraph 5.10.2 below for a discussion of what a “relevant 
place” means for the purposes of the scheme. 
127 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 10.  
128 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 10.  
129 A “naaste” may be translated to a “loved one”.  
130 According to the HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) this means a category 4 injury: see HSG Letsellijst 
(2016). 
131 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 10.  
132 10.  
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that their relationship may be equated to that of family members.133 In all other cases, 
i.e. where the witness does not stand in the aforementioned relationship with the 
primary victim of the violent crime, it will not be presumed that the witness suffered a 
psychiatric injury. The victim will accordingly be required to provide sufficient evidence 
of an affective relationship that is worthy of legal protection in the form of compensation 
being paid by the fund, as well as medical information that a psychiatric injury was 
indeed suffered by the witness.134  
Significantly, in relation to this category of witness, it should be noted that 
compensation will only be awarded if the primary victim has also applied for 
compensation under section 3(1) of the Act for the injuries which he sustained as victim 
of an intentionally-caused violent crime. This limitation is justified on the basis that it 
ensures that the latter has indeed been wounded.135  
In the context of a child’s exposure to systematic domestic violence, the Dutch Fund 
distinguishes between children under 12 years and children between the ages of 12 
and 18. With regard to the former, the fund presumes a psychiatric injury, whereas 
children in the latter category are required to prove a serious psychiatric injury for the 
purposes of receiving compensation under the Fund.136 
Neither the Act nor the Beleidsbundel provide a clear indication of when a victim would 
have been directly confronted with the consequences of a violent crime and in this 
regard the clarity provided under the UK 2012 Scheme is to be preferred.  
 
5.2.2.3 Conclusion: witnesses of violent crimes who sustain mental injuries 
Both schemes aim to compensate witnesses of violent crimes as well as those who 
are directly confronted with the consequences or immediate aftermath of violent 
crimes. It is recommended that the proposed fund, if it were to be enacted, should 
follow suit. This would mean that a person who has suffered psychiatric harm due to 
                                                          
133 10.  
134 10.  
135 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 10. In this context, this means that the Dutch Fund would want to 
ascertain that the primary victim did obtain a category 4 injury: see HSG Letsellijst (2016). 
136 HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 8 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
270 
 
witnessing the immediate aftermath of a violent crime would be allowed a statutory 
claim against the proposed fund whereas the common law of delict does not recognise 
a remedy under similar circumstances. This difference in approach between the 
proposed scheme and the common law may nevertheless be justified on the basis 
that, as the Dutch Fund suggests, these people may rightly be regarded as victims of 
violent crimes themselves.  
As indicated in paragraph 5.2.2.1 above, it may be difficult to determine the meaning 
of “immediate aftermath”. In this regard, the UK 2012 Scheme Guide refers to “the 
period of time immediately following the incident in which a loved one was injured and 
not where someone is later told about the incident either by the victim or another 
person.”137 The CICA states that it “will be taken to mean arriving at the scene of the 
incident before the victim is moved to another location,”138 and expressly excludes 
harm that may befall one as a result of “dealing with the police and medical 
authorities”.139 Should the legislature elect to award a claim to people other than those 
who actually witnessed the violent crime, the approach adopted in the UK is preferred 
to the one adopted in the Netherlands, because neither the Dutch Act nor the 
Beleidsbundel provide a clear indication of when a victim would have been directly 
confronted with the consequences of a violent crime. 
To ensure the fund’s financial sustainability, it is suggested that it should also seek to 
place a limit on the category of people eligible to institute statutory claims in this 
category.140 Therefore, it would be necessary to state the relationship between the 
witness and the primary victim of the violent crime. As a result, a definition of “loved 
one” should be provided by the proposed fund. In this context, the approach adopted 
by the UK 2012 Scheme is advisable, especially considering the fact that it would be 
in line with the judicial stance that is taken regarding delictual claims instituted by 
victims of so-called emotional shock.141 By thus stating that a “loved one” is deemed 
                                                          
137 UK 2012 Scheme Guide available at <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/criminal-injuries-compensation-
a-guide> (accessed on 10 April 2017). 
138 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 9. 
139 9. 
140 See the HSG Letsellijst (2016) 8-10 and Annexure E of the UK 2012 Scheme for the categories of 
mental injury victims recognised by the two foreign schemes. See Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for 
Victims and Witnesses (2012) 3, where the Secretary of State emphasises the importance to provide 
financial stability by “focusing resources on the most compelling cases.”  
141 See Road Accident Fund v Sauls 2002 (2) SA 55 (SCA), where it was held that in cases dealing with 
the negligent causation of emotional shock and resultant detectable psychiatric injury, it would not be 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
271 
 
to refer to a person with whom the applicant had a close relationship of love and 
affection at the time of the incident, the proposed fund would potentially cover the 
specific categories of individuals identified by the Dutch Fund (married or unmarried 
life partners, children, parents, siblings and those individuals who play a significant 
role within the family of the witness), while also remaining open to further potential 
categories of victims being recognised.   
In order to further limit the proposed fund’s exposure, these additional 
recommendations may be made. First, it is suggested that, if the proposed fund were 
to compensate people other than those who actually witnessed the violent crime (e.g. 
those who witnessed its immediate aftermath), it should clarify under what conditions 
such a victim would be eligible. In this regard, the approach adopted by the UK 2012 
Scheme is preferred. This means that the victim must have suffered a detectable 
psychiatric injury and would be required to provide the compensation authorities with 
medical evidence from a psychiatrist to confirm that this is indeed the case.142 
It could also be considered, in line with the judicial stance taken in delictual cases, to 
extend the category so as to include those who were later told about the incident by 
the victim or another person.143 The fear of exposing the fund to unlimited liability in 
this way could be tempered by ensuring that the victim proves a recognisable 
psychiatric injury.144 Indeed, it is recommended that, unlike the position that obtains in 
the Netherlands, victims should always be required to do so and that the fund should 
not incorporate a presumption in favour of any category of victim.  
 
                                                          
justifiable to limit such a claim to a defined relationship between the primary and secondary victims, 
such as parent and child, husband and wife, etc. 
142 This would also be in line with the legal position in the South African common law of delict relating 
to compensation for non-patrimonial harm arising from emotional shock insofar as, in that context, “the 
only relevant question should be whether the plaintiff sustained a recognisable psychological lesion”. 
See Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 307. See also Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 (1) SA 202 
(SCA). 
143 See Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 (1) SA 202 (SCA). 
144 See Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 (1) SA 202 (SCA). 
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5.2.3 Relatives of the deceased victims of violent crime 
5.2.3.1 The UK 2012 Scheme  
The scheme awards compensation to the dependants or close bereaved relatives of 
victims who die as a result of the injuries which they sustained in circumstances 
described in paragraphs 5.2.1 above and 5.2.4 below.145 Paragraphs 57-77 of the 
scheme regulate compensation under these circumstances and hold that a dependent 
or a relative may be awarded a bereavement payment,146 a child’s payment,147 a 
dependency payment148 and/or a funeral payment if they fall within the definition of a 
“qualifying relative.”  
A “qualifying relative” is defined in paragraph 59 of the UK 2012 Scheme and refers to 
the spouse or civil partner149 of the deceased who was living with the deceased in the 
same household;150 the unmarried partner of the deceased (other than a spouse or 
civil partner) who was living with them in the same household and had done so for a 
continuous period of at least two years immediately before the deceased’s date of 
death, the former spouse or civil partner of the deceased who was financially 
dependent on the deceased, as well as a parent151 or a child152 of the deceased. 
In terms of paragraphs 61-62 of the scheme, bereavement payments of up to £11,000 
may be made to qualifying relatives. This amount may be less (typically £5,500) where 
the CICA is satisfied that more than one person may be eligible for a bereavement 
payment in respect of the deceased.153 Paragraph 61 of the UK 2012 Scheme 
expressly excludes such a payment from being made to former spouses or partners 
                                                          
145 Paragraph 7 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
146 Paragraphs 61-62.  
147 Paragraphs 63-66. 
148 Paragraphs 67-74.  
149 As understood under the Civil Partnership Act of 2004.  
150 If they did not live in the same household, this must have been because of ill-health or infirmity. See 
CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 10. 
151 According to the CICA, this includes the natural or adoptive parents of the deceased, or a person 
the deceased accepted in the role of parent and who provided the deceased with parental services. 
See CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 10. 
152 The definition of “child” is not limited to a person below the age of 18. It includes adult children, 
unborn children of the deceased (who were conceived before the deceased’s death and born alive after 
they died), or a person who the deceased accepted as their child and who was dependent on the 
deceased for parental services. See CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 10. 
153 See paragraph 62 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
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of the deceased, or if the person was estranged from the deceased at the time of 
death.154  
A child’s payment may be made to a qualifying relative in terms of paragraph 59(f) of 
the UK 2012 Scheme (“a child of the deceased”) who was under 18 at the time of 
death and dependent on the deceased for parental services.155 The period to which a 
child’s payment will relate begins on the date of death and ends on the day before the 
child’s 18th birthday.156 The child’s payment is £2,000 for each full year of the period 
to which the payment relates, proportionally reduced for part years and is calculated 
as a lump sum.157 In addition, the CICA may also award an amount for the expenses 
incurred by a child as a direct result of the “loss of parental services as a claims officer 
considers reasonable.”158  
In this context, it may be noted that the UK 2012 Scheme Guide is silent on the issue 
as to what impact this award may have on the dependent’s action for loss of support 
as a result of the death of a breadwinner.159 However, taken into account that the UK 
2012 Scheme adopts an approach in terms of which the scheme is seen as a last 
resort for compensation, it could be argued that, where a dependent has received 
compensation after instituting the dependent’s claim, the CICA may withhold or reduce 
an award of compensation.160  
Qualifying relatives who were financially or physically dependent on the deceased at 
the time of their death may also claim a so-called dependency payment if they are able 
to show the CICA that the deceased was their “main carer”161 or if they can provide 
evidence to show that the deceased was making a material financial contribution to 
their upkeep.162 
                                                          
154 See CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide.  
155 See also paragraph 63 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
156 Paragraph 64 of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
157 See paragraphs 65-66 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
158 See paragraph 65(b) of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
159 See the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976.  
160 CICA The UK 2012 Scheme Guide 2; see para 98(b) of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
161 See CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 25: “We define a main carer as the person who met the majority 
of your care needs.”   
162 See paragraph 67 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
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To qualify as financially dependent, the deceased victim must have met the conditions 
of paragraph 43 of the UK 2012 Scheme on the date of death.163 This means that, at 
the time of the incident, the deceased must have been in paid work, or, if he was not, 
he must have been in regular paid work for a period of at least three years before the 
incident. If he was not in paid work, he must have had good reasons, e.g. reasons 
relating to his age or caring responsibilities.164 A financial dependency payment will 
not be made if the deceased relied on social security benefits as their main income.165 
The eligible period of payment begins on the date of death, and may end on one of 
the dates set out in paragraph 69 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
Lastly, in accordance with paragraphs 75-77 of the scheme, the CICA will award 
funeral payments if someone has died after sustaining criminal injuries in the 
circumstances described in paragraph 5.2.1 above or paragraph 5.2.4 below.  
Generally, awards of £2,500 are made in this regard and further payment will only be 
made “where receipts or other satisfactory evidence is provided for the costs incurred 
and where those costs are reasonable.”166  
As indicated earlier, the concept of the innocent victim is central to the scheme’s effort 
to narrow eligibility. Therefore, and in accordance with paragraph 28 of the scheme, if 
the behaviour of the victim “led or contributed to the incident in which they were fatally 
injured [the CICA] will not normally make a payment” in any of the above fatal injury 
cases.167 Furthermore, prior criminal convictions may also be taken into account and, 
where the deceased’s convictions or crimes were so serious that to pay for their 
funeral, or to make other payments, would be an inappropriate use of public funds, the 
CICA may refuse payment.168  
 
                                                          
163 See paragraph 70 and 43 of the UK 2012 Scheme. Paragraph 43(2) requires that the applicant: “(a) 
was in paid work on the date of the incident giving rise to the injury, or, in the case of a series of 
incidents, at any time during the series; (b) had been in regular paid work for a period of at least three 
years immediately before the date of the incident giving rise to the injury; or (c) had a good reason for 
not having been in regular paid work for the period mentioned in paragraph (b).”   
164 Paragraph 43 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
165 Paragraph 70 of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
166 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 27.  
167 11.  
168 11. 
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5.2.3.2 The Dutch Fund 
In accordance with section 3(1)(c) of the Act, the relatives of a victim who suffered an 
intentionally-caused violent criminal attack in the Netherlands, as well as the victim of 
an intentionally-caused violent crime aboard a Dutch aeroplane or ship outside the 
borders of the Netherlands and who dies as the result of that crime, are eligible for 
compensation. The Dutch Fund determined that these relatives are entitled to 
compensation for patrimonial as well as non-patrimonial harm.169 Unlike the position 
in the South African law of delict, a relative may also claim damages for non-
patrimonial loss in the form of grief arising from the death of a relative.170  
Section 3(1)(c) of the Act was amended in 2016 so as to expand the scope of potential 
applicants in this category.171 The amended section now provides relief also to the 
relatives of someone who has died as the result of a contravention of section 6 of the 
Dutch Road Traffic Act of 1994 or section 307 of the Dutch Criminal Code. The former 
prohibits road traffic users from causing another person’s death through their negligent 
conduct, while the latter states that any person who, through their own negligence, 
causes the death of another person, shall be liable to imprisonment.  
In justification of this development, reference is made to those “harrowing cases” that 
falls just outside the ambit of the old section 3(1)(c) of the Act, i.e. where the death 
was held to be caused through negligent conduct as opposed to intentional conduct.172 
The Dutch legislature has taken the view that the non-patrimonial harm which the 
relatives suffer in the case of intentional causation of death is comparable to the non-
patrimonial harm suffered when a relative was negligently killed. In an accompanying 
policy document, the Dutch Fund confirms that it will now be tasked to determine 
negligence.173 Senior officials from the Dutch Fund subsequently indicated that in 
determining negligence, regard must be had to the approach adopted in Dutch criminal 
law.174 
                                                          
169 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 10-11.  
170 Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 (1) SA 202 (SCA): “The appellant’s ‘grief’ for her son mentioned in that 
question was clearly not a psychiatric injury […] The appellant’s counsel correctly conceded that no 
damages could be recoverable in respect of such grief.” 
171 The amendment became effective on 1 July 2016. 
172 MM Olman, JCD Van de Weerd & M Zoethout “Dood door schuld en het Schadefonds 
Geweldsmisdrijven” (2016) Verkeersrecht 449 450. 
173 HSG Bijlage bij Beleidsbundel Schadefonds Geweldsmisdrijven: dood door schuld (2016) 2-6. 
174 Olman, Van de Weerd & Zoethout (2016) Verkeersrecht 449-451. 
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Section 3(2) of the Act indicates who may qualify as “relatives” in this context: the non-
legally separated spouse and registered partner of the deceased; the deceased’s 
relatives by blood or marriage (provided that, at the time of the deceased’s death, he 
or she wholly or partly provided maintenance to the applicant); those who lived with 
the deceased within a family context and to whose maintenance the deceased 
contributed through the maintenance of a shared household; blood relatives of the 
deceased in the first degree and in the second degree of consanguinity (parents, 
children, half-brothers and half-sisters).175  
 
5.2.3.3 Conclusion: relatives of the deceased victims of violent crime 
Both schemes compensate the relatives of deceased victims of intentionally-caused 
violent crimes. In this regard, the UK 2012 Scheme provides a much more thorough 
account of the conditions that are required to be met as well as the amounts payable. 
In addition, the UK 2012 Scheme appears to be much more generous in the 
compensation it provides in this context: whereas the Dutch Fund offers up to €5,000, 
the UK 2012 Scheme provides up to £11,000 for fatal criminal injury payments.176 
However, the recent expansion of the fund’s liability with regard to the negligent 
causation of a relative’s death may hold considerable financial implications for the 
Dutch Fund.  
It is suggested that the proposed fund should also compensate the close relatives of 
deceased victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes. It is recommended that the 
definition of a “close relative” should be similar to the definition of a “qualifying relative”, 
as defined in paragraph 59 of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
The purpose behind compensation within this context should be to provide financial 
support where the death of a breadwinner has caused a loss of that support. Put 
differently, the proposed fund should aim to provide compensation in situations similar 
to the ones where the UK 2012 Scheme makes dependency and child payments. This 
would also be in line with financial protection offered through the common-law claim 
for loss of support, with the major difference being the fund’s insistence on the 
                                                          
175 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 11. 
176 See HSG Letsellijst (2016) 1, 8; Annexure E of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
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intentional causation of the breadwinner’s death. In addition, the common-law 
requirements for establishing a common-law claim for the loss of support suffered as 
a result of the death of a breadwinner – i.e. a legal duty of support on the part of the 
deceased breadwinner and a reciprocal right to such support on the side of the victim 
– may also be used by the fund to determine the eligibility of a prospective victim’s 
claim in circumstances where such a victim does not fall within the definition of “close 
relative”.  
It is suggested that the proposed fund should not follow the direction of the Dutch Fund 
regarding the cover provided in case of the negligent causation of a relative’s death 
and should focus solely on instances where relatives were intentionally killed as the 
result of a violent crime.  In the first place, the relatives of people who were killed as a 
result of negligently-caused motor vehicle accidents are currently provided 
compensation under the RAF Act and will also be provided cover under the proposed 
RABS, if it were to be enacted. Furthermore, if the legislature were to recognise 
compensation for the victims of negligently-caused accidents generally, it would be in 
conflict with the ultimate purpose of the compensation, namely compensating the 
victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes and the question may therefore arise 
whether the fund should not provide cover to the victims of all negligently-caused 
crimes. However, such a potential expanded liability of the proposed fund would be 
undesirable from a financial perspective.  
 
5.2.4 People who sustain injuries as a result of taking risks  
5.2.4.1 The UK 2012 Scheme 
The UK 2012 Scheme compensates those who sustain a criminal injury which is 
directly attributable to their taking an exceptional and justified risk in apprehending an 
offender, preventing a crime, containing or remedying the consequences of a crime, 
or assisting a constable who is acting for one or more of the aforementioned 
purposes.177 Broadly stated, the purpose behind this paragraph is to compensate 
those who are accidentally injured while taking an exceptional and justified risk to 
                                                          
177 See paragraph 5(1) of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
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prevent crime.178 These would typically include individuals who engage in law 
enforcement who take exceptional risks, but the provision may also apply to other 
members of the public.179   
The scope of protection offered is limited by paragraph 5(2), which stipulates that, if a 
risk has been taken “in the course of a person’s work”, it will not be considered to be 
exceptional if it would “normally be expected of them in the course of that work.” The 
CICA provides some assistance in interpreting the meaning of “exceptional” and 
“justified”:180 “[W]e will consider if the risk taken was unusual and was not something 
which you had been trained to deal with. When considering if the risk was justified we 
will consider all the circumstances, including the seriousness of the situation, and 
whether there was an immediate threat to those involved.” 
This paragraph therefore limits the number of claims that may be instituted by police 
officers.181 Greer remarks that this is a unique feature of the UK schemes and that it 
“has no equivalent in the European Convention”.182 The Dutch Fund, for instance, 
does not make express provision for this category of victim. Greer explains the history 
and purposes behind this provision as follows:183  
“[D]uring the 1970’s it was found that many claims were being made under this part of the Scheme 
by police officers for what were not really ‘criminal’ injuries. As a result the Scheme was amended 
in 1979 to provide that when the injury arose accidentally out of an act of law enforcement, 
compensation would not be paid ‘unless the Board are satisfied that the applicant was at the time 
taking an exceptional risk which was justified in all the circumstances’ […] This, too, is not an 
easy test to apply. But its effect has been that police officers are now much less likely to obtain 
compensation under the Scheme for injuries sustained in the process of law enforcement. The 
impact on an ordinary member of the public who attempts to prevent a crime or arrest an offender 
is much less significant, since it will not normally be difficult to persuade the Board that he or she 
was taking an ‘exceptional’ risk.” 
 
5.2.4.2 Conclusion: people who sustain injuries as a result of taking risks 
Arguably, it would not be essential to provide cover for this category of victims if the 
South African legislature does decide to enact a compensation scheme for crime 
                                                          
178 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 53. 
179 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 251.  
180 See the UK 2012 Scheme Guide available at <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/criminal-injuries-
compensation-a-guide> (accessed on 10 April 2017). 
181 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 252.  
182 Greer Compensating Crime Victims 596.  
183 597.  
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victims. It is true that police officers, who by virtue of their employment are required to 
take risks, are not eligible for compensation from the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (“COIDA”) in the event that they suffer injuries 
as a result of taking a risk in the pursuit of an offender or the prevention of a crime.184 
However, they nevertheless receive compensation from their employer in such event: 
“Claims for patients that have been injured on duty are paid by the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) and not the Compensation Commissioner. [The employee] will 
therefore not experience problems with the payment of [their] accounts if you submit 
them to SAPS.”185 
Furthermore, other members of the public who take risks in preventing crime and who 
as a result fall victim to intentionally-caused violent crime, will in any event be eligible 
to receive compensation under the general proposed eligibility criteria discussed in 
paragraph 5.2.1 above.  
If the category is not included in the proposed fund, it might be that a small number of 
crime victims may not be compensated. For instance, suppose X burgles Y’s home 
and Z (Y’s neighbour) attempts to capture X, only to sustain bodily injuries while 
accidentally stumbling in his attempt to do so. Without an “exceptional and justified 
risk” category, Z will likely not be eligible for compensation from the proposed fund, 
because, arguably, his injuries were not intentionally caused by X and/or his injuries 
were not “directly attributable” to a violent crime.  
Nevertheless, such an exclusion may be justified on the basis of financial constraints. 
Indeed, by including such a category, the UK 2012 Scheme seeks to award the 
behaviour of certain people, i.e. those who voluntarily engage in risky conduct for the 
benefit of a third party. However admirable that may be, it is subordinate to what should 
perhaps be regarded as the primary goal of the proposed fund (if it were to be 
enacted), namely the compensation of victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes.  
                                                          
184 Section 1(xix)(iii) of the COIDA excludes cover in respect of a member of the South African Police 
Force while employed in terms of section 7 of the Police Act 7 of 1958 who is on “service in defence of 
the Republic” as defined in section 1 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
185 Polmed “Attention Service Providers” available at <http://www.polmed.co.za/injury-on-duty-claims/> 
(accessed on 27 June 2017). The process followed by the SAPS to determine whether a police officer’s 
injury took place during the course and scope of their employment will be similar to the process followed 
by the COIDA. 
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If the proposed fund were to be enacted, the legislature should aim to ensure that it is 
sustainable and that it offers compensation to crime victims over the long-term. This 
will not be possible if the proposed fund were made to compensate an extended variety 
of categories of claimants who are victims of accidents. Furthermore, it may be argued 
that the harm suffered by this category of risk-takers are simply too far removed from 
the actual criminal conduct so that it may be said that, taking into account the proposed 
goal of the fund, it would be unreasonable to hold the fund liable for the voluntary 
decision of the risk-taker to assist his neighbour. In other words, it may be argued that 
this category of claimant should not be compensated by the proposed fund on the 
basis of remoteness, or legal causation. 
 
5.2.5 Conclusion: categories of victims eligible to institute a statutory claim 
against the proposed compensation fund  
In both the UK and the Netherlands, the legislature has enacted publicly-funded 
compensation schemes aimed at recompensing the victims of intentionally-caused 
violent crimes, the relatives of such deceased victims and those who witness a violent 
crime. In the UK a further category is recognised (those who take exceptional risks in 
preventing crime), while the Dutch Fund has looked to compensate a limited class of 
victims whose harm has been brought about in a negligent manner.  
In this section, the approaches adopted by the different schemes have been set out 
and an attempt was made to provide practical suggestions for the legislature, if it 
indeed decides to develop the law of delict by enacting a statutory compensation fund 
for victims of violent crime.  
In summary, it is suggested that the proposed fund should focus primarily on the 
compensation of victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes that were committed in 
South Africa (see further paragraph 5.10.2 below); the close relatives of victims who 
die as a result of such crimes and those who have witnessed violent crimes, or 
experienced its immediate aftermath. As indicated above, it should exclude from its 
cover the category of risk-takers recognised by the UK 2012 Scheme.  
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The fund should expressly state that some acts will be regarded as violent crimes and 
for further guidance, regard must be had to the approach adopted in criminal law. The 
focus of the proposed scheme should be on the compensation of innocent victims who 
did not contribute to their own harm. Lastly, the fund should insist on a direct causal 
relationship between injury and conduct.  
A concluding remark may be made about the UK 2012 Scheme. Ever since the first 
compensation scheme was created in 1964, the UK legislature has struggled to 
delineate the exact scope of eligibility.186 It commences without any clear definition 
and later provided a rather vague definition (a “crime of violence (including arson and 
poisoning”),187 which the compensation authorities and courts apparently struggled to 
apply in a consistent manner. 
When compared to earlier schemes, the UK 2012 Scheme displays the legislature’s 
intention to tighten eligibility criteria188 so that payments are not made in situations that 
fall outside parameters of the scheme’s core purpose, namely to compensate those 
who suffer serious physical or mental injury as the direct result of deliberate violent 
crime of which they are the innocent victim.189 It also gives a clearer indication of what 
the eligibility criteria is, e.g. for the first time providing a definition of a “crime of 
violence”.  
Although such a narrowing of the scheme’s scope may be regarded as harsh because 
it will exclude certain victims of other crimes, it may arguably be justified on the basis 
of the scheme’s financial position and the availability of economic resources.190 
Ultimately, because financial resources are limited and South Africa faces many other 
                                                          
186 Duff (1989) Modern Law Review 518-519. 
187 Duff (1989) Modern Law Review 526. 
188 For another example of where the eligibility criteria has been narrowed, see paragraph 2(1)(c) of 
Annexure B as read against the background to paragraph 4 of the UK 2012 Scheme. It seems that 
conduct may amount to a crime of violence if it involves a threat of violence against the direct victim 
and causes that person fear of immediate violence in circumstances which would cause a person of 
reasonable firmness to be put in such fear. This is a notable departure from earlier schemes, which 
“provided that applicants who suffered mental but no physical injury could be compensable where they 
were ‘put in reasonable fear of immediate harm’ by the commission of a crime of violence, whether or 
not they were personally threatened.” See Miers (2014) Legal Studies 250.  
189 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses 50-52; Ministry of Justice Getting it 
Right for Victims and Witnesses: Government Response 40-41; Miers (2014) Legal Studies 242-245. 
190 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 243.  
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socio-economic challenges,191 the proposed fund cannot sustain a potentially 
unlimited class of eligible claimants. 
In paragraph 2.2.1.2.3 in chapter 2 above, the judicial development of the vicarious 
liability doctrine by the Constitutional Court (“CC”) was criticised insofar as it was 
argued that making the standard test for vicarious liability dependent upon the nature 
of the legal interest at stake could potentially produce arbitrary outcomes. Against that 
background, it may be asked whether the same criticism could be levelled against the 
suggested exclusion of non-violent crimes, non-intentional crimes and property-
related crimes from the scope of the proposed scheme.  
In this regard, it is argued that the proposed narrow eligibility criteria, and 
consequential exclusions of certain crimes from the ambit of the proposed scheme, 
are not susceptible to the same criticism. This is because the eligibility criteria and 
concomitant exclusion of certain categories of crime may be justified on the basis of 
policy-based reasons, not the least of which include the socio-economic challenges 
mentioned above (particularly the fact that the limited financial resources in South 
Africa are supposed to be used in respect of a series of socio-economic challenges) 
as well as the fiscal constraints that may be applicable in connection with the proposed 
scheme.192  
Indeed, as a comparative overview of foreign crime victim compensation schemes 
indicates,193 statutory compensation funds generally limit their attention to specific 
categories of crime (e.g. intentionally-committed violent crimes), because it would 
simply be unaffordable to provide compensation to all types of crimes.  
It is advised that the South African legislature should heed the lessons learned by the 
UK legislature: it appears to be advisable to have a more constrained approach 
regarding a scheme’s scope of application and, when setting out eligibility criteria for 
a fund, it would be recommendable to provide as much clarity as possible for the sake 
of consistency and certainty when it comes to its application.  
                                                          
191 See chapter 1. 
192 This suggestion is also in line with the recommendations made in respect of the approach that the 
proposed fund should adopt in focusing on blameless victims – see further paragraph 5.2.1.2.3 above.  
193 See generally Greer Compensating Crime Victims; Miers (2014) International Review of Victimology. 
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5.3 The nature of the harm recoverable from a statutory compensation fund for 
crime victims 
An important issue to be considered by any legislature contemplating the enactment 
of a compensation fund for crime victims is the nature of the harm that ought to be 
compensated by the fund. Should it compensate only patrimonial harm or should it 
also provide cover for non-patrimonial harm?  
 
5.3.1 The UK 2012 Scheme 
The type of harm recoverable under the UK 2012 Scheme is determined by the tariff 
of injuries set out in the scheme’s Annexure E. Part A focuses on bodily and mental 
injuries and Part B contains a series of injuries arising from sexual and physical abuse 
and which are compensable under the compensation scheme. Broadly speaking, the 
scheme provides compensation for both patrimonial and non-patrimonial harm. It 
recognises the following categories of patrimonial harm: loss of earnings, the financial 
costs associated with the bodily injury, as well as certain payments made in respect 
of the death of a relative (bereavement payment, dependency payments, child 
payments and funeral payments).194 The fund also compensates non-patrimonial 
harm in the form of a mental injury arising from the violent crime.195  
Annexure E of the UK 2012 Scheme first sets out different levels of compensation that 
may be awarded: from A1 (£1 000) to A20 (£250 000) for physical and mental injuries 
and from B1 (£1 000) to B15 (£44 000) for injuries arising from sexual and physical 
abuse.196 Part A of the tariff of injuries consists of a table that provides a description 
of the injury, the level of compensation that it merits and the standard amount of 
compensation in that regard. It deals with bodily injuries (e.g. injuries to the head and 
neck, upper limbs, torso and lower limbs) as well as mental injuries. Part B focuses 
                                                          
194 Paragraphs 57-77 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
195 See paragraphs 4-9 of the UK 2012 Scheme; Annexure E of the UK 2012 Scheme. 
196 Paragraph 31 of the UK 2012 Scheme states that the “maximum award which may be made under 
this Scheme to a person sustaining one or more criminal injuries directly attributable to an incident, 
before any reduction under paragraphs 24 to 28, is £500,000.” 
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specifically on sexual abuse injuries and has a similar structure. It deals with fatal 
criminal injuries, physical abuse of adults and children, general sexual abuse and 
sexual offences where the victim is a child. 
 
5.3.2 The Dutch Fund 
The Dutch Fund similarly provides compensation for patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
harm for the bodily and psychiatric injuries which victims of an intentionally-caused 
violent crime have suffered. Section 3 of the Dutch Act states that compensation may 
be awarded for the serious bodily or psychiatric injuries which they have suffered as 
the result of violent criminal conduct. The Act itself, however, provides no indication 
as to which injuries would be regarded as serious and therefore compensable. Instead, 
the fund has developed a list that provides this information (“Letsellijst”).197 The 
Letsellijst sets out the list of compensable injuries and amounts claimable under the 
scheme. Broadly speaking, the Dutch Fund compensates the following instances of 
patrimonial harm: financial costs arising from bodily injuries and loss of support.198 The 
fund also compensates non-patrimonial harm in the form of a psychiatric injury that 
arises from the violent crime.199 
More specifically, the Letsellijst identifies six categories of injuries, with each category 
being linked to a fixed amount receivable from the fund.200 The seriousness of the 
crime, as well as the circumstances under which the crime has been committed will 
determine into which category the relevant crime will be placed.201 An injury that falls 
in the lowest category (category 1) will entitle the victim to €1 000, while victims of the 
highest category (category 6) may receive €35 000, which represents the highest 
amount receivable under the Act.202  
The Letsellijst consists of two parts. The first concentrates on bodily injuries while the 
second focuses on psychiatric injuries. The bodily injuries section provides guidelines 
                                                          
197 HSG Letsellijst (2016). See also HSG Letsellijst (2015). 
198 HSG Letsellijst (2016) 2-7. 
199 8-10. 
200 HSG Letsellijst (2016) 1; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 8. 
201 HSG Letsellijst (2016) 1; HSG Beleidsbundel (2016) 8. 
202 See further the HSG Letsellijst (2016) 1. 
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to establish whether an injury may be regarded as serious enough to merit 
compensation under the Act and, if it is indeed serious, into which of the six categories 
of compensation the injury should be allocated.203 After stating the guidelines, the 
Letsellijst provides a detailed list of bodily injuries that are expressly recognised by the 
Dutch Fund together with an indication of the category into which they fall.204 The 
guidelines will therefore only be used if the victim’s bodily injury does not appear on 
this second part of the bodily injury list.  
The second part of the Letsellijst follows a different pattern. First, the Dutch Fund sets 
out a list of violent crimes in respect of which the fund will presume psychiatric injuries 
from being suffered by the victim and in respect of which an applicant will not be 
required to give medical information to the fund prior to being awarded any 
compensation.205 An indication is also given of the category of compensation that may 
be ascribed to these presumed psychiatric injuries.  
For the assessment of psychiatric injuries in all other cases, the fund requires medical 
information on the basis of which it will establish whether the injury is serious enough 
to merit compensation.206 In this regard, the Letsellijst sets out broad guidelines to 
determine when psychiatric injuries would be serious enough to receive 
compensation, and also provides a general outline of the category of compensation 
into which the injury will fall. 
 
5.3.3 Harm covered under the RAF Act and the COIDA 
Section 17(1) of the RAF Act states that compensation may be claimed for “any loss 
or damage which the third party has suffered as a result of any bodily injury to himself 
or herself or the death of or any bodily injury to any other person caused by or arising 
                                                          
203 HSG Letsellijst (2016) 1. For example, the guidelines for injuries that may typically be regarded as 
category 1 injury maintain that they are bodily injuries requiring treatment and which are accompanied 
by temporary dependency, or bodily injures in which 24-hour hospitalisation is required or which are 
accompanied with permanent disfigurations A category 3 injury is a bodily injury, however, that creates 
a permanent limiting obstacle to performing one’s daily professional or business function whereas a 
category 4 bodily injury is an injury similar to a category 4 injury, but where the nature and the 
consequences are more serious than in category 3.  
204 See HSG Letsellijst (2016) 3-7 for the full list. 
205 See HSG Letsellijst (2016) 8-9 for the full schedule.  
206 HSG Letsellijst (2016) 10.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
286 
 
from the driving of a motor vehicle”. Case law illustrates that harm caused by bodily 
injury refers to both patrimonial and non-patrimonial harm.207 The following heads of 
damages is generally regarded as recoverable instances of patrimonial harm which 
may result from a bodily injury in the context of a motor vehicle accident: medical and 
hospital costs, loss of income, loss of earning capacity, travelling and transport costs 
and the costs of a medical assistant, servant, helper or manager.208 A claim may also 
be instituted against the RAF for the loss of support which a dependent has suffered 
arising from the negligent and wrongful death of the breadwinner in a motor vehicle 
accident.209 The RAF’s liability for patrimonial harm is limited, which will be discussed 
in paragraphs 5.5.1.1 and 5.7 below. 
With regard to non-patrimonial harm, a motor vehicle accident victim may also claim 
compensation for the pain and suffering arising from a bodily injury caused by a motor 
vehicle accident. This refers, on the one hand, to compensation for the physical pain, 
discomfort and suffering on account of a physical impairment of the body or the 
causing of emotional shock.210 On the other hand, a motor vehicle accident victim may 
also claim compensation from the RAF for loss in the amenities of life.211 The RAF’s 
liability for non-patrimonial harm is limited and will be discussed in paragraphs 5.5.1.1 
and 5.7 below. It is important to note that the proposed Road Accident Benefit Scheme 
(“RABS”) will not cover non-patrimonial harm.212  
Unlike the RAF, but similar to the proposed RABS, the COIDA only provides cover for 
patrimonial harm and excludes liability for non-patrimonial harm.213 The patrimonial 
                                                          
207 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict (2012) 52-54, 296, 303-310; RAF “The Road Accident 
compensates for the following” available at <http://www.raf.co.za/Product-and-Services/Pages/ 
Compensate.aspx> (accessed on 11 April 2017). 
208 HB Klopper Road Accident Fund: The Practitioner’s Guide (2009) paras 3.3.1-3.3.5. 
209 Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 (6) SA 377 (SCA). There is some uncertainty as to whether a 
dependant has the same right where a breadwinner is only injured and not killed. See Loubser & Midgley 
(eds) The Law of Delict 292-293; Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (2) SA 94 (SCA); De 
Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34. However, a discussion of this matter falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
210 JM Potgieter, L Steynberg & TB Floyd Law of Damages (2012) 506-509. 
211 See generally Potgieter et al Damages 510-512; Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict (2012) 
52-54, 296, 303-310; RAF “The Road Accident compensates for the following” available at 
<http://www.raf.co.za/Product-and-Services/Pages/Compensate.aspx> (accessed on 11 April 2017).  
212 Minister of Transport Policy Paper (2011) 10. 
213 See the COIDA generally; MP Olivier “Social Security: Core Elements” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA 13(3) second edition (2007); JJ Jansen van Vuuren A Legal Comparison between South 
African, Canadian and Australian Workmen’s Compensation Law Unpublished LLM thesis University of 
South Africa (2013) 78; Jooste v Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) paras 13-15.  
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harm which the COIDA covers includes predominantly financial loss arising from bodily 
injuries or diseases and the pure economic loss which a dependant suffers after a 
breadwinner died as a result of an accident that occurred during the course and scope 
of his employment.214  
 
5.3.4 Conclusion: recommendation in respect of the nature of the harm that 
should be recoverable from the proposed fund 
Both foreign schemes aim to compensate patrimonial and non-patrimonial harm. 
However, the scope of those schemes is nevertheless limited by providing a tariff of 
specific injuries that is compensable.215 Furthermore, the scope of the compensation 
fund’s coverage is sought to be limited through establishing a narrow eligibility criteria 
(in the case of the Dutch Fund) and tightening the criteria (in the case of the UK 2012 
Scheme). Also, as we shall see in paragraphs 5.5.1.1 and 5.7 below, the schemes 
place a limit on the amounts recoverable. It is recommended that the proposed fund 
should compensate both patrimonial and non-patrimonial harm, provided that the fund 
adopts similar strategies in establishing narrow eligibility criteria and limitations 
regarding its liability. The proposed fund should cover both forms of harm so as to 
bring it in line with the trends adopted by foreign compensation schemes and because 
this will give recognition to the scope of the crime victim’s injury. The reasons for the 
suggested limitations revolve around the financial viability of the proposed fund and 
will be discussed in further detail in especially paragraph 5.7 below. 
 
5.4 Nature of the perpetrator’s state of mind and conduct 
Another question which ought to be considered with regards to establishing a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims is whether it should cover only injuries arising 
from intentional criminal conduct, or also harm arising from negligent criminal conduct.  
 
                                                          
214 See section 54 of the COIDA. See Schedule 2-4 for a list of the injuries and diseases that may be 
compensated and the method of calculation of the compensation. 
215 See further paragraphs 5.5.1.1 and 5.7 below.  
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5.4.1 The UK 2012 Scheme 
Paragraph 2(2) of Annexure B of the scheme gives meaning to the term “crime of 
violence” by stating that an act or omission will not constitute a crime of violence unless 
it is done either “intentionally or recklessly.” This requirement was not stated expressly 
in either the UK 2001 Scheme or the UK 2008 Scheme.216 According to Miers, this 
means that an applicant is therefore required to provide evidence to show that the 
assailant intended or was reckless as to the elements of a crime of violence.217 
However, the CICA states that what is essentially required is that it must be satisfied 
that there is sufficient evidence “to warrant a finding that the injury was caused by a 
crime of violence, rather than being an accident.”218  
The UK 2012 Scheme does not expressly state whether the same meaning should be 
ascribed to intent and recklessness as under English criminal law. The UK 2012 
Scheme Guide, however, states that an act would “constitute a crime of violence if 
there was intention on the part of the assailant to cause you harm, or if the injury 
sustained was because of the intentional or reckless behaviour of an individual who 
was likely to have foreseen that their actions could cause significant injury to another, 
and proceeded to act regardless of this outcome.”219  
Arguably, the reference to intention includes both direct intention220 and oblique 
intention.221 The exact meaning of recklessness for the purpose of English criminal 
law has been the centre of academic debate and falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation.222 Based on the extract above, it is submitted that recklessness seems 
to correspond with the form of intent that is labelled dolus eventualis in South African 
criminal law, i.e. it exists where the perpetrator, in executing a plan to cause harm, 
                                                          
216 Paragraph 12 of both the UK 2001 Scheme and the UK 2008 Scheme. 
217 Miers (2014) Legal Studies 253.  
218 253. 
219 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 8. 
220 This refers to the scenario where the defendant is desirous in bringing about the consequences of 
his actions. See R v Mohan [1] [1976] QB 1; [1975] 2 All ER 193; D Ormerod, JC Smith & B Hogan 
Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law 14 ed (2015).  
221 This deals with the scenario where the defendant foresees the consequences of his actions as 
certain, although it is not desired for its own sake, and nevertheless goes ahead with his actions. 
See also Ormerod et al Criminal Law.  
222 See R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [1982] AC 
341; R v G [2003] UKHL 50; S Cunningham “Recklessness: being reckless and acting recklessly” (2010) 
21(3) King’s Law Journal 445-467; Ormerod et al Criminal Law. 
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foresees a wrongful consequence that is not desired, but nevertheless reconciles 
himself with the possibility that it might arise and continues to act.223 
It may also be noted that the UK 2012 Scheme will exceptionally treat something as a 
crime of violence, regardless of the fact that the assailant is “not capable of forming 
the necessary mental element due to insanity”224 or if the latter is a “child below the 
age of criminal responsibility who in fact understood the consequences of their 
actions.”225 In other words, in exceptional cases, the capacity of the alleged criminal 
to be at fault will not be taken into account and compensation may nevertheless be 
paid. Thus, the scheme may therefore award compensation on what appears to be a 
strict liability basis, although it is not clear in what circumstances (other than those 
expressly stated) this would be competent.   
  
5.4.2 The Dutch Fund 
As indicated above, section 3(1) of the Dutch Act refers to intentionally-caused violent 
crimes. The Beleidsbundel confirms that, for the purposes of compensation under the 
Act, intention has the same legal meaning as under Dutch criminal law. This, briefly, 
means that the perpetrator must have desired to bring about the criminal injury wilfully 
while conscious of the wrongfulness of his conduct.226 Furthermore, Dutch criminal 
law appears to draw the same distinction that South African criminal law does between 
dolus directus (“opzet met bedoeling”), dolus indirectus (“opzet met 
noodzakelijkheidsbewustzijn”) and dolus eventualis (“voorwaardelijke opzet”).227 The 
fund specifically states that dolus eventualis would also satisfy the requirement set out 
in section 3 of the Dutch Act.228  
                                                          
223 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 110-111; Burchell Criminal Law 346-347. 
224 Paragraph 3(1) of Annexure B of the 2012 Scheme.  
225 Paragraph 3(1).  
226 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5.  
227 See Burchell Criminal Law 346-347; Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 110-111. Dolus 
directus is where the perpetrator meant to bring about the specific prohibited consequences in question. 
Dolus indirectus refers to the situation where, in effecting a specific consequence, the perpetrator 
foresees another harmful consequence that will inevitably also be realised by his conduct. Lastly, dolus 
eventualis describes the scenario where the perpetrator, in executing a plan to cause harm, foresees a 
wrongful consequence that is not desired, but nevertheless reconciles himself with the possibility that it 
might arise and continues to act. 
228 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 5. 
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In its Beleidsbundel, the fund states that harm arising from a game between children, 
traffic accidents and injuries suffered by voluntarily taking part in a sporting activity will 
not ordinarily be regarded as having been intentionally caused.229 The fund also 
confirms that injuries brought about as the result of negligent conduct will not be 
awarded compensation.230 However, as discussed in paragraph 5.2.3.2 above, the 
relatives of deceased victims, who have been killed as the result of negligent conduct 
that contravenes section 6 of the Road Traffic Act or section 307 of the Dutch Criminal 
Code, will be allowed to institute a claim for compensation.  
 
5.4.3 Conclusion: recommendation regarding the nature of the perpetrator’s 
state of mind and conduct 
It would appear as though the majority of the crime victim compensation schemes limit 
compensation to criminal injuries that were caused through intentional conduct.231 The 
predominant reason for the exclusion of criminal injuries caused by negligence would 
be the financial interest in limiting the scope of the fund’s exposure, while the exclusion 
of such claims may also be explained by the fact that “the effects of accidental injury 
and death are well covered by other forms of social insurance”.232 For example, in the 
South African context, those who suffer harm arising from the negligent causation of 
another person’s death through the driving of a motor vehicle may approach the RAF 
for compensation. 
For these reasons, it is proposed that the availability of a statutory claim be limited so 
as to ensure that the proposed fund will compensate only the victims of intentionally-
caused violent crimes.  
 
                                                          
229 5. 
230 5. 
231 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 80-81; European Council Directive 2004/80/EC 
of 29 April 2004 available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex: 32004L0080> 
(accessed on 11 April 2017); Greer Compensating Crime Victims.  
232 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 80. 
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5.5 The potential impact of awarding a statutory claim against a compensation 
fund on liability under the common law of delict 
If a statutory compensation fund is established from which crime victims are allowed 
to claim compensation, what should the role of the common law of delict be in this 
context? Should a crime victim retain his common-law right to claim damages in delict 
from the actual wrongdoer for the remainder of the harm not covered under the 
proposed fund, or should the victim’s common-law claim against the wrongdoer be 
abolished?  
In answering this question and before setting out the position under the Dutch Fund 
and the UK 2012 Scheme, regard may be had to the approaches adopted in existing 
South African statutes that have developed the law of delict by the establishment of a 
statutory compensation fund. 
 
5.5.1 South African statutes that have developed the law of delict 
5.5.1.1 The RAF Act 
The RAF Act was amended by the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 15 of 2005. 
Before its amendment, section 21 of the RAF Act essentially provided that, “where no 
claim lay against the Fund or an agent, a third party retained the common-law residual 
claim to recover losses not recompensable under the RAF Act from a 
wrongdoer.”233  However, the amended section 21 abolishes this common-law right. 
The Constitutional Court (“CC”) explained the effect of the amendment as follows: “In 
plain language it provides that no claim for compensation arising from the driving of a 
motor vehicle shall lie against the owner or driver of a motor vehicle or against an 
employer of the driver.”234  
Although the limitation of claims will be discussed in further detail in paragraph 5.7 
below, it should be noted that, prior to its amendment, section 17 of the RAF Act 
obliged the RAF to compensate a motor vehicle accident victim in full.235 In contrast, 
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claims instituted by passengers who were injured due to the negligent driving of a 
motor vehicle in which they were being conveyed were limited.  
The amended section 17 limits the obligation of the RAF to compensate a victim in 
various important ways that are connected to the CC’s finding on the abolition of the 
victim’s common-law claim for residual harm. First, it limits damages for non-
patrimonial harm to cases where the victim suffers a “serious injury”.236 Secondly, 
damages for patrimonial harm are restricted insofar as the compensation for loss of 
earnings or support falls to be calculated, irrespective of actual loss, on the basis of a 
maximum annual income.237 Lastly, the limitations on passenger claims, a prominent 
exception to the uncapped liability under the old RAF regime, were repealed.238 Of 
course, this means that passengers whose claims were limited in the past now stand 
to be recompensed on the same basis as all other victims.239 
In Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport (“Law Society”),240 the CC had 
to consider a constitutional challenge in respect of the amended sections 17 and 21 
of the RAF Act. With regard to the latter, the applicants argued that the abolition of the 
victim’s common-law claim failed to comply with the constitutional principle of 
rationality. They argued that, by abolishing the residual common-law claim, the new 
scheme would fail to provide the fullest possible protection to victims of road 
accidents.241 The new scheme, they argued, would confer immunity on negligent 
drivers against all residual common-law claims by their innocent victims, while the 
latter would be left under-compensated because the new scheme capped their 
claims.242 
The Minister of Transport countered that the abolition was rational on the basis of the 
following reasons. He first argued that the legislative change was made necessary “by 
an ever-growing funding deficit of accident claims”.243 Despite the removal of a cap on 
passengers’ claims, the new scheme would enable financial sustainability because all 
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238 Para 27. 
239 Paras 27-28. 
240 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC).  
241 Para 40. See also paragraph 3.3 in chapter 3 above, where the need to provide social security was 
discussed as a justificatory motivation for the enactment of motor vehicle legislation.  
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victims’ claims were significantly limited by the amended section 17.244 Secondly, he 
contended that the amendments were rational because there was a “constitutional 
obligation to remove arbitrary forms of differentiation in the compensation of accident 
victims”245 and that it was therefore necessary to remove the limitation on passenger 
claims. However, this could only be financially possible if the section 17 limitations 
were introduced.  
Thirdly, it was argued that the new system of compensation for road accident victims 
“must be integrated into a comprehensive social security system that offers life, 
disability and health insurance cover for all accidents and diseases.”246 In the 
Minister’s view, a fault-based common-law system of compensation for road accident 
victims “would be at odds with a comprehensive social security model.”247 It was 
argued that the amendments to sections 17 and 21 were the first step towards the 
reform that was required,248 i.e. “an interim measure towards the restructuring of the 
Fund’s scheme into one which pays compensation on a no-fault basis.”249 To achieve 
this, the Minister argued, the common-law claim had to be abolished: “the retention of 
the common-law claim does not sit well with a social security compensation system 
that aims to provide equitable compensation (as distinct from the right to sue for 
compensation) for all people, regardless of their financial ability.”250 
The applicants objected to the respondent’s attempt to rationalise the abolition on the 
basis that its continued existence did not influence the financial viability of the scheme 
whatsoever.251 Abolishing the claim did not further the basic needs of every victim 
because it did not contribute towards the funding of the RAF. Indeed, the applicants 
contended that there was “no proper relation between the objects of the scheme and 
the means it invokes.”252 The CC seemed to agree with this argument insofar it could 
not be denied that the abolition of the residual common-law claim did not worsen or 
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improve the financial standing of the RAF.253 Indeed, damages recoverable through 
the residual common-law claim, and the costs related to its pursuit, fall outside the 
funding remit of the RAF.254  
Notwithstanding this argument, Moseneke DCJ held that the abolition of the claim was 
indeed justifiable and rational. The court emphasised that it was important to see the 
abolition of the common-law claim against the broader background of reform of the 
entire scheme.255 It had to be remembered that a cap was placed on various heads of 
damages and that all claims for non-patrimonial damages that do not arise from 
“serious injury” were now to be excluded.256 However, without legislative immunity 
provided for negligent motorists, the victims of motor vehicle accidents would be able 
to claim from them the damages which the RAF now excluded or limited. In other 
words, “negligent motorists would have to bear the risk of substantially increased 
residual claims from accident victims.”257 The CC held as follows:258 
“The colossal risk to which the new cap exposes all drivers (from which the Fund would previously 
have protected them by paying full compensation), as against the relatively small inattentiveness 
or oversight that could give rise to the risk, lends further support to the abolition of the common-
law action. What is more, the retention of the common-law claim does not sit well with a social 
security compensation system that aims to provide equitable compensation (as distinct from the 
right to sue for compensation) for all people, regardless of their financial ability. There are two 
aspects to this incongruity. The first is that the common-law claim would be actually recovered 
only from those drivers or owners who are capable of in fact paying compensation or who are 
able to afford the required insurance. In my view, the number of drivers and owners who would 
be able to pay would be very small. It would be pointless for any person to sue in circumstances 
where actual recovery would not result. The second consideration is that the right to sue would 
be available only to those who can afford to pay legal fees or who are granted legal aid. And it is 
unlikely that legal aid would be granted to people who have claims that are in fact irrecoverable 
because of the inability of the driver or owner to pay. These two factors would have a negative 
effect on an equitable compensation system if the common-law right of action were to be 
retained.” 
The CC reminded the parties that it should not lose sight of the “primary and ultimate 
vision of the Fund”,259 which was to “render a fair, self-funding, viable and more 
effective social security service to victims of motor accidents.”260 It concluded that the 
interim scheme was a necessary step in that direction and that the “abolition of the 
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common-law claim is a necessary and rational part of an interim scheme whose 
primary thrust is to achieve financial viability and a more effective and equitable 
platform for delivery of social security services.”261 
A detailed, critical analysis of this judgment, and of the impact that it may have on 
victims of motor vehicle accidents, falls outside the ambit of this dissertation. However, 
some of the aspects of the CC’s reasoning will be discussed in paragraph 5.5.4 below, 
where a recommendation is made for the route which the legislature may take, if it 
elects to enact a statutory compensation fund for crime victims. 
 
5.5.1.2 The COIDA  
As discussed in chapter 3, the COIDA effectively replaced the employer’s common-
law liability with the limited liability of a no-fault based statutory compensation fund to 
which the employer contributes, in circumstances that make it unnecessary to prove 
fault on the part of the employer.262 Section 35(1) of the Act stipulates as follows:  
“No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for the recovery of damages 
in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of such 
employee against such employee’s employer, and no liability for compensation on the part of 
such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of such disablement or 
death.”  
This section has a twofold purpose: it expunges the common-law claims of employees 
against their employer and it limits an employer’s liability to pay compensation.263 In 
Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (“Jooste”),264 the CC confirmed the 
section’s constitutionality. In this case the applicant argued that it infringed sections 
9(1) and 9(3) of the Constitution.265 The argument was based on the contention that, 
by being deprived of their common-law right to claim damages against their employers, 
                                                          
261 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 54.  
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employees are placed at a disadvantage in relation to people who are not employees 
and who retain that right.266  
The court found that the only issue of relevance to the equality challenge was whether 
the impugned section was rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose.267 
To answer this, the CC had to consider the COIDA’s purpose. To do so, the court 
highlighted the features of the common-law system which it sought to replace. To 
institute a common-law claim for damages, an employee would be required to prove 
negligence, which could be difficult and expensive to achieve. A further disadvantage 
of the delictual route was the prospect of a proportional reduction of damages based 
on the employee’s own contributory negligence. Further, if an employee instituted his 
delictual claim successfully, he may not receive compensation on account of the 
employer’s impecuniosity. Pursuing a remedy in this way was also expensive and 
time-consuming. However, one advantage under the common-law regime was the 
prospect of recovering non-patrimonial harm.268 
By way of contrast, the COIDA provides a speedy and cost-effective administrative 
process through which to claim payment for patrimonial harm to the amount 
established by the Act.269 Payment of compensation is not dependent on the 
employer's negligence or ability to pay, nor is the amount susceptible to reduction by 
reason of the employee's contributory negligence.270  
Similar to the argument later raised in Law Society the applicant argued that the nature 
of the balance achieved by the legislature through the COIDA tilts somewhat in favour 
of the employer.271 It was contended that the object of the Act is to provide 
compensation for employees, not to benefit employers and that, because the abolition 
of the common-law claim benefited only employers, it was not rationally related to the 
purpose of the legislation.272 The court rejected this argument because it 
misconceived the rationality review as an opportunity to persuade the court that the 
scheme created by the legislature could be improved, while the court was only 
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interested in determining whether the differentiation between employees and other 
individuals were arbitrary or irrational. The court concluded as follows:273  
“Whether an employee ought to have retained the common-law right to claim damages, either 
over and above or as an alternative to the advantages conferred by the Compensation Act, 
represents a highly debatable, controversial and complex matter of policy. It involves a policy 
choice which the Legislature and not a court must make. The contention represents an invitation 
to this Court to make a policy choice under the guise of rationality review; an invitation which is 
firmly declined. The Legislature clearly considered that it was appropriate to grant to employees 
certain benefits not available at common law. The scheme is financed through contributions from 
employers. No doubt for these reasons the employee's common-law right against an employer 
is excluded. Section 35(1) of the Compensation Act is therefore logically and rationally connected 
the legitimate purpose of the Compensation Act, namely a comprehensive regulation of 
compensation for disablement caused by occupational injuries or diseases sustained or 
contracted by employees in the course of their employment.” 
It should be noted, however, that, while employers enjoy protection against common-
law delictual claims by their employees for harm suffered as a result of occupational 
injuries and diseases, section 36(1)(a) of the COIDA provides that an employee may 
recover damages from a third party who has caused an accident or occupational 
disease.  
 
5.5.2 The UK 2012 Scheme 
The UK 2012 Scheme is intended to be the crime victim’s last resort.274 If the victim 
therefore has an opportunity to pursue compensation via other routes, he is 
encouraged, although not required, to do so.275 Briefly, the CICA does not abolish the 
common-law right to claim compensation from the perpetrator.276 The CICA states 
that, where there is an opportunity for the crime victim to pursue compensation 
“elsewhere”,277 he should do so. Further, it expressly states that it “expect[s the crime 
victim] to take all reasonable steps to obtain any social security benefits, insurance 
payments, damages or compensation to which you may be entitled as a result of your 
injuries.”278 In fact, the CICA may require a crime victim to provide evidence that 
indicates that he considered whether it was “possible to claim compensation from [the 
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perpetrator] and pursued this if there was a chance of success[,] asked [his] employer 
about damages or insurance entitlements[,] and applied for all benefits to which [he] 
may be entitled.”279  Indeed, the CICA may delay making a final decision as to whether 
the crime victim should receive compensation “until such times as we are satisfied that 
you are eligible and you could not get compensation from any other sources.”280  
Interestingly, the UK 2012 Scheme Guide states that a victim is apparently also 
entitled “to claim from someone who was indirectly responsible for your injury.”281 More 
will be said about adopting this approach in South Africa in paragraph 5.5.4 below. 
Where a victim intends to claim compensation elsewhere, he is required to inform the 
CICA when he applies for statutory compensation from the fund and keep the 
compensation authorities updated.282  
 
5.5.3 The Dutch Fund 
Section 6 of the Dutch Act states that the fund may have regard to the damages a 
crime victim has succeeded in recovering from a wrongdoer when making payment to 
the crime victim. In its Beleidsbundel, the fund interprets section 6 of the Act as 
expecting a crime victim to attempt to recover as much as possible from the 
perpetrator, if the latter is known and in a position to compensate the victim.283 
However, it expressly states that it is not required to seek damages from the 
wrongdoer in order to be eligible for compensation under the fund.284 
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5.5.4 Conclusion: recommendations regarding the relationship between a 
statutory compensation fund and the common law of delict 
Whereas the RAF Act285 and the COIDA286 has abolished the victim’s common-law 
right to claim damages from the wrongdoer (in the case of the COIDA, this refers to 
the employer) in delict, neither the UK 2012 Scheme nor the Dutch Fund does the 
same.  
From the wording of the foreign statutes and accompanying policy documentation, it 
appears that, although the victim is not required to institute a civil claim against the 
wrongdoer before he might be considered eligible for compensation from the 
respective funds, he is nonetheless strongly encouraged to do so.  
It is recommended that the proposed fund, if it were to be created by the legislature, 
should follow the same route as these foreign compensation schemes, i.e. it should 
not abolish the common-law delictual claim against criminals. For the following 
reasons, the fund should allow, but not require, crime victims to attempt obtaining 
compensation from the criminal.  
First, retaining the common-law claim, and appropriately reducing or withholding the 
claimant’s statutory claim against the fund if the common-law claim has been instituted 
successfully (see paragraph 5.6 below), would improve the financial position and 
sustainability of the proposed fund.  
Secondly, it requires emphasis that the scheme, if established, would to a large extent 
be funded by innocent citizens’ taxes.287 It may be recalled that the Criminal Assets 
Recovery Account (“CARA”) is established under the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act 121 of 1998. However, as indicated in paragraph 2.3.3 in chapter 2, the Act does 
not state that the funds in the CARA should be used to compensate crime victims and, 
in fact, does not contain any reference to the compensation of crime victims. It may 
further be noted that, although the POCA’s purpose is not crime victim compensation, 
once the proceeds from confiscation and forfeiture orders have been paid into the 
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CARA, it could potentially be used for the purpose of crime victim compensation if the 
CARA committee were to advise Cabinet to advance the funds to a specific institution, 
organisation or fund which, in turn, uses the funds to compensate certain crime 
victims. However, as indicated in chapter 2, this appears not to have been the practice 
up to date. Therefore, it is conceivable that the proposed scheme, if it were to be 
enacted, would receive much of its funds from innocent taxpayers. Insisting on their 
contributions, while denying those same tax-paying citizens an opportunity to pursue 
the criminal for the remainder of the harm that may potentially not be covered by the 
fund, seems indefensible.  
It might be argued, as the CC did in Law Society, that retaining the common-law 
delictual claim in this context does not fit within the social security framework that aims 
to provide equitable compensation for all people, regardless of their financial ability.288 
The court held as follows:289 
There are two aspects to this incongruity. The first is that the common-law claim would be actually 
recovered only from those drivers or owners who are capable of in fact paying compensation or 
who are able to afford the required insurance. In my view, the number of drivers and owners who 
would be able to pay would be very small. It would be pointless for any person to sue in 
circumstances where actual recovery would not result. The second consideration is that the right 
to sue would be available only to those who can afford to pay legal fees or who are granted legal 
aid. And it is unlikely that legal aid would be granted to people who have claims that are in fact 
irrecoverable because of the inability of the driver or owner to pay. These two factors would have 
a negative effect on an equitable compensation system if the common-law right of action were to 
be retained.  
The first aspect highlighted by the court does very little to justify the abolition of the 
common-law action in any context. Rather, the financial inability of the wrongdoer – 
whether it is a culpable motorist or a criminal – may contribute towards justifying 
legislative intervention via the establishment of a statutory compensation fund. As 
Miers’ comparative overview of statutory compensation schemes illustrates, one of the 
predominant motivations for the establishment of these schemes has been “the 
commonplace fact of the offender’s limited means.”290 Furthermore, allowing the crime 
victim to institute a common-law claim in this context would not undermine the goal 
behind a compensation fund; in fact, because both claims intend to compensate the 
victim of harm, they arguably complement each other.  
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The second consideration which the court highlighted in Law Society to justify the 
abolition of common-law claims in the context of motor vehicle accidents is factually 
accurate, i.e. some people in South Africa are in a position to pay for legal fees while 
others are not. Again, however, this consideration – the high transaction costs 
associated with civil litigation – has been used to justify statutory reform in the past 
and may potentially also be used to justify the enactment of a crime victim fund, but 
does very little to explain why a crime victim – who is in a position to afford legal fees 
– should be denied the opportunity to pursue the criminal for compensation. Indeed, 
allowing a crime victim the possibility to institute a common-law claim against the 
perpetrator would reaffirm the importance of the notion of personal responsibility, 
which underpins the law of delict.291   
As illustrated by the CC in its judgment in Jooste, the abolition or retention of a 
common-law delictual claim may be dependent upon the question as to whether the 
specific statute is rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose.292 To make 
a ruling on the issue of rationality, any court would have to consider the proposed 
crime victim compensation scheme’s purpose. In this regard, it requires emphasis that 
the aim of such a scheme would be the improvement of the compensatory regime 
relating to crime victims. It is argued that retaining the common-law delictual claim is 
rationally connected to such purpose because it improves the likelihood of 
compensation in some cases. At the same time, it does so without infringing upon any 
rights of the criminal. Therefore, it may be said that, if the legislature accepts as the 
scheme’s purpose the improvement of the crime victim’s position insofar as 
compensation goes, it would be rational and prudent to retain the victim’s common-
law delictual claim. 
The CC also implied in Law Society that, in that context, “negligent motorists would 
have to bear the risk of substantially increased residual claims from accident 
victims”293 if the legislature does not provide motorists with immunity. This statement 
will not be analysed in further detail. However, with the eye on the establishment of a 
crime victim compensation fund, it is proposed that there are no convincing policy-
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based reasons to offer immunity to the category of people who intentionally commit 
crimes of violence. In fact, it is submitted that there are important public policy reasons, 
as informed by constitutional rights pertaining to freedom of safety and security, that 
points in exactly the opposite direction and would support the notion that, where 
possible, those electing to pursue such crimes, should be held personally liable. 
Expecting innocent members to make financial contributions via their taxes to the 
proposed fund while offering such immunity arguably offends the moral fibre 
underlying the constitutional rights to dignity as well as safety and security.  
Ultimately, as the CC noted in its judgment concerning the constitutionality of section 
35(1) of the COIDA, the decision as to whether the common-law right to claim 
damages, either over and above or as an alternative to the advantages conferred by 
legislation, represents “a highly debatable, controversial and complex matter of 
policy.”294 For the policy-based reasons outlined above, this dissertation proposes that 
the proposed compensation scheme should be implemented with retention of the 
common-law delictual claim for compensation. This proposal would also be in line with 
approach adopted in the UK 2012 Scheme as well as the Dutch Fund, where the aim 
is first and foremost on improving the position of crime victims. A final remark in this 
context relates to a statement that was made regarding the UK 2012 Scheme, namely 
that a victim is also entitled “to claim from someone who was indirectly responsible for 
your injury.”295 It might be argued that, if this approach were to be adopted by the 
South African legislature in respect of the proposed fund, it could allow a crime victim 
to hold the state, as the employer of police officers, vicariously liable for the harm 
caused by the negligent and wrongful failure of its employee to prevent crime during 
the course and scope of his employment.296  
This would be possible because, in the context of vicarious liability, the state, as 
employer, may be regarded as being indirectly responsible for the crime victim’s injury. 
Of course, if allowed, this could mean that victims of crime would continue to institute 
common-law claims against the state for the harm they suffered as a result of the 
wrongdoing of their employees. It is therefore conceivable that, if a similar route were 
to be taken by the South African legislature, it would arguably be ineffective in 
                                                          
294 Para 17. 
295 CICA The UK 2012 Scheme Guide 2 (own emphasis). 
296 See paragraph 2.2.1.1 in chapter 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
303 
 
combating the widening of the state’s delictual liability. For the reasons outlined in 
chapter 2, the continued expansion of state liability is, however, undesirable and 
unsatisfactory from a crime victim compensation perspective.  
It therefore requires emphasis that, if the legislature does elect to retain the crime 
victim’s common-law right to claim damages for the harm that is not covered by the 
proposed fund, then it is suggested that the victim should only be allowed to claim 
from someone who was the direct cause of his injuries and not from someone who 
may be regarded as being indirectly responsible for their harm. This means that the 
crime victim ought to be able to hold the perpetrator liable in delict for harm not covered 
under the proposed compensation scheme, but should not be allowed to institute a 
delictual claim for the remainder of his harm in a vicarious liability suit against the state. 
In essence, when establishing the proposed fund, the legislature should pay careful 
attention to prevent the continued expansion of state delictual liability.   
In summary, it is recommended that, although it should not be made a requirement for 
eligibility under the proposed fund, crime victims should be encouraged and expected 
to claim from the perpetrator who is directly responsible for the victim’s harm, if that 
person is known to the victim and in a financial position to compensate.  
 
5.6 Should benefits received under a statutory compensation fund be 
deducted from compensation received under a residual common-law claim 
of delict? 
It may happen that a person who suffers harm as a result of violent crime receives 
some benefit from a third party to mitigate the harm.297 For example, a friend of the 
victim may donate a sum of money to cover the cost of medical expenses incurred as 
a result of the crime.298 In this type of scenario, the question is often asked what effect, 
if any, the receipt of the donation, which is characterised as a collateral benefit, should 
have on the damages that the wrongdoer must pay the victim. In this section it is 
considered to what extent, if any, collateral benefits should affect the quantum of 
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compensation received from the proposed statutory compensation scheme (if it were 
to be enacted). 
As Neethling and Potgieter explain, there are two possible ways to approach this 
problem relating to collateral benefits: the law may hold the wrongdoer liable for all of 
the harm he caused, or the law may hold him liable only for the harm ultimately 
sustained by the victim.299 In the case of the former, the donation of the family member 
in the abovementioned example (i.e. the collateral benefit) will not be taken into 
account when calculating the damages payable by the wrongdoer, which means that 
the victim will ultimately be in a better financial position than he would have been if 
there had been no delict because he will receive the donation as well as damages in 
delict (on the assumption that the delictual claim is successful). This approach, 
however, is at odds with the primary function of the law of delict, i.e. compensation of 
harm (as opposed to enriching a victim of harm).  
On the other hand, if the second approach is adopted and the donation received from 
the family member is to be taken into account, it will mean that the victim will simply 
be restored to his position prior to the delict. However, while it may be said that the 
function of compensation is fulfilled, this approach also means that the wrongdoer is 
not required to make good all of the harm that he has caused and that he therefore 
gains from someone else’s generosity and is partly absolved from liability.300 
Loubser and Midgley state as follows: “Benefits that courts do not deduct from the 
damages claim are regarded as collateral sources and therefore res inter alios acta. 
This phrase literally means that something that happens between two parties does not 
concern anyone else.”301 Furthermore, although it has been noted that, whether a 
benefit is deducted might be dependent on the source and the nature of the benefit,302 
there appears to be “no general principle that our courts can use to decide which 
benefits they should account for and which benefits they should regard as res inter 
                                                          
299 Neethling & Potgieter The Law of Delict 238; Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 408-410. 
See also Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of Damages (2012) 229-273. 
300 Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 408-410. 
301 408. 
302 408. See also Neethling & Potgieter The Law of Delict 239-241 for list of practical guidelines on 
which benefits have been taken into account in particular circumstances in reducing the damages to 
which the victim is entitled and which benefits have been regarded as res inter alios acta.  
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alios acta. South African courts deal with each benefit on a case by case basis, based 
on policy considerations.”303 
Against this background, and assuming that a crime victim’s common-law right to claim 
compensation from a wrongdoer is not abolished, and assuming further that the victim 
successfully pursue his common-law delictual claims for recovery against a deep-
pocketed perpetrator,304 should the compensation awarded to a crime victim from the 
proposed fund be taken into account when the victim’s common-law damages is 
calculated or should it be regarded as res alios inter acta?305  
It is suggested that any benefit received from the proposed compensation fund at the 
stage of calculating the victim’s delictual damages should not be taken into account 
when calculating the final damages awarded to a crime victim. This is because, from 
a public policy perspective it is preferable that, where possible, a perpetrator should 
compensate the victim of his violent crime as opposed to the compensation scheme 
that is funded by innocent tax-payers.306 For this reason, it is also strongly 
recommended that the victim of crime should be obligated to notify the proposed fund 
about the prospects of receiving delictual damages when he submits his initial 
application for compensation to the fund. If the victim indeed receives damages in 
delict, the fund should also be informed. It is therefore the proposal that, in this 
scenario, the fund should be allowed a right to recover any payment that was made to 
the victim and that the victim must have a corresponding duty to repay the 
compensation fund the amount awarded to him under the fund.307 The fund should 
aim to ensure that, where possible, the perpetrator should compensate the victim 
before the tax-funded scheme’s resources is used to do so. 
If the abovementioned approach is adopted, it would also mean that the potential 
double compensation of the crime victim will be avoided, while the victim’s harm would 
                                                          
303 410. See also Neethling & Potgieter The Law of Delict 242-243; Boberg The Law of Delict 479. 
304 It may be recalled that, in paragraph 5.5.4 it was proposed that, although it should not be made a 
requirement for eligibility under the proposed fund, victims should be encouraged and expected to 
approach the perpetrator who is directly responsible for the victim’s harm, if that person is known to the 
victim and in a position to compensate.  
305 See Loubser & Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict 407-411; Potgieter et al Damages 229-270; M 
Devaney “A Comparative perspective of Personal Injuries Compensation Schemes: Lessons for Tort 
Reform” (2009) EJCL 1 1-9. 
306 See Neethling & Potgieter The Law of Delict 243: “Questions regarding collateral benefits are 
normative in nature: they have to be approached and solved in terms of policy principles and equity.”  
307 See CICA The UK 2012 Scheme Guide 36.  
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be fully compensated for. This would therefore give effect to the primary goal of the 
law of delict, i.e. compensation of harm (as opposed to enriching the victim or 
punishing the wrongdoer), which, from a policy point of view, seems to be the most 
suitable approach for the legislature to adopt.  
It may further be asked what should occur where a victim first institutes a common-
law delictual claim (if it is retained) and thereafter approaches the proposed fund for 
compensation. In this context, it may be noted that paragraph 85 of the UK 2012 
Scheme, for example, states that an award under the scheme may be withheld or 
reduced if the victim has received a payment similar to criminal injuries compensation, 
damages from a civil court, money under a settlement of damages claim or where he 
received a compensation order in his favour during the criminal proceedings. The 
position is similar in the Netherlands. Section 6(1) of the Dutch Act states that the 
Dutch Fund may take into account whether the victim has received any monies in 
respect of his relevant injury (albeit from a civil claim or another source) before 
payment is made to the victim in terms of the Act.308  
It is suggested that the South African legislature should adopt a similar approach in 
this context. This will contribute towards the proposed scheme’s financial viability as 
well as promoting the principle of personal responsibility, i.e. holding the perpetrator 
responsible for the harm arising from his crime (where possible). Furthermore, to allow 
the crime victim to claim compensation from the proposed fund where he has already 
received compensation after successfully instituting a common-law delictual claim, 
would amount to double compensation which, as indicated above, does not accord 
with the aims of the proposed scheme. Indeed, this would place the crime victim in a 
better position than he would have been in if there had been no delict. 
In summary, it may therefore be suggested that the proposed scheme’s position 
should be as follows:309 
“In general, therefore, State compensation programmes internationally are ‘payers of last resort’ 
in the sense that compensation will not be paid in respect of any loss or expense covered by a 
collateral source such as medical insurance, pension schemes, insurance arrangements, 
payments made by the offender, employer wage-continuation programmes, social security and 
so on.” 
                                                          
308 HSG Beleidsbundel (2017) 14.  
309 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 87. 
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This would mean that all benefits received by the crime victim - not only damages in 
delict, but also private insurance, a pension scheme or social security - should be 
taken into account when calculating the compensation awarded under the proposed 
fund. This will ensure that, in line with the approach adopted under the UK 2012 
Scheme, the proposed fund will be a final resort for compensation which, in turn, may 
improve its financial viability. 
 
5.7 Limitation of the victim’s claim against the compensation fund 
Another practical question which the South African legislature would be confronted 
with if it elects to enact a compensation scheme is whether a crime victim’s claim 
against the fund should be limited to a capped amount.  
Generally, statutory compensation schemes limit the victims’ claim and do not offer 
compensation that is similar to what is payable under the common law. Indeed, 
schemes aim “rather to contribute towards the compensation of a blameless victim, 
acting as a social safety net and compensating actual loss as opposed to claims in 
respect of pain and suffering. In practice therefore, state compensation is usually well 
below comparable awards arising from civil claims.”310  
 
5.7.1 South African statutes that have developed the law of delict: the RAF Act 
and the COIDA 
As stated in paragraph 5.5.1.1, the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act introduced a 
variety of limitations on claims for patrimonial and non-patrimonial harm being 
instituted against the RAF.311 For example, the introduction of section 19(g) excludes 
liability for claims for emotional shock by secondary claimants who were not actually 
involved in the accident.312 Furthermore, limitation is provided by section 17(1) of the 
RAF Act, which provides that damages for non-patrimonial harm will only be 
                                                          
310 76. 
311 See “Legal Framework of the RAF” available at <http://www.raf.co.za/About-us/pages/Legal-
framework.aspx> (accessed on 3 February 2015). 
312 See Fourie v Road Accident Fund 2014 (2) SA 88 (GNP) para 36.  
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recoverable in respect of “serious injuries”. An additional significant limitation of the 
RAF’s liability is provided in terms of section 17(4)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Act, which state 
that, where a claim for the loss of income or a claim for loss of support is successful, 
the annual loss awarded to a victim will be capped. Section 17(4A), read together with 
a Board Notice issued in July 2017, limits both these claims to R262 366, with effect 
from 31 July 2017.313 Section 18(4) further limits the liability of the RAF in respect of 
funeral expenses to “the necessary actual costs to cremate the deceased or to inter 
him or her in a grave.” As recorded in Law Society, these limitations were introduced 
to ensure the financial sustainability of the RAF.314 
Similarly, compensation awarded under the COIDA may also be less than an 
employee would otherwise be entitled to in the case of a delictual claim for damages. 
While the COIDA claim is based on a fixed percentage of earnings, a claim for 
damages in the civil courts could include a total loss of earnings. Section 63 of the Act 
contains rules as to how the compensation should be calculated.  
 
5.7.2 The UK 2012 Scheme and the Dutch Fund 
As discussed in paragraph 5.3, both compensation schemes contain set lists of 
specified injuries recognised by the respective scheme as well as limited amount of 
damages compensable in respect of each injury.315    
 
5.7.3 Conclusion: suggestions relating to the limitation of the victim’s claim 
against the proposed fund 
Compensation funds generally develop upper and lower limits for compensation. 
Lower limits are set to prevent small or negligible claims from being instituted against 
a fund, which may therefore increase the administrative workload of the fund 
                                                          
313 See Government Gazette (28 July 2017) No. 41013 “Adjustment of Statutory Limit in respect of 
Claims for Loss of Income and Loss of Support” available at <https://archive.opengazettes.org.za/ 
archive/ZA/2017/government-gazette-ZA-vol-625-no-41013-dated-2017-07-28.pdf> (accessed on 28 
July 2017. 
314 See also “Legal Framework of the RAF” available at <http://www.raf.co.za/About-us/pages/Legal-
framework.aspx> (accessed on 3 February 2015). 
315 See the UK 2012 Scheme and the HSG Letsellijst (2016).  
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administrators. Higher limits are introduced to ensure the fund’s financial viability. It is 
recommended that the proposed fund should introduce both a lower and upper limit 
with regards to the compensation that it will award crime victims.  
It is argued that the apparent financial disadvantage to which such (upper) limitation 
may expose future applicants is a necessary trade-off in order to secure a source of 
funding through a relatively cost-effective and time-efficient administrative procedure. 
As the comments made in Law Society and Jooste illustrate, such a goal is in line with 
promoting the right to social security and it would therefore be rationally connected to 
a legitimate government purpose. The financial calculation of each specific limit would 
require extensive statistical analysis and falls outside the ambit of this dissertation. 
 
5.8 Should the compensation fund require victims to prove fault? 
The COIDA introduced a form of no-fault statutory liability and a victim of occupational 
injuries or diseases may institute a claim regardless of the reasonableness of his 
employer’s conduct in preventing the mishap. In contrast, the RAF Act, which caters 
for the compensation of motor vehicle accidents, requires prospective plaintiffs to 
prove fault. However, as we have seen, the legislature is intent on doing away with a 
fault-based system of liability under the proposed RABS. As such, it seems as though 
the major compensation funds operative within the delictual context will both be footed 
on a no-fault basis. If serious about the possibility of enacting a compensation fund for 
crime victims, the legislature will therefore have to consider the basis of the fund’s 
liability. It might be thought that, because it has been proposed that the legislature 
should consider the enactment of a compensation scheme for victims of intentionally-
committed violent crime, the scheme will be fault-based because it would require crime 
victims to require fault (in the form of intention). However, as indicated elsewhere,316 
and as discussed further below, this is not the case. For the sake of completeness, 
therefore, the basis of the proposed fund’s liability should be briefly considered. 
 
                                                          
316 See paragraph 4.2.2.3 in chapter 4 as well as paragraph 5.2.1.3 above.  
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5.8.1 South African statutes that have developed the law of delict: the RAF Act, 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (“CPA”) and the COIDA 
The COIDA provides compensation in respect of patrimonial harm which a victim 
suffers as a result of an occupational injury of disease contracted in the course of 
employment, regardless of the fault on the side of the employer. Similarly, section 
61(1) of the CPA provides that producers, importers, distributors or retailers of goods 
are strictly liable for any harm caused to the consumer as a consequence of (a) the 
supply of unsafe goods; (b) a product failure, defect or hazard in goods; or (c) 
inadequate instructions or warnings provided with goods. Although the RAF Act still 
requires victims to prove fault, the proposed RABS aims to implement a no-fault based 
compensation scheme. In Law Society, the Minister for Transport gave evidence that 
the amendments introduced by the RAF Amendment Act of 2005 were the “first step 
to greater reform”.317 It was considered “an interim measure towards the restructuring 
of the Fund's scheme into one which pays compensation on a no-fault basis.”318  
The advantages which the no-fault approach may hold in this context were discussed 
in chapter 3 and 4 and will not be repeated here. 
 
5.8.2 The UK 2012 Scheme and the Dutch Fund  
The majority of compensation funds that have been established for crime victims, only 
compensate victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes.319 Compensation funds for 
crime victims generally require applicants to prove that they suffered harm arising from 
a violent crime that was intentionally committed. The exclusion of victims of negligently 
caused crimes from the scope of compensation funds is generally justified on financial 
grounds and because the effects of those victims’ injuries are often covered by other 
forms of social insurance. For the sake of clarity, it may therefore be said that these 
compensation funds are not based on fault, because applicants are not required to 
prove fault (in the form of intention), but merely to prove that their harm had arisen 
from an intentionally-committed crime. 
                                                          
317 Para 46. 
318 Para 46. 
319 See the SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 80. 
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5.8.3 Conclusion: recommendation as to whether the proposed fund should be 
a fault-based compensation scheme 
On this issue, the SALRC Report is unclear. Neither of the draft bills it attached to the 
report give any indication as to whether the victim is required to prove fault on the part 
of the perpetrator in order to be eligible for compensation and, if so, whether 
negligence or intention ought to be proven.320 Von Bonde refers to the SALRC’s 
Discussion Paper, which preceded its 2004 report, and merely proposes that a “prima 
facie intentional criminal act should have occurred. This means that a successful 
prosecution need not be required in all cases, for example where the perpetrator has 
died.”321 The Discussion Paper, as well as the SALRC’s eventual report, however, is 
not clear on the issue of whether intention is required. It merely states, in general terms 
that, where intention is required,  
“the notion of intentional crime should involve a wide definition of intentionality. It would be unjust 
if, for instance, a claim were turned down because the injury suffered was the result of being 
injured by a stray bullet fired negligently by the offender without the offender’s having formed the 
specific intention to kill or injure the actual (or any) victim. The reasonable possibility of 
injury/death to some person must merely have been foreseeable to qualify the victim for making 
a claim [...] It is not, in general, necessary for the victim to have been the intended victim of the 
act of the offender. In some cases, therefore, even the dependants of a victim of a culpable 
homicide might well qualify for compensation.”322 
It is suggested that the proposed fund, if it were to be established, should follow the 
approach adopted by the UK 2012 Scheme. In line with this scheme and indeed most 
of the compensation schemes operative in this context, a victim is not required to prove 
fault (in the form of intention), but should be required to place sufficient evidence in 
front of the compensation authority to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he is 
eligible for a payment under the fund, i.e. that he suffered harm arising from an 
intentionally-committed crime. This will require a victim to provide medical evidence 
that supports the claim that the victim indeed obtained an injury recognised under the 
fund, confirmation that the incident (an intentionally-caused violent crime) has been 
reported to the police and a report from the police indicating whether the victim’s 
conduct contributed to their injury. In this sense only could it be said that the proposed 
                                                          
320 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 353-386. 
321 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa 291. 
322 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 81. 
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fund scheme would take fault into account. As indicated in paragraph 4.2.2.3 in 
chapter 4, from a policy perspective, this proposal may be justified on the basis that it 
may be much more time-efficient and therefore also cheaper than would be the case 
if the victim would be required to prove fault (in the form of intention) on the part of the 
perpetrator. In turn, this promotes the crime victim’s constitutional right to access to 
justice. This proposal improves the victim’s likelihood of being compensated for harm 
arising from crime, and therefore serves to further the goal of enacting the proposed 
fund.  
 
5.9 Relevance of the perpetrator’s identity  
In K v Minister of Safety and Security,323 the Supreme Court of Appeal denied the 
plaintiff a delictual remedy, but alluded to the possibility of legislative intervention.324 
In criticising the CC’s judgment in K, Fagan implied that it would have been more 
reasonable to compel the legislature to create a statutory compensation fund for all 
victims of police rapes.325 For the reasons set out below, limiting the scope of eligibility 
of a proposed fund in this manner is not recommended.  
The establishment of a statutory compensation fund specifically for victims of police 
rapes would obviously limit the availability of compensation from the proposed fund in 
various ways. First, it would limit compensation to those instances where the 
intentional infringement upon bodily integrity has occurred in a very specific way, i.e. 
in the form of rape. Secondly, it would limit compensation to situations where the 
victim’s intentional infringement of bodily integrity in the form of rape was perpetrated 
by a specific wrongdoer, namely a police officer.  
Arguably, these limitations would not be justifiable. The nature of the crime of violence 
that should be compensated under the proposed fund has been discussed in 
paragraph 5.2 above. With regard to the relevance of the wrongdoer’s identity, it may 
be argued that, when a police officer rapes an innocent member of the public, there is 
a reproachable betrayal of trust by a person tasked with the legal duty to promote 
                                                          
323 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA). 
324 Fagan (2009) SALJ 204. 
325 Fagan (2009) SALJ 204; K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
313 
 
safety and security. The betrayal of such trust by itself, however, does not provide a 
justifiable basis upon which to deny a remedy to innocent victims raped by other 
categories of wrongdoers, especially considering the fact that those categories of 
wrongdoers may equally consist of people in whom the victims placed their trust.  
There is a further jurisprudential problem with opting to award a statutory remedy only 
in the case where the wrongdoer is a member of the police: taxpayers’ monies are 
allocated to the budget of the Minister of Police (previously the Minister of Safety and 
Security) and indirectly employed to recompense police officers to provide safety and 
security. When they breach that duty and rape innocent members of the public, the 
latter will be awarded a statutory claim against a compensation fund which is likely 
also to be funded with the taxpayer’s money. Awarding a statutory claim to victims of 
police rapes only, thereby indirectly forcing the taxpayer to pay in respect of the 
provision of safety and security of the general public, and simultaneously denying 
those tax-payers who may be raped by someone other than members of the police, 
seem morally indefensible. 
However, considering the fact that the police may be seen as the vanguard of public 
safety, it may be considered whether a victim of a crime intentionally committed by a 
police officer should be awarded a higher amount of compensation. In other words, 
perhaps the abuse of trust that accompanies the victim’s physical injuries should be 
addressed by a higher compensation award. This could be in line with the standard of 
practice under the COIDA, where the employee is allowed increased compensation if 
his employer culpably caused the employee’s harm.326 
To conclude, it is suggested that the perpetrator’s identity is irrelevant for the purposes 
of applying for compensation under the proposed fund. 
 
                                                          
326 See sections 56 and 66 of the COIDA.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
314 
 
5.10 Miscellaneous practical considerations to be taken into account when 
enacting a statutory compensation fund for crime victims 
5.10.1 The time frame for instituting a statutory claim 
Most of the compensation schemes enacted in foreign jurisdictions require the 
applicant to report the crime to the police and to lodge a claim within a specified period, 
and also to get proper police verification of the incident or medical records.327 Failure 
to meet such deadlines may mean that an applicant’s award is reduced or withheld. 
The UK 2012 Scheme generally requires an applicant to send his application to the 
CICA as soon as reasonably practicable after the incident giving rise to the criminal 
injury to which it relates, and within two years after the date of that incident.328 
Similarly, section 7 of the Dutch Act states that a claim for compensation must be 
submitted to the Dutch Fund within ten years from the day on which the crime was 
committed. 
Requiring a time limit within which to bring a claim against the proposed fund would 
be an administratively sound practice that would be in line with the general trend in 
other foreign jurisdictions.329 Taking into account that delictual claims must generally 
be instituted within three years after the cause of action arose, and that applicants 
claiming compensation from the RAF and the COIDA fund are expected to institute 
their claims within specific time periods, it is proposed that victims under the scheme 
as envisaged should bring their claims within three years of the date on which the 
incident occurred.330 
It is proposed that crime victims should be encouraged to pursue their common-law 
delictual remedies to claim compensation from the perpetrator of the crime. To prevent 
prescription of a claim against the proposed fund taking effect while a common-law 
claim against the perpetrator is in process, it is suggested that it be enacted as part of 
the scheme that, while a debt owed by the perpetrator to the crime victim is the object 
of a claim instituted by legal process by the victim against the perpetrator, an 
                                                          
327 See SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 83-84.  
328 See paragraph 87 of the UK 2012 Scheme; CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 2. 
329 SALRC A Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime 83-84. 
330 See section 11(d) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
315 
 
”impediment” delaying the completion of prescription under section 13 of the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 will operate in respect of the claim against the fund. 
 
5.10.2 Place where the crime must have been committed 
All of the criminal injuries recognised under the UK 2012 Scheme must have been 
sustained as a result of a crime that occurred in “a relevant place”.331 According to 
paragraph 8 of the scheme, this means Great Britain or any other place specified in 
Annexure C. Annexure C expands on this term and sets out a list of places that may 
qualify for the purposes of compensation.332 According to section 3(1) of the Dutch Act 
compensation may be awarded if the intentional violent crime was committed in the 
Netherlands or on board a Dutch ship or aeroplane outside the Netherlands.  
It should be noted that the European Council adopted a directive in April 2004 which 
required all European Union (“EU”) countries to have a compensation scheme for 
victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes and established formal co-operation 
between member states to ensure that victims may receive compensation, regardless 
of where in the EU the crime was committed.333 As a result, victims of intentionally-
caused violent crimes in an EU country other than the one in which they usually live 
may apply for compensation in that different country.334  
As a point of departure, it is proposed that the South African legislature adopts a 
strategy similar to the one adopted in the UK 2012 Scheme and stipulate clearly the 
list of places that may qualify as a so-called “relevant place” for purposes of 
compensation. More specifically, it is proposed that compensation should be paid only 
to victims who have suffered harm as a result of intentional violent crimes that occurred 
in South Africa. This would be in line with the approach adopted in the RAF Act, where 
                                                          
331 Paragraphs 4-6, 8 of the UK 2012 Scheme.  
332 See paragraphs 1-3 of Annexure C of the 2012 Scheme for the entire list.  
333 See European Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32004L0080> (accessed on 11 April 2017); CICA UK 
2012 Scheme Guide 5; section 18(a) of the Dutch Act. 
334 See European Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32004L0080> (accessed on 11 April 2017); CICA UK 
2012 Scheme Guide 5; section 18(a) of the Dutch Act. 
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the RAF is only liable in respect of harm arising from motor vehicle accidents that 
occurred within the borders of South Africa.335  
Because there are no directives similar to the one adopted by the EU in the African 
context, it would not be possible for South Africa to enter into a comparable regional 
agreement with other African jurisdictions. However, the government of South Africa 
may consider approaching some or all of the countries that are signatories to the 
abovementioned EU directive to determine the possibility of reaching an agreement 
that could allow foreign nationals to apply for compensation under the proposed South 
African compensation fund (if it were to be enacted) and allow South African citizens 
to claim compensation from the various European jurisdictions’ funds. However, if this 
were to be done, the legislature should ensure that such an agreement is aligned with 
the residency requirements referred to in paragraph 5.10.3 below. 
In the event that a prospective applicant is not in a position to satisfy the necessary 
requirement, it is proposed that the fund should deny the claim and the victim would 
consequently have to rely on the common law of delict to find compensation for his 
harm (as proposed, the legislature should not abolish the common-law delictual 
remedies for residual harm). 
 
5.10.3 Nationality of applicant 
Most foreign schemes require prospective applicants to have a connection to the 
relevant jurisdiction that is more than temporary.336 For instance, the UK 2012 Scheme 
requires that potential applicants should comply with nationality and residency 
requirements, which means that the victim must have been ordinarily resident in the 
UK on the date of the incident while an additional condition must also have been met 
                                                          
335 Section 17(1) of the RAF Act. 
336 Ministry of Justice Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses: the Government Response 41. It should 
be noted that the European Council adopted a directive in April 2004 which required all EU countries to 
have a compensation scheme for victims of intentionally caused violent crimes and established formal 
co-operation between member states to ensure that victims may receive compensation, regardless of 
where in the EU the crime was committed. As a result, victims of intentionally caused violent crimes in 
an EU country other than the one in which they usually live may apply for compensation in that different 
country. See European Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32004L0080> (accessed on 11 April 2017); CICA UK 
2012 Scheme Guide 5; section 18(a) of the Dutch Act. 
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by the victim, e.g. the victim must have been a British citizen, “a close relative of a 
British citizen”, a national of a member state of the EU or the European Economic Area 
(“EEA”), a family member of an EU/EEA national who has a right to be in the UK, a 
national of a State party to the Council of Europe Convention on the Compensation of 
Victims of Violent Crimes,337 a member of Her Majesty’s armed forces, or an 
accompanying close relative of an armed forces member, or have been identified as 
a potential victim of human trafficking or made an application for asylum to remain in 
the UK on or before the day of your application for an award.338  
In contrast, the Dutch Fund merely states that if you have suffered harm as a result of 
an intentionally-committed violent crime in the Netherlands, you are eligible for 
compensation and therefore does not follow the same approach as the UK 2012 
Scheme by setting out a list of nationality and residency requirements.339  
Therefore, it seems as though the two examined schemes do not cater only for national 
citizens, but would also compensate other individuals. Whereas the Dutch Fund 
seemingly allows anyone who suffers harm from a violent crime committed 
intentionally in the Netherlands (assuming that the other eligibility criteria have been 
met), the UK 2012 Scheme seemingly provides for a higher eligibility threshold. As a 
result it is conceivable that a holiday-goer who suffers harm arising from an 
intentionally-committed crime in the Netherlands will potentially be eligible for 
compensation, he will not succeed with a claim under the UK 2012 Scheme unless he 
also complies with one of the residency requirements.  
It is proposed that, if the South African legislature decides to enact a crime victim 
compensation fund, it should follow the approach adopted by the UK 2012 Scheme. 
In other words, the legislature should adapt similar residency requirements as those 
set out in the UK 2012 Scheme, taking into account the South African context. It is 
suggested that this may contribute towards the financial sustainability of the proposed 
fund, which, as pointed out above, is a practically significant consideration to take into 
account.  
                                                          
337 CETS 116 of 1983. 
338 CICA UK 2012 Scheme Guide 12-13. 
339 Schadenfonds Geweldsmisdrijven “Veel gestelde vragen” available at <https://schadefonds.nl/veel-
gestelde-vragen/> (accessed on 27 June 2017).  
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5.10.4 What is practically expected of prospective applicants? 
Neither the UK 2012 Scheme nor the Dutch Fund requires an applicant to prove the 
existence of a violent crime in the same way that it must be proven, for example, 
beyond reasonable doubt, in a criminal court. For the sake of clarity, it might be 
emphasised once more that these schemes do not require a prospective applicant to 
prove fault (in the form of intention) in the same way that a victim is required to do so 
under the common law of delict. Instead, as indicated above, it is proposed that an 
applicant should be required to place evidence in front of the fund’s authorities to make 
it plausible to find that such a crime indeed occurred and that the victim did suffer the 
relevant injuries for which he claims compensation. It is recommended that the 
proposed fund, if enacted, adopt a similar approach. In the event that a prospective 
applicant is not in a position to provide the compensation authorities with evidence 
that he suffered harm arising from an intentionally-committed crime, the fund should 
deny the claim and the victim would consequently have to rely on the common law of 
delict to find compensation for the harm he suffered (as proposed, the legislature 
should not abolish the common-law delictual claim available to the victim.)   
 
5.11 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to identify practical questions which the South African 
legislature should answer if it accepts the proposal to develop the law of delict by 
enacting a compensation fund for crime victims. In canvassing the various matters, 
attention was paid to the legislative solutions advanced to the problem of crime victim 
compensation in the UK and the Netherlands. Drawing from the approaches and 
solutions adopted in those jurisdictions, specific recommendations were made, which 
may be summarised below.  
It is suggested that the proposed fund should be established in a concise statute that 
deals with salient matters, while policy documentation may be developed to provide 
an interpretation of the eligibility criteria set out in the statute, the administrative 
procedure by means of which compensation may be claimed, and a more detailed 
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discussion of the questions which crime victims may typically require answering. Both 
of the foreign schemes examined in this chapter follow this approach, providing a 
relatively brief statute which is then accompanied by more detailed policy 
documentation that contains lists of the compensable injuries, the amounts claimable, 
the procedures to be followed as well as a variety of related matters.  
The policy documentation, produced by the compensation authority responsible for 
the administration of the scheme expands on the statute and explains its working in 
simple terms. In this regard, these schemes differ from the compensation schemes 
set up under the COIDA and the RAF Act, which consist of a single, lengthier and 
more complex statute to deal with all matters pertaining to compensation for harm 
arising from motor vehicle accidents and occupational injuries and diseases.  
The advantage of the approach adopted by the foreign crime victim compensation 
schemes is that the statute remains simple, brief and clear, arguably making it more 
accessible to members of the public. The interpretation of the statute, the eligibility 
criteria, the harm compensable under the scheme, its practical mechanics and the 
various questions that may be raised by injured crime victims are set out in the policy 
documentation. If, for example, it is necessary to provide further information, or to set 
out a new procedure to be followed, amend the list of compensable injuries or the 
amounts claimable in relation to those injuries, it can easily be set out in the policy 
documentation, without further statutory procedures having to be followed. Arguably, 
this means that the statute continues to provide certainty about its core objectives, 
while providing a degree of flexibility to the administrative body regarding its practical 
functioning.  
With regard to the core features of the proposed statute, it was suggested that, 
generally speaking, the fund should aim to develop narrow eligibility criteria, placing 
its core focus on the compensation of victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes. 
Furthermore, relatives of deceased victims of crime and witnesses of such crimes 
should also be compensated. As indicated above, it is not suggested that the proposed 
fund should also compensate the category of risk-takers recognised by the UK 2012 
Scheme.  
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In line with the compensation schemes in the UK and the Netherlands, the proposed 
fund should aim to compensate both patrimonial as well as non-patrimonial harm, 
provided that the fund adopts strategies to establish narrow eligibility criteria and 
limitations regarding the scope of its liability. One readily achievable method to limit 
the proposed fund’s liability would be to cap the amount of compensation claimable 
from the fund. Indeed, this is the accepted strategy followed by foreign compensation 
funds as well as the RAF and the COIDA, which statutes could assist in formulating 
the necessary limitations.  
It was also suggested that the crime victim’s common-law claim against the perpetrator 
should not be abolished. Although not a formal eligibility requirement, the proposed 
fund should clearly encourage victims to pursue this route where the perpetrator is 
known and in a financial position to compensate the victim. This arrangement will be 
in the financial interest of the proposed fund (by improving its sustainability) as well as 
crime victims (by allowing victims to claim full compensation).  
Furthermore, if a common-law claim is successful, compensation received from the 
fund, should not be taken into account when calculating the perpetrator’s common-law 
liability. In such a scenario, the fund should also be allowed a right to reclaim whatever 
monies it has already paid over to the victim.  
Of course, for reasons highlighted in chapters 3 and 4, it is unlikely that the victim 
would be successful in recovering damages by means of a common-law claim against 
the perpetrator and the victim would therefore in all likelihood turn towards the 
proposed fund for compensation. Under these circumstances, the fund should be 
entitled to take into account any other monies which the victim has received (from 
sources other than a civil claim, e.g. insurance payments) at the time of application for 
compensation.  
Unlike the COIDA, the CPA and the RABS, the proposed fund will be fault-based 
insofar as a victim will be required to provide evidence to the compensation authority 
that he has suffered harm arising from an intentionally-caused violent crime. The focus 
is on securing a limited amount of compensation to victims of violent crimes caused 
intentionally. Victims, however, are not required to prove intention beyond reasonable 
doubt in the same way that the state is required to do in a criminal trial. Rather, the 
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victim should be required to place evidence in front of the compensation authority to 
allow them to reasonably conclude that an intentionally-caused violent crime was 
indeed committed.   
Lastly, the following remarks may be made about the nature of the statutory 
development of the South African law of delict and the relationship between the 
common law of delict and statutes relevant to this branch of the law.  
This dissertation has examined comparable instances of large-scale reform which 
occurred in the past. The proposal to potentially develop an area which falls within the 
terrain covered by the law of delict has brought to the fore questions relating to the 
nature of statutory reform. Writing from an Australian perspective about statutory 
reform of English tort law, James Goudkamp stated as follows:340 
“The rise of legislation has profoundly affected all areas of the law in the major common law 
jurisdictions. Tort law was arguably the last major stronghold of judge-made law. […] 
Unsurprisingly, the extent of statutory alterations to tort law vary very considerably from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. New Zealand famously underwent by far the most far-reaching 
legislative changes […] that provided for a comprehensive accident compensation scheme. This 
scheme […] leaves tort law with a relatively minor role to play. Tort law throughout Australia has 
also been changed very extensively by statute. […] These changes did not go as far as those 
made in New Zealand. The essence of the tort system was retained […] The United Kingdom 
lacks tort reform legislation that is comparable to that which exists in Australia and New Zealand.”  
The South African law of delict, like English tort law, has not experienced the same 
radical reform which New Zealand underwent when it enacted a general accident 
compensation scheme. In fact, no other jurisdiction has done so.  
Rather than introducing comprehensive statutory reform of the law of delict, the South 
African legislature’s development of this branch of the law, like its English counterpart, 
has occurred on an ad hoc basis, with the major instances of statutory development 
justified by legal and public policy considerations341 and enacted with the view to 
solving very specific practical problems relating to the compensation of specific 
categories of victims. Compared to the alternative, i.e. introducing a complete overhaul 
of the law of delict via the introduction of a general accident compensation scheme in 
the same way as New Zealand has done, the current approach to statutory reform 
appears to be a sensible one. 
                                                          
340 J Goudkamp “Reforming English Tort Law: Lessons from Australia” in E Quill & RJ Friel (eds) 
Damages and Compensation Culture: Comparative Perspectives (2016) 75-95 75-76. 
341 See paragraph 3.2 in chapter 3. 
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This dissertation is not the first research project to consider statutory reform of the law 
of delict to compensate victims of crime. It will be recalled that Von Bonde has made 
the radical proposal of the creation of “a unified Compensation Scheme to compensate 
victims of crime, as well as victims of traffic and industrial injuries.”342 However, for the 
reasons briefly set out below, this solution cannot be supported. 
Von Bonde suggests that there is an “equality argument”343 which dictates that “victims 
of crime should not be treated differently from victims of other kinds of misfortune.”344 
Of course, it may be argued that this argument is undermined by the very fact that 
certain categories of victims have been singled out for preferential treatment in the 
past (e.g. motor vehicle accident victims and victims of occupational injuries and 
diseases are treated differently from victims of drought). However, this kind of 
differentiation has been justified on the policy bases examined in chapter 3. Similarly, 
if crime victims were to receive statutory compensation (either through a general 
accident fund or a fund specifically enacted for this purpose), it would also be 
differentiated and receive different treatment.  
Furthermore, if the proposal set out in this chapter were to be accepted by a 
legislature, the relative positions of crime victims and victims of motor vehicle 
accidents, defective consumer products and occupational injuries and diseases would 
be equal insofar as that they would all receive statutory assistance in their effort to 
claim compensation. Nonetheless, there are notable differences between the different 
categories of accidents which may conceivably justify a differentiated approach. In 
truth, the argument could be made that the existence of tailor-made legislation that 
focuses on a specific practical problem could better alleviate the plights of a specific 
category of victim, which could assist in achieving equality among the various 
categories of victims.  
Von Bonde’s proposal is further premised on the notion that “separate compensation 
schemes for various categories of victims leads to unnecessary complications when a 
decision has to be made regarding the causation of a particular injury in order to direct 
the claim to the appropriate fund”.345 However, these difficulties have been statutorily 
                                                          
342 Von Bonde Redress for Victims of Crime in South Africa iv. 
343 387. 
344 387. 
345 387. 
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regulated and arguably have been settled. For example, section 18 of the RAF Act 
provides that, where compensation is recoverable under COIDA, the amount of this 
compensation is deducted from damages that are recoverable from the RAF.  
The argument that the “distinction between occupational and other injuries is obsolete 
as it dates from an era when workers’ compensation was the only social insurance 
and welfare programme in operation”346 does not do much to justify the radical kind of 
statutory reform which Von Bonde contemplates. At any rate, it is suggested that there 
may be different reasons why an innocent victim of an assault and rape attack should 
be compensated when compared to the reasons for compensating someone who is 
injured while performing a voluntarily elected employment duty – reasons which may 
be relevant for determining, for example, the levels of compensation payable to 
different categories of victims. 
Von Bonde further argues that “[m]odern society should have a system of 
compensation based on the financial consequences of an injury rather than its 
causation”347 and that “victims of injury have the same financial needs irrespective of 
the cause of their injuries.”348 Once again, it is suggested that there may be different 
reasons for compensating a crime victim, when compared to a motor vehicle accident 
victim, especially if the one has not elected to partake in any kind of risky behaviour. 
The legislature may want to give effect to these reasons by catering for different 
compensation tariffs, procedures and further statutory assistance provided. Von 
Bonde’s argument does little to justify the wide-ranging changes which he seeks to 
introduce by amalgamating the RAF and the COIDA together with a fund aimed at 
compensating crime victims.  
Von Bonde points out the danger of a “proliferation of benefits available to victims of 
misfortune”349 which could lead to “overcompensation of some victims of misfortune 
at the expense of others and the state.”350 As indicated in this chapter, the issue of 
collateral benefits will have to be dealt with in the proposed legislative scheme, in the 
same way that it has been dealt with in comparable statutes. In other words, this matter 
                                                          
346 388. 
347 388. 
348 388. 
349 388. 
350 388. 
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may be dealt with through statutory craftsmanship and cannot justify the 
comprehensive scheme which Von Bonde contemplates.  
Von Bonde provides no evidence for asserting that a “single system allows for a more 
equitable dispensation than a number of systems paying benefits on varying scales 
from public funds.”351 In addition, his statement that a “single scheme administered by 
one bureau of officials will be more cost effective to administer than separate systems 
because a duplication of functions is avoided”352 is not substantiated and therefore 
cannot be used in justifying the overhaul which he proposes.  
Lastly, the argument that the COIDA and the RAF are not “functioning optimally”353 
does not justify the proposal to introduce a more comprehensive scheme which will 
conceivably entail much more administration and financial management, because it 
would receive a larger amount of applications for compensation from a greater group 
of victims.  
While it may be true that the South African legislature remains the major engine for 
law reform, this dissertation has argued that it would be better to enact specific 
legislation that is tailor-made for the existence and extent of a particular problem (in 
this case, the high levels of crime).354 Large-scale statutory reform seems impractical 
from an administrative point of view: enacting a general, unified scheme along the 
lines proposed by Von Bonde would necessitate a thorough analysis regarding the 
wide series of role players that are currently involved with the administration and 
management of the existing compensation funds. The idea that, following such an 
analysis, these entities should be realigned, given a different name and ascribed more 
or less the same functions may likely result in an unwarranted waste of time, money 
and effort.   
The existing statutes, funds and entities that manage those funds possess a ring-
fenced expertise, specific to a particular area within the law, and it is not obvious what 
the advantage would be in having them merged with an altogether different entity, with 
unrelated objectives and functions.  
                                                          
351 388. 
352 388. 
353 388. 
354 See also paragraph 3.2 in chapter 3 and paragraph 4.3 in chapter 4. 
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From a drafting point of view, the kind of statutory reform which Von Bonde has in 
mind would require an immense effort to ensure that all of the definitions, procedures, 
rights and obligations which are currently encapsulated by the various statutes would 
also be included in a general statutory scheme of that nature. For example, how would 
an “accident” be defined? Would it merely refer to motor vehicle accidents as well as 
occupational injuries and diseases? If referring merely to both, what is the point of just 
merging them into one definition? It is conceivable that there would be a multiplicity of 
similar definitional problems. 
Further, there are specific theoretical questions relating to each existing statute, e.g. 
what is a “vehicle” for the purpose of road accident compensation under the RAF Act 
and when do you act “in the course and within scope of employment” for the purposes 
of occupational compensation under the COIDA? A comprehensive compensation 
fund, set up by enacting a new all-encompassing statute, would in any event still be 
required to provide answers to these questions. To what degree will such a statute not 
merely result in a compilation of the existing COIDA and the RAF Act to answer these 
questions? If so, the advantage in doing so is not clear at all.   
Each of the COIDA, the RAF Act and the CPA are tailor-made statutes, informed by 
context-sensitive factors and catering for specific problems. Each statute has devised 
(through case law, regulation or practice) solutions for problems that arose in a specific 
area (and which may very well be inherently related to a key feature within the field 
that is legislated). Against this background, it is therefore argued that, rather than 
introducing the radical kind of reform which occurred in New Zealand or which Von 
Bonde proposes, the existing approach to statutory development of the South African 
law of delict, i.e. enacting specific statutes aimed at solving particular practical 
problems on an ad hoc basis, should remain the preferred approach. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This dissertation has identified three main research questions for analysis.1 To 
respond to these questions, a broad range of issues relating to crime victim 
compensation has been explored and a series of arguments and recommendations 
has been considered. The purpose of this final chapter is to recount the factors that 
provided the impetus for this research project, and to set out its main argument. 
Concluding remarks will also be made concerning the relationship between the 
common law of delict and related statutes as well as the function of the South African 
law of delict, issues which have received some attention in passing during the course 
of the dissertation.  
As indicated throughout, compelling evidence exists that South Africa struggles with 
exceedingly high levels of crime.2 Quite understandably, its citizens are filled with 
resentment and anger, and are deeply concerned about this problem.3 So much so 
that, when asked to identify the two most serious problems not yet resolved since 1994 
in a national poll survey,4 people identified the top two issues as crime and 
unemployment.5 
As stated earlier, there are different ways to react to this problem.6 On the one hand, 
the state may introduce various policies and programmes to stem the tide and to 
further crime prevention efforts.7 Obviously, the best possible response to the high 
levels of crime would be the successful implementation of these preventative 
strategies and the significant reduction of existing crime rates. However, the prospects 
of this happening are remote, and this makes it vital for South African law also to 
respond appropriately to crime that has already taken place.  
                                                          
1 See paragraph 1.6 in chapter 1. 
2 See paragraph 1.1 in chapter 1 and paragraph 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4. 
3 Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe 2011 (2) SACR 301 (CC) para 35.  
4 South African Institute for Race Relations Race Relations in South Africa: Reasons for Hope (2016) 
2.  
5 2.  
6 See paragraph 1.1 in chapter 1.  
7 See paragraph 1.1 in chapter 1; S v SMM 2013 (2) SACR 292 (SCA) para 14. 
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Once a crime has been committed, the South African legal system could respond in 
one of the following ways. First, criminal law provides the possibility for the state to 
investigate crimes, apprehend the accused individuals and prosecute them in a 
criminal court.8 Secondly, the law of delict reacts to the harm arising from crime by 
providing the victim with the opportunity to obtain compensation from the perpetrator. 
A crime victim interested in taking up this opportunity to claim damages from the actual 
perpetrator of the crime may institute a common-law delictual claim against the latter 
and would have to prove all of the elements of delictual liability on a balance of 
probabilities. A further, very limited option is to make use of the procedural assistance 
offered in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.   
 
6.2 Summary of the main argument presented in this dissertation 
The point of departure for this dissertation was to evaluate the compensatory response 
offered under the South African legal system to determine whether it is satisfactory 
and, if not, to consider whether an alternative method exists to secure compensation 
for the hundreds of thousands of South Africans who fall victim to crime each year. 
Attention was first paid to the South African law of delict as the branch of the law that 
takes on the compensation of harm as its primary function.9 A crime victim who seeks 
compensation through the law of delict may institute a common-law delictual claim 
against the actual perpetrator if it can be proven that the latter culpably and wrongfully 
caused the victim’s harm.  
However, as argued in chapter 2, it may be said that the compensatory response 
currently provided by the law of delict is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. First, 
the actual perpetrator of the crime is most probably not in a financial position to 
compensate the victim’s harm. Secondly, crime victims who seek to hold the state 
vicariously liable in delict for harm arising from crime may be successful, but the 
theoretical and practical consequences of expanding state delictual liability are 
                                                          
8 See generally JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016); JJ Joubert, M Basdeo, T 
Geldenhuys, MG Karels, GP Kemp, JP Swanepoel, SS Terblanche & SE van der Merwe The Criminal 
Procedure Handbook 12 ed (2017). 
9 See paragraph 2.1 in chapter 2. 
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undesirable. Thirdly, crime victims who seek to hold the state directly liable, may find 
it very difficult, if not impossible, to prove systemic negligence. Lastly, for the reasons 
set out in chapter 2, the compensatory mechanisms contained in the Criminal 
Procedure Act do not provide an adequate statutory avenue for relief to crime victims, 
while the Prevention of Crime Act 121 of 1998 focuses on the prevention and 
deterrence of organised crime and not on the issue of crime victim compensation.  
From the critical overview of the manner in which crime victims are currently 
compensated under the South African legal system, the dissertation considered 
whether there is an alternative way to award compensation to certain categories of 
crime victims. One particular alternative that has been adopted in a variety of foreign 
jurisdictions is the establishment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims.10 
Funds have been adopted in the United Kingdom, a series of other European 
jurisdictions, the United States of America, as well as certain Canadian territories and 
Australian states. Fundamentally, these crime victim compensation schemes are 
generally funded by tax-payer money and, in most cases, seek to provide easier, 
quicker and more cost-efficient access to compensation instead of instituting lengthy, 
expensive delictual claims as part of civil litigious proceedings. 
Considering the pervasiveness and popularity of this method, the question was raised 
whether the South African law of delict may be developed by the enactment of a crime 
victim compensation scheme for certain categories of crime victims. Because such a 
legislative step would entail a large-scale reform project, it would be necessary to 
justify the basis upon which crime victims could be singled out from other groups of 
unfortunates for special treatment. As indicated in chapter 1, earlier research that 
relates to the establishment of a South African crime victim compensation scheme 
failed to provide a justification for its creation. 
Against this background, this dissertation adopted the following approach. First, 
chapter three attempted to develop a theoretical framework for the future statutory 
development of the South African law of delict as far as the general issue of 
compensation is concerned.11 This was done by conducting an investigation into the 
policy backgrounds of arguably the three most important statutes that have developed 
                                                          
10 See also chapter 5. 
11 See chapter 3. 
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the law of delict in the past: the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act 130 of 1993 (“COIDA”), the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (“RAF Act”), as 
amended by the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 15 of 2005 (“RAFA Act”) and 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (“CPA”). 
It was argued that these statutes share common considerations that have acted as 
justifiable motivation for the legislature to intervene. First, the need to combat the 
significant risk of harm arising from motor vehicle accidents, occupational injuries and 
diseases and defective manufactured products as well as the accompanying risk of 
receiving no compensation when the relevant risk of harm materialises. Secondly, it 
was argued that, in addition to alleviating these risks, these statutes were also justified 
by a related, but independent consideration, namely the promotion of the constitutional 
right to social security. A third shared consideration that was identified was the need 
to lessen the significant evidentiary burden provided by the common-law delictual 
requirement to prove fault (specifically negligence). In some contexts it is incredibly 
difficult, if not impossible, for an ordinary person to find the time, money, expertise and 
information that is necessary to prove that the defendant acted unreasonably.  
Further general considerations that have been used to justify earlier statutory 
development of the law of delict in the past include the inordinate costs involved in 
pursuing compensation along the delictual route as well as the likely under-
compensation which accompanies the latter, the convincing preference for statutory 
as opposed to judicial reform (especially when it comes to a profound development 
within the law), and the need to avoid arbitrary outcomes that may be the product of 
claiming compensation by means of a civil trial.  
The second part of the approach was to establish whether the proposed statutory 
development of the law of delict could fit within the theoretical framework outlined in 
chapter 3.12 It therefore fell to be determined if the considerations justifying earlier 
legislative reform could also provide a justifiable basis for the specific legislative 
project proposed in this dissertation, i.e. the establishment of a statutory compensation 
fund for crime victims.  
                                                          
12 See chapter 4.  
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Ultimately, the dissertation concludes that, similar to earlier developments, there is a 
significant risk of falling victim to crime as well as an accompanying risk of receiving 
no compensation where such a risk materialises. In truth, this risk of falling victim to 
violent crime in South African appeared to be statistically higher than the risk of being 
harmed as a result of a motor vehicle accident. It may therefore be argued that the 
notion of risk of harm, and the accompanying risk of having to shoulder costs 
personally if that risk materialises, operates much more forcefully in the context of 
harm arising from crime.  
The enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation scheme could also promote 
the constitutional right to social security in ways comparable to the COIDA, securing 
victims with compensation, allowing for quicker, easier and more cost-effective access 
to a legal remedy, and focusing on providing a more equitable compensation 
dispensation. Furthermore, it was argued that crime victims, like victims of motor 
vehicle accidents, occupational injuries and diseases and defective manufactured 
products are confronted with a similar evidentiary obstacle in claiming compensation 
if they institute common-law delictual claims. Developing a statutory compensation 
fund could contribute to alleviating this burden. It was suggested that crime victims 
who wish to claim compensation from the proposed fund should not be required to 
prove that the perpetrator acted negligently or had the requisite intention in the same 
way that it may be required in a criminal or civil trial. Instead, victims would be required 
to place sufficient evidence before the compensation authorities to prove that they 
suffered harm arising from an intentionally-committed violent crime.  
The dissertation also adopted the view that, as was the case with motor vehicle 
accident victims, victims of occupational injuries and diseases and defective consumer 
product victims prior to the enactment of the RAF Act, the COIDA and the CPA, victims 
of harm arising from crime are currently required to incur excessive legal costs in 
pursuing a time-consuming litigious route to compensation – which may only be an 
option to crime victims if they can identify a solvent entity that may to some extent be 
said to have caused their harm arising from crime. If they cannot, it is likely that the 
institution of a common-law delictual claim may leave them under-compensated. High 
transaction costs and potential under-compensation may therefore also act as 
justifying considerations in the context of harm arising from crime.  
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Furthermore, the judicial expansion of state delictual liability provided the possibility of 
arbitrary outcomes and uncertainty for future litigants (in certain cases), which may be 
side-stepped by instituting a statutory crime victim compensation scheme. Lastly, it 
was suggested that the establishment of a crime victim compensation fund is a fitting 
example of where it is preferable to develop the law through statutory processes as 
opposed to judicial reform. 
Chapter 4 concluded by submitting that the proposed fund is therefore justifiable and, 
when compared to the solutions offered by the current developments within the 
common law of delict and existing legislation, a statutory compensation fund seems, 
in principle, to be a more desirable solution to improve the legal position of crime 
victims insofar as their compensation is concerned. 
Whether the proposal to enact a statutory compensation scheme should ultimately be 
endorsed, would depend on the fund’s practical application. Therefore, chapter 5 
focused on several practical considerations which the South African legislature should 
take into account if it were indeed to enact such a scheme.13 Generally speaking, it 
was proposed that the fund should aim to develop narrow eligibility criteria, placing its 
core focus on the compensation of victims of intentionally-caused violent crimes. 
Furthermore, relatives of deceased victims of crime and witnesses of such crimes 
should also be compensated. In addition, the fund should aim to compensate both 
patrimonial as well as non-patrimonial harm, provided that strategies be adopted to 
establish narrow eligibility criteria and limitations regarding the scope of its liability. 
One readily achievable method to limit the proposed fund’s liability would be to cap 
the amount of compensation claimable from the fund. 
It is further suggested that the crime victim’s common-law claim against the perpetrator 
should not be abolished. It was also argued that the proposed fund should not require 
the victim to prove fault on the part of the perpetrator, but merely to provide evidence 
of an intentionally-caused violent crime. In other words, the victim should be required 
to place evidence in front of the compensation authority to allow them to conclude that, 
on a balance of probability, he suffered harm arising from an intentionally-caused 
                                                          
13 See chapter 5.  
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violent crime. Lastly, it was proposed that the fund’s focus should be on securing a 
limited amount of compensation to victims of violent crimes caused intentionally.  
 
6.3 Concluding remarks and final recommendations 
 
6.3.1 The relationship between the common law of delict and statute 
This dissertation has brought to the fore the relationship that exists between the 
common law of delict and legislation operative within the context of compensation. It 
has focused on the nature of the statutory development of the law of delict and made 
several recommendations in this context. This prompts the question why the 
relationship between the common law of delict and statutory law of delict has been so 
under-researched. 
Throughout the process of conducting research in respect of the questions identified 
in chapter 1, it has become apparent that the relationship between the law of delict 
and statute – which forms the backdrop for this dissertation – has not received much 
attention from South African delict scholars in the past. This is perhaps similar to the 
position under English law, where, as Burrows has remarked, the relationship between 
common law and statute “has traditionally been woefully underexplored by 
commentators.”14  
It is suggested that some of the reasons for this state of affairs which Burrows 
highlights may also apply to the South African context. They include “the perception 
[…] that legislation is comparatively ‘unexciting’; the sense that it is an intruder on 
foundational judge-made law; […] concerns about the necessary separation of 
reasoning derived from the two sources of law; appreciation that the piecemeal and 
limited operation of many statutes make them ill-suited to inform debates concerning 
broader legal issues; and, finally, the view that legislation is often the poorly drafted 
outcome of political expediency, rather than reflective of legal principle.”15 
                                                          
14 A Burrows “The relationship between common law and statute in the law of obligations” (2012) 128 
Law Quarterly Review 232 232. 
15 E Bant “Statute and Common Law: Interaction and Influence in Light of the Principle of Coherence” 
(2015) 38(1) UNSW Law Journal 367 369. 
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This dissertation has aimed to make a contribution in this context by attempting to 
provide a general theoretical framework for potential statutory reform of the law of 
delict in the future and by emphasising the fact that specific instances of legislative 
development of the law of delict may be justified by having regard to such a framework.  
 
6.3.2 The function and role of the South African law of delict 
This dissertation has focused on evaluating the compensatory regime relating to crime 
victims, and investigating a potential alternative method to compensate crime victims, 
i.e. through the establishment of a crime victim compensation scheme. In the process, 
however, the role and function of the South African law of delict has received 
consideration. Although a detailed and thorough analysis of this issue falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation, the following remarks may be appropriate, especially with 
the view to making a contribution to future research projects within this area of the law.  
Compared to the attention that it receives in other jurisdictions, the function and role 
of the South African law of delict is not a topic that is frequently discussed or an area 
that has received much attention from legal scholars. It appears as though most 
academics accept that its primary function is compensation.16 Only one standard 
textbook expressly deals with the matter and concludes that, although it may not be 
the sole function of this branch of the law, it is the primary one.17 In an authoritative 
judgment on the matter,18 the Constitutional Court (“CC”) seemingly confirmed this 
position and it has not been challenged since.19  
As indicated elsewhere, this dissertation agrees with the view that the primary function 
of this branch of the law is compensation. The ultimate proposal, aimed at ensuring a 
more satisfactory compensatory response to crime victims than what is currently the 
                                                          
16 For overviews of the function of the law of delict, see JC Macintosh Negligence in Delict 1 ed (1926) 
1; FP van den Heever Aquilian Damages in South African Law (1944) 3; RG McKerron The Law of 
Delict: a Treatise on the Principles of Liability for Civil Wrongs in the Law of South Africa 7 ed (1971); 
NJ van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 ed (1976) 1-3; J 
Neethling & JM Potgieter Neethling-Visser-Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 3-17; JC van der Walt & 
JR Midgley Principles of Delict 4 ed (2016); MM Loubser & JR Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South 
Africa 2 ed (2012) 8-11. 
17 Loubser & Midgley (eds) (2012) 8. See the discussion of the other functions at 8-11.  
18 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
19 The CC did, however, noted, obiter, that the law of delict also has a deterrent role to play: see Loureiro 
v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA (CC) 394 para 56.  
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case under South African law, does not undermine this position. If anything, it further 
supports the focus on the effective compensation of harm, with the attention in this 
case being on crime victim compensation. The proposal, nonetheless, requires a fresh 
consideration of the following question: who should compensate harm? 
Legal philosophers and delict/tort law scholars have identified two competing accounts 
or frameworks within which that question may be answered, namely corrective justice 
and distributive justice.20  
Essentially, the corrective justice account of the law of delict proposes that someone 
who wrongfully and culpably injures another must make reparation to the injured party 
by paying the victim compensation.21 In other words, a corrective justice explanation 
for the South African law of delict would maintain that, because it was the wrongdoer 
who disturbed the existing equilibrium by culpably and wrongfully causing the victim’s 
harm, he bears a duty to restore the status quo and correct his wrong, which he may 
do by paying compensation to the wrongdoer.  
Whereas corrective justice focuses on the injustice committed by one party and 
suffered by another, distributive justice, on the other hand, deals with the distribution 
of whatever is divisible among the members of a community.22 Distributive justice 
divides a benefit or burden in accordance with some criterion that compares the 
relative merits of the participants. Further, where corrective justice links the victim and 
wrongdoer with each other in a strictly bipolar relationship, distributive justice deals 
                                                          
20 H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) footnote 86; A Fagan “The right to personal 
security” in E Reid & D Visser (eds) Private Law and Human Rights: Bringing Rights Home in Scotland 
and South Africa (2013) 130-156; C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice 
Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 103-164; J Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1. 
The Place of Corrective Justice‟ (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1-50; J Gardner “What is Tort Law for? 
Part 2. The Place of Distributive Justice” in J Oberdiek (ed) The Philosophical Foundations of the Law 
of Torts (2014) 335-354; A Beever Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (2009); T Keren-Paz Torts, 
Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice (2007). See also paragraph 1.1 in chapter 1, paragraph 2.1 in 
chapter 2, paragraph 3.1 in chapter 3, and paragraph 4.2.4.3 in chapter 4. 
21 E Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (1995); E Weinrib “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell” (2002) 52 
University of Toronto Law Journal 349-356; G Fletcher “Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory” (1972) 85 
Harvard Law Review 537. See also J Coleman “Corrective Justice And Wrongful Gain” (1982) 11 
Journal of Legal Studies 421–40; J Coleman “Property, Wrongfulness, and the Duty to 
Compensate” (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law Review451-70; J Coleman “The Mixed Conception Of 
Corrective Justice” (1992a) 77 Iowa Law Review 427–44; J Coleman “The Practice of Corrective 
Justice” in DG Owen (ed) Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1995). 
22 See also paragraph 3.2.3.2 of chapter 3; E Weinrib The University of Toronto Law Journal 2002 354-
355. 
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with the sharing of a benefit or burden; it involves comparing the potential parties to 
the distribution in terms of a distributive criterion.23  
A statutory compensation fund – which may be said to substitute the wrongdoer insofar 
as it assumes responsibility for the compensation of the victim’s harm – may therefore 
be regarded as an instrument aimed at achieving distributive justice rather than 
corrective justice. A compensation fund does not require the person who culpably and 
wrongfully caused the victim’s harm to correct his wrong, but is rather concerned with 
the allocation of resources (in this case money which is paid from a tax-funded pool) 
throughout society in accordance with an established set of criteria (i.e. the eligibility 
criteria applicable in respect of the fund).  
If it is argued that the South African law of delict is grounded in corrective justice and 
that “the law cannot adequately give effect to the right to personal security unless it 
achieves corrective justice in respect of bodily injuries”,24 it would apparently follow 
that a statutory compensation fund of the type that is proposed in this dissertation does 
not constitute a part of the law of delict, and that compensation provided by such a 
fund to crime victims would not give sufficient protection to the victim’s right to safety 
and security. 
In fact, if it is to be accepted that the South African law of delict aims only to achieve 
corrective justice,25 it would mean that only those instances where the wrongdoer who 
culpably caused the victim’s harm and subsequently compensates the victim may be 
regarded as falling within the perimeters of the law of delict. Maintaining this view 
would imply that other cases, e.g. where a motor vehicle accident victim is awarded 
compensation by the Road Accident Fund, cannot be viewed as forming a part of the 
delictual framework.  
In response to this argument, it may first be said that, [i]f corrective justice ever has a 
place in law, it is here”,26 i.e. in the law of delict.27 The institution of common-law 
delictual claims strives to achieve individualised justice between two parties, holding 
                                                          
23 See also paragraph 3.2.3.2 of chapter 3; E Weinrib The University of Toronto Law Journal 2002 354-
355. 
24 Fagan “The right to personal security” in Private Law and Human Rights 131. 
25 See 143-149.  
26 Smits Introduction to Private Law 45. 
27 See also Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 130. 
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the wrongdoer personally responsible for his wrongdoing and may continue to fulfil this 
role in the future. The proposal contained in this dissertation should not be regarded 
as negating this function of this branch of the law.  
However, if the law of delict is characterised as aiming solely to ensure that victims 
receive compensation from wrongdoers who, in the process, are said to correct 
wrongs, it may be regarded as being a particularly ineffective legal instrument, 
because it requires individual victims to resort to a slow, expensive justice system to 
get compensated.28 Of course, that could only occur if the victim has the necessary 
means and time to institute proceedings. Where a victim is indeed in a position to do 
so, and decides to institute a delictual claim, the wrongdoer may, however, turn out to 
be the proverbial man of straw, leaving the wrong uncorrected and the harm where it 
has fallen. Compared to this alternative, private insurance, social security and 
statutory compensation are both cheaper and quicker and may therefore be 
preferred.29 Therefore, while it may be “a powerful image”30 that the law of delict is 
solely concerned with achieving corrective justice, in reality, this branch of the law “is 
swamped with policy questions both legislators and courts have to answer and that 
are necessarily informed by considerations of distributive justice as well.”31   
Indeed, there are many potential ways to compensate a victim of harm other than 
through insisting that the wrongdoer should be made to pay compensation so as to 
achieve corrective justice. This realisation has convinced the South African legislature 
to introduce legislation aimed at compensating motor vehicle accident victims, victims 
of occupational injuries and diseases as well as those who suffer harm arising from 
defective consumer products. For the reasons outlined in this dissertation, the 
compensatory mechanisms created through statutory reform arguably give effect to 
the right to personal security in a way that is much more efficient when compared to 
the possibility of successfully instituting a common-law delictual claim for 
compensation.32  
                                                          
28 45. See also the arguments raised in paragraph 3.3.1 in chapter 3.  
29 45. See also the arguments raised in paragraph 3.3.1 in chapter 3.  
30 55. 
31 55. 
32 See paragraph 3.3.1 in chapter 3. 
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As the CC pointed out in H v Fetal Assessment Centre,33 the distinction between 
corrective and distributive justice has certainly not featured prominently in judgments 
of the courts. Neither has the contention that the South African law of delict solely 
focuses on promoting corrective justice. In line with the court’s statement, it is argued 
that the South African law of delict seeks to compensate victims and does so through 
the institution of the common law of delict (which achieves corrective justice) as well 
as through statutes like the RAF Act and the COIDA (which may be seen as examples 
of distributive justice). Indeed, “distributive justice and public purposes do not have to 
be pursued by public law means. Private law can be, and sometimes is, used to pursue 
such purposes”.34  
In conclusion, it may be said that the South African law of delict’s function remains to 
compensate victims of harm. In some cases this will give rise to the institution of 
common-law delictual claims which are instituted against the person who culpably and 
wrongfully caused the victim’s harm. If successful, this will mean that the wrongdoer 
corrects his wrong by compensating the victim.  
However, given the socio-economic realities of South Africa, it is very likely that a 
wrongdoer may be impecunious and unable to provide compensation. If this is the 
case, as it is in the context of harm arising from crime, the law should respond. An 
example of a potential response would be the statutory development of the law by way 
of the enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation scheme, which may be seen 
as representative of distributive justice.  
It is suggested that the law of delict – which is focused on the compensation of harm 
– may be regarded as being able to achieve and promote both distributive and 
corrective justice. It would be important, however, to ensure that, where the legislature 
elects to develop the law through statutory reform, it should be justifiable. In this 
regard, this dissertation has set out a theoretical framework that may be useful for 
future legislative endeavours.
                                                          
33 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC). 
34 F du Bois “Private Law in the Age of Rights” in Reid and Visser (eds) Private Law and Human Rights 
12-36 25. 
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available at <https://crcvc.ca/for-victims/financial-assistance/> 
• Inflation Calculation “Inflation Calculation” available at 
<http://www.inflationcalc.co.za/> 
• ISS Crime Hub “Fact Sheet: Explaining the official crime statistics for 
2013/2014” available at <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ISS-crime-statistics-
factsheet-2013-2014.pdf> 
• Legal Aid “Who Qualifies for Legal Aid?” available at <http://www.legal-
aid.co.za/?p=956>  
• “Legal Framework of the RAF” available at <http://www.raf.co.za/About-
us/pages/Legal-framework.aspx> 
• McQuillan LJ & H Abramyan, “The Tort Law Tax” (2007) available at 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117496524456750056>  
• Nationmaster “Countries Compared by Crime>Rape rate. International 
Statistics at NationMaster.com” available at 
<http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Rape-rate>  
• Newham “Warning Lights Flashing: Exploring Police Abuses and Performance 
in South Africa” available at 
<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/2013CrimeConfNewham.pdf>  
• News24 “Rape in South Africa” available at 
<http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/rape-in-south-africa-20160810>   
• Polmed “Attention Service Providers” available at 
<http://www.polmed.co.za/injury-on-duty-claims/> 
• Prince L “R14,6 mjd. se siviele eise teen polisie in boekjaar” available at 
<http://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Politiek/r146-mjd-se-siviele-eise-teen-
polisie-in-boekjaar-20170420> 
• Rape Crisis “Prevalence of Rape” available at http://rapecrisis.org.za/rape-in-
south-africa/#prevalence 
• Road Accident Fund “Fuel Levy” available at <http://www.raf.co.za/about-
us/pages/fuel-levy.aspx> 
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• Schadenfonds Geweldsmisdrijven “Veel gestelde vragen” available at < 
https://schadefonds.nl/veel-gestelde-vragen/> 
• South African Government “National Crime Prevention Strategy: A Summary” 
available at http://www.gov.za/documents/national-CRIME-prevention-
strategy-summary#6 
• Williams “The adoption of Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme: 
Chronology” available at < https://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history/downloads/ 
pdfs/Williams_Compensation.pdf>  
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